Brewer, Paul J. (1995) Allocation and computation in rail networks : a binary conflicts ascending price mechanism (BICAP) for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09172007-152133
The thesis addresses problems that surfaced as part of the proposal to deregulate access to railroads in Sweden. Skepticism exists about the feasibility and efficiency of competitive processes for access to the publicly owned track network. The skepticism is related to the capacity of any competitive process to solve certain technical problems that stem from performance criteria (efficiency, safety), informational requirements (values of track access are initially known only to the operators) and computational requirements. In the thesis, auction-like processes are developed for allocating the rights to operate trains on the track and for procuring the necessary computational effort to solve a related optimization problem inherent in the track auction process. The processes are tested in a series of human subject laboratory experiments. The data are examined to determine the degree to which the evaluative criteria are met and the degree to which the performance of the processes are consistent with the behavioral principles on which they are based.
|Item Type:||Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.))|
|Degree Grantor:||California Institute of Technology|
|Division:||Humanities and Social Sciences|
|Major Option:||Social Science|
|Thesis Availability:||Restricted to Caltech community only|
|Defense Date:||2 May 1995|
|Default Usage Policy:||No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.|
|Deposited By:||Imported from ETD-db|
|Deposited On:||08 Oct 2007|
|Last Modified:||26 Dec 2012 03:01|
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