Citation
Wu, Fan (2025) Essays on Information Economics. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/wm4y-np67. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05122025-002523947
Abstract
This paper on information economics contains three chapters. In the first chapter, we study how to incentivize information acquisition in a principal-agent model. A principal hires an agent to collect information about a state. We study the optimal contract that incentivizes the agent to acquire the most precise information. In the second chapter, we study how to recover information in the selection model. We show that, given the selection rule and the observed selected outcome distribution, the entire outcome distribution can be characterized as the fixed point of an operator, which we prove to be a functional contraction. In the third chapter, we study how to implement randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers.
| Item Type: | Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.)) | ||||||
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| Subject Keywords: | Information Economics | ||||||
| Degree Grantor: | California Institute of Technology | ||||||
| Division: | Humanities and Social Sciences | ||||||
| Major Option: | Social Science | ||||||
| Thesis Availability: | Public (worldwide access) | ||||||
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| Defense Date: | 29 April 2025 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechTHESIS:05122025-002523947 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05122025-002523947 | ||||||
| DOI: | 10.7907/wm4y-np67 | ||||||
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| Default Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 17220 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechTHESIS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Fan Wu | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 27 May 2025 19:24 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Jun 2025 23:57 |
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