Interdependence in organizations and laboratory groups

Citation

Weber, Roberto (2000) Interdependence in organizations and laboratory groups. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/qnh7-dd04. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10052010-145303282

Abstract

Interdependence arises in organizations when the appropriate action by an individual or group depends on what action others are taking. The following chapters examine cases of interdependence through the lenses of game theory and laboratory experiments. The research focuses on two games — the dirty faces game and the weak-link coordination game — that, while apparently very different, are in fact quite similar in key aspects. The most important of these is that (under some assumptions) in both games the efficient or "high effort" action is only optimal if it is the action being taken by everyone. The dirty faces game is first presented, analyzed and tested experimentally to determine whether actual behavior conforms to the optimal, theoretically proposed outcome. This is shown not to be the case even in simple versions of the game. The latter chapters examine a possible means for inducing optimal behavior in the weak-link coordination game. This method involves starting with small group sizes, which are better suited for efficient coordination, and then growing large groups slowly. The effectiveness of this method is supported by an example from the field, theory, and experimental results.

Thesis Files