PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN

Thesis by
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The development in the British parliament, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, of highly cohesive legislative parties is a leading thread in the complex of events marking Britain's passage from an aristocratic to a democratic politics. Since the 1870s, journalists and scholars have attempted to account for the marked increase in the frequency with which MPs voted with their parties, and a number of plausible hypothesis have been advanced. There has not, however, been a systematic exposition of the kinds of factors which might, in theory, have been responsible for the change, nor much in the way of testing those ideas which have been suggested.

We argue that most of the explanations in the literature cannot explain the earliest increases in party cohesion--in the 1860s and 1870s. Sometimes, this is simply because the factors to which the explanation refers are not operative until a later date. In other cases, we devise tests of the hypotheses and find them wanting. In particular, we find no support in the 1870s for the idea, associated with Mosei Ostrogonski, that the new local party associations which developed after the second Reform Act effectively pressured MPs to support their party's leadership.
Our theoretical discussion of the determinants of party cohesion leads us to investigate, as an alternative source of legislative change, the effect of electoral voting behavior (or, more properly, anticipations of such behavior) on legislative voting behavior. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to this task, and proceeds as follows: First, extensive use is made of a peculiarly detailed form of electoral documentation available in the double-member districts of pre-1885 Britain to study electoral behavior in the 1841-1880 period. This study reveals clear and marked changes in British electoral behavior in the 1860s and 1870s which have not hitherto been documented in the literature. An expected utility maximization model of the decision problem faced by electors in the double-member districts is developed and used to interpret these behavioral findings. We argue that voters became more party-oriented in the 1860s and 1870s, voting more on the basis of their preferences between the two great parties—the Liberals and Conservatives—and less on the basis of their attitudes toward the individual candidates. This shift in the basis of electoral choice, we argue, with electors becoming less responsive to the issue positions adopted by MPs, meant that the electoral benefits to an MP of dissent were smaller relative to the sanctions available to party leaders. Hence, we expect a decline in
the influence of constituents over the voting behavior of their MPs (and a concomitant increase in party voting.) A number of approaches to the measurement of the influence of constituents over their MPs' voting behavior are taken, and the findings, on the whole, support the hypothesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that the British parliamentary parties in the 20th century were markedly more cohesive than their early 19th century predecessors. Whereas the average frequency with which legislators in the first half of the 19th century dissented from their parties' positions might range above 20%, the corresponding figures for the 20th century probably never exceeded 3% and were often below 1%. The explanations for this tightening of party lines can be classified in three broad categories, comprising those which focus on procedural or practical developments in the conduct of parliamentary government, on organizational innovations in the extra-parliamentary parties, and on the shifting attitudes of the electorate.

Over the course of the 19th century, the procedure of the House of Commons was revolutionized. The simplest summary of this change is to say that the Cabinet established a more and more complete control over all business of the House, and, at the same time, was held more and more responsible as the doctrine of collective responsibility was elaborated./1/ The Government became accountable, not just for carrying on the administration,
as in the 18th century, but also for legislation—both that which it introduced and that which it failed to introduce. As late as 1836, Melbourne proclaimed the older view that "the duty of a Government is not to pass legislation but to rule,"/2/ and traces of this survived to the 1850s and beyond; but this view and the allied notion that general measures of public policy "were properly the concern of parliament as a whole, and should normally be introduced not by the Government but by private members,"/3/ both faded in the 1830s. More and more of the major legislation of parliament was initiated by the Ministry, until, by the end of the century, the bills introduced by private members which were enacted into law were negligible both in number and importance. The amount of time (formally and actually) at the disposal of the Government increased more or less monotonically; correspondingly, the amount of time available to private members decreased./4/ The techniques available to the Government for limiting debate and expediting business (e.g., the closure, 1881-83) multiplied, though sporadically;/5/ correspondingly, the parliamentary manoeuvres by which a private member might force his interests to be considered, or by which he might delay the business of the House, diminished./6/ As the private member lost some of his traditional and less
predictable rights, the new institution of the question period, which greatly limited the havoc a member might play with the orderly progress of business by confining him to a definite time period, rapidly developed./7/

A development intimately connected with the evolving responsibility of the Government for a legislative program was its duty or right to either resign or dissolve parliament when defeated on crucial legislation (it had had such a duty in regard to administration since the 17th century). The "duty" to resign was really the "right" to threaten resignation; on matters of importance, the Cabinet might pressure its adherents by threatening to resign unless supported, thus changing the vote from one concerning the merits of the bill to one concerning the overall merit of the Government. The Ministry might in a similar fashion threaten dissolution, although the effects of this threat were somewhat more complicated. Both these "rights" of the Ministry—to threaten resignation, and to threaten dissolution—have often been identified as important factors explaining the discipline of late 19th and 20th century British parties; and the development of these rights has been identified as a cause of the increasing trend in party cohesion./8/

Another consequence of the aggrandizement of the Ministry
was that positions there became more desirable (and also more numerous). Since the Prime Minister held the keys to these positions, he had an increasingly attractive reward with which to induce discipline. Although more attention has been paid to ministerial ambition as a cause of party loyalty later in the 20th century, its development in the late 19th century may plausibly be viewed as contributing to the evolution of cohesive parties. After reviewing the statistical evidence in chapter 2, we examine the inducement of office, threats of resignation and dissolution, and other "procedural" explanations of the rise in party discipline in Part I.

The second kind of explanation for the tightening of party lines holds that the development after the Second Reform Act of local party associations, and the loyalty of these associations to the parliamentary leadership (who had often had a hand in instigating them), exposed the MP to a potent electoral threat: that the assistance he had received from the local association would not again be forthcoming./9/ The parliamentary leadership might make or carry out this threat by withdrawing the whip or, later, by expelling the member or exercising a central veto over his readoption by the constituency party. In Part II, after reviewing the evidence that
electoral pressure of this kind was exerted in the 19th century, and finding that it is mixed and anecdotal, we propose a series of statistical tests of the significance of such pressure. The results yield no support for considering the establishment of local party associations to be of much importance for the improvement in party discipline in the 1870s.

The third class of explanations for the increase in party discipline builds on certain crucial changes in the behavior of the electorate. The outlines of the purely legal modifications in the electoral arena are well-known.\textsuperscript{10} The first Reform Act (1832) increased the total electorate in England and Wales by 50% to 651,535; completely disfranchised 56 and partially disfranchised 30 of the smaller boroughs; and gave the seats taken from these boroughs to the counties and to the large industrial cities of the north, which had previously been unrepresented in parliament. The second Reform Act (1867) increased the total electorate in England and Wales by 94% to 2,000,753, took one seat from 45 boroughs with less than 10,000 inhabitants, and allotted these seats to the counties and to larger cities previously un- or under-represented. The Ballot Act (1872) replaced the system of public viva voce voting with the secret ballot.
The third Reform Act (1884) increased the total electorate in England and Wales by 76% to 4,376,916, and completely disfranchised 79 and partially disfranchised 36 of the smaller constituencies in the process of a comprehensive redistricting and reallocation: before 1885, 57% (and before 1867, 70%) of the English and Welsh districts returned two members, whereas after 1885, only 8% did so.

Concomitant with these legal changes were important if imperfectly understood changes in electoral behavior. It is generally agreed that by the mid-20th century British electors had become quite party-oriented, and various consequences for party discipline of this orientation have been asserted. Epstein has claimed that the mid-20th century MP was not expected to vote in accord with the opinions of his constituents, and hence could afford to support his party even against local opinion./11/ Robert Jackson has adduced interview evidence that MPs considered indiscipline to be electorally harmful to the party in general, and has concluded tentatively that this may be a key to the high 20th century levels of discipline./12/ It has also been noted that, since 20th century elections were construed as choices of a party and a program, dissident MPs were
open to the criticism that they were voting against the program which they had been elected to support. Although it is widely supposed that these various expectations about electoral behavior developed in the late 19th or early 20th century, there has been remarkably little detailed attention given to the question. In Part III, the main body of the thesis, we argue that the crucial beginning steps of this development were taken in the 1860s and 1870s. Drawing on an unusually detailed and under-utilized form of electoral documentation to which we refer as ballot counts, and supporting this with more traditional statistical sources, we demonstrate the increasing importance of party in the electoral arena. The consequences of the electoral changes for legislative behavior are then investigated.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I


6. See Fraser, op. cit., for a detailed survey of the decline of the private member's procedural status.

7. See Howarth, op. cit., and Chester and Bowring, op. cit., for a detailed survey of the development of the question period.


CHAPTER II
THE MEASUREMENT AND THEORY OF PARTY COHESION

1. The Measurement of Cohesion

Historians have referred to the period between the first and second Reform Acts as the "golden age of the private MP." Although this phrase would certainly be a misleading guide to the private member's procedural status, which Fraser has shown to have been declining significantly in this period,1 it does convey some idea of the prestige which the private member enjoyed. This prestige was based in part on a conception of the member of parliament as an independent and significant agent in the "grand inquest of the nation". Parliamentary independence was in vogue, especially after the Peelites broke off from the Conservatives in 1846: "[I]f there was one attitude that the Peelites popularized and made fashionable, it was that even the most mute backbencher, when it came to a division, had a duty to vote his conscience and his sense of honor."2 In keeping with this attitude, many MPs emphasized in their election addresses that they would take an "independent" stance in the Commons, or give "independent support to Liberal (or Conservative) principles." And, in parliament, party discipline reached its lowest measured levels in the twenty years after the repeal of the Corn Laws.
It is the marked increase in levels of discipline after this mid-century nadir that has attracted the attention of journalists and scholars since the 1870s. Precise measurement of the increase in discipline has lagged behind recognition, and is still in a very incomplete state. Since we shall often be dealing with questions of timing, and attempting to delimit the periods to which various explanations of the increase in discipline can feasibly apply, we need to take a close look at what quantitative knowledge there is of trends in party discipline in the 19th century.

The bulk of the published figures on aggregate party discipline are due to A.L. Lowell's pioneering 1901 study "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America."/3/ It is in this work that Lowell defines the now-familiar concept of a "party vote"—one in which 90% or more of the members of one major party are on one side of the question, opposed by 90% or more of the members of the other major party—and uses it to document statistically the upsurge in discipline by calculating the percentage of all divisions which were party votes in seven selected years: 1836, 1850, 1860, 1871, 1881, 1894 and 1899. Since Lowell's work, only two further comparable contributions to our quantitative knowledge of
the levels of discipline in Victorian parliaments have been made. Samuel Beer has estimated coefficients of cohesion (as defined by Rice) for two years—1906 and 1908—somewhat after the last of Victoria's parliaments; and Hugh Berrington has calculated the percentage of divisions which were party votes in 1883, 1890 and 1903. We have compiled data for this thesis which allow us to estimate the levels of discipline in 1869 and 1875.

Party discipline taps a number of dimensions. The significance of intra-party unity on a division or set of divisions depends on the context in which those divisions are conducted: e.g., whether there was salient inter-party conflict, whether the division was whipped, and whether the division was well-attended. The premises here are as follows: (1) High levels of unity on questions which provoke little inter-party conflict do not testify to the strength of party as a determinant of the vote as much as would the same levels of unity on conflictual issues. (2) Intra-party unity on unwhipped divisions indicates less about the efficacy of leadership pressure on the membership and more about the natural tendency of members to vote together (based perhaps on cue-taking and similarity of opinions), since for some
subset of the unwhipped votes the party leadership actually has no position. (3) Simple averages may mislead. The procedure of previous scholars (not just in the British field) has been to calculate simple averages, adding up, for example, the cohesion scores on each division and dividing this sum by the number of divisions. By this procedure, a division in which only ten members of the party participated, three dissenting, counts equally as a division in which 300 participated, 90 dissenting. Ninety instances of dissidence in the latter division contribute no more to the final statistic than do the three dissents of the first division. If most dissidence occurs at unimportant and sparsely attended divisions, then we may understate the real influence of party by reporting simple percentages of party votes and averages of cohesion coefficients, without weighting divisions by their attendance.

In order to take account of these three factors—inter-party conflict, whipping and attendance—we have presented a broad array of measures in Table 2.1. First, in order to maintain some comparability with previous studies, we present both the simple percentage of all and of whipped divisions which were party votes and the unweighted average coefficients of cohesion for all and for whipped divisions. In order
TABLE 2.1: INTRA-PARTY UNITY AND INTER-PARTY DIFFERENCE

PANEL A: COHESION--SIMPLE AVERAGES

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Note: PV = party votes, in which 50% or more of one party opposed 50% or more of the other.

PANEL B: COHESION--WEIGHTED AVERAGES

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Note: PV = party votes, in which 50% or more of one party opposed 50% or more of the other.
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>(1) ALL</th>
<th>(2) WHIP</th>
<th>(3) UNWHIPPED</th>
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<td>1836</td>
<td>.447</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.564</td>
<td>.572</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>.606</td>
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<td>.577</td>
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<td>.465</td>
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<td>1875</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>.339</td>
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### PANEL E: PARTY VOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>PARTY VOTES</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1850-a</td>
<td>.33</td>
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<td>.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1850-b</td>
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<td>.33</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<td>1871</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.62</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874-80</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>.83</td>
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### PANEL F: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WHIPPED DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
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<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>88 (48.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>216 (67.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>173 (67.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11 (68.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>209 (81.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24 (92.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>379 (92.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>222 (90.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>316 (88.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures for 1836, 1850, 1860 and 1871 are the author's calculations, using the data published by A.L. Lowell in "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America." In panels A, B and E the first line referring to 1850 (labeled 1850-a) defines a Conservative as a Protectionist or Peelite, a Liberal as a Liberal, Radical or Repealer; the second line (labeled 1850-b) defines the parties as did Lowell. When there is only one line for 1850, it defines the parties in the more inclusive fashion (i.e., as the lines labeled 1850-a do). The figures for 1869 and 1875 are based on 10% random samples drawn by the author from the House of Commons Division Lists. The figures for the 1874-80 parliament are based on the sample drawn by James C. Hamilton for use in his thesis (see bibliography). The figures in 1881, 1894 and 1899 are calculations by Samuel Beer based on Lowell's published data for those years. The figures for 1906 and 1908 are based on 10% samples drawn by Beer. See Samuel Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 257. The numbers for 1883, 1890 and 1903 are given by Hugh Berrington in "Partisanship and Dissidence in the Nineteenth Century House of Commons." All figures exclude divisions in which nine-tenths or more of both parties (defined as the members of the party voting in the division) were on the same side, except in panel F, where we have been unable to find anything but the total figures in 1881, 1894 and 1899.
to measure inter-party conflict, we utilize Rice's index of likeness. A frequently used statistic in studies of the American Congress combines some elements of the intra-party unity and inter-party conflict dimensions by computing cohesion based only on divisions which saw 50\% or more of one party opposed to 50\% or more of the other; we present this so-called "index of unity" as well. Finally, weighted averages are calculated for the various classes of divisions—all, whipped, and those in which majorities of the two parties were opposed.

We will make no attempt to digest the mass of figures in Table 2.1 at one sitting. The table will be visited several times and portions served up when appropriate. A few general observations can be made, however. First, as the internal cohesion of the parties increased, their similarity to each other (as measured by the index of likeness) declined. We have calculated the index of likeness only for the years on which we focus in the remainder of the thesis—up through the 1870s—but it is clear from Berrington’s work that it declines in the 1890s,\textsuperscript{8} and even for the subset of years for which we do have both cohesion and likeness scores, a broad covariance is visible; increasing cohesion was not due to an increase in the number of uncontroversial votes. Second, cohesion increased markedly within the category
of whipped votes, starting in the 1870s. Thus, although it is true (see Panel E) that the percentage of votes whipped increased in the 1860s and 1870s, this does not in itself explain the trends in cohesion. Third, there is no trend observable in the unwhipped figures (Panel C) for either party over the century as a whole. Indeed, the figures appear quite erratic, especially for the Conservatives. This is no doubt due in part to the fact that only 10-20% of the divisions were unwhipped by the 1870s, and only 10% thereafter. With a small sample of bills introduced by a motley crew of backbenchers (bills introduced by the Government were whipped), it is not surprising to find widely varying figures. This observation warns us against the procedure, which might at first have appeared attractive, of simply comparing whipped to unwhipped cohesion in order to gauge the power of the whip. Even in the earlier years, when a significant number of divisions were unwhipped, there is still the question of why. The Government had a decision to make—to whip or not—and we know next to nothing about how they decided. On some unwhipped votes, the Government may have had a known preference but decided (because they anticipated defiance of the whip? because they had not introduced the bill?) not to whip; in these cases there may still have been pressures on members to
support their leaders, and to compare whipped to unwhipped votes in hopes of controlling for these pressures may be misleading. We shall follow the usual procedure in the literature and concentrate for the most part on whipped votes.

Another point to note is that the weighted figures are generally higher than the simple averages. Dissidence does appear to have occurred more frequently on smaller divisions, as the work of Beales and Bylsma would indicate. On the larger divisions, the parties held ranks more firmly. Nonetheless, roughly the same pattern appears in both the weighted and unweighted numbers. This pattern can be described as follows (using the weighted figures when available, and ignoring the second line for 1850): For the Conservatives, there is a sharp decline from .823 in 1836 to .602 in 1850, a plateau in the 1850s, and a sharp recovery in the 1860s and 1870s to .716, .828 and .965 in 1869, 1871 and 1875, respectively. This is followed by a dip in the 1880s (which can be seen in the party vote percentages in Panel D, or in the simple averages) and a reinstatement of the high 1875 levels in the 1890s. For the Liberals, there is a much more gradual decline from .642 in 1836 to .618 in 1860, followed by an increase to .699, .771 and .687
in 1869, 1871 and 1875. Liberal cohesion then continues upward, reaching a high point in the 1900s.

We should emphasize that Lowell's original figures were much starker, and bespoke a much more monotonic increase in discipline from its mid-century nadir. For example, Lowell's calculations of the percentage of all divisions on which the Conservatives had less than 10% of their members dissent from the majority of the party went as follows (compare column D-1 in Table 2.1): 1860--31, 1871--61, 1881--71, 1894--91, 1899--91. These figures limned a very steady development in discipline. The contributions made after Lowell's, however, depict a development far less monotonic. Especially noteworthy are the figures for the Conservatives in 1875 (the first such figures available for the important parliament of 1874-80 /11/), which reveal levels of discipline quite comparable to those in the 1890s. A larger sample of divisions drawn from the entire parliament of 1874-80 indicates that the Conservatives compiled a party voting record in this parliament comparable to the most disciplined in the century./12/ The contrast between the 1874-80 figures and those immediately before (1869 and 1871) and after (1881 and 1883) raises a question about the size of the "short term" forces affecting party discipline, as opposed to the originally posited secular
forces on which Lowell, Ostrogorski and subsequent scholars have focused.

Despite the caveat just issued about the monotonicity and timing of the development of party voting in parliament, the contrast between the early and late Victorian periods remains striking. Discipline did undeniably increase from its mid-century low-point, and appears to have done so—at least amongst the Conservatives—considerably faster than has previously been recognized. In the next section, a theoretical perspective on the determinants of party cohesion is given which will lead into the substantive hypotheses discussed in later chapters.

2. The Determinants of Party Cohesion

The classification of explanations introduced in the previous chapter—into procedural, organizational, and electoral—corresponds roughly with the three main structural components of parties defined by Sorauf: the party as a governing force, as an electoral organization, and as a body of adherents in the electorate. /13/ We can complement this substantive or structural classification with one which focuses on the abstract logic of how party cohesion is improved. We should first note a distinction
between "party discipline" construed as how united a party is in the division lobbies, and "party discipline" construed as the actual disciplinary actions taken by the leadership. When interest centers on disciplinary action, it is natural to concentrate on the rewards and punishments available to leaders and their effectiveness in using these sanctions. When the explanandum is a particular statistic or set of statistics measuring the frequency with which members of a party support their party, however, any factor which influences the MP's voting decision becomes relevant. We shall use party discipline (and other terms, e.g., party cohesion, party voting unity) to refer to the statistically measurable tendency of members of a party to vote with their party. Both aggregate statistics—such as Rice's coefficient of cohesion—and individual statistics—a variety of party support scores—will be used, and three basic ways in which an increase in these statistics can be caused will be distinguished: (1) The party can gain control of new resources with which to pressure their membership. (2) Other influential groups can simply agree more often with the party. (3) Other groups, which can influence the vote of MPs, and which do not always agree with the party, can change their strategy or behavior in such a fashion so as to exert less pressure on MPs, rendering
party pressures relatively more effective. In order to clarify the motivation for singling out these three mechanisms, and to orient the reader to much that follows, we need to discuss our approach to legislative voting behavior. The discussion will be relatively informal and carried on largely in terms of Victorian MPs but is often of more general applicability and should be supportable by a number of more formal approaches.

The fundamental assumption with which we begin is that MPs are purposive and goal-oriented. When they cast a vote in the legislature, they do so with an eye to the likely consequences for their own well-being or satisfaction. This does not necessarily mean that their actions are "selfish" in a narrow sense, since the well-being of an MP may be defined partly in terms of the well-being of others; for example, a member may derive satisfaction from supporting a measure which will increase the prosperity of an important segment of the populace, even if he does not stand to gain personally. Nor does the implication of a conscious calculation of benefit need to be retained in all cases: on a number of divisions the MP may consciously do no more than seek guidance from trusted colleagues or leaders. The purposiveness or rationality of this behavior is hidden in the prior choice of whom to trust. The MP, if he is
goal-oriented, will not choose leaders from whom he expects no patronage, no effort in promoting what are in his opinion sound policies, no social recognition—in short, no attempt to satisfy any of his goals. The level at which such expectations are formulated may vary greatly between MPs, from a quite explicit calculation to a virtually subliminal bias predetermined by family or social ties. Nonetheless, we accept the implication of our basic assumption, viz., that the MP does have an expectation of gain, broadly defined, from his leaders, and will react when these expectations—even if poorly articulated—are trodden upon. Thus, when we say that the MP votes with his own well-being in mind, it will be understood that this does not necessarily imply a close attention to costs and benefits on each particular issue.

A healthy concern with the consequences of voting one way or the other doubtless occurred with some frequency, however, especially when the issue aroused the passions of pressure or constituent groups. And we do not wish to leave the concept of the well-being of the MP completely free. We believe that there was a significant communality of experience and of purpose amongst MPs. The social prestige, the influence over policy, and the access to power which a seat in parliament conferred: one or more of these basic goals attracted most MPs to
parliament. Further, the desire for attainment of a seat which these basic goals induced meant that MPs had to concern themselves with election and reelection. While the significance of the electoral connection may have been definitely limited when, as commonly occurred before the Second Reform Act, well over a third of the constituencies were uncontested, the trends depicted in chapter 3 do indicate the increasing presence and acceptance of electoral competition; and concern for reelection, as an indispensable intermediate goal, must have increasingly shaped the thinking of MPs.

Once in parliament, the public nature of voting opened the MP to pressure from a variety of groups interested in the issues before the Commons. As he cast his vote, the MP could not simply weigh the questions of public policy in vacuo. He had also, perhaps, to deal with explicit communications and requests from active and articulate pressure groups, to anticipate the response of less articulate constituent groups, or to gauge the interpersonal consequences of his action in a collegial and partisan body. There was an implicit (sometimes explicit) barter to be concluded between the MP and these various groups: the MP would vote so as to further the group's goals if the group would further, or refrain from hindering, the MP's goals (over some of which it
presumably had some control). Thus, for example, Lowell notes that socially-conscious Conservative backbenchers were aware that they might forfeit invitations to events at the Foreign Office if they did not consistently support the party in the division lobbies./14/

Mid-Victorian pressure groups, as discussed in chapter 3, were firmly wedded to a strategy of electoral pressure, seeking to convince MPs that they faced electoral defeat if they supported "the drunkard's drink", business on Sundays, or any of a number of other pernicious practices. The Victorians' American counterparts in Congress accepted bribes from wealthy men with a market to corner or a railroad to build; although such transactions appear to have been rare in parliament, it has been reported as Disraeli's opinion that "buying Representatives was a much more important mode of managing Representative systems than buying constituencies."/15/ On a less obvious plane, an MP had to be sensitive to the desires of his constituents, even if these were not expressed at the time of a particular division, for he knew that these desires might very well be expressed at the next election. And, in other cases, the usual connotations of "pressure" are inappropriate, the MP voting simply according to the cues offered by colleagues or leaders.
Pressure, then, as we use the term, refers to the MP's perception that a group's future behavior is to some degree contingent upon his vote, and that this behavior will affect his well-being. Our basic assumption of goal-oriented behavior means that the various group pressures, together with the MP's personal preferences, are the determinants of his vote. The MP does not decide based on considerations unconnected with his goals.

One simple consequence of this assumption is that, if all concerned groups and the MP's own conception (if any) of public policy agree, then the MP simply votes the consensus. This of course entails that the MP has on this issue supported each concerned group, and in particular, his party, if it is concerned. By "concerned", we mean that the MP has perceived that the group is interested in his decision and that its future actions are (partly or wholly) a function of his vote.

Another basic conclusion characterizes the situations in which the party will fail to be supported by a particular MP.

Proposition: The party will fail to be supported by an MP when, and only when, both of the following are true: (1) Its position is opposed to that of the MP or to that of some other group(s); and (2) The forces opposed to
party outweigh party—and any forces which happen to agree with it—in terms of their ability to affect the MP's well-being.

This proposition follows essentially by definition. Certainly, if the party is opposed by forces which outweigh it in their ability to affect the MP's goals, then, by our assumption that the MP is goal-oriented, the party fails to be supported. On the other hand, if the party fails to receive support, then it must be opposed by some other forces (for, if not, then the MP simply votes the consensus, and in so doing, supports the party) which outweigh it (for, if not, then it outweighs the opposed forces, and the MP will support it).

An obvious corollary to this proposition is that the level of support an MP gives to his party will tend to be higher as the party is more able to affect important goals of the MP. This idea, of course, is what drives most thinking about party discipline. For Lowell, party discipline improved because the Government could increasingly use the threat—implicit or explicit—of resignation or dissolution to keep its partisan and election-shy supporters in hand. For Ostrogorski, the key was electoral pressure exerted by the new local party associations. In explaining the decline of discipline
after the Conservative split over the Corn Laws, the loss of credibility of the leadership as a source both of patronage and sanctions has been cited as important.

Another corollary to our basic proposition, which is less often clearly recognized, is simply that the level of support an MP gives to his party will tend to be higher when the party is less often opposed by other groups or by the MP. This effect is independent of the "strength" of party; it is possible for the party to have virtually no control over any of the MP's goals and yet still be supported consistently, if it happens that the party usually agrees with the forces which determine the MP's decisions. A number of hypotheses are suggested by this corollary. First, any process or occurrence (e.g., a redistricting, an extension of the franchise, a propaganda campaign) which increases the frequency of agreement of a party with the constituencies of its members will promote cohesion. This idea is common in the American literature, where the strength of constituent groups makes it particularly appealing, but has received only limited attention in the British literature. Second, any process (e.g., the regularization of nomination procedures, an ideological polarization in the country coincident with party lines) which increases the probability that a party's membership
will agree personally with the party program fosters voting unity. Third, if we consider the decisions which MPs would make in the absence of any party pressure (but reflecting all other pressures), any process bringing these decisions more into accord with the party position will increase cohesion. An example of such a process has been suggested by Berrington.\textsuperscript{16} According to Berrington, the inability of the party leadership to rely on support from the opposite benches after the early 1880s necessitated the negotiation of greater intra-party unity; this process of intra-party negotiation ensured that the actually proposed legislation was more likely to be palatable to concerned members of the party. If anything, Berrington seems to argue that the party leadership became weaker, yet the level of specifically partisan support they received is pictured as increasing because of an increased probability of agreement between them and their followers (the dissatisfaction that a party member expressed in the "negotiation period" may have reflected not just his personal preferences but also pressure from constituent and other groups, so that Berrington's hypothesis in a sense combines the first two hypotheses).

A third corollary, which will be important when we consider the effects of party-oriented behavior in the
electorate, requires a supplementary assumption. Put strongly, this assumption is that the personal preferences of MPs and the pressures which they perceive from groups not in their constituency are both negligible compared to party and constituent group pressures. When this is the case, then a decrease in the net pressure perceived from constituent groups will lead to an increase (or, at least, no decrease) in the level of party support, since party pressures bulk relatively larger in the MP's decision.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II


10. In 1850 there two sets of figures based on different assumptions about the status of the parties; these assumptions are briefly explained in the notes to Table 2.1 and discussed at greater length in chapter v.


12. The total sample from the 1874-80 parliament numbers 74, roughly 5% of the divisions in that parliament. Of these, 26 were a random sample drawn by the author from 1875. Since this subsample was random, we can construct 95% confidence intervals for the 1875 figures. The results are quite reassuring. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the simple average Conservative cohesion score on all sample divisions is [.923, .939]. That is, the probability that the interval [.923, .939] contains the true average Conservative cohesion is .95. Thus we are confident that the figures for the Conservatives in 1875 do not significantly overstate the level of Conservative discipline in that year. The reliability of the figures for the whole parliament cannot technically be justified in the same manner, since the full sample is not random. However, further evidence that the levels of discipline in this parliament were quite high can be culled from the figures on (1) the number of amendments carried against the Government and (2) the number of times the Government whips were defeated. The average number of amendments per year carried against the second Disraeli Ministry was .17—lower than the corresponding figure for any other Ministry between 1853 and 1905 (these being the cutoff years for the data series on which we base this assertion; see A.L. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol. I, p. 317.). Similarly, the average number of defeats on whipped divisions per session of the Disraeli Ministry was 1.1, a record bettered by only one other Ministry (Salisbury's, 1895-1900) from 1847 to 1900.


CHAPTER III
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION AND MINISTERIAL AMBITION

Why did men in the 19th century seek to enter parliament? How many wished to stay once they had had a taste of the "best club in London," and how many aimed higher, eyeing a position in the Ministry? In an age before surveys or polls, the answers to these questions must be largely indirect. But the answers are important. If members coveted admittance to the Ministry or Cabinet, the Prime Minister, who held the power of appointment, could establish a strong inducement to loyalty by making it clear that those who too frequently dissented would generally not receive office. Since members who sought Ministerial office had usually to acquire a certain amount of parliamentary experience—especially if they aimed for the Cabinet—they must have become at least instrumentally concerned with reelection, and a natural preliminary question concerns the number of members who sought to (and the number who did) stay in parliament long enough to have a realistic shot at the Ministry and especially the Cabinet.

Interest in reelection could stem from sources other than Ministerial ambition, however, and the question of the number of members willing to put up with increasingly
frequent election contests and the rigors of serving ever-larger popular constituencies is of considerable interest in its own right. The desire of members to be returned to parliament exposed them, unless they effectively controlled their districts, generally to electoral pressure and specifically to influence by their constituents. In the first section of this chapter, we make a preliminary exploration of the desire of members to stay in office and some consequences of this desire. We then turn, in the second section, to the question of specifically Ministerial ambition and its significance for party discipline.

1. The Electoral Connection

I expect, therefore, always that the man who holds the seat of power and profit, and whatever emolument or honour may tie him to it, will cling to it, and in proportion as he clings to it he will be ready to concede something to those who may wish to shift him.

--The Reverend Charles Stovel, May 1871

Men sought seats in the House of Commons for a great variety of reasons. Barristers-at-law who entered parliament were commonly believed materially to benefit in their practice and to have better chances of securing a place on the judicial bench. These considerations were likely to be imputed as reasons for entering parliament to the numerous barristers in or at the door of the
Commons; Sir Henry Hawkins took care in his autobiography to state that he "had no eye on parliament merely as a stepping stone to a judgeship."/2/ The Commons was also an excellent position from which to secure a baronetcy or other honor. F.B. Smith speaks of one MP as "trying to auction his vote in return for a baronetcy, the sole object of his entering the House"/3/ (as it turned out, he realized his ambition by "opportune surrendering his seat to the Tory Lord Advocate." ) The demand for MPs as directors of companies was brisk, and this, together with access to important select committees which controlled railway, shipping, and commercial contracts, may have attracted a number of businessmen. In any event, a rather astounding number of railway directors sat in mid-Victorian parliaments (the high water mark being the 142 who sat in the parliament of 1865)./4/ Besides these more or less pecuniary reasons for entering parliament, contemporaries and scholars have cited a number of others. The prestige of a seat in parliament was nearly unexcelled. For those families with a tradition of public service, sitting as a member of parliament was perhaps the most illustrious fulfillment of this tradition. The Commons was also a gateway to high society; Robert Lowe spoke of "gentlemen wishing to get into society under the stimulus of their wives and
daughters" as a familiar species of "non-political" members. For the more political members there was the attraction of the Cabinet, and, even if this pinnacle was not attained, members might still (at least earlier in the century) have a significant impact on policy. On a lesser plane, members enjoyed certain legal immunities, and one author has even noted the seat in St. Margaret's Church and the reader's ticket at the library of the British Museum—to both of which MPs had a right.

For whatever reason men went to parliament, and however their attitude toward it changed once they had sat in its halls, if they wished to remain, or, as one contemporary put it, "they long[ed] with the deepest longing to get back again," then they had to concern themselves with reelection. Even the so-called non-political members had to pay attention to electoral politics if they planned to continue in the House. This necessity became increasingly prevalent as the number of uncontested seats declined and the number of candidates increased. Nearly half of the seats in the United Kingdom were typically uncontested at General Elections from 1832 through 1865; but the average percentage of seats uncontested at General Elections fell dramatically to 26% for the three elections between the second and third Reform Acts, and to 21% for elections in 1885-1910.
Correspondingly, the number of candidates increased: before 1867, only one election—1832—saw more than a thousand candidates in the field; after 1867, no election saw fewer than this number. Faced with the increasing probability of electoral competition, were MPs sensitive to those who had electoral power? Much of our thinking presumes this. And, contemporaries shared this presumption: they stated it in general terms, as did the Reverend Stovel whose remarks to a Liberation Society conference head this section, and they were willing to act on it.

The tactics of pressure groups illustrate this willingness to act on a conception of the MP as a seeker of reelection. D.A. Hamer’s illuminating study, The Politics of Electoral Pressure, shows that the typical repertoire of tactics employed by mid-Victorian pressure groups was increasingly centered on the electoral connection. Petitions, which earlier in the century were generally addressed to parliament as a whole, came to include clauses affirming a resolve on the part of the signatories to use their votes in a particular way if MPs did not support the object of their prayer.8/ During elections, pressure groups attempted to secure pledges from the voters—both "positive" pledges, which bound the elector to vote for any candidate who committed himself
to a particular policy (if there were any; if there were none, the voter being free), and the more constraining "negative" pledges, which bound the elector to vote for, and only for, candidates who had made the required commitment. /9/ With sufficient discipline, a bloc of voters tied by common pledges could be dangled before the candidates. Hamer writes that "some electoral strategists in the pressure groups, especially in the temperance movement, had a vision of a great bloc vote, completely detached from all other parties and issues...Very strenuous efforts were made to segregate and coop up a 'temperance vote' through pledges and Electoral Associations...An entire temperance electoral way of life developed: canvassing, pledges, meetings." /10/ Although not all pressure groups had such a grand vision of the bloc vote, most sought to organize and utilize a body of opinion in the electorate as the basis of their influence over MPs. In this endeavour, there were three straightforward messages to be sent to candidates, apparently depending on the kind of pledge extracted from the electors. First, candidates might be informed that they could secure so-and-so many votes by adopting a policy (when the pledges were mostly positive). Second, candidates could be threatened with the abstention of voters who, presumably, would otherwise
vote for them (when pledges were negative). Third, independent candidatures might be bruited.

Although pressure groups after the Anti-Corn Law League appear to have been firmly committed to a strategy of electoral pressure, most of them were not conspicuously successful in getting their nostrums into the statute books, and one may wonder whether their failure stemmed from an inadequacy in their assumptions about how to pressure MPs. Did most MPs wish to be reelected?

One straightforward way to answer this question is to look at the percentage of MPs actually seeking reelection. Of course, it should be kept in mind that this percentage is an imperfect indicator of the percentage who would have been willing to face some standard cost and probability of defeat (we are thinking here of those MPs who had a "fairly large" willingness to pay for the opportunity to remain in the Commons). First, some incumbents faced no and others only token competition, and their willingness to go to the poll against more formidable opponents must remain conjectural. Second, some of those not seeking reelection had died—obviously we do not know anything about their desire to be reelected. Third, others did
not seek reelection because of elevations to the peerage or acceptance of some remunerative position in the colonies, the judiciary, or the Civil Service. For these men, all we know is that they did not so wish to remain in the (unsalaried) Commons that they were willing to forgo appealing opportunities elsewhere. Since generally only four or five days elapsed between the dissolution and the date at which the earliest constituency went to the poll, the importance of these last two points is greatly limited by our definition of an incumbent as an MP sitting at the dissolution. Still, the election typically dragged on for several weeks or a month, most constituencies did not begin polling until the middle or end of this period, and a dissolution was the logical time for new opportunities to be seized and, to a certain extent, for them to be offered. A fourth point is more important: those MPs who anticipated a too-high probability of defeat may have opted reluctantly not to seek reelection. In the days of open voting and small electorates, candidates could get a pretty good idea of their chances. Sir John Aubrey, a prospective candidate for Buckinghamshire in 1789, addressed a letter asking for support to every freeholder of the county, later announcing that he had "not met with such an extensive Encouragement as will justify a Perseverance in offering
himself..."/12/ The electorates, at least in many of the boroughs, remained small enough down to 1867 so that similarly comprehensive information gathering was feasible. Finally, it should be noted that the figures we are about to present concern only the percentage of incumbents seeking reelection at the hands of the same constituency for which they sat at the dissolution. Those who went off to contest other places, however, obviously were also interested in reelection, and the figures we present clearly understate the total percentage of MPs seeking reelection. This understatement would appear to range from about 1 to 4 or 5 percentage points./13/

With these caveats in mind, we can turn to Table 3.1. Considering all MPs sitting for English provincial boroughs at each dissolution from 1835 to 1900, the table shows that only twice did fewer than 70% of these MPs seek reelection. In 1847, the first General Election after the Conservative split over the Corn Laws, only 67.2% of the members wished to face their constituents, while in 1868, in the shadow of the second Reform Act's near doubling of the national electorate, only 69% of English provincial MPs sought reelection. On average, the percentage of MPs seeking reelection was higher, and this average increased over the century: it was 76.8% in
### TABLE 3.1: INCUMBENTS IN ENGLISH PROVINCIAL BOROUGHS, 1835-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>INCUMBENTS IN ALL BOROUGHS</th>
<th>INCUMBENTS IN CONTESTED BOROUGHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>.809</td>
<td>.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVGS</strong></td>
<td><strong>.768</strong></td>
<td><strong>.835</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>.690</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>.811</td>
<td>.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVGS</strong></td>
<td><strong>.780</strong></td>
<td><strong>.736</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>.813</td>
<td>.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>.928</td>
<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td>.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>.855</td>
<td>.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVGS</strong></td>
<td><strong>.860</strong></td>
<td><strong>.790</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Column 1**: Proportion seeking reelection
- **Column 2**: Success rate
- **Column 3**: Survival rate (col.1 * col.2)
- **Column 4**: Proportion seeking reelection
- **Column 5**: Success rate
- **Column 6**: Survival rate (col.4 * col.5)

Source: Author's compilation from F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results.

Notes: Incumbents are defined as the members sitting at the dissolution. The number of incumbents in provincial boroughs by this definition was essentially equal to the number of seats—only rarely was a vacancy created so late in the parliament that it was not filled at a by-election. There were roughly 304 provincial seats in the period 1832-68, 263 in 1868-85, and 166 in 1885-1918. The first figure represents 46% of all the seats in parliament at the time, the last, about a quarter.
1835-65, 78.0% in 1868-80 and 86.0% in 1885-1900. This increasing tendency to seek reelection occurred despite a decreasing probability of success. Whereas on average 83.5% of incumbents seeking reelection were successful in 1835-65, this figure fell nearly 10 percentage points for the elections between the second and third Reform Acts, and recovered only to 79.0% in the post-1885 period, these figures reflecting to a considerable degree trends in the number of uncontested constituencies./14/

The same basic patterns appear if we look only at incumbents who faced a contest for their seats. As might be expected if we believe that MPs anticipated the incidence of electoral competition and shunned too-high probabilities of defeat, fewer incumbents sought reelection in districts which saw an actual contest. But the percentage of MPs seeking reelection in these contested districts also shows a definite upward trend: 75.6% in 1835-65, 77.8% in 1868-80, and 84.8% in 1885-1900. The figures on the success rate of incumbents facing a contest are of course lower, and exhibit a somewhat different pattern than the overall figures. They still indicate, however, that the increasing tendency to seek reelection did not come about simply because of an electoral climate more favorable for incumbents.
Indeed, the electoral climate appears to have been particularly harsh in the four consecutive General Elections of 1868, 1874, 1880 and 1885. Whereas the average survival rate of incumbents (i.e., the proportion who actually continued to sit in parliament for the same borough) was .64 in 1835-65, only 57% on average of English provincial incumbents survived into the next parliament at the elections of 1868-85. Only in the first of these elections, 1868, is the low survival rate attributable to a low proportion seeking reelection. In the last three the explanation lies in the low success rates: .719 in 1874, .693 in 1880, and .689 in 1885, these being the three lowest figures in Victoria's reign. Yet, despite these low success rates, the percentage of incumbents seeking reelection in these three elections averaged 82.1%, more than five percentage points higher than the 1835-65 average.

Two structural developments which may have been important in increasing the proportion of incumbents seeking reelection were the imposition of severe campaign expenditure limits in 1883, which made elections thereafter cheaper, and the increasing size and number of central party subsidies, starting in the late 1880s, which also made elections cheaper (for the candidates). Since most of the party fund subsidies appear to have
gone to non-incumbents to encourage contests in the enemy's strongholds, the second point may not be too important, and the first cannot explain the elections of 1874 and 1880, at which proportionately more incumbents were already seeking reelection.

Another perspective on the desire of MPs to remain in parliament can be attained by considering their activities in the House. One such activity, widely interpreted to reflect a concern with impressing constituents, was talking. As early as 1833, C.W. Wynn complained in the Commons that the length of speeches was increasing, and attributed this to the reportage of debates. The importance to an MP of a favorable reception in the press was increasingly evident. Disraeli's concern with this can be traced early in his career; he was even aware of circulation figures. After the fire of 1834, the Commons moved to new quarters which, for the first time, had a gallery reserved for reporters. By the end of the century, an article on parliamentary reporting had this to say about the treatment of reporters by MPs:

Their [the MPs'] courtship is assiduous; none more eager than they to send upstairs, unsolicited, the notes of their speeches, occasionally the speech itself in extenso; nay, they will often track the reporter to his lair and plead with him to do justice to their eloquence. There are no members
who are never reported; even the most insignificant is reported in his local paper./17/

The achievement of universal press coverage of parliament, so that even the most insignificant member might be reported, was then (1905) a relatively recent development, which followed the explosive expansion of the press in the middle of the century. The number of English provincial newspapers had increased nine-fold between 1824 and 1886, with the increase in the U.K. being comparable./18/

The number of MPs speaking in parliament appears roughly to track this increase in press coverage. Whereas only 30.5% of all MPs spoke in the session of 1820, this figure had nearly doubled by 1835, and nearly tripled by 1896 (see Table 3.2).

Although there is room for doubt about timing, it seems relatively clear that there was a firm electoral connection in English politics by the middle of the century, and that this connection, if anything, became stronger toward the end of the century. Beginning with the Anti-Corn Law League in 1841, a series of pressure groups explicitly adopted a strategy of electoral pressure. More incumbents sought reelection, and this was true even at elections which in the event proved their chances to have been relatively unfavorable, and
### TABLE 3.2: SPEAKING IN PARLIAMENT, 1820-1896

#### PANEL I: SPEAKING EARLY IN THE SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>VOL. 1</th>
<th>MPS LISTED IN HANSARD'S</th>
<th>NO. COVERED</th>
<th>% INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR</th>
<th>(1) AS % OF ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PANEL II: SPEAKING DURING THE WHOLE SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MPS LISTED IN SESSIONAL INDEX</th>
<th>PERIOD OF SITTING</th>
<th>% INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR</th>
<th>(1) AS % OF ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4/21-11/23</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>378*</td>
<td>3/12-9/10</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>2/10-8/20</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>2/5-7/28</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>3/5-8/7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>2/11-8/14</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In this year, the index to the last volume of the year did not distinguish between peers and MPs, so the next-to-last volume was used instead. 360 MPs were listed in this volume and a 5% addition was made to this figure to give 378. 5% was chosen after examination of the increase from volume to volume in that year, and of the first-to-last volume increases in other years. Source: Author's compilation from Hansard's. Notes: Hansard's was the standard record of the parliamentary debates, and generally ran to several volumes in a session. An MP was included in the index if he spoke in debate, asked a question, made a motion, or otherwise addressed the chair. The first panel, column (1), gives the number of MPs listed in the index to the first volume of the year. The second panel, column (1), gives the number of MPs listed in the cumulative sessional index for the year.
even before election costs were curbed. Finally, more MPs were willing to engage in the activities, such as speaking in parliament to provide copy for the organs of the press, which a more popular politics demanded./19/

2. Ministerial Ambition and Party Discipline

...a seat in the Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men in parliament...
--A.L. Lowell, 1906 /20/

If most MPs did wish to remain in the Commons, why was this so? Since by the end of the century the backbencher had been reduced to relative impotence, and almost all positions of any consequence were in the Ministry, the inference seems inescapable that politically ambitious men must increasingly have sought positions in the Ministry. As these positions were at the disposal of the Prime Minister, he had a valuable resource with which to reward loyalty. The crucial questions are, were there a substantial (possibly growing) number of "political" members sensitive to the Premier's criteria in allocating Ministerial posts? And was it understood that these posts went, generally, to those who were solid party men supportive of the leadership? The answer to both questions, as applies to the end of the century, appears to be "yes", but the evidence is less clear earlier in the century.
As was the case when we considered the number of MPs who desired re-election, we do not have any survey evidence on the number of members aspiring to the Ministry. We may be able to get a handle on things by focusing on the Cabinet. How many members acquired the parliamentary experience which Cabinet Ministers usually had? If only a few members acquired such experience, then perhaps a relatively well-defined set of "political" members will be suggested by tenure considerations alone. Table 3.3 presents the mean tenure and the 50th, 75th and 90th deciles of the tenure distribution for three sets of MPs defined by period of first entry into parliament. Thus, for example, there were 329 MPs who entered parliament for the first time in the years 1860 through 1867 (this figure includes MPs entering at by-elections in all years 1860-67, and those entering at the General Election of 1865; it does not include those re-entering parliament after an absence). The average and median tenures of these 329 MPs were 11.8 and 9, respectively. Fully a quarter of these MPs went on to accumulate 17.5 or more years of service in the Commons. Since the average prior experience in parliament of Cabinet Ministers in 1868-1916 was between 13 and 14 years,\(^{21}\) it is evident that quite a few members entering in 1860-67 could not be discounted for office on the count of inexperience.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Entry</th>
<th>Number Entering</th>
<th>Mean Tenure</th>
<th>Deciles of Tenure Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860-1867</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1884</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-1910</td>
<td>1786</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Later cohorts of entering MPs appear roughly comparable to the 1860-67 cohort. The group of MPs entering parliament between the second and third Reform Acts had a slightly lower mean, and higher median, tenure, as did those entering in 1885-1910, while both cohorts saw over a quarter of their members go on to careers in parliament lasting more than 15 years.

Evidently, experience in parliament puts very little limit on the number of MPs who might have aspired to the Cabinet. The 9-10.5 years of experience which the median member accumulated are too many for a conclusion that he could not have realistically aimed for high office because of inexperience.

A more important limiting factor was simply the number of posts in the Cabinet. From Grey's reform Ministry in 1830 to Salisbury's second Ministry in 1886, the number of men in the Cabinet varied without much trend between 12 and 16. Since about half of the posts were normally filled by peers, the number of MPs in the Cabinet ranged usually between six and eight. Clearly, not many MPs could realistically hope for a Ministerial appointment in the Cabinet in these years. The situation improved when Cabinets increased in size, which they began to do in the 1890s, reaching 20 in 1902 and 1908,
and usually exceeding this figure after the Great War. Lowell attributed this enlargement to the increasing range of affairs with which the Government dealt and to "the fact that a seat in the Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men in parliament," so that "there is constant pressure to increase [its] size..."/22/

Although the Cabinet increased in size in the last decade of the century, the number of MPs in the Ministry as a whole did not increase until the first decade of the next century. Whereas 34 MPs served in Peel's short-lived 1835 Ministry, only 28, 33 and 33 served under Derby (1959), Disraeli (1874) and Salisbury (1895)./23/ Typically, less than 10% of a 19th century Premier's followers found office under him. The real increase in the number of MPs serving in the Ministry comes in the opening decades of the 20th century. The figure reached 43 by 1910 and 60 by 1917, after which it dipped into the 50s before surging again after mid-century./24/

There are two inferences to be made from the increasing number of Cabinet and Ministerial posts in the 1890s and early 1900s. First, one might argue, with Lowell, that the increase reflected a greater Ministerial
ambition amongst backbenchers. Second, one might infer that the larger number of positions attracted a larger crop of applicants. If either inference is valid, the value to the Prime Minister of his power of appointment would potentially have increased.

For the purposes of this thesis, the timing of this end-of-the-century appreciation in the value of the appointment power excludes it from our purview. Our focus is on the earliest observed increases in discipline in the 1860s and 1870s, and in these decades there was no increasing trend in the size of Cabinets (Disraeli's second was the smallest Victorian Cabinet) or Ministries. Yet, although there was no multiplication of places, the Cabinet was increasingly recognized in the 1860s as the "effective" part of the constitution (Bagehot's articles employing that term appeared in the Contemporary Review in the mid-60s), and the attraction of the stable supply of Cabinet posts may have become stronger or more widespread even in this earlier period. And, regardless of whether the attractiveness of Cabinet and Ministerial positions was increasing, the static connection between the Premier's disposal of these seats and discipline is of interest in its own right.
Whether the power of appointment translated into increased discipline naturally depended on how offices were allocated, and the strategies which MPs employed to obtain them. Lowell describes two basic techniques for those seeking a Ministerial post./25/ An MP might adopt a safe course, voting with the party whips consistently, speaking in support of his leaders, patiently awaiting his just reward; or, he might adopt a riskier course, criticizing and even attacking the leadership, cultivating a personal following amongst the backbenchers, and hoping to be bought off by a position in the Government. To be successful, this latter strategy required an independent power base which most private members neither had nor could realistically hope to acquire. It is plausible, therefore, that most MPs adopted a strategy closer to the first.

One simple way to test this idea is to examine Opposition MPs, comparing the party support scores of those who received a Ministerial appointment the next time their party was in office to the support scores of those who received no such appointment. Table 3.4 shows that the 34 MPs who both sat in the parliament of 1874-80 and found a position in Gladstone's second Ministry (1880-85) supported their party in 1874-80 on 91.6% of
TABLE 3.4: PARTY SUPPORT OF THOSE WHO LATER RECEIVED MINISTERIAL POSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PANEL I. LIBERALS IN 1874-80</th>
<th>AVERAGE PARTY SUPPORT SCORE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those receiving office in 1880-85</td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those not receiving office in 1880-85</td>
<td>.858</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PANEL II. CONSERVATIVES IN 1869</th>
<th>AVERAGE PARTY SUPPORT SCORE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those receiving office in 1874-80</td>
<td>.846</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those not receiving office in 1874-80</td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For panel I, the party support scores are based on a sample of 74 divisions described in footnote 11 of chapter 10. For panel II, the support scores are based on a random sample of 16 drawn by the author. The identification of ministers was made from the first volume of Hansard's.

Note: The party support score is defined as the proportion of all divisions whipped by the Government on which the MP supported his party.
the divisions whipped by the Government, as compared to a figure of 85.8% for those Liberal MPs who did not go on to receive an office under Gladstone. However, a comparable analysis for Conservatives in 1869 who held office under Disraeli in 1874-80 comes to an opposite conclusion. The average party support score of Ministry-bound Conservatives in 1869 was 84.6 as compared to 91.6 for their backbencher colleagues./26/

The sample of divisions in 1869 upon which party support scores were calculated is quite small; possibly, the finding would be reversed if a larger sample were available (although the process of averaging should have decreased the variance about the true mean values). But, for now, the best information we have on the connection between future Ministerial appointment and discipline in the 1870s is mixed, and it would appear that the idea that increasing party cohesion can be attributed to a greater number of MPs seeking Ministerial posts is best left to a later time-- the 1890s and early 1900s.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III


7. Ibid., p. 67.


9. Ibid., p. 28.

10. Ibid., p. 29.

11. Ibid., chapter iii.


13. The justification for this assertion comes from the following table. Column 1 gives, for each year, the number of times an MP, from anywhere in the U.K., left his constituency to contest another—whether at a General or a by election. Since the bulk of these departures to contest another constituency probably occurred at the General Election in each year, we can interpret the proportions recorded in column 2, which are arrived at by dividing by the number of seats in the House at that time, as (over-)estimates of the proportion of incumbents seeking reelection at each dissolution in a different district. By adding these figures to the corresponding figures in Table 3.1, we could estimate the total proportion of MPs seeking reelection for any constituency. As can be seen, the
figures correspond to a range from about one to almost five percentage points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of MPs contesting different constituencies</th>
<th>Percent. of all MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


14. The average percentage of seats uncontested at General Elections in the periods 1832-65, 1868-80, and 1885-1900 were 45, 26 and 21, respectively.


18. The growth of the English press can be seen in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of newspapers in the U.K.</th>
<th>No. of newspapers in provincial England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>2093</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


19. The largest percentage increase in speaking came from 1820 to 1835, and this is too quick for a straightforward "more press coverage causes more gab"
explanation which might link the sheer number of newspapers and speeches since the Stamp Tax was not lowered until 1836 and the figures in the table in footnote 18 do not make a clearly prior jump. This prompts some caution in accepting the connection between press coverage and speaking which we suggest and which is so frequently asserted in the literature.


23. MPs in the Ministry were identified from *Hansard’s*.


26. These results hold up in a multivariate analysis controlling for the type of constituency (borough or county), whether the MP survived into the next parliament, and various other factors.
CHAPTER IV

THE CABINET'S STRENGTH:

THREATS OF RESIGNATION AND DISSOLUTION

"He had never been able to discover what was the proper moment, according to members of Parliament, for a dissolution. He had heard them say they were ready to vote for everything else, but he had never heard them say they were ready to vote for that."

--Richard Cobden /1/

"...from the first I have felt that the duty of every member of your Cabinet was to try to keep the party together, & acting in that sense I will...subordinate my own views to the paramount object of keeping Gladstone out of office."

--Lord George Hamilton /2/

One of the features of the British political system which most distinguishes it from the American is the lack of a fixed term for control of the executive. In America, unless a President is estranged from his erstwhile supporters--as has happened only twice (Tyler and Andrew Johnson)--the same party will head the executive for four years. In Britain, the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet colleagues can be ousted at any time. During the Victorian age, the Cabinet had two choices when it no longer enjoyed the confidence of the House. It could resign, handing the administration over to whomever the Queen designated (her choice being restricted to at most a few major figures in the
Opposition); or, it could ask the Queen to dissolve parliament and issue writs for a General Election. The verdict as to whether the Cabinet enjoyed the confidence of the House could be decided, or contributed to, in a variety of ways; for example, by a formal vote of no-confidence, by a vote on a major piece of legislation, or by a series of votes of secondary importance. Each division in a session might be classified by the likely effect on the status of the Cabinet and parliament which a defeat for the Government on that division would entail. For example, a particular division may have been such that a defeat for the Government was certain to lead to an immediate dissolution; another may have been quite likely to lead to a resignation within a few weeks; and so on.

These considerations of resignation and dissolution play major roles in A.L. Lowell's explanation of the rise in party voting. To be accurate, we should acknowledge that the explanation we present here is a piecing-together of a number of passages which Lowell does not himself clearly synthesize. Indeed, Lowell's discussion of the increase in discipline in his original paper is scanty; he attributes it, as one scholar has not unfairly noted, "without further explanation to the influence of the second and third Reform Acts..."/3/ We
believe, however, that the materials for a fuller explanation are fairly evident in Lowell's work, and that he had a more satisfying explanation to offer than his somewhat telescoped discussion would indicate.

Perhaps the key point that Lowell makes in his discussion of party voting is that "when men recognize that the defeat of a Government measure means a change of ministry, the pressure is strong to sacrifice personal opinions on the measure in question to the more important general principles for which the party stands."/4/ Here, the focus is clearly on the possibility of change in the Ministry—with all that that implies in terms of patronage, policy, and of course, ministerial place. Elsewhere, Lowell recognizes the separate effect upon which Bagehot puts much emphasis: that certain divisions entail dissolution, and hence, a General Election—with all that that implies in terms of expense and risk of defeat./5/ The point, both as regards change of ministry and dissolution, is that the merits of particular questions can be swamped by these larger issues, and backbenchers must take heed of this. The party leadership also reacts to its precarious tenure of office and to the dissolubility of parliament: "Since the cabinet may be overturned at any moment...it must try to
keep its followers constantly in hand; and since every
defeat, however trivial, even if not fatal, is damaging, it must try to prevent any hostile votes...Thus from the side both of the private member and the responsible minister there is a pressure in the parliamentary system towards more strict party voting."/6/

Lowell is not too explicit about how the essentially static logic just described accounts for the changes in party voting he discovered. There seem to be two basic ways in which the static argument might relate to the dynamic, however: (1) the proportion of votes which hastened resignation or dissolution could have increased as the century progressed; (2) the hastening power of these votes could have increased. Lowell discusses these trends implicitly in his discussions of "Cabinet responsibility."/7/ To say that a Cabinet had responsibility meant that members of parliament shared two important expectations: that all major pieces of legislation would emanate from the Cabinet, and that the Cabinet would resign or dissolve upon sustaining any important legislative defeat. It is clear that the Cabinet did not have legislative responsibility in 1800; it is clear that it did in 1900; and Lowell apparently believed that the timing and magnitude of the development
of legislative responsibility in the 1800-1900 period were appropriate for explaining the post-1850 rise in party discipline.

This is a difficult argument to assess. The crucial premises are that the frequency of divisions which were perceived by MPs as hastening resignation or dissolution increased in the 1860s and 1870s and that such perceptions did indeed promote discipline. We will look first at the question of timing.

The opinion of most recent scholars is that the expectations that the Ministry would introduce most (later, all) major legislation, and that it would resign or call for a dissolution upon significant legislative defeat, first achieved currency in the 1830s./8/ Starting in this decade, Ministers began the practice of letting it be known that they would resign, or possibly, seek a dissolution, if defeated on certain important motions. These threats--so they were interpreted and called by contemporaries--were both unpopular and rare for some time after 1832. In 1847, "men complained of the unreasonable conduct of the ministers" because they had twice in six months made a major question a matter of confidence./9/ And the leaders seemed disposed to make--or at least advocate-- sparing use of such threats.
Peel noted that "menaces of resignation if the House of Commons do not adopt certain measures are very
unpalatable, and I think they should be reserved for very rare and very important occasions."/10/ It would appear
that the use of threats of resignation and dissolution picked up considerably in the 1860s. Bagehot, writing in
1867, observed that

though the leaders of party no longer have the vast patronage of the last century with which to bribe, they can coerce by a threat far more potent than any allurement—they can dissolve. This is the secret which keeps parties together....a solid mass of steady votes...are maintained by fear of [the leaders]--by fear that if you vote against them, you may yourself soon not have a vote at all./11/

The fates of both the Liberal Reform Bill in 1866 and of Disraeli's Bill in 1867 seem to have been significantly affected by the fear of dissolution among Liberal backbenchers;/12/ and Gladstone's use of threats of confidence in the parliament of 1868-74 startled one contemporary, who asserted that

if the number of times Mr. Gladstone declared that he should regard the current proceedings as a vote of want of confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers could be ascertained and summed up the result would be astounding./13/

By 1886, when Lord Salisbury found it necessary to consider announcing a general limitation on the bills for
which his Cabinet was prepared to accept responsibility, this limited sphere of responsibility included and extended beyond all bills introduced by the Government.\textsuperscript{14} Although Salisbury was not suggesting that every bill introduced by the Government should be by itself a stand-or-fall issue, the extension and explicit recognition of responsibility is clear. This process of extension continued into the 20th century. In 1939, Jennings wrote: "It is the fear of defeat and the threat of dissolution that supply the most effective elements of the Government's power over its majority. Consequently, modern Governments tend to treat most questions as questions of confidence."\textsuperscript{15}

The evidence on the increase in the number of bills which the Cabinet were willing to treat as matters of confidence is, while highly suggestive, not conclusive, and there remains the question of the precise effect of a threat of resignation or dissolution. We shall deal first with dissolution.

The most frequent objection to the idea that threats of dissolution account for party cohesion is that they cannot explain the cohesion of the Opposition. Jackson, for example, has asserted that, "since only the government can dissolve parliament, opposition leaders
cannot use this threat with their backbenchers. Therefore, nearly half the MPs cannot be controlled by the threat of dissolution of parliament."/16/ Other criticisms are that even the Government, which can threaten dissolution, has neither the incentive--since Ministers stand to lose more by a dissolution than backbenchers--nor the "follow-through"--since Governments rarely use elections to purge their ranks of dissidents--to make dissolution an effective tool./17/

These criticisms clearly view dissolution as an explicit threat made by the Ministry. Although we shall continue to speak of threats, we shall understand by this only pressure, as defined above. Our position is that, whenever an MP perceives that the defeat of the Government on a motion has some probability of producing or hastening a dissolution, this "threat" will affect his decision, whether or not Ministers have explicitly menaced the House. It is common knowledge that substantial amendments to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech are tantamount to votes of no confidence, and no reminder of impending resignation or dissolution need be made by the Government. Indeed, no overt threat of dissolution has occurred since 1922,/18/ yet the occurrence of votes which had the potential of causing dissolution was frequent. It would appear much more
fruitful, therefore, to focus on the response of MPs to the pressure of a perceived dissolution, rather than to confine analysis to dissolution as an explicit threat.

A dissolution meant a General Election, and whether and how much an MP wished to avert this depended on the time remaining to the natural end of parliament and on his expectations of electoral victory and costs. The cost of an election was presumably something that an MP always wished to avoid. The earlier in a parliament that a dissolution was threatened, the greater the value in deferred costs that might be secured by ensuring that the threat was not carried out. Since the only way an MP could, by private action, decrease the probability of the threat being carried out was to vote for the Government (or, if a member of the Opposition, to abstain), we would expect threats of dissolution to be decreasingly effective as a parliament toiled toward its statutory end, and we would also expect that the Opposition's discipline and attendance might be lower than the Government's, since its members are exposed to a pressure favoring the Government.

However, there is another component in the value of a dissolution which may perturb these relationships. When MPs felt that an immediate General Election would
give them a poor chance of reelection, they naturally wished to avoid a dissolution on this count as well as on the count of cost. The Liberal whips in 1867 reported that their backbenchers were averse to opposing the second reading of Disraeli's Reform Bill (as Gladstone wished to do) for fear that the Government would dissolve if beaten, and they dared not face their constituents after having defeated an extension of the suffrage./19/

T.D. Acland wrote to his wife explaining that Gladstone was hampered by the Radicals, the Whigs, and "a large body who care for nothing except to avoid a dissolution."/20/ On the other hand, when MPs felt that an immediate dissolution would give them a good chance at reelection, they might actually seek it, even if they were currently in office and parliament had some years to go. For example, in 1878, after Lord Beaconsfield's triumphant return from Berlin, the Conservative Government considered a dissolution, even though they had suffered no setback and the parliament had over two years remaining./21/ Again, in 1900, Conservatives were generally happy to fight an election on the Boer War, even though this meant a dissolution two years earlier than legally necessary. Thus, when electoral conditions were favorable enough, the value of deferred costs could be outweighed by the high
probability of reelection, and MPs might, on balance, actually favor and seek a dissolution. When Opposition MPs entertained similar notions about the favorableness of the electoral climate, they might be especially eager to overthrow the Government. Thus, the tendency for Opposition discipline to be lower may have been mitigated because dissolution was not always something to be avoided.

Even when Opposition members were strongly averse to a dissolution, this need not mean that they would support the Government. First, there were other factors to consider—-the change of Ministry, pressure from constituents and party, and so on. Second, even if dissolution outweighed these factors in a choice under certainty, the actual chance of one's vote being determinative had to be considered. Since the Government was usually the majority party (there were twelve years of minority Government between Disraeli's in 1867 and MacDonald's in 1924), and on many matters of confidence could count on the solid backing of its followers, it was safe for Opposition MPs to vote with their party—-without fear that they would really be bringing on a dissolution by doing so. Finally, even when an Opposition member feared dissolution more than any other consequence, and also felt that the vote would be close, he might normally
decide to abstain rather than to vote with the Government. If he did abstain, then he would not lower his party's observed voting unity, but would affect the attendance rate./22/

Whereas the idea that dissolution plays a role in party discipline has been both strongly propounded and attacked, the pressure exerted on MPs due to the possibility of resignation has generally received less attention. This is not to say that it is not a widely-recognized phenomenon, but only that, lacking controversy, it has tended to receive less space. Yet, despite its wide acceptance, the effect of a potential resignation on discipline has never received an explicit statistical assessment.

Such an assessment would involve factors quite different than those pertinent to dissolution. Whereas the pressure that a threat of dissolution puts on an MP depends on his expected electoral chances and costs, and on the time remaining to the statutory end of parliament, the effectiveness of a threat of resignation is relatively insensitive to these factors. The potency of a threat of resignation for an MP depends on the relative attractiveness of having his, rather than the other party's, leaders in office. This, in turn, depends on
such considerations as whether the MP holds or hopes for Ministerial position, whether he anticipates a future stream of patronage, and how greatly he prefers the likely policy of his own leaders to the likely policy of the other party's leaders.

We have already seen evidence that threats of resignation may have become more common in and after the 1860s; it may also be that they became more efficacious, since, Disraeli's volte face on reform notwithstanding, it is clear that the policy differences between Disraeli and Gladstone were much greater than those between Derby and Palmerston or Russell. Indeed, Derby and Palmerston had a secret agreement whereby the Conservatives supported Palmerston against his more radical followers.23 George Hamilton's adherence to the "paramount object of keeping Gladstone out of office," based as it was on policy disagreement rather than personal animosity, would sound strange indeed if uttered by a politician in the 1850s in reference to any of the Premiers of that decade. Another trend that may have increased the strength of threats of resignation was the increasing number and attractiveness of Ministerial posts, discussed in the previous chapter.
Although the general direction of the longitudinal trends in policy differentiation and in the attractiveness of Ministerial posts are clear, and these trends should in theory have made resignation a more significant pressure, the contribution which was actually made to the increase in cohesion is unclear. Any research directed to measuring this contribution would have to deal with a problem which afflicts research into the effect of dissolution as well: it is hard to tell when threats of resignation and dissolution are made and even to distinguish between them. The only entirely explicit and "guaranteed" threat of dissolution was Derby's in 1858, when the noble lord obtained royal permission beforehand to announce that if the motion of censure over Ellenborough's despatch were carried, he would go to the country. F.B. Smith speaks of Gladstone on one occasion "intimating" that the Government "might not accept an adverse vote."/24/ And that differences of opinion could arise as to whether a threat had been made is shown by this amusing exchange in the House of Commons:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer had threatened the House with a dissolution. ["No, no!" from the Treasury Bench.] Well, what was the meaning of the passage about cutting away the bridges and burning the boats? He had understood that--and he ventured to think it had been so understood by the
public—-as a threat of dissolution. ["No!" from the Treasury Bench.] He was glad to hear it was not so—he was glad to have been the humble instrument of clearing up the mystery.../25/

Beside these straightforward differences of opinion, there must also have been subtler disagreements over exactly what had been threatened—-resignation or dissolution. At one point, Brand, advising Gladstone to treat Grosvenor's amendment as a matter of confidence, emphasized that the threat should be one of resignation rather than dissolution;/26/ one may wonder whether this distinction was always clearly conveyed.

Despite the difficulties one must anticipate in identifying the various types and degrees of votes of confidence, the topic is deserving of further attention. This is especially so since the evidence we have on the timing of the increase in Cabinet use of threats of confidence encourages the view that these were significant in improving the discipline of parties.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV


5. Ibid., p. 467.

6. Ibid., vol. II, p. 84.


15. Ibid., p. 458.


20. Ibid., p. 181.


22. A number of testable hypotheses are suggested by this discussion. Unfortunately, we are unable to perform these tests at present. In order to give the reader an idea of the feasibility of such studies, we shall briefly discuss a particular example. We have seen that, in theory, Opposition members who are uncertain about the outcome of a vote of confidence face a pressure to abstain or vote for the Government. By identifying votes of confidence which were actually close and/or reported beforehand as being in doubt (e.g., the various motions on Disraeli's Reform Bill), we should be able at least to test the significance of high expected costs (as proxied by the actually returned costs at the next election) and low subjective probabilities of reelection (as proxied by the actual margin of victory at the next election). In the case of Disraeli's Reform Bill, this procedure seems acceptable since the election was only a year after the relevant votes, although this same fact raises questions about the deferral value of preventing dissolution in 1867.


CHAPTER V

THE PEELITES AND THE DISRUPTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

Part of an explanation for the observed increase in discipline from mid-century to 1875 may come from examining the earlier decline in discipline from 1836 to 1850 and 1860. This decline is generally attributed to the controversy over the Corn Laws and the resulting break-up of the Conservative party. If this explanation is correct, then we might expect that, when the split in Conservative ranks had been resolved, discipline would recover. Hence, some portion of the post-1850 increase might be accounted for by a simple recovery or rebound theory. In order to assess this idea, we must first briefly examine what the effects of the split in Conservative ranks were, and when these effects began and ended.

The schism in the Conservative party came in the parliament of 1841-47 when Sir Robert Peel, then Conservative leader, introduced and passed (with the aid of the Whigs) the repeal of the Corn Laws. After the decisive vote in 1846 the bulk of the Conservative party, referred to as Protectionists, acquired new leaders (among them, Disraeli), and refused to follow Peel further, while a somewhat smaller band—referred to as
Peelites and including many prominent men (among them, Gladstone)—continued allegiance to Peel. Although the break was acrimonious and sharp, the possibilities for reconciliation between at least the majority of Protectionists and Peelites remained. The prestige of the Peelite leadership was such that the possibility also existed that they would forge a new party, drawing additional support from both the Protectionists and the Liberals. And, finally, union with the Liberals could not be discounted./2/

This uncertain status of the Peelite section, with the possibility that they might pivot to either party or form a new party, acted to erode the foundations of party discipline. First, the Peelite leadership contained a number of Cabinet-level talents, and any Premier—Protectionist or Liberal—bidding for their support had naturally to allocate several Ministerial positions to them. But this meant that those who conducted the day-to-day party battle for the Protectionists and Liberals "found themselves (with good reason) wondering whether...their services would be rewarded once the prize of office had been attained..."/3/ or whether the position that might have been theirs would go to a Peelite. Thus, the Peelite
position exerted a demoralizing influence on the leadership in both major parties. Second, as an alternate set of leaders, the Peelites represented an alternate source of patronage. Disappointed Liberal or Protectionist office-seekers, who might not be able to see their way over to the other major party, could appeal to the ideologically more palatable Peelites. Third, backbenchers in both of the major parties had in mind the possibility that the Peelite leaders might appear in their party in a leadership capacity. This possibility undermined the authority of the regular party leaders, since backbenchers might look to future Peelite leaders for guidance when they disagreed with their nominal leaders. Thus, for example, disobeying Disraeli was not so dangerous if the chance existed that he would be displaced from the Conservative leadership in the Commons by Gladstone.

The state of limbo or potential in which the Peelites stood lasted for approximately a decade. Sir Robert Peel, who died in 1850, made no attempt to resolve the uncertainty. He did not reward his followers and move toward the establishment of a new party; nor did he make overtures either to the Protectionists or to the Liberals. Rather, he allowed his example of disregard
for party to stand and emphasized the independence and dignity of the individual MP. After Peel's death, the Peelite leaders similarly made no decisive move. Throughout the 1850s, however, the Peelite section shrank, its members drifting back into the major parties or retiring, with not enough new recruits to make up the losses. Recent scholars have put the point at which no meaningful section could be said to exist in 1856 or 1857./5/

This date may be a bit early as marking the end of the effects mentioned above. Presumably, the prestige which the Peelite example gave to parliamentary independence did not disappear suddenly. And individual Peelites remained to a later date. In particular, Gladstone did not clearly enter the Liberal party and sever all ties with the Conservatives until he accepted office under Palmerston in 1859 and resigned from the Carlton Club in 1860. Until that time, he may still have been seen by backbenchers in both parties as a possible future leader, and still have led ambitious men in both parties to slightly discount their chances for office. Nonetheless, we may expect that the major parties in 1860, well after the supposed end of the Peelite section in 1856-7, should have been less directly influenced by
the Peelite episode. A comparison of the levels of cohesion in 1850 with those in 1860 might then provide a very rough means by which to assess the importance of the Peelites' effect on discipline. The impression is that discipline, if measured comparably in both years, would be lower in 1850, when the Peelites were much in evidence, than in 1860, after they had passed from the scene as a separate group.

Table 2.1 dispels this impression. The reader will note that there are two sets of entries for 1850. One set (labeled "1850-b" in the table) corresponds to Lowell's assumption that the Protectionists and Peelites were properly viewed as separate parties at this time, as were the Liberals and Repealers. Since he did not make these distinctions in 1860, but classified all MPs in that year as either Conservative or Liberal, Lowell notes that the apparent decline in discipline in his figures from 1850--when Protectionists and "true" Liberals are compared--to 1860--when expanded notions of Conservative and Liberal are used--is presumably due to this difference in classification, and opines that the nadir of party voting occurred somewhat earlier than 1860. Yet, if we recalculate cohesion scores in 1850 after grouping Protectionists and Peelites under the
Conservative banner and subsuming the Repealers under the Liberal banner—essentially what Lowell does in 1860—we see that the new 1850 figures (labeled "1850-a" in the table) are remarkably similar to the 1860 figures.

This finding may indicate a problem with the rebound theory if we believe that the disruptive effects of the Peelites on discipline should have been significantly mitigated by 1860. The other alternative is to emphasize the slowness with which the scars of the Peelite schism healed. If we take this latter route, then the timing of the rebound would appear to be about right—the 1860s.

However, there are other factors we must consider before accepting the rebound theory. Although it has some appeal, the theory is more complicated than it appears. In order for it to be straightforwardly operative, party discipline must be reestablished in the 1870s on the same basis as in the 1830s; that is, the factors making for discipline in the 1830s must somehow be depressed by the split in Conservative ranks and then re-emerge as this split is resolved. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine these questions fully, it seems clear—despite Lord Liverpool's reforms earlier in the century—that discipline in 1836 was still heavily influenced by a still extensive
patronage system. The following excerpt of a letter from Thomas Fremantle, then Patronage Secretary of the Treasury, to a youthful William Ewart Gladstone, then a member of Peel's Conservative Ministry, is indicative of the state of affairs:

I hear that your application in favor of young Mr. Walker is not founded on strong political claims. It is more a case of kindness and charity—such as I should more readily consider than any others if I were at liberty to do so—but at the Treasury we must look first to the claims of our political supporters & our patronage is, as you know, quite inadequate to meet the applications of members of the H of C in favor of their constituents who naturally consider all our patronage as theirs.

The son of a good voter at Newark would stand a better chance under your recommendation than the son of a poor clergyman who probably made it a point of duty not to interfere with politics.

If, however, I have misunderstood the case, let me know and I will note the name & pray excuse me for my frankness in explaining to you how these things are viewed within the corrupt walls of a Sec[retary of the] Treasury's room./7/

The importance of patronage was considerably reduced and clearly on the decline by the 1870s, however. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1853) on the Civil Service, advocating open competitive examination as the means for admission to the Civil Service and a number of other reforms, became the programme for reformers for the rest of the century. In 1855 a preliminary examination
designed to exclude the unfit from further consideration
was wrung from a reluctant Derby Ministry, although it
appears to have had limited effect. A more important
step was taken in Gladstone's first Ministry by an Order
in Council of June 1870 which established open
competition as the method of entry into the Civil
Service. Gladstone's friend and Patronage Secretary,
George Glyn, complained of the reform: "I lose, without
notice, and at once, the great advantage of the daily
correspondence and communication with members of the
party which the ordinary dispensing of the Treasury
patronage gave me, to say nothing of the power which it
placed in my hands."/8/ It would seem, then, that an
important pillar in the edifice of discipline in 1836 had
been seriously damaged by 1870, and for reasons not
usually linked with the split in Conservative ranks over
the Corn Laws. Thus, we may doubt whether the rebound
theory in its simplest form makes any sense.

The difficulty in giving an accurate account of the
timing of the Peelites' effects and the conceptual
problem just discussed lead us to discount the rebound
theory. It seems plausible that there were some
phenomena we might wish to group under the rubric of
"recovery", but to talk of a return to the status quo
ante is somewhat misleading. Finally, it should be noted that even if we accepted some notions of recovery, these would not account for the levels of discipline in 1875, which were considerably higher than those in 1836.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V


2. Most of this chapter is based on Jones and Erickson, op. cit., and, to a lesser extent, on J.B. Conacher, The Peelites and the Party System, 1846-1852 (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1972).

3. Jones and Erickson, op. cit., p. 222.

4. Ibid., p. 35.

5. Ibid. and Conacher, op. cit.


CHAPTER VI
THE CAUCUS

The explanations of party discipline which we have considered so far have all concerned "intra-mural" factors having to do with the ability of the party leadership to pressure its followers: the power of appointment, the threats of dissolution and resignation, the certainty with which leaders lead. At least one of these explanations clearly touched on events outside the House, however: the degree to which dissolution was to be shunned depended largely on the election to follow. We turn now to an explanation which focuses particularly on elections and the electoral pressures to which members were subject from the new forms of party organization which developed after the second Reform Act.

The establishment, spurred by the second Reform Act's near doubling of the electorate, of local party associations in most constituencies, and the role these new organizations played in disciplining MPs, became the subject of a series of polemical contemporary examinations. /1/ W.E. Forster's well-publicized altercation with the Bradford Liberal Association in the 1870s was painted as an intemperate attack by rabid non-conformists on a moderate statesman. The fancied
resemblance of the Birmingham plan of organization to American big-city machines, the vigorous activity of the National Liberal Federation in the 1880s, Randolph Churchill's attempt to use the National Union as a vehicle for his ambitions, all made lively topics in the periodical literature, and later, in books. The culmination of this literature was Mosei Ostrogorski's forceful attack at the end of the century on the new forms of British party organization, which put forth a view of this organization--emphasizing its importance in disciplining MPs--that went largely unchallenged until the 1960s.

Before 1832, there was no permanent, formal organization to contest elections at either the national or the local level. The first Reform Act's provision that electors be listed on an official register of voters which stated their qualification to vote opened the door to the first species of permanent party organizations for electoral purposes. It quickly became evident that a good way to win elections was to object to the qualifications of one's opponents, getting them struck off the register if possible, and to promote the qualifications of one's supporters, getting them put on the register if possible. Both parties in the 1830s
encouraged local gentlemen to form Registration Associations to tend to the register. The purpose of these associations was to drum up funds and hire barristers and solicitors to slug it out in the Registration Courts, which decided who should and should not be on the register. The associations did not generally have anything to do with the actual conduct of elections, nor did they propagandize in favor of a party or candidate.  

The conduct of elections was still organized in an ad hoc fashion. The candidate hired someone, generally a solicitor, to run his campaign, and electoral machinery—to carry on the canvass, get voters to the poll, and so on—was constructed out of his purse. This handling of election campaigns was feasible because the constituencies were still small (85% had electorates smaller than 2,000) and because there was something of a natural electoral organization in the hierarchical structure of society. It was accepted, for example, that landlords effectively controlled the votes of their tenants-at-will, a similar relationship may have held between employers and their men, between important customers and the shopkeepers to whom they gave their custom, and so on. This meant that lining up the
support of influential men—which required little organization—could do much for a candidate's chances. If a candidate was successful in courting influential support, he needed even less in the way of a "machine". Finally, it should be noted that, in some constituencies, a wealthy candidate might still purchase the seat.

This state of affairs was altered fundamentally, according to Ostrogorski, by the second Reform Act. The electorate was almost doubled by this Act and the traditional conduct of elections—by solicitors, influence, and money—became inadequate. Encouraged by the parliamentary leadership on the Conservative side and by the example set by the "Birmingham Caucus" on the Liberal, permanent local party associations with dues, officers, regular meetings, "mass" membership and continual activity sprang up. These were organized at the national level by the National Union of Conservative and Constitutuional Associations (the NU, founded in 1867) and the National Liberal Federation (the NLF, founded in 1877). MPs who sought reelection found that they were now dependent for this on the new party associations. Since, Ostrogorski argued, the local and national associations were loyal to the parliamentary leadership, that leadership acquired an effective
electoral threat with which to discipline their members:

Now under the Caucus [i.e., the new organizational regime], and thanks to it, in both parties refractory Members are called upon by their respective Associations to fall in behind the leader and they must comply if they want to be reelected. Thus in the intimate relations between the parliamentary chief and his followers, there has been imported from outside a regular intimidation agency, which makes the Members, for the nonce, simple puppets on the parliamentary stage./4/

The evidence which Ostrogorski gives for this view is anecdotal and pertains largely to the Liberal experience. Much attention is paid to the "Birmingham Caucus", an elaborate machinery created to organize the Liberal forces of Birmingham so as to thwart the so-called "minority representation" clause of the second Reform Act which directed that electors in those few large boroughs returning three members should have only two votes. The Caucus arranged a system of ward-by-ward voting so as to split the total Liberal strength equally amongst the three Liberal candidates, ensuring the victory of all three over the greatly outmanned Conservatives, who might otherwise have snuck in. The Birmingham Caucus, a dramatic new departure in electoral organization, appeared at the first General Election (1868) after the second Reform Act, and to a considerable
extent, the rapidity and radicalness of this innovation set the tone for much of Ostrogorski's discussion.\footnote{5}

The actual content of the other evidence which Ostrogorski advances is indicative of a much less sharp and radical organizational break, however. The following passage from G. Lowes Dickinson, who came to many of the same conclusions as Ostrogorski slightly earlier, is representative of the other evidence upon which Ostrogorski relies:

To organize simultaneous protests, addressed, at critical points, to members who show signs of a dangerous independence, is one of the recognised functions of the National Liberal Federation. "If the caucus had existed in 1866," says Mr. Schnadhorst in a burst of confidence, "the Cave of Adullam would have been almost untenanted;" and later examples show that the boast was justified. In 1881, for instance, there were signs of wavering in the Liberal ranks on the question of the Irish policy of the government. Instantly, a circular was issued by four officials of the Federation, calling upon the Liberal associations to put pressure on their representatives. "The time has come," they announced, "for Liberal constituencies to declare that proceedings which involve such danger to the nation, and to the Liberal Government, cannot be tolerated." "The circular," we are told, "produced the effect which the committee had hoped to secure," and the Liberal Government was saved, to save the nation. Similar tactics were adopted with equal success in 1883.\footnote{6}
What is noteworthy about this passage is that the examples cited of the Liberal Caucus in action are both from the 1880s. This is characteristic of Ostrogorski’s evidence regarding the NLF, also. And this is unsurprising, since the NLF was not established until 1877. The point is that we should not look to the Caucus’ sway to explain the general increase in Liberal discipline from 1850 and 1860 to 1869, 1871 and 1875, which is seen most clearly in the weighted averages (Table 2.1). The discipline of members from Birmingham and other constituencies where the organizational change was abrupt may have been affected by such changes, but most Liberal members do not seem to have faced a vigorous association in the early 1870s. Hanham has noted that, even in the big towns, "almost everywhere the 1868 election was fought on an ad hoc basis by an organization specially formed or adapted for the purpose by the old party leaders,"/7/ and that, further, "the overwhelming success of the Liberals at the 1868 election encouraged them to rest content with their existing organization."/8/ James Bryce observed that "as late as the general elections of 1868 and 1874, nearly all candidates offered themselves [directly] to the electors,"/9/ rather than as the nominees of a local association, as became customary later. It appears that,
on the Liberal side of the House, increased discipline due to the spread of local associations could not have been significant until the later 1870s at the earliest.

Even when a local association had been established, this did not necessarily mean added pressure on the MP to toe the party line. First, the local association may have been impotent. For example, "the North Northamptonshire Liberal Association, formed by the Radicals of Wellingborough and Kettering in 1877, played a decidedly subordinate role in the 1880 election...The Association remained the client of the Whig landowners because, as its President acknowledged, "there was no possibility of their gaining a success unless they obtained a candidate from one of the aristocratic families in the county". The decision that Robert Spencer should contest the North division was made quite independently by Lord Spencer, and the Association was not informed of it until after the dissolution."/10/

Second, the local party may have been independently-minded. In East Northamptonshire, the Liberal MP found himself drawn away from the mainstream of his party by the radical activity in his local association./11/ Berrington has asserted that this was common, and that "the Liberal Caucus, at least in the early stages, made for more, not less indiscipline."/12/
The strength and independence of Liberal associations and their effect on Liberal discipline in parliament have not yet been the subjects of comprehensive research. The proponents of their importance, such as Ostrogorski and Dickinson, cite instances of the successful pressuring by the NLF of potentially dissident MPs, while other scholars cite examples showing that local associations sometimes fostered rather than inhibited dissidence. What is needed to advance this dispute is constituency-by-constituency knowledge of the status of Liberal organization together with information on the tendency to dissent of each Liberal MP. One could then see whether MPs with well organized districts were more or less supportive of party positions than MPs with poorly organized districts. Also, the increase in discipline in those districts acquiring the new organization could be compared to the increase in districts with no organizational improvement. While this programme of research is not feasible for the Liberals, it is for the Conservatives.

The development of local Conservative associations and the influence of this development on Conservative discipline received, as noted above, less attention from Ostrogorski. Partly, this seems to be because the NU did
not pressure MPs in the open fashion of the NLF. One early observer noted that "the local Conservative committees were jealous of outside control, and would not surrender their independence; the NU has consequently become more than anything else a centre for distributing pamphlets, cartoons and other electioneering literature."/13/ Although the NU did not overtly suppress dissidence, it should be noted that the Conservatives, the losers in 1868, made a determined effort to improve their organization. An aggressive new party agent, who set about to prod local Conservatives into achieving a basic level of organization, was appointed in 1870, and, by 1874, 57% of all English and Welsh constituencies had self-styled "conservative" or "conservative workingmen's" associations. Further, efforts were made to ensure that candidates of whom the party leadership could approve were adopted by maintaining a list of approved candidates from which those constituencies seeking central help in finding a candidate could choose./14/
Possibly, this attempt to secure suitable candidates, coupled with the fairly rapid development of local associations, made for an increase in discipline on the Conservative side of the House. If we do not entertain this supposition, which essentially extends Ostrogorski's explanation to a time and party which he did not
originally emphasize, then there is certainly a need to explain the markedly higher levels of Conservative discipline in the 1870s.

In order to probe the connection between Conservative organization and discipline, we make use of a document compiled in 1874 by the Conservative Central Office which describes the state of local Conservative organization in each of the 293 constituencies of England and Wales in that year. In addition to noting the existence of clubs, registration associations, conservative or conservative workingmen's associations, and variants on these forms, the document gives the names and addresses of relevant officers and agents. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 57% of the English and Welsh constituencies were identified as having some kind of a conservative association. Another 11% had either a registration association or a club as the most significant organization, while 29% had only a local party agent, and 3% had no organization whatsoever. The relatively fine organizational categorization appearing in the source document is collapsed in Table 6.1, which compares, in counties and in boroughs, the average party support score of Conservative MPs from districts with a conservative or conservative workingmen's association to
TABLE 6.1: CONSERVATIVE DISCIPLINE AS A FUNCTION OF CONSERVATIVE ORGANIZATION

PANEL I. THE BOROUGHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE PARTY SUPPORT SCORE</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T TEST</td>
<td></td>
<td>T=.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PANEL II. THE COUNTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE PARTY SUPPORT SCORE</td>
<td>.976</td>
<td>.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T TEST</td>
<td></td>
<td>T=1.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The party support score is defined as the proportion of times a Conservative MP supported his Government when they put on the whips.

TABLE 6.2: CHANGES IN CONSERVATIVE DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION RELATED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS IN 1874</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE CHANGE IN PARTY SUPPORT</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the average score of MPs from districts which had no organization or only an agent. As can be seen, there is no support in this table for the idea that Conservative organization affected Conservative discipline. In the boroughs, there is virtually no difference between the average loyalty of MPs from well- and poorly-organized districts, while in the counties, those from the poorly-organized districts actually gave higher levels of support than those from organized places (although the difference is not significant).

Although there is no support for the Ostrogorskiian hypothesis in these data, the approach might be criticized as not testing the theory in its own terms. What is relevant to Ostrogorski's theory is not, directly, the average levels of party support found in organized and unorganized places, but, rather, the change in discipline found in those places which saw the formation of one of the new party associations, as compared to the change found in those places which clung to the older forms. This comparison is more difficult, but we attempt it in Table 6.2. Using a random sample of divisions from 1869, we have computed party support scores for all those MPs who attended at least one division in the sample. The levels of discipline in 1869
should be less affected by the Conservative organizational push, which, as mentioned above, really got underway with the appointment of a new national party agent in 1870. Hence, a comparison of the change in discipline from 1869 to the 1874-80 parliament registered in those constituencies with and without a new conservative association in 1874 should be, for the most part, a comparison of constituencies which underwent organizational change with those which did not.\textsuperscript{17}

Before we interpret the results in Table 6.2, we should note that the number of observations is reduced somewhat by incomplete data, and, more importantly, that the sample of divisions in 1869 used to calculate party support is lamentably small—only 16. This is adequate for the original purpose of estimating aggregate cohesion, but clearly introduces a distressingly large measurement error component to the present analysis. Two defenses of this analysis should be noted, however. First, the sample in 1869 is random, and therefore the estimator of party support used is unbiased: the problem which the small sample introduces is not of inherently biasing the results one way or the other. Second, we have applied various weighting schemes to the calculation of changes in discipline, which give more importance to
those observations based on a more solid data base, and these approaches corroborate the unweighted findings.

Bearing in mind the potential problems, the results in Table 6.2 are no more supportive of an Ostrogorskiian perspective than those in Table 6.1. The 54 constituencies which had Conservative MPs in both 1869 and 1874-80 (in the case of double-member districts, both MPs were Conservative in both years) and had acquired neither a conservative nor a conservative workingmen's association by 1874 saw a steeper increase in the percentage of divisions on which their MP(s) supported the Conservative position than did those 23 constituencies which had Conservative MPs in both years and which had acquired one of the new organizations by 1874. This result holds up for both single- and double-member districts considered separately, and for counties and boroughs separately. There is simply no support here for extending Ostrogorski's thesis to the Conservatives in the 1870s.

Ostrogorski, and those like Dickinson who agree with his position, focus on the Liberal party in the early 1880s when expounding their theory that the new local party associations which arose after the second Reform Act were responsible for pressuring MPs into greater
party loyalty. The Conservatives are generally pictured as following the Liberal example. Therefore, any applications of Ostrogorski's theory to the 1870s is something of an extrapolation of the original argument. If we do not make this extrapolation, then obviously we need an explanation, especially for the marked increase in discipline amongst Conservatives, and also for that found amongst Liberals, which Table 2.1 reveals. If we do extrapolate, then, as we have just seen, our best shot at testing Ostrogorski's theory—for the Conservatives in the 1870s—turns out largely negative. So, either way, whether we accept Ostrogorski's argument without test for the times and parties for which it was originally framed, or whether we reject an attempted extrapolation of the argument to the 1870s, we are left with an increase in discipline from 1850 and 1860 to the 1870s, which is quite large on the Conservative side of the House, to explain.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. References to this literature can be found in Mosei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, translated from the French by Frederick Clarke, Vol. I (London: MacMillan and Co., 1902).


3. Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, chap. viii.


5. Ibid., pp. 161-192.


8. Ibid., p. 114.


11. Ibid., pp. 114-5.


14. W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, Vol. V, pp. 184-5. Lists of candidates were not new. What may have been new was a greater effort to ensure that those who got on the list were acceptable.
15. This document, titled "Conservative Agents and Associations in the Counties and Boroughs of England and Wales," was first used by H.J. Hanham in his Elections and Party Management. Dean Hanham was kind enough to provide me with a Xerox copy of his own hand copy of the document after efforts to secure a copy from England failed.

16. In this and the succeeding analysis, party support is defined as the percentage of divisions whipped by the Conservative Government on which the MP supported the Government position. The divisions used to calculate the party support were drawn from two sources: first, a random sample of 26 divisions in 1875 drawn by the author; second, a sample of 19 divisions in 1874 and 1875 drawn by James C. Hamilton (see his "Parties and Voting Patterns in the Parliament of 1874-80," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1968). An overlap of two meant that the total sample was 43. If a larger sample of divisions is used by including 31 divisions from the later years of the 1874-80 parliament, the findings are not altered.

17. The number of associations affiliated with the NU by year was 1871--289, 1872--348, 1873--407, 1874--447, 1875--472 (plus 228 branch associations). Unfortunately, it is not known precisely how many associations there were before 1871, nor is it known how many associations per constituency there were. Perhaps as many as 50-100 associations were original members in 1867. In 1874 there were 167 constituencies with associations, for an average of 2.68 associations per constituency. If we assume there were 150 associations in 1869, this would indicate 56 constituencies if we assume the association per constituency ratio was constant. Hence, if we had a full sample, we would be comparing 56 constituencies with high and constant organization, plus 111 which changed from low to high levels of organization, to 94 which remained at a low level. We do not have a full sample, of course, since not all constituencies returned Conservatives. If we are willing to assume that the sample of observations we do have—which requires a Conservative MP sitting in 1869 and 1874—is random with respect to the possession of organization, then about 111/(111+56)=66% of those districts having associations in 1874 should have acquired them in the
period 1869-1874. See R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties, pp. 150, 159-60.
CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PARTY-ORIENTED ELECTORATE (1)

The idea that elections should properly be a method of securing the influence of constituents over their representatives never achieved the currency in Britain that it did in her North American colonies which had experienced first-hand the delights of virtual representation. The system described by Jefferson wherein representatives were "chosen either pro hac vice, or for such short terms as should render secure the duty of expressing the will of their constituents"/1/ would have repulsed his counterparts in England, and the authoritative exposition of a theory of representation based on local electoral control of local representatives was and remained distinctively American. Those groups in Britain in closest sympathy to these ideas--the Levelers, the Paineite Radicals, the Chartists--were on the fringe of the political system./2/

Yet, these groups were distinguished from the political mainstream chiefly by their insistence on popular control. The use of electoral power to secure influence over MPs was not objectionable in certain contexts. Part of the stability of Governments in the 18th century stemmed from the sizable bloc of seats
controlled by royal influence, and the participation of the Crown in elections was expected and accepted. What made the formal and institutional supremacy of the House of Commons tolerable to the aristocracy in the same period was the influence exercised by Lords over Commons through the control of elections. Namier has estimated that some 192 English MPs were "nominees" in 1760, owing their seat to a patron whose ownership of land or economic dominance allowed him to return, for the most part, whomever he pleased./3/ The electoral control exercised by patrons was unquestioned and the behavior expected from a nominee seems to have been that which in a popular context would be attributed to an American-style delegate; the nominee was to represent the opinions of his patron, and if any serious disagreement developed, he was expected to resign./4/ The blunt fact that the seat was in the gift of the patron underpinned a relationship of undoubted authority.

It is this potency of electoral pressure which makes Ostrogorski's theory particularly appealing. If the parties truly had attained the degree of control over the election of their members which Ostrogorski pictured, then the obedience of 20th century MPs to their parties would be no more surprising than the obedience of 18th
and 19th century MPs to their patrons; and one might well attribute the gradual 19th century development of party cohesion to the gradual development of this electoral clout.

Regardless of the merits of this argument later in the century, however, an Ostrogorskiian dynamic is not in evidence in the 1870s and we cannot look to his ideas to explain the increasing levels of cohesion in the 1860s and 1870s. The explanation for these earliest increases, which begin the upward trend in party cohesion, is, nonetheless, intimately related to electoral phenomena.

The major premise of the argument developed in the rest of the thesis is that Victorian electors voted more and more on the basis of their preferences between the parties, and correspondingly less and less on the basis of their evaluations of individual candidates, after about mid-century. The intermittent but drastic century-long erosion in the parliamentary abilities of the private member, the development of a cheap partisan press following the removal of the Stamp Tax in 1856, and the increasing polarization of the parties—both in parliament and in the constituencies—were the chief factors pushing this development. We discuss these and other factors in the succeeding sections of this chapter.
The primary evidence on which we rest our case that voters were becoming more party-oriented is drawn from a particularly detailed form of electoral documentation unique to the multi-member districts which predominated in Britain before 1885. The range of electoral options available to voters in these districts was considerably wider than that in the single-member districts prevalent after the redistribution of 1885; using an expected utility maximization model of the decision problem faced in the double-member districts, we analyze in chapter 8 the extensive changes in electoral behavior which our compilation reveals. The consequences of the shifting basis of electoral choice for legislative behavior are detailed in chapter 9. The most important consequence was a deflection of electoral pressure from the individual MP to the party. When voters became more party-oriented, basing their votes to a greater degree on partisan preference, the electoral impact of the votes of individual MPs simply became less important. Since the electoral benefit to MPs of a specific act of dissidence was no longer as great, the incentive to dissent was less and party cohesion increased; at the same time, the influence of constituents over the behavior of their MPs decreased, as shown in chapter 10.
1. Did Voters Become More Party-Oriented?

In the remainder of this chapter, we seek to motivate the major premise of our inquiry: that Victorian electors became gradually more party-oriented after about mid-century. A formal definition of the term "party-oriented" and of the complementary term "candidate-oriented" must await the development of the model of electoral choice in the next chapter, but in the meantime the intuition behind these terms may be sketched. A preliminary distinction, which we shall understand throughout the discussion, is between voters who were independent agents and those who were not. The central theme of work on Victorian elections is the existence of a "deferential" vote; the paradigm is the tenant-at-will, who was supposed often simply to vote as his landlord wished or instructed. We consider the deferential voter a distinct species, and the terminology we develop applies to the independent electorate only. Although this limits our discussion in terms of the number of electors to which it is applicable, it does not limit it in terms of ultimate political significance. The votes of deferential electors simply magnified the decisions of influential electors, and hence, if we can explain the decision-making of independent and influential electors, we can explain the outcomes of
elections. Of course, the distinction between deferential and independent voters is not always clear, and we shall eventually have to worry about this.

Deferential voters aside, the basic distinction we wish to make is between voters who based their votes chiefly on partisan preference and those whose evaluations of the individual candidates bulked larger in their decisions. In most of the discussion, we assume that this distinction is based primarily on the policy outputs (sensu lato) from parliament which parties and candidates could affect, although this assumption is not always necessary to the argument nor firmly adhered to. In terms of this assumption, more candidate-oriented voters looked to the outputs that the individual candidates could supply or affect. These, depending on the voter, might include patronage, private bills, other divisible benefits, and measures of general or national policy. We can imagine an idealized elector voting solely on the basis of the candidates' past actions in supplying these outputs and their indications of how they intended to proceed in the future. When we say that one voter is more candidate-oriented than another, we mean that the one more closely approximates this ideal than the other. The more party-oriented electors, on the
other hand, looked to the outputs that the parties could provide. These might include a programme of domestic policy, competence in conducting foreign and imperial affairs, and even trends in the economy. Once again, we can imagine an elector basing his vote entirely on his preferences between the parties on these criteria, and voters who (more) closely approximate this extreme are termed "(more) party-oriented." Finally, it should be noted that voters who have made a durable partisan choice based on the past behavior and performance of the parties and perhaps on early socialization experiences are also considered to be party-oriented.

Did voters become more party-oriented? The literature is generally favorable on this point for the period after the second Reform Act. Feuchtwanger, in his study of Conservative organization, notes in reference to the post-reform period that "members of parliament and their leading supporters now saw public opinion swayed predominantly by national issues and by the manner in which the national leaders handled these issues...not only the policies but the personalities of the national leaders were of growing electoral importance."/6/ In a similar vein, Mackintosh assumes that electors after the second Reform Act "voted for a party and a programme."/7/ Neither of these scholars, however, addresses himself
primarily to the question of voting behavior, and neither concentrates on justifying the hypothesis that voters were more party-oriented after the second Reform Act. The only scholar to focus on the question of why electors might have become more party-oriented is John Vincent. Vincent’s thesis, argued fifteen years ago, was that the explosive 19th century growth in the number of British newspapers, and the highly partisan propaganda to which the new press exposed their readers, caused a rapid and "massive development of party loyalties throughout the country" in the 1860s. Unfortunately, Vincent does not seek to support this thesis by systematic reference to electoral statistics, nor does he offer any evidence of comparable generality. His discussion is pitched at a local level for the most part, and the reader is left to wonder on what grounds the general conclusion was arrived at.

If all the case-study evidence were one way, the failure to cast a wide research net would be less disturbing. But, of course, the evidence is not all consistent. For example, mid-Victorian pressure groups sought to induce candidate-oriented, rather than party-oriented behavior. Voters were urged to vote for any and all candidates who supported particular measures,
regardless of party. And, as Hamer has chronicled, this kind of activity was on the rise after mid-century, as a series of pressure groups came onto the scene. The Times in 1874 noted the great variety of groups which pushed particular issues on the attention of the electors:

A remarkable fact connected with the present general election is the numerous advertisements appearing in the newspapers from political and social organizations of every conceivable description, all appealing to the electors to vote only for those candidates, irrespective of party, who will pledge themselves to support the opinions or crotchets represented by the respective societies, and to make those opinions a test question at the election....Among the leading organizations thus appealing to the electors may be enumerated the United Kingdom Alliance, for suppressing the liquor traffic; the Sunday Rest Association, for stopping all...traffic on Sundays; the Contagious Diseases Act Repeal Association, the Female Suffrage Association, the Sunday League, the Liberation Society, the Church Defence Society, the Peace Association, the Land Tenure Reform Society, the Free and Open Church Association, the Open Spaces' Preservation Society, the Anti-Vaccination Society, the Licensed Victuallers' Protection Society, the Labour Representation League, the Protestant Electoral Union, &c./10/

One consequence of pressure group activity was that MPs often pledged themselves to support particular policies. Mackintosh notes, for example, that the National Education League exacted pledges to repeal the
25th clause of Forster's Education Act from 300 of 425 Liberal candidates in England and Wales./11/
Feuchtwanger, too, comments on the "great diversity of pledges and programmes to be found in election addresses."/12/ Saunders has described the activity of the Female Suffrage Association at the 1880 election: "many candidates were astonished by the sudden appearance of ladies in their committee-rooms, who questioned them with great earnestness on topics with which they were but little acquainted..."/13/ Clearly, some persons were still candidate-oriented.

And, of course, some constituencies were still small enough to be dominated by a single man or family regardless of party. Hanham cites the example of Bridgnorth (which had an electorate of about 1200 in the 1870s). After returning W.H. Foster as a Liberal in 1874 by a handsome margin of 44% over his Conservative opponent, the electors of Bridgnorth returned him as a Conservative in 1880 by a still-healthy margin of 33% over a Liberal opponent./14/

Which kinds of evidence do we believe? Those that show voters more, or those that show them less party-oriented? The question in which we are interested, and the question in which Vincent and others are also
seemingly interested, is inherently quantitative. Can we identify what percentage of the electorate was by some standard party-oriented? Did this percentage increase, and by how much? Did voters become more party-oriented throughout the country or only in the regions and areas scrutinized? To our thinking, the only hope of answering these questions lies in mass electoral statistics. Only by observing how large samples of electors actually voted are we likely to make sound inferences about the criteria on which they based those votes. In the next chapter, we pursue this. In the meantime, we wish to look in more detail at the question of why voters might have become more party-oriented. We accept Vincent's emphasis on the importance of the new press, but feel that there are other important factors which may motivate a belief that voters were becoming more party-oriented.

2. The Development of a Party-Oriented Electorate

In the way we use the terms, both an orientation toward parties and one toward candidates stem chiefly from a concern for policy outputs; the candidate-oriented voter looks more to what the individual MP can do, the party-oriented voter more to what the parties can do. Thus, we expect voters to be more candidate-oriented when individual MPs—which for the most part means private
members--can more effectively secure or further policy goals of interest, and we expect voters to be more party-oriented when the parties--which means the Cabinet and those seeking to replace the Cabinet--are more important policy actors. From this perspective, the steadily increasing control of the Cabinet over the legislative business of parliament and the correspondingly decreasing abilities of the private or unofficial members, which are the central themes of 19th century procedural history, ought to have been accompanied by gradual changes in electoral orientation.

We shall not attempt a comprehensive review of parliamentary history, but a few subthemes--the increasing amount of time at the disposal of the Government, the growing expectation that all important legislation would be initiated by the Ministry, and the loss of procedural devices by the private member--can be taken up. The basic causes suggested by procedural scholars that pushed these developments were an increase both in the amount of Government business and in the number of members who sought to secure a hearing before the House./15/
The introduction of order days in 1811 can be taken as an example. Owing to the addition of a hundred Irish members after 1800 and to an augmentation of parliamentary business, the time available for Government business became inadequate. Since the "notices of motion" put down in the order book were more numerous, and since these had to be dealt with before the House could proceed to the "orders of the day" (which included committee of supply, the stages of bills, and other approved matters), this latter business was quite commonly not reached until after midnight. It was complained that the Ministers were sneaking through controversial legislation at late hours, and the Government responded with a proposal that the orders of the day should be given precedence on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. This proposal was vigorously contested as a limitation of the right of members to move questions, but the choice was continued after-midnight sittings or some expedient, and the House accepted the Ministerial proposal limited to Mondays and Fridays.

Private members still enjoyed considerable rights which gave them the ability to bring their concerns before the Commons against the wishes of the Ministers or even of a majority in the House; these included the right
to obstruct by repeatedly moving "that the House do now adjourn," the right to claim a hearing at any time by motion made without previous notice (a right which was successfully exercised even on Mondays and Fridays by the device of moving an amendment to the previously routine motion that the Speaker leave the chair), and the right to raise a debate upon the presentation of petitions. By the end of the century, all these devices, and a number of others which rose up to take their place during the century, had been beaten back or totally eradicated.

Typically, the parliamentary devices employed by private members were done away with under severe time pressure. What one contemporary referred to as "the rage for speaking" in the first reformed parliament (evidence of which we saw in Table 3.2 above) was accompanied by a large increase in the number of notices of motion put down in the order book, and Fraser notes that "inevitably this pressure forced the choice of either allowing the public business to come to a standstill, or taking steps to give it priority by curbing the opportunities of private members."/16/ The first of these opportunities to be abolished was that of raising a debate on petitions, and this was discarded simply by an agreement between the two front benches, backed by the Speaker. Perhaps the
crucial change came in 1835 when Wednesday was made an order day exclusively for private members, Monday and Friday being reserved exclusively to the Government. For the first time, a clear distinction was made between Government and private members’ business, and hereafter encroachments by unofficial members into the Government’s time could be more readily identified as such and dealt with accordingly. This became important because the time reserved to private members was becoming "polluted". The Tuesday and Thursday "notice" days, on which it was proper for private members to raise general debates, were falling into disrepute because of the greatly increased number of notices of varying quality; the order book was filled for weeks in advance and a ballot for precedence was instituted, which meant that the House had to face the luck of the draw (previously, the notices had been few enough so that the House could choose the order in which it took them). Since, as Lord Stanley told the House, "most of the notices were a mass of trash and rubbish to which no-one thought it worthwhile to attend, except for the member who gave the notice,"/17/ those who sought the attention of a full House (or any House, since counts out became more frequent on notice days) raided the Government days by moving amendments to the routine motions of the orders of the day. By 1837, the
Government found that a third of their days were being seized in this way by private members, and after a select committee reviewed the matter, amendments to particular orders were forbidden by Standing Order. A number of other methods remained to secure the same effect, and after these had been discovered and their use became intolerable, all but one was abolished when another select committee so recommended in 1848.

The segregation of Government from private members' business also had a deleterious effect on the ability of unofficial members to legislate. It was easy for a member to introduce a bill, have it read a first time, and then printed at state expense; but after that, progress was very uncertain. In part perhaps because of the attractiveness and ease of having a bill printed, the number of bills introduced by private members greatly increased. This filled the order book for weeks, and then months, in advance, and a ballot was introduced for the scarce resource, time. Eventually, it proved virtually impossible for a private member to pass a bill which was controversial, since anyone opposed to it could talk it out on the night it came up (especially after a prohibition against taking on opposed business at late hours was passed in the 1870s /18/) and the chances of
securing more time later in the session were slim. Thus, increasingly, private member's bills could be passed only with the help of Ministers, or if they were unopposed and lucky. By the 1870s, out of 120 bills introduced by unofficial members in the average session, only 20 to 25 were passed into law,/19/ and generally only 10 to 15 per annum reached the statute books around the turn of the century./20/

The end product of a series of crises over the amount of parliamentary time, the pruning back of the procedural devices available to members, the discovery of new devices by pathfinding private members and their eventual suppression, was a much regularized procedure in which (by the 1880s) Government business had precedence on 83% of the sittings,/21/ and the Ministry introduced all important measures. The legislation introduced by private members was "neither large in amount nor important in character."/22/ The passage of Standing Orders restrictive of private members' rights seems to have been facilitated by the lack of any natural backbench coalition. Often, the overuse of parliamentary devices was as annoying to other private members as it was to the Ministers, and the merits of the particular events precipitating each crisis sometimes confused the
issue of backbench rights—this was especially true of the Irish obstruction in the 1870s and 1880s. What may also have been important in making the abolition of the various devices for grabbing a bit of parliamentary time easier and more tolerable was the development of the question period. Many members had only sought to air a specific grievance or raise a fairly limited point and for these purposes a question was often adequate. At the same time the Government greatly preferred a question since they had previous notice of it and could answer it at a scheduled time.

The impact on voting behavior of the specific procedural developments which marked the Cabinet's rise was presumably not very great, but the cumulative effect of these developments—the increasing preeminence of the Cabinet—must have become evident to those concerned with the legislative output of parliament. Certainly it was evident to scholars. Todd notes in 1866 that

the rule that all great and important measures should emanate from the executive has of late years obtained increasing acceptance. The remarkable examples to the contrary, which are found in parliamentary history antecedent to the first Reform Acts, could not now occur, without betokening a weakness on the part of ministers of the crown which is inconsistent with their true relation towards the House of Commons. . . . Sir Robert Peel, in 1844, insisted that "individual
members of parliament had a perfect right to introduce such measures as they thought fit, without the sanction of the government."...But of late years the great increase of debates, and the annual accumulation of arrears of public business, have combined to render it practically impossible for Bills introduced by private members to become law, unless by the active assistance of the government./24/

Contemporaries did not have to read scholarly texts to find similar estimates of the Cabinet's importance. Walter Bagehot's series of articles in the Contemporary Review in the mid-60s (which later were collected in the English Constitution) popularized the distinction between the "dignified" and "efficient" parts of the constitution, and made it clear that the "efficient secret," the controlling power, of the English government lay in the Cabinet./25/

Even in the popular press, where there was not much concern to explicate the technical status of the Cabinet, the most obvious dramatis personae on whom to focus were the Cabinet Ministers and shadow Ministers, simply because these men increasingly took the leading roles in the introduction, criticism, and passage through the House of the important legislation. Vincent has put considerable emphasis on the importance of the new penny press, which arose after the removal of the Stamp Tax in
1856, in contributing to the "formation of national parties as communities of sentiment."/26/ Often less independent than the older papers, and more interested in politics as a method of increasing circulation, the new press tended to be consistently partisan. Verbatim reports of parliamentary debates allowed readers to follow the battle in parliament each day, the editorials providing consistent partisan cues. At election time, improved communication technology meant expanded press coverage, giving the elector a broader view of politics; the Times noted in 1859 that, whereas elections used to drag on for months,

we now live in an age of steam, and the phases of the contest succeed each other with startling rapidity....Not only have the leading statesmen of all parties addressed their constituents, but every electoral body has had an opportunity of scrutinising the appeals addressed to every other....Electors are no longer confined to the communications of their own candidates. They can peruse, contrast, and criticise a dozen addresses at a time,...and deduce perhaps rather a broader moral than any particular candidate intended to convey./27/

The "moral" which electors drew might also be influenced by the direct entry of the parties into press affairs; the Conservatives, for example, purchased in 1871 a business called the Central Press Board which served as a Conservative news agency for provincial papers./28/ The
expansion of the press in the provinces was facilitated by the telegraph (the number of papers jumping from 375 in 1856 to 851 in 1871), and Vincent speaks of the development of party attachments there as occurring "with such speed in the 1860s that it has been largely lost sight of."/29/

The penny press was not the only newly-increased mass medium that presented a party-oriented view of politics. The parties themselves entered the fray with redoubled effort after the expansion of the electorate. Whatever other functions the new national party associations may have had, scholars are agreed that one of their major activities was propagandizing the electorate on behalf of the parties. A stream of party broadsheets and pamphlets on such topics as "Who Are the Real Friends of the Working Class?" and "The Tory Reform Bill" flowed out from the NU, NLF and other central organs./30/

If the popular literature increasingly focused on the choice between the two major parties, so too did elections themselves. In the single-member districts, contests tended more often to pit one Conservative against one Liberal, and in the double-member districts, the two-against-two contest became more common (see Table
8.4). Further, with the development of local party associations after 1867, the candidates more often ran explicitly as the nominees of these associations,/31/ which meant that the tie to party was reinforced (this may have been especially important in an age when no party affiliations appeared on the ballot /32/). Hence, contests may well have been presented to voters as more of a party battle in the 1870s than in the 1850s, since elections in the later period might be contested by candidates bearing something like official party imprimatur conferred by organizations which contributed at the local level to the flow of partisan propaganda with posters, flyers and speeches.

Another development which may have fostered a partisan orientation after 1867 was a change in the policy agenda and a polarization of political feeling along a reform/anti-reform axis. The agenda in the 20 years after the repeal of the Corn Laws was largely negative, aimed at preventing the schemes of the Radicals in the House from coming to fruition. As noted in chapter 4, there was an explicit agreement between Derby (the Conservative leader) and Palmerston (the Liberal Prime Minister) to this effect, and the effort was perhaps aided by the prosperity of the nation in the
1850s and 1860s. Palmerston's foreign policy successes and his popularity with the people gave him am immense prestige, and most proponents of reform were agreed that progress would have to await his retirement. Palmerston died soon after the 1865 election, and the agitation which had begun in 1859 finally culminated two years later in the Second Reform Act. Reformist agitation did not stop there, however. Hanham notes:

For the seventeen years after 1867 there was scarcely a break in the catalogue of reforms, even during the life of the Conservative parliament of 1874 to 1880. As Gladstone wrote prophetically in his Chapter of Autobiography (1868), the "movement of the public mind has been of a nature entirely transcending former experience," and the public soon became prepared for changes which had seemed out of the question only a few years before. At the same time, a clear division between reformers and anti-reformers began to emerge, which gradually transformed both political parties.../33/

Issues of reform, pushed onto the agenda chiefly by the Radical wing of the Liberal party, served to define or redefine party boundaries. The growing Radical contingent, made possible by the expansion of the electorate, moved toward radical reform; their proposals, now with the authority of substantial numbers in the House of Commons and no longer safely bottled up by a
conspiracy between the leadership of the two parties, demarcated the real political cleavages, and made the position of the Whigs in the Liberal party anomalous. A prophetic article in 1880 entitled "The Unstable Equilibrium of Parties" highlighted this anomaly, decrying the "unnatural" division of moderate conservative politicians between the two great parties. The author noted that whereas "nine out of ten Liberals were until a quite recent period at one with their Conservative opponents in professing a desire to maintain the general framework of English institutions," the fact that the recent election had for the first time given the "new radicalism" a predominant position in the Liberal party meant that the Whigs were actually closer in feeling to the Conservatives than to the ruling faction of their own party. The author hopefully predicted that this could not last, and that the Whigs as a body would break off and join the Conservatives. /34/ As soon as an appropriate excuse appeared in the form of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill in 1885, this in fact happened.

As the choice between the parties became clearer, it is plausible that more voters formed durable partisan attachments. The work of a number of American scholars, generally those interested in the notion of "critical
elections," emphasizes the role of sharp issue cleavages in producing lasting partisan affiliations in the electorate;\(^{35}\) an even wider array of scholars pictures these affiliations as to some degree heritable, being passed on to the next generation in a fashion similar to the passing-on of religious preference.\(^{36}\) Hence, we may look to the sharp reform/anti-reform cleavage as productive of stable partisan attachments both in the "first" and succeeding generations. In this regard, it is interesting to recall W.S. Gilbert's ditty in Iolanthe (first produced in 1882) noting

How Nature always does contrive
That every boy and every gal,
That's born into the world alive,
Is either a little Liberal,
Or else a little Conservative! \(^ {37} \)

Why might voters have become more party-oriented in the 1860s and 1870s? Because the picture of politics to which they were exposed—-in the expanding popular press, in partisan propaganda from both national and local organizations, in the highbrow journals, and in scholarly treatises—all reflected the increasing predominance of the parties in government, and because, at election time, the choice that was offered or urged upon voters was increasingly a choice between two distinct parties. Those whose involvement in politics did not reach to a
careful weighing of the issues at each dissolution, and
who sought a simple and informative cue, which might
earlier have been their landlord, now turned naturally to
party; while those who paid closer attention to the
specific issues raised in the election realized that the
resolution of those issues depended crucially on the
question of which party secured office, and less on the
particular members within each party returned.

Thus far, we have discussed only factors which
should have focused the attention of electors on the
parties. We can approach the matter from the other side,
so to speak, and examine the foundations of the electoral
significance of individual candidates.

2. The Private Member in the Distributive Arena

It might seem that we could simply advert to the
evidence already given on the declining procedural status
of the private member and make a plausible case that
voters should not have remained candidate-oriented. But,
although that evidence does contribute to such a
conclusion, closer attention should be paid to the type
of policy which constituents expected their MPs to
influence. The general decline of the private member's
status is clear, but the scholars who have charted this
decline have not made any distinctions as to the area or type of policy in which private members were interested and sought to legislate. In general, the kinds of legislation one most readily thinks of in connection with individual legislators fall in the area of what Lowi has called distributive policy, /38/ concerned with the allocation of geographically divisible benefits, such as capital projects and grants for the establishment or support of various local services. Indeed, one of the most widely-observed behavioral regularities of geographically-based legislators is the provision of "particularistic" or divisible benefits to their constituents. /39/ It is natural to suppose that Victorian MPs also performed such services, and that they were valued for their ability to do so. Thus, the private member's inability to initiate legislation on more general matters of public policy may not have been too debilitating if he could still influence the course of distributive policy. Could he? On the face of it, not nearly so much as could his counterparts in other legislatures.

The most striking feature of distributive policy in late Victorian Britain is the degree to which the formal rules limited the private members' initiative. This is
especially evident when contrasted with the American experience. The mainstays of the U.S. Congressman's particularistic usefulness to his constituents have been, at various times, tariff bills, Civil Service patronage, and local improvement bills. Each of these areas was largely shut off from the influence of the private members of parliament after the mid-19th century.

First, tariff bills, which, with their many separate rates for different industries proved ideal vehicles for log-rolling in the U.S. Congress down into the 1930s, simply did not exist in Britain after the definitive triumph of the policy of free trade in the 1840s. Second, the local Civil Service patronage of which the member of parliament disposed declined throughout the 19th century. Whereas positions in the Revenue, Postal and other geographically dispersed branches of the Civil Service were regularly referred to the recommendation of the local member in the early part of the century, /40/ patronage in the Revenue departments began to decline with Lord Liverpool's renunciation (1820) of the direct appointment of superior offices in the Customs Service; and the reforms initiated by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1853), and furthered by Gladstone's Order in Council establishing open competition (1870), cut back
the patronage throughout the Civil Service. The last bits of local patronage—the provincial postmasterships—were turned over to the surveyors of the postal districts in 1896.\footnote{41}

A third area of distributive politics at least partially closed to the private member was the pork barrel. Whereas local improvements bills have long been a feature of American politics, the use of national resources for the benefit of particular places was largely avoided in Victorian Britain. There were, of course, local matters on which national expenditures were made: construction of post offices, education, and local police being three examples. But these funds tended to be disbursed according to fairly regular and general rules which mitigated, if they did not eliminate, particularistic pressures. Expenditure on the traditional bulwarks of the American pork barrel—rivers and harbors, railways, roads, dams and canals—was almost nonexistent. Except for expenditures on Harbours of Refuge and in the half dozen boroughs where the great ship-building shops of the state were maintained, and where the solicitude of the local members for such expenditures was proverbial, the government spent no money upon harbors. Neither canals nor roads nor
railroads were constructed by the Crown, and state involvement in these affairs—chiefly via the private bills procedure—greatly limited the influence which interested local members could have on the outcome./42/

The distinction between private and public bills was not always exact, especially as regards the affairs of the Metropolis, but generally "every bill for the particular interest or benefit of any person or persons"/43/ (here included local governments) was regarded as a private bill. Such bills had first been widely used in promoting turnpike roads and the enclosure of commons in the second half of the 18th century; in the 19th century, they were used to authorize construction of canals and railroads, to regulate local police and sanitation, and to grant private or municipal bodies the authority to undertake the provision of water, gas, electric light, tramway services, etc. The procedure on such bills was distinctly different from that governing matters of general public policy; although they were still regarded as legislation, and had to proceed through the same formal stages as any other bill, they were also viewed as inherently controversies between the promoters and opponents of the measure, and the committee stage of the bill was patterned after a trial in a court of law,
the "cases" being handled by barristers who had evolved almost into a distinct branch of the legal profession (the "parliamentary bar"). For most of the first half of the century, the private bill committees consisted chiefly of the parliamentary supporters and opponents of the measures referred to them. In 1844, however, the Commons began to staff their railway bill committees exclusively with impartial members, and this practice was extended to all other private bills in 1855. Each member chosen for private bill committee service was thereafter required to sign a declaration "that his constituents have no local interest, and that he has no personal interest" in the bill to be considered./44/

These changes reinforced the judicial character of private bill procedure and limited the services which an MP could render to local interests. Earlier in the 19th, and in the 18th century, a significant part of the job of many MPs was to steer through parliament private bills in their constituents' or patron's (or indeed, their own) interest. The MP generally prepared and introduced the bill, and often reported it from committee./45/ After the removal of interested members from the crucial committee stage, however, and the previous introduction of paid agents to prepare the bills, there was not nearly so much
that the member could do to defeat or promote such bills. In committee, the proceeding was judicial; out of committee, it was handled mostly by a registered agent retained for the purpose by the party promoting the bill (and MPs could not be agents /46/); only at stages occurring in the House could the member be useful, and then he was but one voice in a large assembly.

The points just raised provide another reason for believing that voters became less candidate-oriented after mid-century. As regards the "pure" divisible benefits--private bills and patronage--these had always been demanded by the local constituency elite, who were the most likely to know what could be expected from their members. Since the electoral decisions of these elites were magnified by the amount of their influence, elections earlier in the century may well have turned considerably on the ability of candidates to provide distributive benefits (and of course on the question of to whom in the constituency these benefits would be allocated). But, we may suppose that the important changes in private bill procedure and in the Civil Service did not go unnoticed, which would imply that the foundation of this kind of an orientation toward candidates was eroding.
Although the private member's ability to provide patronage and private bills declined, not all the trends concerning his particularistic usefulness were downward, and he had not become completely toothless by the 1860s. Anent financial legislation, private members apparently found ways in the third quarter of the century to evade the stringent restraints on their activity. By a Standing Order dating back to 1713, the House would not proceed upon any motion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue unless recommended by a Minister of the Crown, and in practice this rule had been extended to prohibit also any amendment which increased the sum proposed. Similarly, no taxes could be imposed except upon the recommendation of the Crown. Nonetheless, Todd notes in 1866 that

of late years it has become customary to permit the introduction of bills by private members, which, though not professedly in the nature of money bills, do yet necessitate, to a greater or less extent, the imposition of new charges upon the people... These bills have been either for the construction of certain public works, or for the establishment or encouragement of certain new institutions, or they have proposed to grant... compensation or aid to individuals, or associations for various causes assigned./47/

In order to avoid violating the Standing Orders, these bills would contain a clause noting that any necessary expenses should be "defrayed out of moneys
hereafter voted by parliament." Although this subterfuge was specifically forbidden in 1866, members could still affect the course of finances via resolutions stating the desirability of certain expenditures or by addresses to the Crown asking for expenditures and promising to make good on them. Gladstone even expressed the opinion (in 1877) that the responsible Ministers had suffered a loss of financial control, complaining that "local claims, and the interests of classes and individuals, are now relentlessly pressed from private and irresponsible quarters" via the use of addresses, resolutions and even bills which committed the Government to expenditures. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the use of resolutions and addresses in this fashion, nor is there a body of case studies on which one can base conclusions about the usual motivations prompting them. The few examples that Todd gives fit with a picture of the MP as a seeker of local benefit. But how significant were these trends? Could a private member claim credit for some specific item of expenditure, as his American counterparts were so wont to do? It seems doubtful. Resolutions had to be made in the House, and addresses in Committee of the Whole; neither came from a small committee over which the individual MP could claim to have significant and regular
control. But the efforts of MPs to evade the spirit of the financial Standing Orders do at least show that the provision of divisible benefits to constituents was actively pursued.

Overall, the evidence from parliamentary history is decidedly against the continuation of an orientation toward candidates in the electorate. The private member's ability to provide pure divisible benefits, which seems the firmest basis for his independent electoral significance, clearly declines. His capacity to initiate and pass public bills also clearly declines. And, although "raiding the Treasury" in the interests of constituents may have become more common as national expenditures grew, we have no direct evidence that electors responded to this.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII


5. We use the term "elector" very broadly. Anyone with the effective disposal of a vote or votes is considered an elector, whatever his or her legal status.


16. Fraser, op. cit., p. 452.


21. Ibid., p. 312.

22. Ibid., p. 314.


27. The Times [London], April 11, 1859, p. 8.

28. E.J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 120.

29. Vincent, op. cit., p. xxxii.

30. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties, pp. 159-60.


37. Quoted in Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 166.


41. Ibid., p. 170.

42. This and the succeeding paragraph are based largely on Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 514-519 and Vol. I, pp. 367-93.


44. The form of this declaration had been set by 1850; see Ibid., p. 529.


46. May, op. cit., p. 510.


48. Ibid., p. 190.


CHAPTER VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PARTY-ORIENTED ELECTORATE (2)

The best-known landmarks of 19th century British political history remain the three Reform Acts which, in the Whig interpretation, punctuated the march from an aristocratic and factional politics, prevalent in the early years of the century, to a party-based and democratic politics at the end of the century. The unreformed electoral system, which lasted until the passage of the first Reform Act in 1832, was based on the enfranchisement of particular communities: the counties and the parliamentary boroughs, each such constituency typically returning two members to Parliament. Within the boundaries of the geographically-defined constituencies, local customs and special enactments determined which men were actually allowed to vote, with the result that the franchise approximated universal manhood suffrage in a few places, was confined to a small corporation in others, and dwindled to a single elector in the rotten boroughs of Old Sarum and Gatton. The first Reform Act did away with some of the worst anomalies of this system by, first, wholly or partly disfranchising 86 of the smallest boroughs and distributing the seats thus freed to the new county divisions created by the Act, and to some of the larger
cities--e.g., Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds--which had previously been unrepresented in Parliament; taking a step toward uniformity in the franchise by granting the vote in all boroughs to those occupying a house worth ten pounds a year: thereby, with other provisions, allowing about a 50% increase in the national electorate; and third, providing for the creation of registers of voters. Notwithstanding the apparent importance of these changes, historians have emphasized that most of the features of the unreformed system survived the Act: although the utterly rotten boroughs were gone, 39% of English boroughs still had registered electorates of less than 500; proprietary or pocket boroughs, the seats of which were essentially in the gift of certain powerful noblemen and commoners, persisted; and electoral influence, corruption, and violence remained, in the view of many historians, the chief determinants of election results./1/

Electoral influence in the period between the first and second Reform Acts took a variety of forms. Norman Gash, a noted authority on this period, relates, for example, how the vice chancellor of Cambridge University sent round the marshall of the University to the licensed lodging-house keepers in order to recommend a candidate, and how the day for renewing licenses was deferred until
after a Parliamentary by-election in 1834./2/ One of the commonest forms of influence was the practice of dealing exclusively with shopkeepers who had voted "correctly" and withdrawing custom from those who had not./3/ In the counties, the influence of landlord over tenant was taken for granted. Gash has concluded that

It may indeed be stated as a generalization that wherever in ordinary social and economic relationships there existed authority on the one side and dependence on the other, political influence was always liable to be exercised./4/

Competing with influence in the determination of elections were corruption and electoral violence. According to Gash, the purchase of votes, the temporary (and more or less involuntary) detention of voters in an inebriated state until the day of the poll, outright physical coercion, and a variety of other corrupt and coercive tactics all played a part, and cumulatively, a significant part, in English elections after the first Reform Act./5/

The next major reform of English electoral politics came in 1867 with the passage of the second Reform Act. Once again, some of the smaller boroughs were wholly or partly disfranchised, new boroughs and county divisions being given seats. The franchise in the counties was enlarged and that in the boroughs extended to all
householders, with the practical result that the
registered electorate in England nearly doubled between
1865, the last pre-reform election, and 1868, the first
post-reform election. After the report of the Hartington
Committee in 1870 revealed the extent to which corrupt
practices and "undue" influence had survived the reform,
Parliament adopted vote by secret ballot in 1872 (the
Ballot Act); previous to this legislation, voting had
been entirely public, with the elector declaring his vote
viva voce at the hustings, a practice which facilitated
the purchase of votes and the exertion of influence.

Although the changes effected by the Reform and
Ballot Acts were fundamental, H.J. Hanham, whose
Elections and Party Management is the standard work on
the period between the second and third Reform Acts,
emphasizes the essential continuity of British political
life down to the reforms of 1883-85.\(^6\)/ Proprietary
boroughs, "where a patron normally succeeded in
maintaining a traditional interest by returning the
candidate of his choice," could still be found: Hanham
lists 39 for England, and 7 for the rest of the U.K.\(^7\)/
Rich men could still make or purchase influence: Robert
Richardson-Gardner, going to Windsor in 1866 to "create
an interest," spent lavishly on clubs, charity, and
entertainment; purchased property and erected dwellings
which would qualify their tenants for the franchise; accepted only Conservative tenants; evicted those who voted against him in 1868; and was returned in 1874, by which time he had 220 voting tenants, representing more than 10% of the legal electorate. 

And, those who had influence might still offer seats to their friends, as in this succinct letter from a prominent cotton-spinner of Ashton-under-Lyne:

Dear Melly, Will you be able to sit for this borough? I know you voted on the Lawson Bill and would vote for Scottish Disestablishment. We have a majority. Very sincerely, Hugh Mason.

Viewing the whole period from the first to the third Reform Acts, Hanham concludes that "the electoral history of the period between 1832 and 1885 is largely the history of electoral influence." 

The picture of electoral politics just sketched cannot do justice to the fuller portraits offered by Professors Gash and Hanham. But it does indicate the background upon which subsequent scholars have set their work. Thus, for example, T.J. Nossiter has emphasized the politics of opinion as well as the politics of influence and purse. Derek Fraser has especially stressed that the larger cities of the north could not be controlled by influence and bribery, and that the
successful MPs in these constituencies gave careful consideration to the wishes of their constituents in their speeches and votes in Parliament.\textsuperscript{12} D.C. Moore, while accepting and elaborating on the dominance of influence in the early Victorian period, argues that its effectiveness declined in the 1860s and 1870s.\textsuperscript{13} R.W. Davis and R.J. Olney, in their studies of electoral politics in Buckinghamshire and Lincolnshire, find that the extent of electoral influence has in some cases been exaggerated, and that there existed a substantial amount of independence in the electorate. Davis and Olney both emphasize evidence that MPs were grilled by their constituents regarding their votes, and even their attendance, in Parliament.\textsuperscript{14} The close questioning to which an MP could be subjected are illustrated by this passage from Davis:

In response to a direct question, he admitted that he had voted for a revision of the Corn Laws...More questioning revealed that he had been ill on the occasion of a division for total repeal, and that though he had voted with Chandos on the first division on the latter's motion for an inquiry into agricultural distress, he had not voted with him in the second division because the result had the motion succeeded would have been to bring down the government.\textsuperscript{15}

The controversies of Victorian political historians over the relative importance of influence, corruption and
opinion at elections simply cannot be found if one moves to the literature on British elections in the 20th century. Electoral choice a century later is pictured largely as a function of social class and partisan preference,/16/ and the central themes of the political historians find only passing reference. At some point between the elector in 1851 who observed that, "as a tenant-farmer, I well know, that when we are given to understand which way our landlord means to vote, and are canvassed by his steward and lawyer, we quite understand which way we are expected to go,"/17/ and the elector in 1951 who asserted, rather more succinctly, "I would vote for a pig if my party put one up,"/18/ voting behavior had clearly changed considerably.

Yet, although the sheer fact of change in electoral behavior has been frequently noted, there has been remarkably little detailed attention to when and how such changes occurred. There is a broad agreement amongst Victorian scholars that electoral influence was of greatly diminished significance after the third Reform Act, but the timing of the decline before this is disputed. D.C. Moore has argued that poll books became "unpublishable" because the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system of electoral influence which they facilitated and presupposed were declining./19/ This
would appear to put the decline in the 1860s and 1870s. H.J. Hanham, on the other hand, has emphasized the continued importance of influence down to the sweeping electoral reforms of 1883-85. Similarly, there is broad agreement that British electors had become highly party-oriented by the mid-20th century, voting for parties rather than candidates. But the question of when such a party orientation began to develop, of when voters became accustomed to vote for parties so that observers could "fairly firmly [agree] that a particular candidate, whatever his merits, is not likely to add or subtract more than about 500-1000 votes to the total his party would win, regardless of who had been nominated,"/20/—and this out of an average district of 56,000—has not been satisfactorily answered. Those scholars who have dealt with this issue have not supported their arguments by systematic reference to the only documents—the poll books and ballot counts—which capture enough of mass behavior to convincingly address it.

The central purpose of this chapter is to investigate the when and why of change in Victorian electoral behavior. Our interest focuses in particular on the question of when British electors became party-oriented. In this inquiry, we shall employ an
expected utility maximization model of voting in a double-member constituency. The decision problem faced by electors in these districts was more complicated than that faced in the single-member districts, and the electoral options available only in the two-seat elections are particularly revealing of electoral motivation, and important to our study. The double-member districts were also the most common in the period under examination. Before 1867, 240 (60%) of the 401 constituencies in the U.K. returned two members to parliament, while between 1867 and the redistribution of 1885, 211 of 420 districts did so. Before we introduce the model, it will be useful to note some of the features of electoral behavior in the double-member districts which contemporaries and scholars have highlighted, and to survey the evidence on changes in electoral behavior.

1. Electoral Behavior in the Double-Member Districts

Electors in the double-member districts had two votes, which they could cast in any manner they wished, short of giving both votes to the same candidate. Thus, in a three candidate contest, such as that held at the General Election of 1874 in Pontefract between the Right Hon. H.C.E. Childers (a Liberal), Samuel Waterhouse (a Conservative), and Viscount Pollington (also a
Conservative), there were six ballots which could legally be cast: those voting for Childers and Waterhouse, for Childers and Pollington, and for Waterhouse and Pollington—these three being all the possible "double" ballots, in contemporary parlance;\textsuperscript{/21/} and those voting for Childers alone, for Waterhouse alone, and for Pollington alone—these being all the "single" ballots or "plumpers". As it turned out—and this was typical—the electors of Pontefract employed all six kinds of ballot in 1874, as can be seen in appendix 1, which displays the number of ballots of each kind cast in that election. Elections in Victorian Britain (even those after the secret ballot had been introduced in 1872) were often documented in essentially the format of appendix 1 in the newspapers, and it is on these invaluable electoral records, which we refer to as "ballot counts", that much of the analysis in this chapter is based.

Contemporaries of course also had access to ballot counts, and were aware of the rates at which electors split their votes between the parties. In Pontefract, we see that 182 voters cast Childers/Waterhouse, and 53 cast Childers/Pollington ballots, these amounting to 14.2% of the total ballots (and voters, since there was one ballot per voter). One reason suggested by contemporaries for split voting in races which pitted two members of one
party against a lone member of another party was that the partisans of the "minority" party (i.e., the party putting up only one candidate) had an incentive to use their second votes to help the lesser evil in the other party. This incentive to cross vote did not exist when there were two candidates from both parties, and it was often argued that running a single candidate was bad strategy, since the second votes of one's own partisans might be the cause of defeat. Whether running one candidate was bad strategy or not, contemporaries were apparently correct that the incentive to cast split votes in two-against-one contests was greater than that in two-against-two contests; the mean split voting rate in the 100 three candidate contests from the sample described below was 16.3%, while that in the four candidate races was 7.1%.

An interesting assertion about the causes of split voting in general is made in an 1866 article from the Fortnightly Review:

At present we see the larger proportion of the electors in the boroughs and county constituencies, where two members are to be chosen, give one vote to a Liberal and another to a Conservative. Thus they secure the grand object of giving offence to neither party...
It would appear that the author is referring to competing electoral influences. A shopkeeper, for example, faced with a Tory landlord and an important Whig customer, may have split his vote in order to offend neither. Was this kind of cross-pressuring influence common? It is hard to say. In some counties, attempts by candidates to influence both votes of their tenants were viewed with disapproval./24/ If candidates did generally seek only one vote from their tenants (or other dependents), then perhaps the second vote was frequently at risk of being cast for another party as a method of appeasing other influences (or the voter's conscience). The typical evidence given that electoral influence was widespread, however, presupposes that it controlled both votes, as when Olney shows that those Lincolnshire parishes wholly owned by Tory (Whig) Lords voted wholly Tory (Whig)--or nearly so./25/

The question of whether electoral influence was generally cross-pressuring or "complete" is relevant to our study. As we shall see, split voting declined considerably in the 1860s and 1870s. We have already noted that influence is believed to have been declining in the same period, and if it was generally cross-pressuring, then this provides a likely explanation of the decline in split voting. We have, however, no
firm basis for considering cross-pressuring influence to be significant. The article quoted above is the only contemporary allusion to such a phenomenon that we have found, and most historians do not mention it at all. Nossiter is the only historian to address the existence of cross-pressuring influence explicitly in regards to split voting, and he considers it unimportant, at least in the boroughs./26/

If influence was complete rather than cross-pressuring, then its importance for a study of split voting is chiefly that it magnifies the decisions of influential men in the statistics. We can consider a hypothetical county constituency in which the electorate is dominated by a relatively few landed magnates together with their numerous tenants, and suppose that tenants always vote exactly as their landlords do: no hint or breath of policy or party considerations crosses their minds. The split voting rates in this county for the most part reflect the decisions of the landlords, each being weighted by the number of his tenants. We can hold the amount of influence constant, and produce virtually any rates of split voting by stipulating the decisions of the landed magnates. A decline in influence in such a constituency would produce declines in split voting only if the formerly dependent voters tended to cast fewer
split votes than the landlords. This may have been the case to the extent that influential electors were more candidate-oriented (being the clientele for patronage and private bills, and also being educated and informed enough to make more refined political judgments).

Another kind of voting choice relevant to the question of how party-oriented voters were, which we refer to as a non-partisan plumper, has received much less attention than the split vote. In the Pontefract election of appendix 1, we see that 60 voters cast single ballots for Waterhouse and 37 did the same for Pollington. As these voters were distinguishing between members of the same party, they evidently employed criteria other than partisan preference. One suggestion as to what these criteria might have been points to the refusal of candidates with influence to share it with members of the same party. At the 1832 election in Buckinghamshire, for example, the Marquis of Chandos, "always cautious in estimating his own chances of success," refused to release electors who had pledged to give him plumpers despite the pleas of another Tory who had entered the contest./27/ Whether or not non-partisan plumpers stemmed often from the "selfish" use of influence, it is clear that they were more a "personal" than a "party" vote.
Motivations other than those touched on above undoubtedly existed for both split voting and non-partisan plumping. We shall deal with some of these later, in a discussion which also encompasses the other voting options evident in appendix 1, where we see two species of what might be called party votes: the plumpers for Childers and the double ballots for Waterhouse and Pollington.

2. The Decline in Split Voting and Non-partisan Plumping

Now that we have a basic familiarity with the electoral options available to British voters before 1885, we can turn to the evidence. The pioneer in the use of ballot counts to study electoral behavior is T.J. Nossiter, whose stimulating papers have cast much light on the subject./28/ Nossiter has used the ballot counts reported in W.W. Bean's invaluable Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties of England /29/ to calculate split voting rates in two-member north English boroughs from 1832 to 1868. Naturally, in this work, the question of the party affiliation of the candidates is important, that information determining which of the double votes are to be counted as split. Nossiter has apparently accepted the party affiliations given in Bean for the most part, although it is evident
that he has used other sources as well. After finding
that a few of the higher split voting rates reported by
Nossiter appeared to stem from errors in Bean’s
attributions of party, we have decided to use the party
affiliations given in F.W.S. Craig’s British
Parliamentary Election Results, 1832-1885, a more recent,
and, hopefully, more carefully proofread, reference
work./30/ We have also compiled statistics for both
county and borough constituencies. These two changes in
procedure do not greatly affect most of the yearly split
voting rates, and our figures are generally close to
those of Nossiter. In 1859, however, they account for a
drop of roughly ten percentage points in the average
split voting rate. More important than any difference
between our and Nossiter’s split voting figures is that
we have not stopped our compilation at 1868, but have
included 1874 and 1880 as well, and have also calculated
non-partisan plumping rates./31/

Table 8.1 below gives, for all General Elections
between 1841 and 1880, the unweighted mean split voting
and non-partisan plumping rates in selected county
divisions and boroughs of the six northern counties of
England: Northumberland, Cumberland, Durham,
Westmorland, Yorkshire and Lancashire. The six northern
counties contained 59 constituencies returning one fifth
TABLE 8.1: SPLIT VOTING AND NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING IN THE SIX NORTHERN COUNTIES OF ENGLAND, 1841-1880

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL ELECTION</th>
<th>MEAN SPLIT VOTING RATE</th>
<th>MEAN NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING RATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from W.W. Bean, Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties; party affiliations from F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885.

TABLE 8.2: SPLIT VOTING AND NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING BEFORE AND AFTER 1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEAN SPLIT VOTES</th>
<th>MEAN NON-PARTISAN PLUMPERS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEFORE 1867</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTER 1867</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T=5.1</td>
<td>T=4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: t-tests are both significant at .001 level. The figures are based on all contests, not just the two-against-one and two-against-two contests discussed in the text.
of all English MPs, before 1867, and 67 constituencies returning nearly one fourth of all English MPs, after 1867. In terms of population, the north loomed even larger, accounting for 29.5% of the total English population in 1861 and 30.8% in 1871. The question of how far we may generalize from the data for northern England will be dealt with presently; for the moment, we are satisfied to study the North for its own sake, as a large and important part of England.

As can be seen in the table, both the split voting and the non-partisan plumping rates are generally lower after than before 1867. Table 8.2 collapses Table 8.1 by period to make this more evident: the mean split voting rate drops from 19.2% before 1867 to 7.2% after; while the mean non-party plumping rate drops from 10.7% to 3.3%; both these drops being significant.

Nor are these drops simply artifacts of a compositional change in the kind of election contests occurring. While it is true, both in the northern counties and in the U.K. as a whole, that two-against-one contests were less common after 1867 (relative to two-against-two contests), the declines in split voting and non-partisan plumping occurred within both classes of contest. Considering only the
two-against-one contests, for example, split voting declines from an average of 20.3% to 6.6%, while non-partisan plumping declines from 9.4% to 2.6%.

The decline in split voting and non-partisan plumping rates in the North is all the more worth emphasizing since Nossiter, the only other researcher to look at this data, after noting that the generally high levels of split voting in the 1832-68 period indicated that "the party system did not entirely succeed in mobilising the electorate," concludes: "nor is there any pronounced secular trend towards firmer party organisation at elections revealed in this evidence as time passed, either in the north of England or in the rest of the country."/32/ That Nossiter stopped his analysis in 1868 largely accounts for his failure to notice the clear decline in split voting in the northern counties from the pre-1867 to the post-1867 periods. It is also interesting to note that both the split voting and non-partisan plumping rates appear to decline from 1847 on, although by no means monotonically. Nossiter's figures on the split voting rates in selected English boroughs outside of the North show such a decline too. We shall continue in this chapter to emphasize the contrast between the periods before and after 1867, but
it is best kept in mind that this is probably concentrating on the largest step in a longer-term trend.

How widespread were these trends in split voting and non-partisan plumping? Were they phenomena special to the northern counties of England? Based on a statistical analysis of the whole of the U.K. which employs a measure proxying the total non-partisan voting rate (the sum of the split voting and non-partisan plumping rates), we believe not.

In order to understand the rationale behind the measure we employ, consider once again the 1874 election in Pontefract. The number of each kind of ballot cast in this election can be designated according to the following scheme. First, number the candidates in the order that they finished in the poll. Thus, Childers is candidate 1, Waterhouse 2 and Pollington 3. The number of Childers plumpers is then designated B(1) (the number of ballots voting for the first candidate only), the number of Waterhouse/Pollington double ballots is B(2,3), and so on. The total number of non-partisan votes, NPV, is the sum of the split votes (SV) and the non-partisan plumpers (NPP): the split votes are SV = B(1,2) + B(1,3); the non-partisan plumpers are NPP = B(2) + B(3); and the total non-partisan votes are NPV = SV + NPP. In
constituencies which saw a two-against-one contest but for which a ballot count is not available, we can still fashion a downward-biased proxy for NPV by taking the difference of the total votes received by the two candidates of the same party. In Pontefract, the total votes received by Waterhouse (T(2)) and Pollington (T(3)) were:

\[ T(2) = B(2) + B(1,2) + B(2,3) \]
\[ T(3) = B(3) + B(1,3) + B(2,3) \]

and the difference was

\[ D = T(2) - T(3) = B(2) + B(1,2) - [B(3) + B(1,3)]. \]

If we compare D to NPV we see that \( D = \text{NPV} - 2[B(3)+B(1,3)] > 0 \). Thus, D gives us a downward-biased estimate of NPV, where the bias is twice the number of non-partisan plumpers and split votes associated with the weaker candidate of the party contesting both seats.

What we shall refer to as the "intra-party difference" (or IPD) is formed by dividing D by the total number of votes cast at the election. This procedure introduces a further downward bias,\(^{33}\) but we are not so much interested in using the intra-party difference to proxy the non-partisan voting rate in any given year as
to study trends over time, and for this purpose the downward bias does not matter; what matters is how highly the intra-party difference correlates with the non-partisan voting rate. In the northern counties, where we have ballot counts and can compute both the intra-party difference and the non-partisan voting rate, the correlation between these is .53 (which is significant at the .0001 level). Since we use the IPD only in averages—either yearly or by period—this level of correlation is adequate; the same basic conclusions would be drawn by a scholar who had only the figures on the intra-party difference (and interpreted them as valid indicators of trends in the non-partisan voting rate) and one who had the true figures. Indeed, if we rank the General Elections from 1841 to 1880 in order of their average non-partisan voting rate, and in order of their average IPD, the two orderings are the same except for one year out of place (1841).

We can have a certain amount of confidence, therefore, when we turn to the data in Table 8.3, which gives the mean and median intra-party difference for all two-against-one and two-against-two contests in the U.K. at each General Election from 1859 to 1880. The trends revealed there corroborate the more detailed investigation of the northern counties. Both in
TABLE 8.3: INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES IN ALL U.K.
TWO-AGAINST-ONE AND TWO-AGAINST-TWO CONTESTS, 1859-1880

PANEL I: TWO-AGAINST-ONE CONTESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL ELECTION</th>
<th>MEAN IPD</th>
<th>MEDIAN IPD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PANEL II. TWO-AGAINST-TWO CONTESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL ELECTION</th>
<th>MEAN IPD</th>
<th>MEDIAN IPD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral data were coded from McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book of All Elections 1832-1918.
two-against-one and in two-against-two contests, the intra-party difference declines after the second Reform Act. If we compare all elections—both by- and general—from 1859 to October 1868 with those after the new registers took effect, the mean intra-party difference falls in three candidate elections from .071 to .039, and in four candidate elections from .033 to .015, both of these being statistically significant. And, these differences are not much altered when we exclude the six northern counties (becoming, respectively, .073 to .041 and .032 to .017).

Although the intra-party difference is useful in indicating trends in the non-partisan voting rate, it does not have a particularly clear interpretation in terms of the behavior of individual electors within any given year. The basic problem is that the units of the numerator—ballots or electors—do not gibe with the units of the denominator—votes. For an individual candidate, the vote total does correspond exactly to a number of electors, since there was no cumulation: if a candidate received x votes, there must have been x voters supporting him. But when we add the vote totals of all candidates, as we do to get the denominator of the IPD, we double count all those electors who cast double ballots. Hence, the IPD is not really a rate of
occurrence of specific behavioral acts within a well-defined population.

An alternative statistic, with a direct interpretation in terms of individual behavior, can be constructed by choosing a different denominator for D, and re-interpreting D itself. Recall that D is the excess of non-partisan ballots which the stronger of two candidates of the same party received. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between ballots and electors, and since by taking the difference we eliminate double counting, another way to put this is that at least D of the electors who gave a vote to the stronger candidate did so in the form of a non-partisan ballot. If we divide D by the total number of votes received by the higher placed candidate—which is equal to the number of voters who voted for him—we get a statistic Z which gives a lower bound on the percentage of all electors voting for this candidate who cast non-partisan ballots. This figure of course suffers from a downward bias as does the IPD, but it has a direct behavioral interpretation and would certainly be preferable if interest centered on the absolute level of non-partisan voting in a given year.
For our purposes, Z and IPD seem about equally useful. Z has a cleaner interpretation, but pertains to the wrong population (all electors who voted for a given candidate, rather than all electors who voted), while IPD is messier to interpret, but should relate to the population of interest more closely. In any event, if we had used Z in Table 8.3 instead of IPD, the substantive conclusions concerning the decline of split voting and non-partisan plumping would be the same.

Further evidence consonant with the hypothesis that split voting and non-partisan plumping were declining throughout the U.K. can be found by examining the actual outcomes of election contests. The outcome of an election can be symbolized by a numerical code indicating the number of candidates of the same party and the order of finish. The 1874 election in Pontefract, which ended with Childers, a Liberal, at the top of the poll, followed by the two Conservatives, can be represented in a simple alphabetic code as "LCC" (a four candidate election with a Liberal, then two Conservatives and another Liberal would be "LCCL", and so on). We can then collapse such alphabetic codes by ignoring the identity of the parties and just recording their order of finish. /34/ Thus, the Pontefract election would be a '122'--telling us that there was one candidate of some
party who finished first, and two candidates of some other party who trailed him. A '1212' code tells us that the party of the first place candidate also had a candidate placing third, while another party secured the second and fourth slots.

In this notation, there are only five possible outcomes from three candidate elections: 111 (all candidates of the same party); 123 (no two candidates of the same party); and 112, 121 and 122 (the possible outcomes from what we have referred to as a two-against-one contest). For present purposes, interest focuses on the 121 outcomes as a percentage of two-against-one contests. Such outcomes cannot occur if only party votes are cast; they represent one of the concrete consequences of the widespread split voting and non-partisan plumping in the pre-Reform period, and their decline (shown in Table 8.4) gives another perspective on the decline of non-partisan modes of voting.

The decreasing frequency with which constituencies returned members of different parties to parliament is evident also in four candidate contests. Of the three outcomes possible from a two-against-two contest—1122, 1212 and 1221—only the first does not
TABLE 8.4: TYPES OF ELECTION OUTCOMES IN DOUBLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS

PANEL I: THREE-CANDIDATE CONTESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Outcome Type</th>
<th>111</th>
<th>123</th>
<th>121</th>
<th>122</th>
<th>112</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PANEL II: FOUR-CANDIDATE CONTESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Outcome Type</th>
<th>1122</th>
<th>1212</th>
<th>1221</th>
<th>subtotal</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(51.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(61.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(69.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral data were coded from McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book of All Elections.
Note: The percentages given in parentheses are based on the grand totals in each general election.
presuppose a certain amount of non-partisan voting. And, the percentage of two-against-two contests which resulted in 1122 outcomes increases from an average of 76.5% in 1859 and 1865 to 85.5% in 1868, 1874 and 1880.

3. A Model of Electoral Behavior in the Double-Member Districts

Why did the changes documented in the previous section occur? In order to establish a basis from which to answer this question, we turn to an analysis which will give a unified treatment of the electoral decision problem, encompassing the various motivations for splitting the vote, for partisan and non-partisan plumping, and for voting a straight party ballot.

There are two basic classes of reasons for casting a particular ballot; the voter may make his choice in order to help bring about the victory of the candidate or candidates he prefers, or to secure benefits (avoid costs) which are directly contingent upon his choice (as when he accepts a bribe, or bows to influence). We shall focus first on the outcome of voting, and voters' preferences over these outcomes.

In a three candidate election (between Messrs. 1, 2 and 3) there are three possible outcomes in the normal
course of affairs: either the first and second, the first and third, or the second and third candidates will be returned to parliament. We denote these outcomes as $(1,2)$, $(1,3)$ and $(2,3)$, respectively, and assume that each elector has preferences amongst these outcomes which can be represented by a utility function, $u$. The preferences of a voter over outcomes may stem from a variety of sources, among which we distinguish two, corresponding to the notions of candidate- and party-oriented electors introduced earlier. First, an elector may prefer a slate of candidates because of the policy positions which they espouse (and would, if elected, presumably support in parliament). Second, an elector may prefer a slate of candidates because of the party with which they are affiliated. The partisan preference of the elector in turn may be based on his anticipation of what kinds of policy the party will support (or prevent), his retrospective evaluation of the past performance and policy of the party, and the affective orientations which early socialization experiences in the home, and later experiences in the workplace, have imparted.

Consider now an elector for whom $u(1,2)>u(1,3)>u(2,3)$. The only choice such an elector will face (if, as we assume, he seeks to maximize
expected utility, and has decided not to abstain totally from voting) is that between plumping for 1 (written \{1\}) and voting for 1 and 2 (written \{1, 2\}). This can be seen as follows. First, the elector will never vote for 3, since the only effect such a vote can have is to defeat either 1 (changing the result from (1, 2) to (2, 3)) or 2 (changing the result from (1, 2) to (2, 3)), and the elector desires neither of these changes. Second, the elector will never cast a plumper for 2, since this is dominated by \{1, 2\}: the only effect the vote for 1 can have is to defeat either 2 (changing the result from (2, 3) to (1, 3)) or 3 (changing the result from (2, 3) to (1, 2)), both changes the elector wants. So, the elector is indeed left with only two ballots—\{1\} and \{1, 2\}—to consider.

If the elector knows how everyone else will vote, then he has a simple problem; he needs only calculate what the outcome would be if he voted \{1\}, what it would be if he voted \{1, 2\}, and choose the ballot leading to the preferred outcome. For most configurations of how everyone else has voted, the two ballots will be equivalent. For example, if we let T(j) stand for the total number of votes received by candidate j exclusive of the votes of the elector under consideration, and \(T(0) = \min\{T(2), T(3)\}\), then when \(T(0) > T(1) + 1\), both 2
and 3 are "out of reach"—the outcome will be (2,3) no matter what ballot the elector casts.

Using the notation just introduced, we can define twelve mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of nature. We define the state $S(0)$ as the situation in which $T(0) > T(1) + 1$; the other states are defined in Table 8.5. The entries in this table are ordered triplets of probabilities $(q_1, q_2, q_3)$, where $q_1$ is the probability that $(1,2)$ will be the outcome, $q_2$ is the probability that $(1,3)$ will be the outcome, and $q_3$ is the probability that $(2,3)$ will be the outcome. For example, the definition of state $S(1)$ is $T(0) = T(1) + 1$ and $T(3) > T(2)$, which is equivalent to $T(3) > T(2) = T(1) + 1$. If the elector votes $\{1\}$ in this situation, he brings about a tie between 1 and 2, with 3 a clear winner. As we assume that ties are broken equiprobably, both 1 and 2 have a probability of one-half of being returned along with 3, which implies that $q_1 = 0$, $q_2 = 1/2$, and $q_3 = 1/2$.

The elector's choice between $\{1\}$ and $\{1,2\}$ depends on the expected utility of the various probabilistic outcomes in Table 8.5. For notational simplicity, we assume that the utility function $u$ is normalized so that $u(1,2) = 1$, $u(2,3) = 0$, and $u(1,3) = b$, where $0 < b < 1$. The expected payoffs to both strategies can now be computed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States of Nature</th>
<th>T = T - 1</th>
<th>T = T + 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B.5**
simply by taking the scalar product of \((1, b, 0)\) with the entries in Table 8.5. We have done this for those states in which the ballots yield different outcomes (and hence, different payoffs). The results are shown in Table 8.6.

We assume that the elector has beliefs about how the other electors will cast their ballots. These beliefs are represented in the model by a 12-tuple of subjective probabilities

\[ p = (p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4, p_5, p_6, p_7, p_8, p_9, p_{10}, p_{11}) , \]

\[ p_j > 0, \quad \sum_{j=0}^{n} p_j = 1 \]

where \(p_0\) is the elector's subjective probability that \(S(0)\) will hold and the other \(p_j\) are defined analogously. The assumption of expected utility maximization postulates that the citizen will choose that act with the highest associated expected utility.

In the present instance, the elector will choose \(\{1\}\) over \(\{1,2\}\) if the expected utility of \(\{1\}\), denoted \(EU(\{1\})\), exceeds \(EU(\{1,2\})\); that is, if
### TABLE 8.6: PAYOFF MATRIX FOR A THREE-CANDIDATE TWO-SEAT ELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTS</th>
<th>$S_1$</th>
<th>$S_2$</th>
<th>$S_4$</th>
<th>$S_5$</th>
<th>$S_6$</th>
<th>$S_7$</th>
<th>$S_{10}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{1}</td>
<td>$b/2$</td>
<td>$\frac{b+1}{3}$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$\frac{b+1}{2}$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$\frac{b+1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{1,2}</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$1/2$</td>
<td>$b/2$</td>
<td>$\frac{b+1}{3}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\frac{b+1}{2}$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ p_1 \left( \frac{b}{3} - 1 \right) + p_2 \left( \frac{b+1}{3} - \frac{1}{2} \right) + p_4 \left( b - \frac{b}{2} \right) + p_5 \left( b - \frac{b+1}{3} \right) + p_6 \left( \frac{b+1}{2} - 1 \right) + p_9 \left( b - \frac{b+1}{2} \right) + p_{10} \left( \frac{b+1}{2} - 1 \right) > 0 \]

This condition simplifies to

\[ b > \frac{r(2)}{2} + \frac{r(3)}{r(1) + r(2) + r(3)} \quad (*) \]

where \( r(1) = p_1 + p_4 \) = the probability that the only effect of the vote for 2 will be to decrease the chances that 1 is elected; \( r(3) = p_6 + p_9 + p_{10} \) = the probability that the only effect of the vote for 2 will be to decrease the chances that 3 is elected; and \( r(2) = p_2 + p_5 \) = the probability that the vote for 2 will decrease both the probability that 1 and the probability that 3 is elected.

The analysis leading up to (*) is somewhat complicated, but the condition itself yields a number of intuitive yet previously unnoticed implications. Suppose the elector believed it certain that 3 would be more than one vote ahead of at least one of Messrs. 1 and 2,
exclusive of his vote; that is, he expects 3 to win one of the seats regardless of what he does. Given this expectation, the only possible effect of a vote for 2 would be to defeat 1; the contest is essentially reduced to a two-candidate race for the other seat, and the best strategy is to plump for the most-preferred candidate, 1. (In terms of the model, $r(2) = r(3) = 0$ and --if $r(1) > 0$-- the condition reduces to $b > 0$, which is always satisfied.) On the other hand, if the elector believed it certain that 1 would be more than one vote ahead of at least one of 2 and 3, he would cast a \{1,2\} ballot on the reasoning that the contest was really between 2 and 3 for the other seat, and that the second vote for 2 could only defeat 3, something he is interested in doing. (In terms of the model, $r(1) = r(2) = 0$ and --if $r(3) > 0$-- the condition is $b > 1$, which is never satisfied.)

These two corollaries to our condition (*) represent feasible or believable thought processes. Even if one does not believe that Victorian electors recognized all the various states of nature identified in the model, it seems quite plausible that they had beliefs about who was likely to win, and that they could then draw the conclusions in our two corollaries as if they were using the condition (*).
The implications of (*) can be linked to the split voting and non-partisan plumping questions by specifying the party affiliations of 1, 2 and 3. Consider first the case where 1 is a Liberal, 2 and 3 being Conservatives. Then, so long as there is a fairly stable (but not necessarily large) chance that a second vote for 2 might "do its duty" and defeat 3 \(r(3) > 0\) held constant), a split vote is more probable as 1 is more likely to win a seat (i.e., to beat at least one of 2 and 3).

Intuitively, it is "safe" to vote for the lesser Conservative evil when you believe that the Liberal has a high probability of securing one of the seats. If we consider some other elector at this election who prefers the Conservatives, we must renumber the same three candidates in order of this elector's preference, which gives us 1 and 2 Conservative and 3 Liberal. In this case, non-partisan plumping is more probable as the Liberal is more likely to win—-if we hold \(r(1) > 0\) constant. Putting these two together, we have the following prediction: in two-against-one contests in which the minority party's candidate is generally perceived as likely to win, we should expect higher rates of split voting and non-partisan plumping than in contests in which the minority candidate is generally expected to lose.
What we need in order to test this prediction is some way to measure the general perception in a given constituency of the probability that the minority candidate will win. One way to do this is simply to look at the actual outcome. If voters' beliefs about what the outcome would be bore a relationship to what it actually turned out to be, then we ought to expect that voters in the 122 districts, where the minority candidate actually topped the poll, generally estimated high probabilities of this candidate winning a seat; that voters who experienced a 112 outcome, where the minority candidate lost, generally felt beforehand that his chances were slim; and that voters in the 121 districts, where the minority candidate came in second, generally had intermediate beliefs about the probability of his securing a seat. To the extent that these classifications capture the relevant probability, we expect the highest rate of non-partisan voting in the 122 districts, an intermediate rate in the 121 districts, and the lowest rate in the 112 districts. These expectations are born out. As can be seen in Table 8.7, the split voting rate in 122 districts was roughly twice, and the non-partisan plumping rate more than twice, that in 112 districts, and the rates on both kinds of non-partisan voting are intermediate in districts where the outcome was 121.
TABLE 8.7: NON-PARTISAN VOTING RATES IN THREE-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS, BY TYPE OF OUTCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN SPLIT VOTING RATE</th>
<th>MEAN NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING RATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table 8.1.
A further indication of the importance to voting decisions of the probability of the minority candidate's victory is that, within two of three outcome types, the minority candidate's margin of victory correlates in the expected fashion with the non-partisan voting rate. In the twenty-two contests in our sample which resulted in 122 outcomes, for example, the correlation of the minority candidate's margin of victory (found by subtracting from the total votes received by this candidate the total received by the weaker of the two majority candidates and dividing by the grand total votes cast) with the non-partisan voting rate is .465 (significant at the .05 level); this is as we should expect on the reasoning that, the larger the eventual margin of victory, the more obvious it must have been beforehand that the candidate would win a seat.

Similarly, in the twenty-three contests in which the minority candidate placed second, the correlation of his margin of victory with the non-partisan voting rate is .534. The situation is less clear in the 112 districts. The correlation is very small and positive for split voting, but small and negative for non-partisan plumping, and the overall correlation with the sum of these rates is also small and negative: -.022.
The hypothesis just discussed is one of a class of what might be called probability hypotheses having to do with changes in the elector's subjective beliefs about how other citizens will vote (the r terms in the inequality (*)). Another hypothesis can be stated which depends on variations in the other parameter in (*):

"Ceteris paribus, as \( b = u(1,3) \) increases, the elector is more likely to plump." (**) 

This hypothesis too has a straightforward interpretation which we can make clearer by introducing a simplifying assumption and some further notation. We assume that the utility to a voter of the election of a particular pair of candidates can be separated additively into components associated with each of the members of the pair. Thus, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
 u(1,2) &= w(1) + w(2) \\
 u(1,3) &= w(1) + w(3) \\
 u(2,3) &= w(2) + w(3)
\end{align*}
\]

where we can think of the \( w(j) \) terms as the utility of the \( j \)th candidate being elected. Given our previous normalization of \( u \), a little algebra reveals that \( w(1) = (b+1)/2 > w(2) = (1-b)/2 > w(3) = (b-1)/2 \). Hence, we can now interpret our set-up as follows: there are three
candidates whom the elector ranks in order of decreasing preference and are denoted 1 (for the first choice), 2 (for the second choice), and 3 (for the last choice). The utility difference between the first and third choice candidates has been normalized to unity: \( w(1) - w(3) = u(1,2) - u(2,3) = 1 \), while that between the first and second choice candidates is represented by a parameter \( b \): \( w(1) - w(2) = u(1,3) - u(2,3) = b \) (note that the third utility difference, \( w(2) - w(3) = u(1,2) - u(1,3) = 1 - b \), varies directly with \( w(1) - w(2) = b \). Now, our result (** ) is quite intelligible. As \( b \), the utility differential between the first and second choice candidates increases, it is more likely that a plumper will be cast, since, on the one hand, the possible negative effects of the vote for 2 (namely defeating 1) now carry a bigger utility penalty \(-b\); while, on the other hand, the possible positive effects of the vote for 2 in defeating 3 now carry a smaller utility reward \( 1 - b \).

So far we have considered only the utility which an elector might derive from the actual outcome of the election. When, however, the elector accepted a bribe to vote a particular ballot, or voted as his landlord or employer wished, he was responding to incentives which were not dependent on the outcome, but rather on the
particular ballot chosen. The key fact that electoral votes were public and often recorded meant that Victorian electors were subject to "pressure" abstractly quite similar to that exerted on MPs. Just as in the legislature, the open nature of voting exposed the elector to "influence" from a variety of groups interested in the outcome and capable of affecting the elector's well-being. In place of a constituency capable of denying the legislator another term of office, there was a landlord capable of denying the elector a renewal of his tenancy (which was often the basis on which the elector qualified for the vote). In place of men buying votes in the legislature, there were men buying votes in the constituencies. The prestige of a seat in parliament was echoed in minor key by the prestige of being an elector, and even the contemporary theories of how electoral votes ought to be cast parallel normative controversies concerning legislative voting. The franchise was often viewed as a trusteeship to be exercised for the benefit of the community; but, when certain elements in the community felt that the electorate was not representing their best interests, they were liable to act on what was closer to a "delegate" theory. Even the humbler non-electors had influence--they could, for example, threaten to deal
exclusively with shopkeepers who had voted correctly, and if this failed, there was always recourse to violence.\textsuperscript{35}

We can introduce electoral influence into our previous notation by adding another term to the expected utility expressions. If we continue to let $\text{EU}(\ )$ stand for the outcome-related expected utility of casting a ballot, and denote by $\text{EU}^*(\ )$ the overall expected utility, we have (taking the ballot \{1\} as an example):

$$\text{EU}^*(\{1\}) = \text{EU}(\{1\}) + e(\{1\})$$

where $e(\{1\})$ is the net electoral influence exerted for a \{1\} ballot expressed in the appropriate utility scale.

It might be thought that the introduction of electoral influence into the model, which we know should be done (at least if we heed the historians), would change the analysis rather completely. After all, if candidate 3 offers an elector a bribe, he may plump for 3 even though such a ballot would never be cast on "outcome" considerations alone. Indeed, in terms of expected utility, it might seem as if the $e$ terms would swamp the others since they do not undergo the same probabilistic discount; in deciding between \{1\} and
\{1,2\}, for example, the fundamental inequality (*) becomes
\[ b > \frac{r(2)}{2} + \frac{r(3)}{r(1) + r(2) + r(3)} + e(\{1\}) - e(\{1,2\}) \quad (***) \]

There are a number of substantive reasons, however, why the previous analysis, focusing only on outcome-related utilities, may not be too greatly perturbed when we also include benefits directly contingent on the choice of ballot. First, and most important, if influence was complete, then we need simply switch attention from the dependent to the influential and independent electors and nothing is altered, except, as noted above, that the decisions of influential men are magnified in the final statistics. Second, even where electoral influence was not complete and asked for only one vote, if it "coincided" with the preferences of the elector, the analysis may well be unchanged. For example, consider an estate on which the first choice of the landlord was the same as that of most of his tenants. If the landlord was the only significant influence and asked only for a vote for his first choice candidate, which we interpret to mean that all ballots voting for this candidate were acceptable, and all ballots excluding this candidate were unacceptable, as far as the lord was concerned, then, for all tenants who agreed with the
lord's first choice, we would have $e(\{1\}) = e(\{1,2\})$, and the analysis would be as before. Even when influence was neither complete nor coincident, it may not have been so strong relative to the outcome-related utilities as might be supposed, if it itself underwent a probabilistic discount because, for example, the intentions of the landlord had not been made clear, or lordly sanctions in the past had only rarely been used against electoral rebels.

4. Change in Electoral Behavior

Our model of electoral behavior suggests three basic types of explanation for the changes in electoral behavior documented in section 2. First, there may have been some alteration in the nature or incidence of influence (which would act through the $e$ terms in inequality (***)). We have already briefly noted two hypotheses of this kind: that cross-pressuring influence declined, and that influential electors used the non-partisan voting options more often than non-influential electors. Second, a shift in the electoral probabilities perceived by voters (the $r(j)$ terms) may have occurred. We have seen that the probability of victory for the minority candidate in a
two-against-one contest had an important effect on split voting and non-partisan plumping; shortly, we shall investigate the possibility that this probability declined. Third, there may have been systematic trends in the size of the utility differential between candidates of the same, and of different, parties. The most obvious hypothesis of this kind, that electors became more party-oriented, will be of especial interest.

There is evidence that all three of these classes of hypotheses are relevant. The simplest and not too-misleading summary of the situation is that voters became more party-oriented. On the one hand, the statistics before 1867 reflect, more than those after, the decisions of elites. To the extent that local elites were more likely than the more humble electors to base their voting decision on the expectation of tangible benefits and the promotion of specific policies from the election of particular candidates, a decline in influence may have produced declines in non-partisan voting. On the other hand, a number of factors, outlined in the previous chapter, operated to shift the orientation of all electors to the parties. The electoral world in which candidates had to operate was transiting from one in which there was a good deal they could do to determine
their own electoral fortunes to one in which what mattered was the success of their party. Further, the ebb tide of influence and flow tide of party acted also to shift the electoral probabilities faced by electors in such a way as to reinforce the downward trend in non-partisan voting. We have already seen in Table 8.4 that the proportion of two-against-one races which eventuated in 112 outcomes increased in the U.K. as a whole. This was true in the North by itself as well, where the proportion of 112 outcomes (in our sample) increased from .45 to .75. One might suppose that this compositional change, which indicates that the probability of victory for minority candidates was for some reason declining in two-against-one contests, goes a fair way toward explaining the decline in non-partisan voting at two-against-one contests. The compositional change in itself, however, is not really too significant, as Table 8.8, which simply disaggregates Table 8.7 into two subtables, one for each period, shows. Split voting and non-partisan plumping rates declined within all classes of outcome types, and the declines within each class are more important than the variation across classes (if the only change had been compositional, the split voting rate after 1867 would have been \((22 \times 0.161 + 4 \times 0.223 + 3 \times 0.252)/29 = 0.179\); if the only change had been
TABLE 8.8: NON-PARTISAN VOTING RATES IN THREE-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS, BY PERIOD AND TYPE OF OUTCOME

PANEL I: PRE-1867 ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN SPLIT VOTING RATE</th>
<th>MEAN NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING RATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PANEL II: POST-1867 ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME TYPE</th>
<th>MEAN SPLIT VOTING RATE</th>
<th>MEAN NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING RATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table 8.1.
the within class declines, the post-1867 rate would have been \((32x.060+20x.091+19x.079)/71 = .074\); the actual figure was .066).

It is interesting to note, however, that the minority candidate's mean margin of victory declines within each outcome class: from .137 to .099 in 122 districts, from .078 to .047 in 121 districts, and from -.089 to -.102 in 112 districts./36/ These trends indicate that the probabilities of victory for minority candidates within each outcome type fell after 1867, and this in turn provides a partial explanation for the observed declines in non-partisan voting within each outcome type. A question is also raised as to why these trends in the margin of victory of minority candidates set in.

One reason is suggested by the prevalence, especially in the counties, of agreements between MPs of different parties to share the representation of a constituency./37/ The expense of election contests could be enormous, and this expense was born almost exclusively by the candidates themselves (or their patrons). Central contributions were small until well after the second Reform Act (one scholar has put them at less than 4% of returned expenses in 1880 /38/) and as late as 1868 some
candidates still discouraged any public subscriptions on
their behalf. Since, if only two candidates were
nominated, no poll was held, a very considerable savings
could be secured by ensuring that there was no contest.
This no doubt is one reason for the high percentage of
constituencies which were uncontested (see chapter 3).
What is important for present purposes is that a
significant percentage of the uncontested constituencies
returned MPs of different party to parliament. In 1859
and 1865, this percentage stood at 38.2% and 37.1%,
respectively, for the U.K. as a whole. The historical
treatment of these agreements to share the representation
of a constituency make clear that colleagues would
actively discourage members of their own party from
entering and precipitating a contest. When these
efforts failed, a two-against-one contest might ensue in
which, first, the sitting member of the majority party
was not pleased with his running mate (and hence was more
disposed to exert his influence for his exclusive
benefit, or even to coalesce with the opposite party);
and second, the minority candidate was often an incumbent
with a fairly good chance at reelection. Both these
factors led to higher rates of non-partisan voting. We
cannot at this point identify those two-against-one
contests which ensued despite the efforts of the sitting
members (or their supporters) to arrange an amicable division of the seats, but if we are willing to assume that the number of "failed agreements" made up a roughly constant proportion of the attempted agreements, then the marked decline in uncontested elections after 1867, and the decline in the percentage of these elections which had candidates of opposite party, are both significant. In 1868, 1874 and 1880 the percentage of uncontested districts returning members of different party fell to 25.0%, 23.6% and 15.2%, respectively. Hence, one suggestion as to why the margins of victory of minority candidates declined is that a higher percentage of two-against-one contests represented "failed agreements" in the earlier years than in the later.

Another possible explanation for the declining chances of minority candidates lies in a consideration of nomination strategy. The nomination stage was generally controlled by a local elite in the pre-1867 period, and increasingly by a party association thereafter. If voters were becoming more party-oriented, and if the decision-makers at the nomination stage recognized this, it makes sense that minority candidates would become generally weaker. Party leaders could anticipate the chances of their candidate(s) at the coming election. If they currently had only one candidate and his chances
were seen as very good, then, if his support was largely party-oriented, it would have made sense to run a second candidate. On the other hand, if his support was to a significant degree personal, it may not have been worth the cost of hunting up another candidate (who would presumably have had to be convinced that his chances were good enough to pay for). Hence, rational decision-making at the nomination stage should have interacted with the increasingly partisan orientation of the constituencies to produce generally weaker minority candidates.

The decline in the minority candidate's probability of victory may have been an important contributor to the curtailment of non-partisan voting at Victorian elections. It is hard to see any way, however, of quantitatively assessing the significance of this explanation. The drop in the average margins of victory is fairly substantial, but the link to the corresponding drop in "average" probabilities is not much more than ordinal. It is also interesting to note that the changes in the probability of victory may in a sense be attributed to the other hypotheses with which we are dealing. If the changes stemmed from a decline in the frequency of agreements to share the representation of a constituency, we might chalk this up to a decay of electoral influence. The successful arrangement of such
agreements presupposed a certain amount of authority on the part of the gentlemen and noblemen involved, and no doubt an important component of that authority took the form of electoral influence. As the pays politique expanded and the electoral clout of local elites waned, these agreements may have become obviously infeasible, and hence, no longer essayed. On the other hand, if the worsening chances of minority candidates stemmed from a response at the nomination stage to changes in electoral behavior, we can subsume the probability effects under the larger theme of the development of a party-oriented electorate.

The picture of change that emerges, then, is of a decline in the importance of the more candidate-oriented influential electors and a corresponding rise in the importance of the larger mass of increasingly party-oriented electors. Such an overview, however, is not complete. Interpreting the decline in what we have called non-partisan voting at elections as evidence of an increasing party-orientation amongst the electorate is subject to caveats similar to those raised earlier against interpreting a decline in the number of times legislators dissented from their parties as evidence of a strengthening party. We noted that the party support score of an MP varied not only with the "strength" of the
party (i.e., its ability to affect the legislator's goals), but also with changes in the strength of other groups, and with the frequency with which the party position on a vote agreed with other influential groups and with the MP's personal opinions. Similarly, the casting of a straight party ballot by an elector may have reflected the strength of his specifically partisan preferences, the (changing) strength of other factors, and the chance correlation of other factors with the party affiliations of the candidates (e.g., two candidates of the same party may have both benefited from the support of the elector's landlord, may have purchased both his votes, or may have adopted identical policy stands).

These considerations suggest another hypothesis concerning the utility differential between candidates of the same, and of different, parties. To the extent that the emphasis in the previous chapter on the polarization of the parties was well-placed, this in itself provides an independent explanation of the trends in electoral behavior. For, one might expect that candidates of the same party tended to be more similar, and candidates of different parties less similar in their personal policy stands after 1867. This internal homogenization and polarization of the sets of candidates running under the
two party labels would in theory have affected every voter (who paid any attention to the candidates), decreasing the probability that he could make a sufficient distinction between members of the same party to vote for one, but not the other. (These comments imply that the utility of each candidate can in some conceptual sense be separated into a component attributable to party and one attributable to the candidate's personal policy stand. We might formalize this in a number of ways; the simplest formalization—using another assumption which additively separates utility—is adequate for our purposes, and allows us to define the terms party-oriented and candidate-oriented more formally./41/).

Polarization is important in explaining the behavioral changes, then, both because of its effect in stimulating the development of long-term party attachments and because of its direct effect in presenting voters with candidates whose personal stands are more tightly related to their party affiliations. The direct impact of polarization on voting behavior may have been mitigated, however, if voters were becoming less candidate-oriented. Increasingly distinct candidates matter only to the extent that voters pay attention to the individual candidates. We believe that
the more important effect of polarization was the
fostering of strong party identifications in the
electorate. There are conceptual problems in
distinguishing between the direct and mediated effects of
polarization: to the extent that partisan attachments in
each constituency were based on short-term evaluations of
the individual members for that constituency, it is hard
to tell at what point the longer-term concept of party
identification emerges from the sequence of evaluations
of the members. But, to the extent that partisan
attachments were based on evaluations of the parties in
aggregate and their national leaders, the conceptual
distinction between candidate-oriented and party-oriented
is clearer; and, in any event, we believe it is more
accurate to emphasize the development of party loyalties
than a continued attention to individual candidates. We
base this belief in part on the work of Vincent,
Mackintosh, and Feuchtwanger; in part on the themes
developed in the previous chapter—the expansion of the
partisan press, the decline of the private member, the
aggrandizement of the Cabinet; and in part on the
findings in the next section, which seeks to show that
candidate-oriented voting was declining.
5. Party-oriented and Candidate-oriented Voting

One approach to deciding where the focus of voters' attention lay can be found in the work of T.J. Nossiter on the nationalization of Victorian politics. Nossiter computes the standard deviation of the swings to the Conservatives in English two-member boroughs for each adjacent pair of elections from 1832 to 1880, as shown in Table 8.9. The standard deviation is a measure of the uniformity of swing across districts, and can be interpreted as tapping the importance of national events in local electoral politics. Donald Stokes, whose work on the nationalization of American politics is well-known, also uses the standard deviation of swing as the basic indicator of nationalization (although he goes on to apportion the variance into national, state and local components). It is interesting to recall that Stokes introduces his work as addressing the question "where are the political actors whose performance is salient to the voter?", and in particular as arbitrating between "doctrines of party government" which "tend to assume that these actors are the national parties" and the "instructed-delegate model of representation" which "assumes a tie between legislator and constituency that is unmediated by party."/42/ Implicitly, Stokes invites
TABLE 8.9: STANDARD DEVIATION OF SWING TO CONSERVATIVES FROM 1832-35 TO 1874-80, IN TWO-MEMBER BOROUGHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION PAIR</th>
<th>STANDARD DEVIATION OF SWING</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832-35</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835-37</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837-41</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-47</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847-52</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852-57</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857-59</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859-65</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865-68</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-74</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874-80</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the reader to interpret the national component of variance (which increases with decreases in the standard deviation) as a measure of, in our terms, how party-oriented electors were. As can be seen in Table 8.9, the standard deviation drops about twenty-five percent between the last four pre-Reform election pairs (in which we include 1865-68) and the two post-Reform election pairs, indicating that a national swing of opinion was more a feature of English elections after the second Reform Act than before.

Although we are not clear on exactly how voting behavior at the micro-level relates to the standard deviation of swing, it seems that the decline in the figures fits better with a picture of elections as retrospective judgments of the parties than as a series of separate judgments of candidates by the particular constituency they face. Even if we accept the hypothesis that the parties were polarizing and internally homogenizing, so that the candidates which each constituency saw tended to look like those every other constituency saw, and suppose that voters were candidate-oriented, it does not follow that the standard deviation of swing should decline. For this conclusion, the only obvious sufficient condition is that the constituencies themselves were also similar.
A second approach to the problem of how candidate-oriented voters were operationalizes a notion of the "policy distance" between pairs of candidates and scrutinizes the electoral response as this policy distance grows. If voters were candidate-oriented, then the bases of electoral support which a pair of candidates in a two-member district tapped should have diverged as the policies they advocated became less similar. The ballot counts allow us to test this idea. Although ballot counts do not reveal who voted for each candidate, they do allow us to precisely quantify the degree to which any given pair of candidates earned the support or opposition of the same voters. If we return once again to the election of 1874 in Pontefract, we can illustrate this. Consider first Childers and Waterhouse. These two shared the support of the 182 voters who cast Childers/Waterhouse double ballots, and they both were shunned by the 37 electors casting plumpers for Pollington. All of the 1431 other voters distinguished between Childers and Waterhouse in the sense that they voted for one but not the other. The ratio $y = \frac{1431}{1431+182+37} = .867$ gives the frequency or probability with which voters in Pontefract voted for exactly one of Childers and Waterhouse; it is on the determinants of this probability, which can be thought of
as the "electoral distance" between the two candidates, that we focus./43/ Presumably, the probability with which electors at a particular election distinguished between a given pair of candidates (by voting for one but not the other) reflected a number of factors, including whether or not the candidates campaigned together and shared the same manager; whether they purchased votes and/or exerted influence in unison; whether they were affiliated with the same party; whether they appealed to the same social circles; and so on. In the Pontefract election, we see that party is of obvious bivariate significance: the two pairs of candidates who do not share party, Childers/Waterhouse and Childers/Pollington, have electoral distances of .867 and .932, respectively; while Waterhouse and Pollington, who share party, are much closer electorally, at .201. Still, it is evident that a fairly large electoral wedge has been driven between Waterhouse and Pollington at this election, and one might look to their policy stands to explain this.

But how can we measure the "policy distance" between these candidates? Unfortunately, we have not been able to come up with a very satisfactory measure of policy differences for pairs involving non-incumbent candidates. The procedure we have adopted is to focus on pairs of incumbent candidates, for we can then look at the
similarity of the roll call records compiled by these colleagues when they sat in Parliament. The roll call votes cast by an MP revealed the types of policies he supported; and if the case-study evidence presented by such scholars as Davis and Olney that constituents paid attention to the roll call votes of their MPs is representative of a widespread practice, then the roll call record of each MP is probably the best single indicator of the MP's policy position as perceived by his constituents (although it is clear that the roll call record gives little if any guide to the distribution of patronage; our approach only catches one kind of candidate-oriented voter--those who paid attention to national issues). We define $x$, the roll call distance of a pair of colleagues, as the proportion of times the two disagreed in Parliament, when both voted. The actual computation of the roll call distance is based on a stratified (by year) random sample of the roll calls taken in a given Parliament. \cite{44}

At an earlier stage of this research we proceeded directly from the definitions of electoral and roll call distance to a model which specified the electoral distance of a given pair of incumbent colleagues at election $t$ to be a function of their roll call distance
in the previous (t-1) parliament and whether or not they were of the same party:

\[ y = a_0 + a_1 x + a_2 p + \text{error term}, \]

where \( p = 1 \) if the pair are of the same party, \( p = 0 \) else. It is clear from the analysis in the previous chapter, however, that such a specification is incomplete. The probability \( y \) with which voters distinguished between a pair of incumbents seeking reelection is closely related to the probability that they would cast a split vote or non-partisan plumper, and the same factors which affect these latter probabilities should be included in an analysis of electoral distance. For example, a pair of incumbents of the same party ought to be closer electorally at a two-against-two than at a two-against-one contest, other things equal, since as we have seen more split votes tend to be cast in the latter kind of election. We include a dummy variable \( D_2 \), equal to 1 if the contest was two-against-one, equal to 0 if it was two-against-two, to take account of this. The sign of the coefficient of this variable depends on \( p \): if the candidates share party, then moving to a two-against-one contest should increase the probability that electors will distinguish between them (positive coefficient), whereas, if the candidates do not share party, the same
move should decrease that probability (negative coefficient). Hence, we need to include a $pD_2$ interaction term in the model. We also know that incumbents of the same party ought to be closer electorally as their opponent in a two-against-one contest is less likely to win; we proxy the probability of the minority candidate's victory simply by separating those elections in which this candidate actually won (outcome types 122 and 121) from those in which he lost (outcome type 112) with a dummy variable $D_2$, equal to one for outcome type 112, equal to zero otherwise. Since $D_2$ pertains only to three candidate elections, it appears in the model interacted with $D_1$. As with $D_1$, the sign of the coefficient of $D_1D_2$ is governed by $p$: if the candidates are of the same party, then moving to a 112 outcome should decrease their electoral distance (negative coefficient), but if they are of different party then the same move should increase their electoral distance (positive coefficient). We include a $pD_1D_2$ term to account for this. Besides the effect of the kind of election on the probability with which voters distinguished between a given pair of incumbent candidates, there are also the issues of whether the slope of the roll call distance variable should be the same for pairs of the same, and pairs of different,
party, and within the various categories of election. The equation we have settled on, which allows only one interaction (px) with x, is as follows:

\[ y = F(\beta + \beta p + \beta px + \beta D_1 + \beta pD_1 + \beta D_2 + \beta pD_1D_2) \]

where F is the logistic cumulative distribution function. This equation, whose specification is discussed in more detail in appendix 2, represents a compromise between what we believe to be the proper specification, the problems of multicollinearity amongst the independent variables (it is clear that p and x are highly correlated, for example), and the limited amount of data with which we must perform the estimation.

The data source for this analysis is the same as for the analysis of non-partisan voting in section 2, viz., the ballot counts available for the six northern counties of England. The number of usable cases is greatly diminished because of the problems in finding roll call data and because of the requirement that there be two incumbents both seeking reelection. Only 48 usable observations could be secured. This makes estimating an equation with many independent variables precarious, especially when the collinearity of x and p is recalled. The only silver lining to the problem of scarce data is
that the observations have at least tended to cluster in certain categories of election. Only one of our 18 two-against-two elections is not of type 1122 outcome; hence, we can dispense with attempts to allow differing slopes or intercepts within the category of two-against-two contests.

The estimated equations for the pre-1867 and post-1867 periods can be seen in Table 8.10. Consider first the post-reform equation. All coefficients whose sign we have discussed are as expected, and most are significant. What is of chief interest is that the roll call distance variable is insignificant. Its slope when p=0, as given by the coefficient of x, is insignificant, and its slope when p=1, given by adding the coefficients of x and px, is even smaller and also insignificant. This indicates either that we do not have enough information in our sample to distinguish the independent effect of x, or that there was no such effect. With the number of observations presently in the analysis, we cannot confidently reject the first possibility: but in any event it is clear that the party variable, p, is the more robust, an indication of party-oriented, not candidate-oriented, behavior.
TABLE 8.10: ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL DISTANCE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ELECTORAL DISTANCE
METHOD OF ESTIMATION: LOGIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>BEFORE 1867</th>
<th>AFTER 1867</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT</td>
<td>T-RATIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-4.12</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>px</td>
<td>-9.30</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_i</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pD_i</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_i D_a</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pD_i D_a</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| # observations=17     | R² = .097            | # observations=31   | R² = .112             |
| ────────────────────  | ──────────           | ────────────────────| ──────────             |
| χ² = 10,320           |                      | χ² = 4,627          |

Note: The χ² statistic reported is that described in Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 197. The R² statistic gives the proportionate reduction in the χ² value from a null model including only a constant term. That is, if CHI0 is the χ² for the null model, and CHIL the χ² for the specified model, then $R^2 = (CHI0 - CHI1) / CHI0$. The model did not include the pD_i term for the pre-1867 period nor the pD_i D_a term for the post-1867 period for the reasons stated in appendix 2.
The contrast with the pre-1867 equation is striking. Our 17 ill-behaved data points return only one coefficient of the expected sign—the slope of $x$ for $p=0$, and this is also the only significant coefficient (at the .05 level). It would be intriguing indeed if this particular result held up as more data is collected, but not too much can be made of it at present.

The weakness of the analysis as it stands is evident in the number of observations and in the goodness of fit chi-square values (which indicate not a good fit even in the post-reform period). Nonetheless, both equations have, we believe, the proper variables (if not, perhaps, the proper functional forms or method of estimation), and the only substantive conclusions that could possibly be drawn are that party-oriented voting was more, and candidate-oriented voting less prevalent after 1867.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII


3. Ibid., p. 175.

4. Ibid., pp. 174-75.

5. Ibid., Chapters vi and vii.


7. Ibid., Appendix III.

8. Ibid., p. 67.

9. Ibid., p. 72 n. 2.


Politics 1832-1885, pp. 132, 154-5, 161-2, 168. See also Janet Howarth, "The Liberal Revival in Northamptonshire 1880-1895: A Case Study in Late Nineteenth Century Elections," The Historical Journal, XII, 1 (1966), 93; Christopher J. James, MP for Dewsbury: One Hundred Years of Parliamentary Representation (Brighouse: Christopher J. James, 1970), pp. 83, 112.


16. See, for example, David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976).


21. Contemporaries actually referred to "double votes" rather than "double ballots". We prefer the latter as it emphasizes that there was a one-to-one relationship between ballots and voters, but not between votes and voters. This is important later—see footnote 31.


27. Davis, op. cit., p. 117.


30. F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977). It should be noted that Craig's policy is to classify Liberal Conservatives as Conservatives "until such time as they appear to have severed all links with that party and become Liberals" (p. xv). It is perhaps preferable to leave the Liberal Conservatives as a separate party; we have tried both keeping them separate and subsuming them in the way that Craig does. Either way the same basic trends are visible, and we report figures based on Craig's classifications. The consequences of these alternative ways of classifying the parties are discussed in the next footnote. The only really large discrepancy between Nossiter's and our yearly average figures comes in 1859—for which Nossiter reports a mean split voting rate of 26.7—and the difference here stems from three constituencies—Lancaster, Preston, and Bradford—in which Bean reports the party of some candidate(s) as Liberal whereas Craig reports the same candidate(s) as Conservative (or vice versa).

31. One advantage of clearly recognizing and tabulating non-partisan plumpers as a separate species of non-partisan vote is evident when we consider the problem of identifying the party affiliation of candidates. We have already noted in the text that Bean's attributions differ from those of Craig; it is also the case that Craig differs from other, more modern, authorities. In particular, Craig, as observed in the previous footnote, classifies as either Liberals or Conservatives candidates whom others describe as Liberal-Conservatives. If we preserve the Liberal-Conservatives as a separate party, our split voting rates naturally go up, sometimes considerably. Similarly, the non-partisan plumping rates, by themselves, are affected by classification decisions. The sum of the split
voting and non-partisan rates, however, is robust; we have found that reclassification of doubtful cases decreases one form of non-partisan voting while increasing the other. Hence, from the larger perspective of non-partisan voting, we need not worry nearly as much about the troublesome problem of party affiliation.


33. To get the non-partisan voting rate from NPV we divide by the number of voters, or the number of ballots cast (the two being the same). To get the IPD from D, we divide by the total number of votes cast. This is generally about 1.5 to 2 times the number of ballots, depending on how many plumpers were cast.

34. Given any contest, we assign a '1' to the first place candidate's party. If the second place candidate's party is the same, we append a '1', otherwise a '2'. If the third place candidate's party is the same as the first, we append another '1'; if the same as the second, which differs from the first, a '2'; if different from both, either a '2' or a '3', depending on whether the first two do or do not share party, and so on.


36. The minority candidate's margin of victory is defined as his percentage of the total vote minus the percentage received by the weaker of his opponents. Thus, if both of his opponents beat him, he has a negative margin of victory.


40. See, e.g., Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33 and Olney, *op. cit.*, p. 129. We assume that an uncontested return of members of opposite party indicates some sort of agreement—tacit or explicit—was reached.
41. Let $z_j = L$ if the $j$th candidate is a Liberal, and $z_j = C$ if he is a Conservative. We assume that one component of the utility associated with $j$ is attributable to his party affiliation; we write this utility component as $d(z_j)$, where the function $d$ summarizes the attitude of the elector toward the two parties: $d(L) > d(C)$ if he prefers the Liberals, $d(L) < d(C)$ if he prefers the Conservatives, and $d(L) = d(C)$ if he is indifferent. Another component of the utility associated with $j$ is due to the policies he advocates. We represent these advocated policies by a point $x_j$ in a multidimensional issue space $X$, and let a function $f$ summarize the preferences of the elector over the points in this space. With these assumptions, we can decompose the utility of the $j$th candidate as follows: $w(j) = d(z_j) + f(x_j)$. We say that an elector has become more party-oriented when the distinction he makes between the parties in utility terms, viz., $|d(L) - d(C)|$, increases. The definition of "candidate-oriented" is technically more difficult, but the intuition is the same: voters are more candidate-oriented when changes in $x_j$ make less difference in utility terms. This might be indicated by, for example, the stipulation that an elector was more candidate-oriented if for all $x$ and $y$ in $X$, $|f(x) - f(y)| > |f'(x) - f'(y)|$, where $f'$ is the reaction function of the elector before becoming more candidate-oriented.


43. In an earlier stage of this research we used a slightly different definition of "electoral distance". Instead of the unconditional probability of voting for exactly one of a pair of candidates, we used the conditional probability of voting for exactly one, given a vote for at least one. This excluded from the denominator all those who had cast ballots naming neither of the candidates, and produced generally higher values. We prefer our present definition because it links up better with the theory in chapter 8. In practice, not much difference is made in the results if we use the previous definition.

44. Ideally, we would calculate the percentage disagreement between two colleagues based on the
entire set of roll calls in which both participated during all years of the Parliament preceding the election furnishing y and p. In practice, the labor required to do this is prohibitive. So, we have adopted the following procedure for the elections of 1865, 1868, 1874, and 1880. A random sample of about 60 roll calls was drawn, generally from the last few years of the Parliament preceding each of the elections. The votes of all relevant colleagues were then coded on these 60 or so roll calls as aye, no, or absent (tellers counted with the side which they served). From this data, for each pair, we counted \( K \) = the number of roll calls in which both colleagues voted and \( D \) = the number of roll calls in which the colleagues disagreed: one voting aye, the other no. The roll call distance, \( x \), was then simply \( D/K \). Naturally, \( x \) is undefined if \( K = 0 \), that is, if the colleagues do not both vote in any of the roll calls in the sample. Attendance in 19th century Parliaments was not very high, and we have lost one observation because \( K \) was zero, while six of our fifty-nine usable observations have values of \( K \) less than 5. Small values of \( K \) are worrisome since the values of \( x \) based on them may not be very stable estimates of the overall or true percentage of times the colleagues disagreed (based on the entire set of roll calls in which they both participated), and so one might argue that all observations with \( K \) less than a given value should be excluded. We did not do this for two reasons. First, we cannot afford this luxury—the number of observations is small as it is. Second, there were no outstanding outliers amongst the small-\( K \) observations. On average, we do not have a problem with small \( K \)’s. The average values of \( K \) for the elections of 1865, 1868, 1874, and 1880 were respectively 12.9, 13.4, 13.3, and 11.0, which seems large enough to get a fairly accurate percentage disagreement estimate. Our procedure has been identical for the election of 1857, except that we have not collected the roll call data ourselves. Professor John R. Bylsma has been gracious enough to allow us the use of his set of 145 roll calls from the Parliament of 1852-57 (see John R. Bylsma, "Party Structure in the 1852-57 House of Commons: A Scalogram Analysis"). Bylsma’s sample is not a random sample, tending to select the larger and more important issues. If anything, one would think that this should bias the analysis against the result that we actually found, since more important issues should have had a more noticeable electoral impact.
CHAPTER IX

THE LEGISLATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A PARTY-ORIENTED ELECTORATE

In the last chapter we presented several statistical analyses testifying to the increasing electoral importance of party. We turn now to an investigation of the legislative consequences of this change in electoral orientation. As our analysis focuses on the response of individual MPs to altered electoral conditions, a necessary preliminary question is whether MPs noticed any change.

1. The Perception of the Electorate

Very few of them had seen the three last elections without feelings of anxiety and concern. He did not like to see these big turn-over majorities: they were unpleasant: they showed great instability in the public mind. —Leonard Courtney speaking in the House of Commons, 1880 /1/

The perception by 19th century MPs of why their constituents voted in the way they did is clearly not a subject on which we can make any definitive statements. Yet, it is necessary, if we are to argue that the changes in electoral behavior had any direct effect on legislative behavior, to say something about how MPs perceived the electoral parameters within which they had to act. Did MPs in the 1860s and 1870s believe that voters were becoming, in our terms, more party-oriented
and less candidate-oriented? Ideally, we would in answer to this be able to adduce numerous direct statements of belief by MPs; somewhat more realistically, we might exhibit arguments or mental constructs which presupposed the belief in question, and demonstrate that these first or more often appeared in the 1860s; in practice, we can only offer a few striking precedents in political argumentation which implicitly recognize the growing electoral importance of party and party government.

In modern Britain, by-elections are routinely viewed as, in good part, judgments of the Government's policy and administration; and General Elections are interpreted chiefly as selections of which party shall govern next. Implicitly, such views presume that voters are party-oriented rather than candidate-oriented, and in this regard the increasing acceptance of similar interpretations in the late 1860s and 1870s is an important clue to the attitude of contemporaries about electoral behavior.

Gladstone's justification of his decision to dissolve parliament in 1873 is an instructive example. Responding in the House of Commons to charges that the dissolution had been "an elaborate surprise," Gladstone vindicated his conduct by pointing out that by-elections
had been going against the Government in the month before his decision, that on this ground he had had a reasonable supposition that popular opinion was against the Government, and that, since no Government could legitimately govern in that day without popular support, he was thereby obliged to afford "the people of this country an opportunity of pronouncing their opinion upon the conduct of affairs."/2/ Gladstone was the first Minister to justify a dissolution on the basis of trends in by-elections. Implicit in Gladstone's interpretation of by-elections (and, indeed, of General elections) is the assumption that they turn chiefly on the conduct of the Government—and not on local jealousies or the particular actions of individual MPs. (This assumption appears again, in a peculiarly strong form, in W.S. Saunders' The New Parliament of 1880, a book-length attempt to explain the Liberal victory in that year. The central premise of Saunders' argument is that the by-elections held just before the General Election had revealed the Beaconsfield Ministry to be popular, and that as it then lost the election, its defeat must be attributed to events that took place between the by-elections and the general appeal to the country!/3/)

A similar assumption concerning General Elections—that they represented national choices of a
Government, and were not just a number of unconnected contests determined by local issues—appears clearly in two important precedents: one in parliamentary practice, one in the theory of the constitution. When Disraeli saw the election results in 1868, he resigned office before meeting parliament. Although this upset some members, who would have preferred that he follow the established procedure of seeking his fortune at the hands of the Commons, Disraeli felt that meeting parliament and being immediately defeated on a matter of confidence (as was surely his fate) would be a simple waste of time, and that the election results having made a Liberal Government inevitable, he should resign forthwith. Gladstone in 1874, and Disraeli (now Lord Beaconsfield) in 1880, followed this precedent, and an article in the June 1880 Contemporary Review noted that these actions had established that

when a Ministry appeals to the country by a dissolution of parliament, and when the elections show that the new House of Commons will certainly be unfavourable to the Ministry, that Ministry must resign, just as much as if the House of Commons itself had spoken./4/

The new power or function accorded to elections by the precedents of 1868, 1874 and 1880 was extended even further by the doctrine of mandate. Although most
political leaders denounced as too democratic the idea that election results bound Ministries to take particular actions, the increasing specificity of proposals for reform in Liberal election addresses after 1867 allowed Gladstone's Government to claim that the decisive electoral verdict had given it a mandate for certain reforms, notably the disestablishment of the Irish church./5/ These claims were supported by the Conservatives, albeit not without a strategic calculation. Lord Salisbury, who played the leading role in securing the acquiescence of the House of Lords to the disestablishment of the Irish church, was concerned at the time to find a viable position for the Lords in the constitution. He explained his motivation for accepting the Liberal pretensions to a mandate in a letter to Lord Carnarvon:

The plan which I prefer is frankly to acknowledge that the nation is our Master, though the House of Commons is not, and to yield our own opinion only when the judgment of the nation has been challenged at the polls and decidedly expressed. This doctrine, it seems to me, has the advantage of being: (1) Theoretically sound. (2) Popular. (3) Safe against agitation, and (4) so rarely applicable as practically to place little fetter upon our independence./6/

Although the attraction for Salisbury of a doctrine of mandate rested on a calculation that the voice of the
people would rarely speak clearly, the recognition and use for conservative purposes of the assumption that elections could express, not just a choice of Government, but also a choice of policy, is clear. This assumption has since had a long and checkered career in British politics.

The other side of the interpretive coin which pictured elections as choices of a Government, and even of a policy, was the increasing importance which evidently attached to the Government's popularity. This is illustrated by contemporary estimations of the likely electoral impact of Lord Beaconsfield's success at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Beaconsfield, proclaiming that he had secured "peace with honour," was given an enthusiastic popular welcome on returning from Berlin, and in the Commons secured an extraordinarily large majority of 143 in favor of the Treaties. Morley wrote, "it was the common talk at the moment that if Lord Beaconsfield had only chosen to dissolve, his majority would have been safe."/7/ The Cabinet sat for three hours on August 10 discussing the possibility, this being the first time that a Government had contemplated an early election (the parliament had over two years remaining) purely as a means of securing a party majority, and without having suffered any legislative or administrative
setback in parliament. Presumably, the Ministers reckoned that Beaconsfield's foreign policy success would have a strong positive effect in most constituencies; and this anticipated effect was large enough to make them sanguine about their chances, and willing seriously to consider trading the more than two years of tenure which remained to them, for a probability of a seven year renewal.

Along with the belief that a Government's popularity might carry its followers to victory went the complementary belief that a Government's unpopularity might drag its adherents down to defeat. These beliefs were given added zest by the magnitude of the Conservative victory in 1874, and of the even larger Liberal victory in 1880; the change in the party composition of the House of Commons due to the 1874 election was significantly larger than that due to any election since 1835, and the change in 1880 set a new record: for the first time, a shift of well over a hundred seats was registered. Both these elections startled contemporaries, and there was much comment on the new volatility of the electoral system./9/

The Second Reform Act had generated tremendous uncertainty as to how the electoral system would react to
an infusion of working-class electors; it was Disraeli's "leap in the dark," what Carlyle styled "shooting Niagra."/10/ The results of 1874 and 1880, coming after another basic structural change, the Ballot Act in 1872, did nothing to reassure members. The dire predictions of the Adullamites about the unhappy consequences of a democratic electorate were brought home, although perhaps not quite as advertised, to many MPs: in 1874 and 1880, more incumbents went down to defeat than in any other election from 1835 through 1900, with almost a third of those facing a contest failing to secure reelection./11/
And the swing from one party to the other, which--as already noted--became more uniform after 1867, became considerably larger in average value as well. In English two-member boroughs, the mean swing to the Conservatives from 1865 to 1868 was larger in absolute value than that for any pair of elections since 1832-35, and the figure advanced to new high in 1868-74./12/

What was the position of MPs in 1880, then? They had seen three sharp party battles in 1868, 1874 and 1880, with the lines drawn more clearly than they had been since the 1840s. After each of these elections, the defeated Prime Minister had resigned without meeting parliament, and these precedents had established as constitutional a practice which tacitly recognized that
the function of elections was not so much to choose individual members as to choose a Government. Members had seen electoral tides higher than they had ever been before, pushing more uniformly in one direction than they ever had before, and beaching more craft than they ever had before. A Premier, in the course of justifying a dissolution to the House, had clearly interpreted by-elections as referenda on the conduct of the Government, rather than individual choices of members. If they cared to look, they found that proportionately fewer electors in the two-member districts were casting split votes and non-party plumpers, and that support for MPs in these districts now came increasingly from electors who cast straight party ballots. Had they searched, they would have found fewer colleagues from these districts of different party, and, in general, they would have found fewer MPs from these districts whose electoral experience had been anything other than what one would expect on the assumption that voters were party-oriented.

2. The Consequences of a Party-oriented Electorate

If voters were more party- and less candidate-oriented, and MPs recognized this, what then? How might this change in electoral behavior, and in the
perception of electoral behavior, have tied up to the increasing discipline in parliament?

One way in which this might have happened is indicated by Robert Jackson's work on 20th century discipline, in which he notes that, "since MPs conceive of politics only in terms of "parties", and believe that the public reacts against "disunity" in parties," both potential dissidents and party leaders have an incentive to reconcile their differences privately, and to avoid public disagreement.\textsuperscript{13} This suggests that a party-oriented electorate which evaluates parties partly on the ability of the leadership to enact a legislative program, and to marshal united forces to the task, makes a party's cohesion a collective good for its members: they all benefit when the leadership looks competent and forceful, they all suffer when it looks hapless.

It is not clear how much force this mechanism had in the 1860s and 1870s, however. The problems generally inherent in supplying a collective good presumably obtained in regards to party discipline also: when an MP felt pressure from his constituents to cast a vote at variance with the party line, he could rationalize such a vote as impairing the party's public united front very little--if indeed he looked any further than his personal electoral chances.
A more important theoretical mechanism linking an increasingly party-oriented electorate to an increasingly party-disciplined parliament lies in the decreasing pressure which a party-oriented constituency puts on its representative(s). Pressure, as we defined the term in chapter 2, refers to the perception by the MP that different actions will be taken by his constituents, contingent upon how he votes in parliament, and that these actions affect his well-being. For present purposes, the relevant action by constituents is simply voting. A belief by the MP that electors have begun to vote more on the basis of their attitude toward the parties goes hand in hand with a belief that the relative importance to them of how the MP himself votes is diminishing, and this is equivalent to a lessening of electoral pressure from constituent groups. The MP may still derive some electoral benefit from his dissenting votes in parliament, but if his constituents are intent on punishing his party, this may do him little good; similarly, if the MP votes with his party on an issue opposed by his constituents, he may still incur some costs by that act, but if the overall record of his party pleases his constituents and that overall party record is what they vote for, he can afford to side with his party. What the MP does simply has less electoral impact.
When electoral pressures from constituents are lessened, however, the pressures from party bulk relatively larger in the MP's calculations, and, ceteris paribus, the MP should support his party more frequently. This can be seen in the context of a simple "three-pressure" model in which two constituent groups and party are the chief influences on the MP's vote. Constituent groups exert pressure because of the votes which they control, while party pressures stem from its ability to determine ministerial advancement, the timing of dissolutions, and so on. A first point to note is that the constituent groups may not always agree. When they do not, the pressures they exert on the MP will "cancel out" and only a net pressure will emerge from the geographical constituency to prod the MP one way or the other. Thus, one factor which must be held constant is the frequency of agreement between constituent groups. For, our argument simply says that if the groups become more party-oriented each exerts less pressure. Clearly, however, if in the ex ante situation (before they become more party-oriented) the groups tend to disagree, while in the ex post situation they tend to agree, the MP may feel greater net pressures from the constituency and actually dissent more frequently after than before the change in electoral orientation. Similarly, the
frequency of agreement between the constituent groups and party must be held constant; we do not want to compare a situation of unanimity to one of constant party/constituency disagreement. (Indeed, to be exact, we should hold constant the entire joint probability distribution of agreement between all three forces and also control for any covariance between agreement and strength, but the two marginal distributions flagged seem to be the most important substantively.) When we do hold the various probabilities constant, then the net pressure exerted by constituent groups will tend to be lower after these groups become more party-oriented, and hence party pressures will more often determine the MP’s actions./14/

It should be emphasized that the argument so far says nothing about party-oriented electors expecting or demanding that their MP support the party generally. It says only that net constituent pressures should be less—whether the "constituency" (taken to be the preponderant group(s) in the constituency) agrees with party or not. When the net constituent position disagrees with party, this means that a dissent is less likely, holding constant the pressures from other groups. On the other hand, when the constituency agrees with party, it provides a less useful "ally" unless some further assumption is made; the idea of constituency
associations or groups as parts of the internal disciplinary structure of the party is a separate one.

The empirical importance of this theoretical link from anticipated electoral behavior to party loyalty depends on the answer to two questions. First, did pressures from the constituency cause much dissidence? Second, did such pressure really decline? The next chapter investigates these questions.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IX


11. See Table 3.1.

12. The electoral system had not seen such excitement since the agitation over the first Reform Act. Then, however, the excitement had died down; in the 1870s and 1880s, it did not. The average change in the number of seats held by the Conservatives at elections from 1835 through 1865 was 43.6, or 35.9 if we do not count 1835, which reflected the temporary reform agitation. In contrast, the corresponding figure for elections from 1868 through 1910 was 83.2, or 91.5 if we do not count the exceptional election of December 1910 which, coming less than a year after the previous election, registered no change in Conservative strength.

14. We assume that party and constituency are the chief influences on the MP. If party is insignificant, but tends to agree with constituent groups which are significant, then a weakening of these groups may actually lower support scores.
CHAPTER X

THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENTS IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN

There is certainly support in the literature for the position that MPs considered the opinions and desires of their constituents when voting. Mackintosh views the first Reform Act as a watershed, noting that "it rapidly emerged that under the new electoral conditions the Member of Parliament had to take great care to conciliate local influences all of which had some interest in his political conduct."/1/ Jephson, too considers the reform agitation important in increasing the influence of constituents over their MPs,/2/ while Davis emphasizes evidence of such influence in Buckinghamshire both before and after 1832./3/ The only systematic effort to assess the significance of local influence, Aydelotte's study of the 1841-47 parliament, agrees with the literary evidence cited by other scholars. Aydelotte constructs a composite classification of constituencies by region, class (borough, county or university), and size, and cross-tabulates this district variable both with the party affiliation of the members and with their scores on a Guttman-type scale. He finds definite relationships on both counts; what is most significant from the point of view of constituency influence, he finds that the type of
constituency explains variation in the scale scores of MPs within party./4/

Aydelotte's work shows that there was a correlation between constituency demographic characteristics and the roll call behavior of MPs, even after controlling for party. His approach is similar to that found in the American literature, where scholars seek to show that representatives from districts demographically atypical of the set of constituencies represented by their party dissent more frequently./5/ From our perspective, the theoretical underpinning of both the American literature and Aydelotte's work is simply Corollary 2 from chapter 2, which indicates that party support scores should go down as the frequency of agreement between party and constituency goes down. Demographic atypicality indicates an atypicality in interests and opinions. Representatives from districts with opinions atypical of--i.e., at variance with--the opinions found in the modal type of district represented by their party will find themselves cross-pressured more often than representatives from typical districts, if the typical majority of the party determines the party line according to their own interests;/6/ for, then, representatives from "minority" districts will receive different cues
from party and constituency on those issues constituting their district's atypicality. It is clear that demographic variables are far from perfect indicators of the relevant probability; this may in part explain the mixed findings of scholars using this approach. We have also looked at demographic atypicality—finding, for example, that Liberal county members and Conservative borough members dissented more often in the 1874–80 parliament just as they had in the 1841–47 parliament—but the work we wish to focus on takes an essentially electoral approach to dissidence. We can begin simply by noting some intriguing correlations in the data.

1. Electoral Pressures Within the Constituency

The reader may already have noticed that the evidence presented in chapters 2 and 8 reveals a broad covariance at the parliamentary level between the rate of non-partisan voting in the constituencies and the rate of dissent in parliament. The earliest figures on legislative voting—in 1836—show fairly tight aggregate party discipline; likewise, our earliest figures on non-partisan voting—in 1841—reveal a fairly disciplined electorate. After the great battle over the Corn Laws, the influence of party over both electoral and
legislative voting declines, appearing to gradually recuperate in the 1860s and 1870s. By the 1874-80 parliament, we have reached a very high level of voting cohesion in parliament, and, similarly, the elections of 1874 and especially of 1880 exhibit very low rates of non-partisan voting.\(^7\)

The covariance at the aggregate level appears at the micro level as well: there is a tendency for MPs in the 1874-80 parliament whose electoral supporters cast more non-partisan votes in 1874 to dissent more frequently in parliament, although this tendency is at best very weak for the Conservatives. We find, for example, that MPs from double-member districts who topped the poll and were returned to parliament with a colleague of the same party (note that the first place finisher necessarily received more non-partisan votes than his running mate) tended to support their parties less in parliament than their colleagues on votes whipped by the Government. In the 73 districts returning MPs of the same party to parliament in 1874, the top candidate gave a higher level of support than his colleague in 32.9\%, as opposed to a lower level in 45.2\%, of the cases. The relatively high percentage of cases in which the two colleagues had identical scores (21.9\%) is due chiefly to the Conservatives. If we look
at the figures for the two parties separately (Table 10.1), it can be seen that while the relationship is fairly definite and in the expected direction for the Liberals, there is virtually no relationship visible for the Conservatives.

The figures in Table 10.1 merely show that there was a mild tendency for Liberal first place finishers to be more dissident than their colleagues. Presumably, however, in a certain number of constituencies the stronger candidate received only a negligible surplus of non-partisan votes over the number received by his running mate. There was also a relationship between the size of the stronger candidate's margin over his running mate (i.e., the intra-party difference) and his "margin of dissidence." If we let $A_1$ and $A_2$ stand for the party support scores of the first and second place candidates, respectively, then $\Delta A = A_1 - A_2$ gives this "margin of dissidence," and we find that larger values of IPD lead to smaller (larger negative) values of $\Delta A$, the overall correlation being $-.240$ (significant at the .05 level). Once again, however, the overall figure hides significant differences between the parties: whereas the correlation for the 26 Liberals is significant at $-.420$, that for the 47 Conservatives is an insignificant $-.180$. 
TABLE 10.1: PARTY SUPPORT OF FIRST AND SECOND PLACE CANDIDATES OF THE SAME PARTY, PARLIAMENT OF 1874-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. AND PERCENT. OF CASES IN WHICH FIRST PLACE CANDIDATE COMPILED A...</th>
<th>LIBERALS</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER SUPPORT SCORE</td>
<td>9 (34.6)</td>
<td>15 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUAL SUPPORT SCORE</td>
<td>1 ( 3.8)</td>
<td>15 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER SUPPORT SCORE</td>
<td>16 (61.5)</td>
<td>17 (36.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnote 11.
A third perspective on the relationship of party-oriented electoral behavior to party voting in parliament can be gained if, instead of comparing first place finishers to their colleagues within the same constituency, we compare candidates who topped the poll in the various constituencies to each other. Here, the question is, did those first place finishers who received a larger percentage of their total support from non-partisan ballots tend to compile lower support scores? The "dependent" variable is now a straight party support score, rather than a difference, and the independent variable is the statistic $Z$ introduced in chapter 8. It will be recalled that $Z$ is a lower bound on the percentage of a candidate's total votes which came from electors casting non-partisan ballots. As this percentage increases, we find lower party support scores—for the Liberals—as is shown by a logit analysis of the determinants of party support in the 1874-80 parliament. The coefficient of $Z$ for Liberal MPs is negative and significant, the coefficient for Conservatives, on the other hand, being slightly positive and insignificant./8/

Thus, any of three largely independent measures of the relationship, at the level of the individual MP, between electoral and legislative voting show much the
same thing. There was little if any connection between the kind of electoral support a Conservative MP received and his future behavior in parliament, but for the Liberals, there was a definite bivariate relationship: Liberal MPs who received a greater proportion of their support in the form of non-partisan ballots tended to dissent more frequently in parliament.

Why is there any relationship at all? We believe that the non-partisan votes an MP received indicate, in a crude fashion, how party- or candidate-oriented his electoral supporters were. On the one hand, low levels of non-partisan support are compatible with—though they do not necessarily imply—a situation in which the MP owes his seat to his party affiliation. The willingness of the MP’s electoral supporters to ignore any differences between him and his running mate (if he had one) and to refrain from splitting their votes may indicate that they were voting chiefly for the party leader (or perhaps the leadership in general or the party programme), expected the MP to support that leader, and would vote at the next election largely on the basis of an evaluation of the success of the leader. On the other hand, high levels of non-partisan support are less compatible with the foregoing ideas. Those who cast non-partisan votes were clearly not voting solely
according to partisan preference; some other criteria
must have entered their thinking. If these criteria
included where the candidates stood on specific issues,
then we should expect a certain amount of electoral
pressure to be exerted on the MP: some of the electors
who voted for him did so because of his policy stands;
ergo, how he votes on certain issues may affect how they
vote in the future, which is precisely what we mean by
electoral pressure.

There are two species of non-partisan vote, however,
and they have distinct consequences for legislative
behavior. Further, within each kind of non-partisan
vote there are distinctions to make. Non-partisan
plumpers, for example, might plausibly indicate a number
of rather different things. They might mean that the
candidate had electoral influence which he used for his
sole benefit. Under this interpretation, more
non-partisan plumpers simply represent a larger electoral
"safety cushion", allowing the MP to pursue his own
policy preferences: this may or may not lead to
dissidence. Non-partisan plumpers might also indicate
real political distinctions: ultra-conservatives
shunning a moderate Conservative for a fire-breathing
Tory, or Radicals shunning a Whig. In these instances,
to the extent that the MP heeded the wishes of the group
plumping for him, he would be pulled to the ideological extreme. This might actually make him less likely to dissent, but in any event it is a rather special kind of dissent we expect from such members.

A classification of dissent similar to that introduced by Berrington is useful here. Following Berrington, we can classify all dissenting votes into three kinds: crossbench dissents, in which the MP votes with a majority of the opposite party and against a majority of his own; extremist dissents, in which the MP, together with other MPs predominantly of his own party, opposes a majority of both parties; and bi-partisan dissents, in which the MP opposes a majority of both parties as a member of a bi-partisan minority. Extremist dissent pitting the far left or far right against the rest of the House is that to be expected from MPs who received (and responded to) large numbers of politically-motivated non-partisan plumpers.

The kind of dissent to expect from those receiving significant split vote support, however, is clearly different. We shall discuss this case in a bit more detail. For specificity, consider a Liberal MP whose last election was a two Liberal versus one Conservative affair. The split votes this Liberal received give us a
rough indication of the level of support from Conservative electors that he could aspire to in a given situation. Some of the split votes may, of course, have come from electors whose first choice was the MP himself, but the great majority of those who cast split votes were presumably Conservative partisans who sought to choose the lesser Liberal evil. These Conservative voters, although they supported the MP at the last election, might not at the next. Their future support depended on who and how many the candidates would be, and also on the MP's roll call record in the intervening parliament. If the Conservative groups had voted for the MP rather than his running mate because they expected him to support certain policies that his colleague would not, then the MP knew that if he disappointed their expectations he might lose their votes. This electoral pressure should have pushed the MP to support the Conservative groups on certain issues. An identifiable link to voting behavior in parliament follows if we are willing to assume that there was generally some congruence between what "Conservative" meant in the constituencies and what it meant in parliament. To the extent that there was such a congruence, then we should find the MP supporting Conservative positions in the House of Commons; that is, we expect crossbench, rather than extremist, dissent, from the MP in our example.
Given that we expect different kinds of dissent from the two different kinds of non-partisan voting, perhaps the previous analysis, which used an overall non-partisan voting rate, has somehow confused the issue for the Conservatives. If we look specifically at the connection between split voting and crossbench dissent, will things clear up? As it turns out, no, but before we get to this result there is a rather lengthy list of caveats to issue.

First, the expectation that split votes should exert a pull toward the opposite party is weakened to the extent that split votes occurred because of cross-pressuring influence, or for any other non-political reason. If, for example, Nossiter's finding that in Sunderland one in every six electors who cast Whig/Tory split votes in 1865 voted Radical in 1868 (apparently for local reasons) can be taken as typical, the political meaning of split votes is diluted. Second, this expectation is also weaker for MPs who were minority candidates in two-against-one contests. If we consider the Conservative in our example above, there are two points to notice. First, he will, by definition of a split vote, receive no fewer than either Liberal—in fact, the number of split votes he receives will equal the sum of the split votes for the two Liberals. This
does not logically guarantee that the percentage of his support due to split votes will be greater, but practically speaking, that is what it means. We do not, however, expect more crossbench dissents from the Conservative than from his Liberal colleague, assuming that the contest ends in a 122 or 121 outcome; to compare minority to majority candidates without allowing for a shift in the constant term would be misleading. And, even if we compare only minority candidates, it is not so clear that any relationship is to be expected. We cannot interpret the split votes a minority candidate received as chiefly representing opposite partisans who might under certain circumstances be induced to vote for him. They represent predominantly his own partisans. Still, some of the split votes a minority candidate received might come from voters whose first choice was a candidate of the opposite party, and the other votes at least indicate that his partisans were willing to choose between the candidates of the other party. In practice, we do not have enough minority candidates in our sample to worry much about allowing for a different slope.

Third, similar points can be made about comparing candidates from two-against-one and two-against-two contests. We should allow for adjustments in both the constant and slope term.
A fourth set of caveats follows if we pay closer attention to the nature of electoral pressure. The crucial point to realize is that electoral pressure depends not on how many split votes an MP got last time, but on how many he thinks he may get or lose, depending on how he votes, at the next election. The split voting rate in a given year simply shows how many such votes were attracted in a specific electoral context. One kind of problem to worry about is that we may weaken the results by comparing different contexts. We know, for example, that the percentage of a candidate's total support derived from split votes depends on the probabilities of victory of the various candidates. That a majority MP from a 122 contest received more split votes than a majority MP from a 112 contest is to be expected and does not necessarily tell us that the first MP had a larger bloc of supporters from the opposite party to nurse home to the next election. If we thought that this was a problem, we could include a dummy variable to allow for a shift in the constant term. A second kind of variable affecting our interpretation of the independent variable, however, cannot be controlled for. The number of split votes an MP pictures as winnable or losable by his actions in the legislature might obviously have depended on who he expected the
other candidates at the next election to be. If, for example, an MP felt certain that he would face two candidates of the opposite party at the next election, the number of opposite partisans whose support he might hope to secure by votes in parliament would presumably be less than if he anticipated only one candidate of the opposite party. On the one hand, these comments suggest that we should use the split voting rate from the election after, rather than before, the parliament furnishing the crossbench dissent figure. Under an assumption of perfect foresight, this might be closer to the relevant concept of "turf to be won or lost". However, we do not think the perfect foresight assumption is tenable in this context. The roll calls on which the crossbench dissent rate are based typically took place years before the next election; although prospective candidates did sometimes reveal their intentions by beginning to "nurse" a constituency long before any dissolution was in the offing, it was legal for candidates to enter the contest down to the very opening of the poll, and, as there was no residency requirement, challengers might appear from anywhere in the Kingdom. Under such conditions, it seems more reasonable to use the last election's figures. And, to the extent that MPs forecast the future as looking like the past, we should
not even control for the last election's outcome type. An MP receiving lots of split votes in a 122 contest might expect a similar contest next time on the assumption that he and his opposite-party colleague would both seek reelection. If so, then it is appropriate to compare him directly to an MP receiving few split votes from a 112 contest (who might similarly expect another 112 contest).

This list of caveats can only be partially accommodated in our analysis. For some of the variables we simply have no proxy. And, in other cases, practical considerations limit the number of interactions we can allow.

Our procedure has been as follows. For every two-against-one and two-against-two contest documented with a ballot count in 1852 and 1874, we have calculated the split votes each MP received (two MPs from each election—we no longer confine attention to MPs who topped the poll) as a percentage of his total votes (we call this variable sv). The utilization of ballot counts, as usual, limits the study geographically to the six northern counties of England. Using large samples of roll calls from the parliaments of 1852-57 and 1874-80, we have calculated a rate of crossbench dissent (c) for
each MP. The party of each MP has also been coded as p=1 if Conservative, p=0 if Liberal. The equation specified for each parliament or year has then been

\[ c = F(a_0 + a_1 s v + a_2 p + a_3 p s v + a_4 M + a_5 N + a_6 N s v) \]

where M is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP was a minority candidate at the relevant election, equal to zero otherwise; N is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP was elected at a four candidate election, equal to zero if at a three candidate election; and F is the logistic cumulative distribution function. The estimated logit equations for 1852-57 and 1874-80 can be found in Table 10.2.

What do these results tell us? We have tried to construct a variable which identifies a bloc of voters with definite political opinions, and who exert electoral pressure in the sense that they might or might not vote for the MP at the next election depending in part on how he votes in the intervening parliament; a further desideratum is that we be able to identify the legislative consequences of the pressure which the variable captures. These requirements are met approximately for majority candidates from two-against-one contests, and perhaps for MPs from 1122 contests. It is only for the majority candidates from
TABLE 10.2: CROSSBENCH DISSENT AND SPLIT VOTING

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RATE OF CROSSBENCH DISSENT
METHOD OF ESTIMATION: LOGIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>1852-57 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT T-RATIO</th>
<th>1874-80 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>-4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sv</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>25.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p*sv</td>
<td>-3.83</td>
<td>-22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N*sv</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>-16.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#OBSERVATIONS=37

\[ \hat{R}^2 = .194 \]

#OBSERVATIONS=25

\[ \hat{R}^2 = .099 \]

Note: See the note to Table 8.10.
three candidate elections that a significant response of crossbench dissent to split voting is found; the coefficient of sv, which gives the slope for Liberal majority candidates, is positive and significant in both parliaments. The slope for Conservatives (found by adding the coefficients of sv and p*sv), and for MPs from four candidate elections (found by adding the coefficient of sv and N*sv), are in both parliaments considerably less, and of the wrong sign in 1852-57.

Why is there a relationship for the Liberals but not for the Conservatives? One possible reason is that the electoral differences between Conservatives were smaller than those between Liberals. The fissiparous nature of the Liberal party in the constituencies is an established theme of 19th century British electoral history. The animosity of Whig and Radical threatened Liberal unity throughout the country, and sometimes broke out into internecine feuds, explicit deals with the Conservatives being concluded (generally by the Whigs)./12/ Deals with the Conservatives were especially likely when two Liberals--a Whig and a Radical--faced a lone Conservative, and Liberal feuding in such contests might have produced a few very high split voting rates (or, in the previous analyses, Z or IPD values) amongst Liberals, as conservative Whigs were returned to parliament with
significant Conservative help. If these Whigs then tended to vote with the Conservatives on certain issues—lowering their party support scores—the positive result for the Liberals may be largely due to such cases. Since the differences within the Conservative party were not as great, one might suppose that the analogous situation—liberal Conservatives being returned with heavy Liberal help—did not occur. Hence, if the positive Liberal result is indeed due chiefly to cases involving full-blown battles between the Whigs and Radicals, the absence of analogous battles amongst the Conservatives would account for the lack of any relationship.

These ideas do help explain the Liberal/Conservative differences. The 1852 analysis, for example, includes the Scarborough election at which the Liberals were evidently badly divided. Sir J.V.B. Johnstone, who topped the poll, received 46.9% of his support in the form of split ballots with the lone Conservative G.F. Young, while the other Liberal, the Earl of Musgrave, received 185 of his 387 votes in the form of non-partisan plumpers. Johnstone actually voted more often with the Conservatives than with the Liberals in the ensuing parliament. Whig/Radical quarrels do not, however,
obviously help explain the 1874 results—we can find no analogue to the Scarborough election in the 1874 data.

Nor do Whig/Radical feuds seem to explain the results of the earlier 1874 analyses using Z (instead of the split voting rate) and straight party support (instead of crossbench dissent). The earlier analysis behaves very similarly to the split vote analysis, in the sense that the only significant relationship is found for Liberal majority candidates in two-against-one contests, and it would seem that Z is simply acting as a proxy for the split voting rate in these cases. Indeed, if we run the earlier analysis using the rate of crossbench dissent, and include similar control variables, the results look much like those of the split vote analysis./13/ Yet, while it is true that the Liberals have considerably higher Z values than the Conservatives in some two-against-one contests, these highest values all stem from contests in which the minority candidate won a seat (outcome types 121 and 122); since we dealt only with pairs of MPs of the same party in the earlier analysis, these contests were not included. And, if we look at the standard deviation and range of Z for the contests that were included in the analysis (outcome types 112 and 1122), there is a slight tendency for the Conservatives to have more, rather than less, variation
in the values of Z. Hence, the lack of a relationship for the Conservatives does not stem simply from insufficient variance in the independent variable, nor is the Liberal result obviously driven by a few instances of Whig/Radical infighting. Thus, we are a bit in the dark as to why there is no relationship evident for the Conservatives.

What the results—at least for the Liberals—suggest is that in situations in which constituent pressures plausibly run counter to party pressures, rates of dissidence are higher. It might be objected that causality is unproven: that candidates have policy differences, voters respond passively to these, and elected candidates go on to consistently support the policies they have advocated at the election—without regard to any electoral pressure. In other words, the phenomenon we may be capturing is not a response by MPs to electors, but a response by electors to MPs, such as that we sought to demonstrate when we examined the effect of roll call distance on electoral distance in chapter 8. This objection bears a rather peculiar relationship to the current analysis: it had better be true if the analysis is to make any sense! The whole point of the discussion in the previous chapter was that the influence of constituents is inextricably bound up with their
anticipated behavior. If there is not some element of reverse causality, if voters do not respond, however passively, to policy differences between the candidates, then there would to our way of thinking be no electoral pressure exerted and no reason to expect any correlation between split voting and crossbench dissent. As soon as voters do respond to the candidates' positions, however, MPs will anticipate this if they wish to stay MPs. Thus, although it is possible that Victorian electors responded to candidates, but elected candidates did not anticipate future responses and were simply consistent, there are in the present instance other reasons to expect consistency besides the hobgoblins. Liberal MPs at least behaved not only as if they were being consistent but also as if they were responding to electoral pressures.

The results as they stand, based on lamentably few and geographically restricted observations, do not give a consistent enough picture for much confidence in our conclusions. Perhaps another approach will be illuminating. Instead of taking single MPs as the unit of observation, we can focus on pairs of MPs. The hypothesis here is that two MPs from the same constituency should vote less similarly in parliament as their electoral bases of support diverge. If we consider first a pair of the same party, the argument would be
that larger rates of split voting and non-partisan plumping should drive a wedge between the two colleagues. The electors who cast non-partisan votes had distinguished between the two on some grounds; if these grounds related to policy, then evidently there were some areas of opinion the support of which one but not the other candidate did secure. If we are willing to take the actual garnering of support in the past as a crude indicator of the ability to do so in the future, then larger electoral distances mean more groups to which one but not the other MP can realistically appeal. Since electoral pressure is exerted only by groups which might (or might not) support you, larger electoral distances mean more groups to which one but not the other MP is sensitive, which, finally, should reinforce any policy divergencies which the electoral difference bespoke to begin with.

MPs as we view them are incrementalists. Richard Fenno, in a recent study of American Congressmen, has found that these representatives have a concept of a "reelection constituency"—the set of groups to which they look for electoral support at the next election./14/ We posit that Victorian MPs had a similar concept and that they looked after their reelection constituencies in an incremental fashion: starting with the groups that
had actually elected them last time and seeking to maintain that coalition intact, making only marginal policy adjustments as they saw opportunities to gain votes without upsetting the foundation of their support. From this perspective, greater electoral distance means that the reelection constituencies to which the two MPs cater are increasingly different, which should lead to different behavior in parliament.

For a pair of colleagues of opposite party, the argument is similar. Larger numbers of shared split votes indicate a greater similarity in the reelection constituencies, which should in turn lead to closer voting stances in parliament. The basic relationship that is suggested, then, is that a greater electoral distance should lead to a greater roll call distance in the ensuing parliament, even when we control for party.

In examining this prediction, we need as usual to concern ourselves with the other factors which affect electoral or roll call distance. In practice, all that we control for is the number of candidates at the election (with a dummy variable N, equal to one if there were four candidates, equal to zero if three), allowing also for changes in the effect of party and electoral distance. It might be thought that we should control for
the probability of victory of the minority candidate in
the usual fashion (i.e., by controlling for outcome
type), but in practice this is not feasible. Since we
deal with the victors from an election, the variable p
which keeps tab on whether they share party also proxies
the outcome type. If p=1 (the two victors share party)
then necessarily the outcome type was 112 or 1122; while
if p=0 (the two victors are of opposite party) then
necessarily the outcome was 121, 122, 1212 or 1221.

The equation we have estimated is

\[ x = F(a_0 + a_1 p + a_2 y + a_3 N + a_4 N^p + a_5 N^y) \]

where x is the roll call distance calculated on the basis
of divisions in the parliament after the election which
furnishes the electoral distance \(y,\)/15/ and F is as usual
the logistic cumulative distribution function. This
equation has been estimated for the periods before and
after 1867 and the results are given in Table 10.3.
Essentially, two equations are presented for each period.
We can ignore all terms involving N and the remaining
terms give us the equation \(x = F(a_0 + a_1 p + a_2 y)\) for pairs
from three candidate elections, while if we add the
coefficients of the uninteracted terms with their
Corresponding N terms, we get the analogous equation for
TABLE 10.3: ROLL CALL AND ELECTORAL DISTANCE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ROLL CALL DISTANCE
METHOD OF ESTIMATION: LOGIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>1859-65</th>
<th>1868-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT T-RATIO</td>
<td>ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT T-RATIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
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<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-.61</td>
</tr>
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<td>n</td>
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<td>n*p</td>
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<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n*y</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#OBSERVATIONS=32
\[ R^2 = .083 \]

#OBSERVATIONS=43
\[ R^2 = .12 \]

Note: See the note to Table 8.10.
pairs from four candidate elections. As can be seen, the equations before and after 1867 are very similar. Looking first at the first three coefficients, we find in both periods: a positive constant term; a negative coefficient of $p$ indicating, as expected, that colleagues who shared party voted more similarly than those who did not; and an insignificant estimate for $\gamma$—no support for the idea that these MPs voted less similarly as their electoral distance increased. The results for four candidate elections are more startling. The estimated coefficients of $p$ are .61 and 1.55 in the pre-1867 and post-1867 periods, respectively, and in both periods these estimates are significantly different from the corresponding estimates for the three candidate pairs. The estimates of $\gamma$ are 1.06 and 2.07—both of the right sign and the former significantly different from zero./16/

We find these results confusing. Why should there be a difference between pairs from three and four candidate elections of the magnitude found? We have looked and found no difference between Conservatives and Liberals analogous to that found in the split voting analysis (we isolated the sets of pairs of the same party who were Conservative and who were Liberal, but discovered no difference to speak of in the correlations
for these sets between electoral and roll call distance). Perhaps both the Conservative/Liberal and the three candidate/four candidate differences are artifacts of the small sample sizes. But why do the same "artifacts" appear in different parliaments and time periods? The consistency of the aberrant findings indicates perhaps that there is a significant excluded variable which is systematically disrupting the results.

To the extent that we can conclude much from the analysis presented in this section, we think that it lends some support to the idea that constituent pressures did matter--seen in the significant coefficient of sv for the Liberals, and of y for pairs from four candidate contests--but no support to the idea that constituent pressures were weakening. In the next section, we take a different approach to the study of constituent pressures which yields considerably clearer results.

2. The Strength of Constituent Pressures

The approach to the study of constituent pressures taken in this section stems from the observation that, thanks to the double- and triple-member districts, we can find pairs of MPs who share the same constituency. This allows us to compare the behavior of pairs from the same
constituency to the behavior of pairs from different constituencies. One obvious comparison to make is in terms of the roll call distance. It will be recalled that the roll call distance \( x_j \) between any pair \( j \) of MPs is simply the number of times the two disagreed (one voting aye, the other no) divided by the number of times they both voted; \( x_j \) is their rate, frequency or probability of disagreement. If constituent pressures were significant, then one might suppose that pairs from the same constituency should disagree less often than pairs from different constituencies (even when party is controlled for). After all, we would consider a comparison of the average roll call distance between pairs who do and do not share party a fair test of party's strength, expecting members from the same party to disagree seldom and members from opposite parties to disagree often.

But comparing pairs of MPs who do and do not share constituency is not cleanly analogous to comparing pairs who do and do not share party. In the latter comparison, there are two expectations which render the procedure meaningful: first, that members of the same party will generally all be pushed in the same direction (to vote aye, or to vote no) by party pressures (this reflects an assumption that the parties can be viewed as unitary
agents); second, that members of opposite parties will generally be pushed in opposite directions (this reflects an assumption that the parties are in an adversary relationship, and/or that they represent distinctly different opinions). Neither of these assumptions, however, hold as strongly when we are comparing members of the same, to members of different, constituencies.

That two MPs hail from the same constituency does not necessarily mean that they both experience on most roll calls similar pressures. This is especially clear when the MPs are of different party, and we shall confine attention to such pairs until further notice. When the MPs under consideration do not share party, we might well suppose that they cater to different groups within the constituency. If so, and these groups differ, then the overall effect of constituent pressures might be strongly to push the MPs apart.

Similarly, that two MPs are from different constituencies does not necessarily mean that they are consistently pushed in opposite directions. If the chosen pair of MPs happen both to come from heavily agricultural districts, for example, then we might find that on issues touching agricultural interests, both are urged to support these interests by their constituents.
Why, then, do we expect the rate of disagreement between pairs from the same constituency to be less than that between pairs from different constituencies (both pairs not sharing party)? It is not, as we have seen, because we are comparing (as we would ideally like to) a set of situations in which constituent pressures always push the MPs in the same, to one in which they always push them in contrary directions. Nonetheless, there is still a presumption that, on average, MPs who do share constituency will more often get the same message from the constituency than will MPs of different districts. There are always a certain number of issues on which a given constituency is pretty much agreed, and in these situations the MPs sitting for that place will both receive a similar impetus from constituent pressures. A Liberal and a Conservative sitting for a county, for example, probably faced similar constituent pressures rather often on agricultural issues. On the other hand, the average roll call distance between pairs not of the same constituency would include, for example, urban Radicals paired with rural Tories, and it is unlikely that these men often were pressed to support the same policies by their constituents. Thus, although the difference in averages suggested is not perfect, it still preserves something of the comparison we would like in theory to make.
We wish now to take a closer look at that theoretically desirable comparison, and show in more detail how the simple difference in averages diverges from it. This will allow us to argue below that, if we look at the difference in averages across a number of parliaments, we can accept any trends revealed as a suitable indicator of trends in the ideal indicator. We need a bit more notation which formalizes some of the distinctions made above. Consider a randomly chosen pair \( j \) of MPs who are of different party but may or may not be of different constituencies. Denote the set of all divisions at which both MPs in this pair voted by \( N_j \). Presumably, at some of these divisions, both MPs were pushed in the same direction by constituent pressures. We call this subset \( U_j \) (the choice of "U" serving to indicate that constituent pressures in this case "unify" the pair of MPs). At all other divisions in \( N_j \) (outside of \( U_j \)) we know then, by definition, that either the MPs were pushed in opposite directions or that one or both were not pressured at all. We designate the set of all divisions in \( N_j \) but not in \( U_j \) by \( \overline{U}_j \).

What have these distinctions gained us? Well, we can in principle think of the roll call distance of the \( j \)th pair based only on divisions in \( U_j \)--call this
$x_{j\mu}$—and of the corresponding figure based only on divisions in $\overline{U}_j$—call this $x_{j\overline{\mu}}$. The comparison we would like to make is between $x_{j\mu}$—how frequently the MPs disagreed when constituent pressures were "unifying": pushing both in the same direction—and $x_{j\overline{\mu}}$—how frequently they disagreed when constituent pressures divided them. In the extreme, if constituent pressures always determined the vote of both MPs, we should expect $x_{j\mu}=0$ (when pressures are unifying, no disagreement) and $x_{j\overline{\mu}}=1$ (when pressures are dividing, continual disagreement). Unfortunately, we cannot calculate the figures $x_{j\mu}$ and $x_{j\overline{\mu}}$ since we have no way of identifying the sets $U_j$ and $\overline{U}_j$. There is, however, a simple relationship between the observable roll call distance $x_j$ and the unobservable values $x_{j\mu}$ and $x_{j\overline{\mu}}$, viz.,

\[ x_j = f_j x_{j\mu} + \overline{f}_j x_{j\overline{\mu}} \quad (1) \]

where $f_j = |U_j|/|N_j|$ is the proportion of roll calls in $U_j$, and $\overline{f}_j = 1 - f_j$ is the proportion in $\overline{U}_j$. With some assumptions, it can be seen that the process of taking the difference of averages recovers an estimate of the average value of $x_{j\mu} - x_{j\overline{\mu}}$.

To show this, we need first to examine what happens when we take an average of the values $x$ within either
the set J0 of pairs not sharing constituency or the set J1 of pairs sharing constituency. Consider first the average roll call distance \( x^0 \) for pairs in J0; this average is related to the unobservable averages \( f^0 \), \( x_u^0 \), \( \bar{f}^0 \), and \( x_u^0 \) as follows:

\[
x^0 = \frac{1}{|J0|} \sum_{j \in J0} (f^0_j x^0_{ju} + \bar{f}^0_j x^0_{j\bar{u}}) = f^0 x_u^0 + \bar{f}^0 x_u^0 + \text{cov}(f^0_j, x^0_{ju}) + \text{cov}(\bar{f}^0_j, x^0_{j\bar{u}})
\]  

(2)

where \( f^0 = \frac{1}{|J0|} \sum_{j \in J0} f^0_j \) is the average proportion of divisions at which constituent pressures were unifying for pairs in J0; \( x_u^0 = \frac{1}{|J0|} \sum_{j \in J0} x_{ju} \) is the average roll call distance for pairs in J0 when constituent pressures were unifying; \( \bar{f}^0 \) and \( x_u^0 \) are similarly defined;

\[
\text{cov}(f^0_j, x^0_{ju}) = \frac{1}{|J0|} \sum_{j \in J0} (f^0_j - f^0)(x_{ju} - x_u^0) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{cov}(\bar{f}^0_j, x^0_{j\bar{u}}) = \frac{1}{|J0|} \sum_{j \in J0} (\bar{f}^0_j - \bar{f}^0)(x_{j\bar{u}} - x_u^0)
\]

are the covariances between the \( f \) and \( x \) terms; and the result follows with a little algebra or simply by recalling the rule that the expectation of the product of two random variables is equal to the product of their expectations plus their covariance. Our first basic assumption deals with the covariance terms:

Assumption 1: \( \text{cov}(f^0_j, x^0_{ju}) = 0 \) and \( \text{cov}(\bar{f}^0_j, x^0_{j\bar{u}}) = 0 \).
What this assumption says is that there is no relationship between how frequently both MPs in a pair (sharing neither party nor constituency) were pushed in the same direction by constituent pressures, and the frequency with which they disagreed on these divisions. The idea is that once we have isolated a pair \( j \) and a division in \( U_j \), there is no reason to suppose that the probability of the pair disagreeing on that division depends on how many divisions there are in \( U_j \) (relative to \( N_j \)). We cannot, of course, offer any direct empirical evidence for this, since it deals with unobservable quantities; it is a basic assumption of the analysis. We shall understand a similar assumption concerning the covariances which appear when we look at the relationship of the observable average \( x^j \) for pairs in \( Jj \) and the unobservable averages \( f^j \), \( x^j_\mu \), \( \bar{f}^j \), and \( x^j_\bar{\mu} \). Hence, we may write

\[
x^j = f^j x^j_\mu + \bar{f}^j x^j_\bar{\mu}
\]

(3)

considering the covariance terms to be negligible. What equation (3) says is that the overall average rate of disagreement between pairs who share constituency (which we can calculate) is just a weighted average of the average rate of disagreement when constituent pressures are unifying \( (x^j_\mu) \) and the average rate when constituent
pressures are dividing \((x'_u)\)--where the weights themselves are averages.

We turn now to the relationship between the unobservable term \(x'_u\) and the corresponding term \(x^*_u\) in equation (2). Both these figures measure the following probability: that a randomly selected pair, in which both MPs are pressured to cast the same vote by their constituents, will disagree. The only difference is that in one case, both MPs face the same geographical constituency, in the other, they face different constituencies. But this, we would argue, is irrelevant to the probability of their disagreement. The essential property of "sharing constituency" which prompted a belief in the first place that pairs from the same constituency would disagree less frequently than pairs from different constituencies was simply that of being "pushed in the same direction by constituent pressures." But we have explicitly controlled for that characteristic in this comparison, and sharing, or not sharing the same geographical constituency is no longer of consequence./17/

A similar argument can be made to motivate an assumption that \(x'_u = x^*_u\). The chief reason to expect \(x^*\) to exceed \(x'\) is, then, as we noted above, that
constituent pressures are more often unifying for pairs of MPs from the same constituency; or, in terms of the equations, that $f' > f^0$. If we use the assumptions that $x_u^0 = x_u^1 (= x_u, \text{ say})$ and $x_u^0 = x_u (= x_u, \text{ say})$, then an interesting thing happens when we take the difference of the overall observable averages $x^0$ and $x^1$; we get, after simplifying:

$$K_o = x^0 - x^1 = (f' - f^0)(x_u - x_u)$$

Thus, the difference in averages $K_o$ is a discounted version of the "ideal measure" $x_u - x_u$. Obviously, the assumptions needed in order to cast things in this form will not be met precisely, but if they are met approximately, the stated relationship will not be much perturbed.

Equation (4) provides an interpretable perspective on how and why the difference $K_o$ understates what we should like to measure in any given year. It also shows that any trend in the values of $K_o$ across parliaments may be accepted as an indicator of trends in $x_u - x_u$, under appropriate conditions: when the term $f' - f^0$ is held constant, $K_o$ increases (decreases) if and only if $x_u - x_u$ increases (decreases). It is from this perspective that we shall interpret the yearly values of $K_o$ presented in
Panel I of Table 10.4. The parliaments for which we have been able to calculate values of $K_0$ are those of 1841-47, 1852-57 and 1874-80. The roll calls for the 1841-47 parliament are those collected by William O. Aydelotte, and the roll calls for the later parliaments were both collected in 1868 as part of thesis research by students of Aydelotte's—John R. Bylsma and James C. Hamilton—at the University of Iowa. Although the discussion has proceeded as if the averages we had were based on all possible pairs of MPs, in practice, of course, the number of such pairs ($\binom{658}{2}$) is far too large to include them all. We have included all pairs who shared constituency, but a random sample of the pairs from different constituencies. There should be no problem here as the samples are quite large. The figures are quite interesting. Whereas $K_0$ equals .076 and .097 for the first two parliaments, respectively, and both these differences of means are significant, the figure almost disappears in 1874-80, falling to .001. This, if we believe that $f' - f^0$ was roughly constant across years, indicates that $x_{\bar{u}} - x_u$ was declining.

It remains to justify, as best we can, the assumption that $f' - f^0$ was roughly constant. What is the substantive meaning of this term? $f'$ can be thought of as a measure of the average homogeneity of those
TABLE 10.4: ROLL CALL DISTANCE OF MPS WHO DO AND DO NOT SHARE CONSTITUENCY

PANEL I. MPS WHO DO NOT SHARE PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1841-47 (N)</th>
<th>1852-57 (N)</th>
<th>1874-80 (N)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHARE</td>
<td>.628 (70)</td>
<td>.576 (104)</td>
<td>.728 (81)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>T=.04</td>
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<th>1841-47 (N)</th>
<th>1852-57 (N)</th>
<th>1874-80 (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHARE</td>
<td>.138 (231)</td>
<td>.180 (226)</td>
<td>.060 (155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T=3.79</td>
<td>T=5.71</td>
<td>T=2.32</td>
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</table>

PANEL II. MPS WHO DO SHARE PARTY
multi-member districts which returned members of different party to parliament. If such districts were often consensual, so that the MPs from them usually received similar pressures, then \( f' \) should be "large"—close to one; if, on the other hand, the multi-member districts whose representation in parliament was split between the parties tended to be internecinely divided, \( f' \) might be quite "small"—close to zero. \( f^0 \) is more difficult to interpret, but it can be construed as a measure of the similarity of districts which returned Conservative MPs, and districts which returned Liberal MPs. Pairs of MPs not sharing constituency come from all kinds of districts—single- and multi-member. A good many of these pairs are from "opposed" districts; e.g., a pair may comprise a Conservative from a single-member district and a Liberal from a multi-member district returning only Liberals. To the extent that these "opposed" pairs make up the bulk of the set of MP pairs from different constituencies, \( f^0 \) is a measure of the political similarity of the constituency bases of the two parties. If the kinds of districts which returned only Liberals were distinctively different from the kinds represented only by Conservatives, then we would expect \( f^0 \) to be smaller, while if the constituency bases of the two parties were rather similar, we would expect \( f^0 \) to be
larger. Hence, two other overall features of the electoral system that will affect the yearly values of $K_\omega$, in addition to the strength of constituency influence, as captured by $x_\alpha - x_\omega$, are the degree of homogeneity of the multi-member districts (which were represented by members of opposite party), as measured by $f'$, and the similarity of the constituent bases of the parties, as measured by $f^\theta$. Were there any trends in these variables?

The polarization of parties which we noted in chapters 7 and 8 would seem to be relevant. If polarization occurred within most constituencies, then, in particular, it might have occurred within those districts returning members of opposite party, ensuring that these members (presumed more sensitive to their own than to opposite partisans) would less often be prodded by similar constituent messages. This would drive $f'$, and hence $K_\omega$, down. This argument must be hedged in two ways, however. First, those districts returning members of opposite parties cannot have been too polarized, else they would not have returned the members they did. Indeed it would seem that these districts must generally have been those most insulated from any process of polarization. Hence the decline in $f'$ should be limited. Second, to the extent that there was polarization, the
sets of constituencies entirely in one camp or the other must have polarized. We can make the same assumption as above, that members pay more attention to their own than to opposite partisans, and make the case stronger; and it should be noted that this argument does not have the same problem as that above since we are comparing MPs from different constituencies—thus we may pick up the extremes of polarization. These considerations would indicate a decrease in $f^0$, hence an increase in $K_0$. It is not clear what trend in $K_0$ to expect on the assumption of polarization.

On the whole, we think that the decline in $K_0$ can be accepted as evidence that constituent pressures declined. Our confidence that such a decline did occur can be bolstered by looking at Panel II of Table 10.4 which presents a figure corresponding to $K_0$ for pairs of MPs who were of the same party. The derivation of this difference in means is similar to that of $K_0$, and the interpretation, although different, is also similar. In particular, we expect the figure to decline if constituent pressures declined. As can be seen, the statistic does decline, from .048 and .095 in the two earlier parliaments, to .033 in 1874-80.
The evidence presented in this section can hardly be taken as conclusive, especially in light of the mixed findings in the previous section. Nonetheless, the findings do point to a decline in constituent pressures, as would be expected on the hypothesis that voters were becoming more party-oriented. And, we might pose the question: if the influence of constituents was indeed potent in the 1840s as Aydelotte finds; was negligible in the 1940s as Epstein asserts; and did not decline in the period we look at—when did it? /20/
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER X


5. See, for example, Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency, and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968).

6. For an example of when this condition is not met, see David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

7. Whether this covariation continues after 1885 is difficult to say since only 8% of the districts still returned two members after that date, and these districts were all in fairly big cities so that they can no longer be considered typical of the nation as a whole. We have compiled the non-partisan voting figures for these districts and present them below. As can be seen non-partisan voting remains at a low level until the 1900s, when Labour and Lib-Lab candidates begin to appear in the more urbanized districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SPLIT VOTING</th>
<th>NON-PARTISAN PLUMPING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918, Appendix I.
8. The analysis controlled for a number of other variables. If we let p=1 if the MP was Conservative, p=0 if Liberal, and TYPE=1 if the outcome was 112, TYPE=0 if the outcome was 1122 (no other outcome types are included), then the equation estimated looks like:

\[ A = F(a_0 + a_1 Z + a_2 p + a_3 p Z + a_4 \text{TYPE} + a_5 \text{TYPE}^2) \]

where A is the percentage of times the MP supported his party on divisions whipped by the Government and F is the logistic cumulative distribution function. The results are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Estimated Coefficient</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>10.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>-6.76</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p*Z</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE*Z</td>
<td>-4.63</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#observations=69


10. T.J. Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms in Reformed England, p. 126. Even more striking is that half the 1865 Tory plumpers went Radical in 1868.

11. We use for the 1852-57 parliament a sample of 145 divisions the use of which Professor John R. Bylsma has been kind enough to allow. Professor Bylsma collected these divisions originally for his thesis. See John R. Bylsma, "Party Structure in the 1852-57 House of Commons: A Scalogram Analysis," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, VII (Spring, 1977), 617-35. For the 1874-80 parliament we have used two sources. First, Dr. James C. Hamilton has graciously allowed us to use the 50 division sample he collected for his thesis, "Parties and Voting Patterns in the Parliament of 1874-80," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1968. Second, we have drawn a 26 division random sample from the same parliament. We have for this analysis merged the two sources yielding a 74 division sample (there were two duplicates).

13. See footnote 8 for the model as specified with a straight support score and control variables. The equation with c looks very similar with some signs reversed.


15. We have adopted the following procedure for the elections of 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874 and 1880. A random sample of about 60 roll calls was drawn from each of the parliaments following these elections (in fact, from the first two years of these parliaments). The votes of all relevant MPs were then coded on these roll calls as aye, no or absent (tellers counted with the side they served). From this data the roll call distance was computed as described in footnote 44 of chapter viii; the discussion in that footnote about the small values of K is essentially the same for this analysis. We have also used, for the election of 1841, W.O. Aydelotte's sample of 186 divisions drawn from the 1841-47 parliament. See W.O. Aydelotte, "Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840s."

16. This analysis has the same kinds of misspecification problems as did the earlier "reverse" analysis discussed in appendix 2.

17. The only reason to suppose that a pair of MPs voting in a division on which constituent pressures are unifying will disagree is that they are of different party. Consider a pair both members of which are pushed by constituent pressures in favor of an "aye" vote, but suppose that the parties are in disagreement. Then one MP in the pair, whose party also pushes him to vote "aye," will do so (ignoring the possibility of strong personal preferences, bribes, and so on). The probability of disagreement is accordingly the probability that the party pressures on the other MP to vote "no" will outweigh the net constituent pressure to vote "aye." There is no reason to expect this probability to vary depending on whether the two share constituency or not.

18. See footnote 11 for references to the 1852-57 and 1874-80 data sets. For the later parliament, we use only Dr. Hamilton's divisions, as these were drawn according to criteria comparable to those used by
The basic equation for pairs sharing party is

\[ K_i = (f^1 - f^0)(x_{u^*} - x_u) \]

The terms can be interpreted as follows; \( f^1 \) is the probability that both MPs from a single constituency are pushed in the same direction by constituent pressures—it can be viewed as an overall indicator of homogeneity, but the homogeneity that is being measured is that of constituencies which returned members of the same party to parliament (this will include triple-member districts returning two Conservatives and a Liberal, as well as double-member districts returning both members of the same party). \( f^0 \) is the probability that two MPs from different constituencies will face unifying pressures. Since, however, the MPs are of the same party, \( f^0 \) taps the internal homogeneity of the constituency bases of the parties rather than how similar these bases are to one another (although it should be noted that there is some overlap with the previous interpretation because of the multi-member districts). Finally, it should also be noted that there is an additional problem unique to the case where MPs are of the same party. When we focus on a division in \( U_j \); for a pair \( ij \), all we know is that constituent pressures push both MPs in the same direction on the particular division chosen. We assume that party pressures push both in the same direction. The problem is that party and constituency may disagree. This muddies the expectation that \( x_{u^*} \) will be greater than \( x_u \).

The development of party or Cabinet government in 19th century Britain has fascinated scholars since the outlines of the change first became visible. A leading theme in the broader sweep of events was the development of highly disciplined parties which, in the descriptions of those more favorable to party government, were capable of advocating fairly coherent policy programmes, of enacting them, and hence of being held responsible for the shaping and conduct of public policy. The major thrust of this paper has been to demonstrate that not only were British parties in the 19th century capable of being held responsible, they were: as the parties became indispensable in the policy process, electors began to vote for parties rather than for individual candidates. This key change in electoral orientation meant that electoral pressure was put on the decisions of the party leaders, who were thus not only "responsible" in the technical sense for the course of public affairs, but electorally accountable as well. By the same token, the electoral pressure on individual MPs was lessened, and this made the task of maintaining a unified party much easier.
The development of a party-oriented electorate may also be viewed as a precondition of any effective electoral threat by local party organizations. So long as electors were willing to vote for individuals, rather than parties, the threat of non-readoption by a local party association carried no more (nor less) weight than a threat of non-support by any local group. The local association might be particularly well-organized, and this counted; it might have expertise in conducting elections, and this counted, too; but if it did not have a substantial and obedient following in the electorate, any threat of non-readoption could be treated as Colville, an independent Liberal, treated a pretentious Registration Society's demand in 1865 that he run as their nominee:

I presume the Liberal Registration Society does not consist of more than one or two hundred members. I shall appeal to the constituency at large, and not as the nominee of any committee or society, and I shall stand to win or lose single-handed and alone.

The ability of candidates to stand "single-handed and alone" in the electoral arena was an important contributor to the vaunted independence enjoyed by backbenchers in the period between the first and second
Reform Acts. It was an age in which the candidate (or his family) still often was the major, or even the only, contributor to campaign finances; in which electoral organization was ad hoc; and in which a candidate might personally visit every elector. The "golden age of the private member" may have rested on the "golden age of the individual candidate".

With the expansion of the electorate and the development of partisan orientations, however, the age of the independent candidate came to a close. Campaign finances changed, with central party contributions and mass subscriptions playing a much larger role. Electoral organization was increasingly monopolized by local party associations with a following in the electorate and staffed, especially after the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, by "activist" voluntary workers whose enthusiasm was tied to partisan objectives. And the peculiarly modern problem of "name recognition" came to plague the candidate who could not cut a figure in the larger and larger constituencies (expanded again in 1885).

It is clear that the change in electoral orientation for which we have argued is far from a complete explanation of the increases in party cohesion. Even if we confine attention to the 1860s and 1870s when such
factors as Ministerial ambition and the development of extra-parliamentary organization do not yet seem important, the electoral arena cannot be construed as an exogenous segment of the political system which acts upon, but does not react to the legislature. As was emphasized in chapters 9 and 10, the response of MPs to their constituents depended upon the anticipated response of constituents to MPs. And, at an aggregate level, the increasing discipline in parliament was itself part of the complex of events which gave party leaders control of the policy process, which in turn affected the orientation of voters.

Also, the increased importance of party both in parliament and the constituencies may have stemmed from a change in the policy agenda and a broad tendency for party lines to be defined by the same issues (and in the same way) at both the electoral and legislative level as the scars of the Peelite schism healed and new issues of reform came to the fore. If political feeling did "polarize," so that the men running and elected as Liberals were both more similar to one another and less similar to the Conservatives, then increased cohesion in parliament and increased party voting in the constituencies would naturally follow.
It is difficult to know how much weight to give to the idea that the parties polarized (by which we mean both a differentiation and internal homogenization of the parties). Many of the electoral findings we have reviewed are what one would expect on the hypothesis that the sets of candidates running under the two party labels differentiated and became internally more homogeneous, but some—notably the declining standard deviation of swing and the declining difference $K_0$ discussed in the last chapter—are not, and fit better with the hypothesis that the electorate was becoming more party-oriented. In the legislature we might hope to get a handle on polarization by looking at the figures on unwhipped divisions. If the Liberals and Conservatives differentiated, then we might expect to find the index of likeness declining even on unwhipped votes, since MPs of different parties should vote together less often simply because they disagree more often—and not because of any pressures associated with the party whip. As noted in chapter 2, there are problems in interpreting unwhipped votes—we do not know whether the leadership really had no position or whether it decided for some reason not to whip the vote—but we can at least look at the figures. As can be seen in Table 2.1 (Panel D), there is a substantial drop (of .182) in the similarity of the
parties on unwhipped votes from 1860 to 1871. This is considerably less than the .278 drop found for whipped votes, so there are presumably other factors to consider, even if we accept the usefulness of the unwhipped figures, but, nonetheless, a differentiation is indicated. This differentiation does not, however, appear to have resulted in internally more homogeneous parties. If we look at the cohesion figures in Table 2.1 Panel C, we find, as noted in chapter 2, no clear trend for either party over the century as a whole. If we confine attention to the 1836-71 period, it can be seen that the Liberal figures still reveal no particular trend but that the Conservative figures follow a pattern similar to that observed in the Conservative whipped figures: a sharp decline from 1836 to 1850, followed by a recovery to 1871. Our confidence in the whole enterprise of measuring polarization with unwhipped figures is shaken, however, by the 1881 unwhipped cohesion for Conservatives. It is not credible that the Conservatives had undergone any massive deterioration in internal homogeneity from 1871 to 1881. Rather, the message seems to be that the set of divisions which were unwhipped were a pretty mixed bag so that the cohesion and likeness figures are not very safely interpreted.
The only other kinds of evidence we have on polarization indicate that it did not have its full impact until the Whig secession in 1885. In preliminary investigations, we have found a complex generational pattern in the parliaments between the second and third Reform Acts, with the freshman classes of both the Liberal and Conservative parties differing from their more experienced brethren in the kinds of dissent engaged in. New Liberals tended to engage in extremist dissent, which fits with the suggestion in the literature that these men were swelling the Radical wing of the Liberal party. But, presumably, the increasing size of the Radical contingent made the Liberal parliamentary party less homogeneous in the 1870s; it was no longer overwhelmingly Whig and Palmerstonian; it was not yet overwhelmingly Radical and Gladstonian. And indeed, Berrington's explanation of the rise in party discipline is the late 1880s takes as its premise the inhomogeneity of the Liberals in the early 1880s and the continuation of a "crossbench conspiracy" between the Liberal and Conservative front benches to limit the legislative success of Radical proposals. Only with the actual secession of the Whigs, argues Berrington, did a real polarization of the parties ensue—with important consequences for discipline.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XI


APPENDIX 1: A BALLOT COUNT FOR THE ELECTION OF 1874 IN PONTEFRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Plumpers</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rt. Hon. H. C. E. Childers</td>
<td>Lib.</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Samuel Waterhouse</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscount Pollington</td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Pair</th>
<th>Double Ballots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childers/Waterhouse</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childers/Pollington</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterhouse/Pollington</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ballots cast</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total ballots cast = 1650
APPENDIX 2: THE SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL

This appendix deals with some of the problems faced in specifying and operationalizing the equation reported in Table 8.10. Consider first an election at which two Liberal incumbents, a and b, face a lone Conservative challenger c. We assume that the utility of each candidate for a typical voter can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
    w(a) &= d(L) + f(x_a) + e(a) \\
    w(b) &= d(L) + f(x_b) + e(b) \\
    w(c) &= d(C) + f(x_c) + e(c)
\end{align*}
\]

where \(d( )\) gives the utility component associated with party, \(f( )\) the component associated with the issue position of the candidate, and the \(e( )\) terms represent excluded variables unknown to the researcher and assumed to be independently distributed with mean zero and finite variance (which will depend on normalization). In this notation, the electoral distance between a and b, i.e., the probability of voting for exactly one of these candidates is

\[
y(a,b) = 1 - \text{Prob}\{a, b\} \text{ or } \{c\}
\]

where the second term on the right-hand side gives the probability of casting a double ballot for a and b or a plumper for c.
We consider now the effect on $y$ of an increase in $U = |f(x_a) - f(x_b)|$, the absolute value of the utility differential between $a$ and $b$ associated with their differing issue positions. The effect of $U$ may depend on the preference ordering, so we look at three cases.

Case 1: Liberal Partisans. $w(a) > w(b) > w(c)$ or $w(b) > w(a) > w(c)$. In this case, the probability of a plumper for $c$ is zero, and the probability of distinguishing between $a$ and $b$ is just the chance of casting a non-partisan plumper. Taking the first ordering, this probability is $\text{Prob}[w(a) - w(b) > r_{ab}]$, where

$$r_{ab} = \frac{r(1) + r(3)}{r(1) + r(2) + r(3)}$$

and the $r$ terms are defined as in chapter 8, equation (*). Since $w(a) - w(b) = f(x_a) - f(x_b) + e(a) - e(b)$, it is clear that as $f(x_a) - f(x_b)$ is increasingly positive, the electoral distance between $a$ and $b$ will increase (if $f(x_a) - f(x_b)$ is negative and becomes more so, we will transit to the other preference ordering in this case, and then a similar argument holds).

Case 2: Conservative Partisans. $w(c) > w(a) > w(b)$ or $w(c) > w(b) > w(a)$. Here, the probability of a $\{a,b\}$ ballot is zero, and the probability of voting for exactly one of $a$ and $b$ is the probability of casting a split vote; for
the first ordering, this is \( \text{Prob}(w(c) - w(a) < r_{c,a}) \), where \( r_{c,a} \) is the cutoff point for a plumper, appropriately defined. After we normalize \( w(c) - w(b) \) to unity, we have \( w(c) - w(a) = 1 - [w(a) - w(b)] \), and hence, as \( f(x_a) - f(x_b) \) is increasingly positive, \( w(c) - w(a) \) decreases and the chances for a split vote go up—hence the electoral distance goes up (if \( f(x_a) - f(x_b) \) is increasingly negative, then we will transit to the other preference ranking in this case, and a similar argument holds).

Case 3: Independents. \( w(a) > w(c) > w(b) \) or \( w(b) > w(c) > w(a) \). Neither a plumper for \( c \) nor a double ballot for \( a \) and \( b \) are possible in this case. Everyone with these preferences will distinguish between \( a \) and \( b \), regardless of their decision about plumping.

The three sources of ballots distinguishing between \( a \) and \( b \) are now clear; there are Liberal partisans who decide to plump, Conservative partisans who split their votes, and Independents. It should be noted that the number of Independents increases with \( U \): for, as \( U \) increases, c.p. so does \( |w(a) - w(b)| \) (even after normalization, unless \( c \) is ranked second), which increases the probability that \( w(c) \) lies between \( w(a) \) and \( w(b) \). But, within the category of Independents, there is no response to changes in the \( r \) terms (nor, for that
matter, to changes in $U$). Hence, we should have two models, one for partisans:

$$y(a,b) = F(\delta + \theta r + \sigma U)$$

and one for Independents:

$$y(a,b) = 1$$

The second model has a pleasing simplicity, but the first requires some comment. The $U$ term has already been explained: we expect $\sigma$ to be positive. The term $r$ is the probability that $c$, the minority candidate, will win a seat. As we argued in chapter 8, higher values of $r$ will induce both split voting and non-partisan plumping; hence, we expect $\theta$ to be negative. $F$ is a cumulative distribution function; in particular, we use the logistic cumulative distribution function for estimation.

Given that we have no way of separating Independents from partisans, we have simply specified the equation for partisans to hold for the whole constituency. If we were interested in the slope of $\sigma$ for partisans, and were worried that Independents were sufficiently numerous to bias this parameter, then we might try some switching regression model. Since we do not care whether the effect of $U$ is due to pushing more voters into the third
case or to causing non-partisan voting, we have not 
sacrificed too much here. As the number of Independents 
grows, of course, $\Theta$ will be biased toward zero.

The next thing to consider is the operationalization 
of the equation. In place of $r$, we have used a dummy 
variable $D_2$, equal to 1 if the election resulted in the 
victory of the two incumbents (type 112 outcome), equal 
to 0 otherwise. The overall merits of this proxy can be 
gauged from the material in chapter 8. It is far from 
perfect, but will suffice. The proxy for $U$ is more 
broadly troublesome. The roll-call distance, $x$, between a and b 
can be related to the terms $x_a$ and $x_b$ as follows. Let $x$ 
be a vector of 0's and 1's of length $N_{ab}$, where $N_{ab}$ is 
the number of roll-calls at which both a and b 
participated and $x_{ai} = 1$ if a voted aye on the ith 
roll-call, =0 if he voted no. Then 

$$ x = \frac{1}{N_{ab}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{ab}} |x_{ai} - x_{bi}| $$

This is to proxy the utility difference 

$$ U = |f(x_a) - f(x_b)| $$

$$ = \frac{N_{ab}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{ai}} q_i |x_{ai} - s_i| - \sum_{i=1}^{N_{bi}} q_i |x_{bi} - s_i|} $$

where $q_i$ are weights and $s_i$ gives the voter's preference 
on the ith roll-call. Unfortunately, there is no strong 
theoretical relationship between $U$ and $x$. If $x=0$ then
U=0, but it is possible that x > 0 and U = 0. Generally, it seems plausible that higher values of x should be associated with higher values of U, but this seems clearly the weakest part of the model's operationalization.

The next thing to consider is how the specification should change when p=0 or when we have a four candidate election. Let D1 be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the contest was two-against-one, and equal to 0 if it was two-against-two. Then there are four cases to examine:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>D1=1 &amp; p=1</td>
<td>y = F(\delta_1 + \delta_2 D_2 + \sigma_1 x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>D1=1 &amp; p=0</td>
<td>y = F(\delta_2 + \delta_2 D_2 + \sigma_2 x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D1=0 &amp; p=1</td>
<td>y = F(\delta_3 + \sigma_3 x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>D1=0 &amp; p=0</td>
<td>y = F(\delta_4 + \sigma_4 x)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A first thing to note is that, whereas \delta_1 should be negative, \delta_2 should be positive, since more non-partisan votes (induced by higher r) will drive incumbents of different party closer together. The specification for cases 3 and 4 do not include any r terms for two reasons. First, we have not yet defined such terms for four candidate races. Second, there is less need to do so since only 1 of the 18 four-candidate contests in our
sample turned out as anything other than a 1122 outcome, and we presume that the analogous probability terms do not vary much within this category of elections. In order to cut down on the number of parameters to be estimated, we have imposed the constraints $\sigma_1 = \sigma_3$ and $\sigma_2 = \sigma_4$; this allows for a $p$-effect on the slope of $x$ but we ignore the effects due to $D_1 D_2$ or $D_1$, and those due to the interactions $pD_1$ and $pD_1 D_2$. This decision was made after preliminary results indicated that the $p$-effect was the largest of these.

With these constraints, the model within a given period (before or after 1867) looks like:

$$y = F(\pi_0 + \pi_1 p + \pi_2 x + \pi_3 px + \pi_4 D_1 + \pi_5 pD_1 + \pi_6 D_2 + \pi_7 pD_1 D_2)$$

Some further concessions have had to be made for each period. In the pre-1867 period, of the three pairs from four-candidate elections, none shared party. Hence, the $pD_1$ interaction term was not included. In the post-1867 period, of the two pairs from three candidate elections resulting in 121 or 122 outcomes, none shared party. Hence, the $pD_1 D_2$ term has been omitted from the equation for the later years.

The method of estimation chosen was the grouped data logit procedure described in Eric A. Hanushek and John
E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 190-200. If we let $y_{ij} = 1$ if the $i$th voter in the $j$th contest voted for exactly one of the pair of incumbent candidates in that contest, then the observed electoral distance in the $j$th contest is

$$\tilde{y}_j = \frac{N_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} y_{ij}}$$

where $N_j$ is the turnout at the $j$th election. The procedure we used takes $L_j = \log(\tilde{y}_j / (1-\tilde{y}_j))$ as the dependent variable and then uses weighted least squares, where the weights are $N_j \tilde{y}_j (1-\tilde{y}_j)$.

One feature of this procedure is that the estimated variance should be unity. In our case, it is not. This divergence of $\hat{\sigma}^2$ from unity, together with the enormous $\chi^2$ values, indicate that the model is misspecified. We have attempted a number of respecifications without noticeable success in diminishing the $\chi^2$ values or improving the value of $\hat{\sigma}^2$. Examination of the scatterplot of sample versus estimated electoral distance does not reveal any obvious functional respecification that might be tried.

We believe that the chief source of misspecification is probably the error introduced by using $x$ as a proxy of
U. While it is defensible to suppose that a more or less "objective" probability \( r \) of victory for the minority candidate existed in three candidate elections, and to measure this by \( D_2 \), the analogous assumption about \( x \) is less tenable. A very large \( x \) means only that the candidates disagree a lot. If we think of it in spatial terms, they are "far apart". But it is quite possible that they both lie on an indifference curve for some elector(s), for whom \( U=0 \). Figure 1 below illustrates a constituency in which \( x \), defined simply as the spatial distance between the two candidates, whose positions are marked with +'s, is a good proxy of \( U \) (where we assume all voters have utility functions \( f \) of the form \( f(a) = -||s-a|| \), where \( || \) || is the Euclidian norm and \( s \) is the most-preferred point of the voter).

\[ +\]

\[ +\]

Note: Voters' positions are marked with dots, candidates' positions with plus signs.

Figure 1

In this constituency, all voters have similar values of \( U \), and \( x \) captures this adequately. In Figure 2, the
candidates are at the same spatial distance, but the U values in the electorate range from 0 to roughly \(-x\). Essentially, the spatial distribution of the electorate can be viewed as an omitted variable which systematically affects one of the included variables, \(x\).

\[\text{Figure 2}\]
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


