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Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research


Balbien, Joel Abe (1982) Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/1akx-ym05.


Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research concerns the regulation of a firm conducting R&D under contract with a sponsor. Chapter 1 surveys the rich economics and policy literature concerned with R&D contracting. Prior to Balbien and Wilde (1980), the chief weakness of the literature was in the analysis of dynamic contracting incentives and the implications of information asymmetry between a researcher and sponsor.

Chapter 2 is an empirical essay describing R&D contracting by the Department of Defense. Based on a sample of DOD R&D contract data from 1979, several hypothesis are tested with multivariate statistics. These hypotheses concern the choice of generic contract type by sponsors, the effect of competition, and the performance of various contractual forms.

The third chapter analyzes a dynamic model of incrementally funded research which is descriptive in nature and not subject to direct econometric estimation. Nevertheless, it provides valuable insight into a firm's behavior in revealing research progress to a sponsor, through targets set over a sequence of research periods.

Chapter 4's essay focuses on the influence of various types of research assistance on a firm's internal investment in a number of private research projects.

Item Type:Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.))
Subject Keywords:Social Science
Degree Grantor:California Institute of Technology
Division:Humanities and Social Sciences
Major Option:Social Science
Thesis Availability:Public (worldwide access)
Research Advisor(s):
  • Noll, Roger G.
Thesis Committee:
  • Noll, Roger G. (chair)
  • Green, Edward J.
  • Wilde, Louis L.
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Defense Date:21 December 1981
Record Number:CaltechTHESIS:05102018-160856281
Persistent URL:
Default Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:10873
Deposited By: Mel Ray
Deposited On:11 May 2018 21:15
Last Modified:02 Dec 2020 01:16

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