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Signaling Games: Theory and Applications


Banks, Jeffrey Scott (1986) Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/hhm5-8h24.


This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial bargaining between litigants to a civil suit, where both parties possess private information, and (ii) a model of electoral competition where the voters attempt to deduce the private information held by the candidates.

Item Type:Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.))
Subject Keywords:Social Science
Degree Grantor:California Institute of Technology
Division:Humanities and Social Sciences
Major Option:Social Science
Thesis Availability:Public (worldwide access)
Research Advisor(s):
  • McKelvey, Richard D.
Thesis Committee:
  • McKelvey, Richard D. (chair)
  • Ledyard, John O.
  • Sobel, Joel
  • Wilde, Louis L.
Defense Date:19 May 1986
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Clarence J. Hicks FoundationUNSPECIFIED
John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556
Persistent URL:
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription DOIArticle adapted for Chapter 1.
Default Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:11463
Deposited By: Mel Ray
Deposited On:15 Apr 2019 20:18
Last Modified:16 Apr 2021 23:01

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