Citation
Banks, Jeffrey Scott (1986) Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/hhm5-8h24. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556
Abstract
This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial bargaining between litigants to a civil suit, where both parties possess private information, and (ii) a model of electoral competition where the voters attempt to deduce the private information held by the candidates.
| Item Type: | Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.)) | ||||||||
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| Subject Keywords: | Social Science | ||||||||
| Degree Grantor: | California Institute of Technology | ||||||||
| Division: | Humanities and Social Sciences | ||||||||
| Major Option: | Social Science | ||||||||
| Thesis Availability: | Public (worldwide access) | ||||||||
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| Defense Date: | 19 May 1986 | ||||||||
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| Record Number: | CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556 | ||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.7907/hhm5-8h24 | ||||||||
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| Default Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||
| ID Code: | 11463 | ||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechTHESIS | ||||||||
| Deposited By: | Mel Ray | ||||||||
| Deposited On: | 15 Apr 2019 20:18 | ||||||||
| Last Modified: | 16 Apr 2021 23:01 |
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