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Essays in Mechanism Design


Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme (2013) Essays in Mechanism Design. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/KC2M-1Q94.


This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

Item Type:Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.))
Subject Keywords:combinatorial assignment; commons; monitoring; fisheries; mechanism design; asymmetric information; buyback auctions;
Degree Grantor:California Institute of Technology
Division:Humanities and Social Sciences
Major Option:Social Science
Thesis Availability:Public (worldwide access)
Research Advisor(s):
  • Ledyard, John O.
Thesis Committee:
  • Ledyard, John O. (chair)
  • Border, Kim C.
  • Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent
  • Shum, Matthew S.
  • Sherman, Robert P.
Defense Date:20 March 2013
Non-Caltech Author Email:guilherme (AT)
Additional Information:Title varies in 2013 Commencement program: Essays on Mechanism Design.
Record Number:CaltechTHESIS:05112013-002045817
Persistent URL:
Default Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:7698
Deposited By: Guilherme Pereira de Freitas
Deposited On:03 Jun 2013 20:54
Last Modified:04 Oct 2019 00:00

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