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Cooperation and Social Choice: How Foresight Can Induce Fairness


Penn, Elizabeth Maggie (2003) Cooperation and Social Choice: How Foresight Can Induce Fairness. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/MC1S-J874.


I present three models of dynamic agenda formation and policy selection, and demonstrate that in each, outcomes emerge which are in keeping with those predicted by cooperative solution concepts such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the core. These outcomes are a consequence of players "thinking ahead," or conditioning how they bargain on the notion that policies selected today should stand up to tomorrow's agenda. Players are induced into taking the payoffs of others into account when voting over and proposing policies, not because of a behavioral assumption such as altruism or inequality aversion, but because they know that the behavior of others in large part determines which policies are enacted in the future. In this sense, fairness is induced through the foresight of the players involved.

Item Type:Thesis (Dissertation (Ph.D.))
Subject Keywords:continuing programs; dynamically stable equilibrium; Markov voting model
Degree Grantor:California Institute of Technology
Division:Humanities and Social Sciences
Major Option:Social Science
Thesis Availability:Public (worldwide access)
Research Advisor(s):
  • McKelvey, Richard D (advisor)
  • Alvarez, R. Michael (advisor)
Thesis Committee:
  • Katz, Jonathan N. (co-chair)
  • Palfrey, Thomas R. (co-chair)
  • Border, Kim C.
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
  • Alvarez, R. Michael
Defense Date:19 May 2003
Record Number:CaltechETD:etd-06022003-112100
Persistent URL:
Default Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:2376
Deposited By: Imported from ETD-db
Deposited On:10 Jun 2003
Last Modified:10 Feb 2021 23:55

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