Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues

Citation

Spitzer, Matthew Laurence (1979) Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/26tg-h480. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-144123758

Abstract

Abstract of Introductory Essay
An essay defines and explores the strengths and limits of the Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues, and then derives guidelines for the use of axiomatic work in papers prescribing policies.

Abstract of Chapter I
Given certain fundamental assumptions, it is possible to engage in economic analysis of costly interactions between the government and individuals. Such an analysis must necessarily focus upon a potential rule's effect on governmental behavior. Various models of governmental behavior are either borrowed or developed, and these models are then independently analyzed, Economic efficiency suggests that a particular immunity rule should be adopted with regard to certain models. In the case of other models, however, rigorous economic analysis is impossible; in such cases, suability is chosen over immunity on the basis of fairness and comparative utility. Based upon this analysis, three potential governmental immunity rules are formulated, and, based largely on considerations of administrative costs and fairness, the indicated rule is that the government should be suable in tort for monetary damages.

Abstract of Chapter II
The limitations of Multicriteria Choice Processes are analyzed by examining the Federal Communications Commission's initial broadcast license comparative hearings. A possibility theorem, developed especially for comparative hearings, shows that the FCC must use an illegal process. This fundamental problem helps to explain previous criticisms of the comparative hearings' practical defects and to separate sufficiently effective reform suggestions from ineffective proposals.

Thesis Files