Nativism in the 1990s

Thesis by

Fang Wang

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

California Institute of Technology

Pasadena, California

1998

(Submitted May 11, 1998)

Acknowledgements

Many people have helped me complete this stage of my education. I must first thank my dissertation advisor, Professor R. Michael Alvarez, who has been a great mentor and an inspiration throughout my years at Caltech. I could never imagine the completion of this dissertation without his guidance, professionally and personally, especially after an unexpected sick leave of three months. I see in him all the strength that I strive to attain.

I thank Professor Rod Kiewiet equally. Rod has generously shared with me his keen professional insights, and from the intellectual discussions with him I derived many of my ideas. He has been an example of a great political scientist to me.

I value the support and input by the other members of my committee tremendously. I especially want to thank Professor Jonathan Katz, whose methodology class has greatly improved my research skills.

A special note of gratitude goes to the great colleagues I have had at Caltech. Garrett Glasgow has been the most patient editor of my English writing, as well as the most honest critic of my preliminary work. Tara Butterfield and

Fred Bohemke have also provided me with their valuable input and encouragement.

For her great patience and superb efficiency in administrating my graduate life, I thank our graduate secretary Laurel Auchampaugh. With her help at each step through my progress in graduate school, I was able to spend the maximum of my time on my research work.

My achievement today is also largely due to the great teachers I have had from my high school to college years. From their unselfish dedication to students, I have learned more than their lectures. I have since understood integrity and professionalism.

But to my family I owe the greater debts. My mother brought me up with both discipline and a good education on independence. My parents never doubted my choices and support my pursuit of every interest. I am also blessed with the best sister one can possibly have. Her unconditional love lifted me from every down in life. Thanks to Charles Fan, for your sense of humor that made every day I spent working on this dissertation fun and motivated.

I dedicate this work to my parents, Wang Shicai and Lu Daojuan, and my sister, Wang Qing.

Abstract

This dissertation is motivated by the desire to understand the origin of inter-group hostility. One issue that divided many Americans in the 1990s is the issue of immigration. Starting with Proposition 187 in California, a wave of nativism has raised the concern that diversity leads to polarization in this society.

Drawing from theories of inter-group relations, I examine how Americans perceive new immigrants and form preferences on immigration policies. I use empirical data analysis to test whether it was interest conflict and/or personal prejudice that motivated a wave of legislation for decreased immigration and restrictions on social welfare payments to immigrants.

With careful differentiation of issues and individuals, I show that most Americans use personal prejudice, such as racial stereotypes or egalitarian beliefs, to form perceptions on immigrants, independent of their views on current economic conditions. Due to the opposite effects exerted by personal prejudice against racial minorities and traditional values of egalitarianism, most Americans are facing a dilemma in their attitudes toward immigrants.

Yet, attitudes do not translate directly to policy preferences. When presented with the choices on public policies, most Americans reveal the rational side of opinion formation. The referents of economic performance or personal economic well being had significant influences on policy preferences. For racial minorities, they even set aside personal sentiment in order to achieve strategic and long-term interests.

The extensive data analysis in this dissertation is designed to achieve a more important goal. As the controversy between the theory of realistic conflict and the theory of prejudice grows with each new study, I challenge both theories' assumptions of ubiquity. With survey data complimenting aggregate data, and national, state, and local data cross-validating each other, I show that the very perception of realistic conflict bear the imprint of personal prejudice.

Substantively, this work contributes to the understanding of nativism in the 1990s. It shows that desegregation and economic progress by minority groups can help bridge gaps in this society. Theoretically, I demonstrate that the logic of opinion formation is contingent upon the content, context and consequences of the issue.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Individual Perceptions on Inter-group Relations

The twentieth century, though marked by unprecedented leaps in modernizing technologies, still has not come to fully understand inter-group relations. The last decade of the century has witnessed brutal ethnic wars in the Balkan Peninsula and on the African continent, pursuit of secession in Quebec and Chechnya, and attempted social exclusion of new immigrants in Europe and North America, just to name a few examples. Within the United States, race rivals any political issue to stay at the top of the political agenda. In recent years, incidences of racial friction have never stopped surfacing. In 1992, the Rodney King case verdict set off a riot in Los Angeles. In 1994, different racial groups split over the rights of illegal immigrants. In 1997, California ended affirmative action as state programs, a long time policy designed to facilitate the progress of minorities and women. The President is making dialogue between different racial groups his top priority.

This dissertation aims to explore the origins of hostility and alienation in inter-group relations. Among the many puzzles that constitute the nature of inter-group relations, the following questions motivate my research: Are inter-group hostilities fueled by competition for material gains or emotional sentiments? If both factors matter, is it plausible that some issues prompt for individuals material calculations while others trigger her solidary sentiments? I use the case of nativism in 1990's to explore the answers to these questions.

1.1 Scope: A Study of Public Opinion

Individual vs. Group Level Approach

This research approaches these questions at the micro-level. The theories and empirical analysis involved both aim only to reveal the rules of individual behavior. The alternative approach, obviously, is to describe and measure macro-level phenomenon. The so-called macro-level approach on this topic means taking *groups* as units of analysis, as opposed to the micro-level that takes *individuals* as the units of analysis. Typical macro-level research studies degrees of segregation (often measured by GINI coefficients), leadership and organization within groups, and other relevant variables that are only measurable at the group level.[1]

[1]For a classic study, see E. Franklin Frazier, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern*

I opt for the micro-level approach for two reasons. First, the "preferences" of a group reflects the aggregated preferences of its members. If we assume that group behavior is guided by group preferences, "one must always make *some* assumptions about individual motivation in order to develop a meaningful theory appropriate to groups as units of analysis" (Blalock 1967). So starting from individual preference avoids making these assumptions. Further, the aggregation process itself is also the product of individual preferences. According to Riker's (1980) "inheritability" argument, any institution that processes decision making for a collectivity is the product of individual preferences. Most variables that macro-level studies rely upon are about the institutional establishment within a group, such as organizational structure and leadership. In this sense, they are indirect measures of individual preference. Thus, rigorous analysis on the micro-level is essential to understanding group behavior.

Psychology vs. Politics

Though this is a study of individual political behavior, it is not a psychological analysis of various types of individuals. The research does not examine the causes of individual differences. Rather, it focuses on the factors that are most invariant across individuals in driving them to behave positively/negatively toward people of other groups. There is no doubt that different psychological

World, New York: Knopf, 1957.

conditions result in different degree of reception to various forces, such as economic distress or social norms. In fact, social psychologists have pioneered the study of prejudice and established the relationship between personalities and attitude (Allport, 1935). However, this research is interested in the political aspect of conflict analysis, and distinguishes itself from the traditional work by social psychologists in the field for two reasons.

First, the findings in this dissertation are about fundamental problems of contemporary politics in the United States, namely what the public thinks of immigration reform in the 1990's. I do not attempt to reveal the universal truth of human behavior, as many psychological studies aim to. Though "[p]erhaps it is true that the only universal propositions in social science are in fact psychological,"[2] the question is whether these completely general propositions are really essential for explaining political opinion. Blalock (1967) pointed out that "these general psychological theories are contentless in the sense that the nature of rewards, goals, and activities is not specified. This is, of course, what makes them so general." Psychological theories may be helpful in pointing out neglected variables in political studies, but cannot substitute for them. This research involves political issues with specific outcomes, and will model public opinion on these issues concretely.

[2]See George Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in R. E. L. Faris ed. *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, Chapter 25.

Second, a political approach focuses on exploring those motivations that apply to most of the general public. In contrast, psychological analysis is more interested in finding out the causes of individual attitudinal differences. Since group conflict often takes place when a significant number of the people in one group share similar negative views of the other group, this analysis should position its focal point on public opinion, not individual opinions. For example, if a politician wants to advocate secession, she would use some cause that attracts most followers, such as improving living standards. With a reasonable assumption that there is no concentration of people with some particular personality, such as authoritarianism, it would be unwise of her to advocate an authoritarianism-oriented platform instead.

1.2 Outline of the Dissertation

Two schools of thought have dominated the study of public opinion on group conflict. One school of thought attributes the source of conflict to a rational calculation of self-interest, often in the form of competition among groups for social and economic resources. The other school of thought stresses ideological factors as the motives for intolerance and hostility. The debate between these two schools of thought is a vivid example of the century-old controversy over the relative merits of economic theories of social causation and theories stress-

ing ideological factors such as belief systems or mental outlooks. Though each school is well supported by theorists and empiricists in the literature, no one seems to be able to tell why sometimes the other theory is more persuasive. In Chapter 2 I conduct a comprehensive literature review to summarize the works on the two theories and provide my critiques.

Starting in Chapter 3 I analyze the recurrence of nativism in the 1990's. Since Proposition 187 symbolized this wave of nativism, I first show how California voters split on their support for the Proposition. Chapter 4 continues the inquiry by studying voting records. As a form of aggregate data, voting records have not been properly studied due to methodological difficulties. In this work, I apply a new method called the generalized method of bounds to show how we can reconstruct important information from aggregate data. Chapter 4's focus is how regional characteristics can influence the vote choice on Proposition 187.

In Chapter 5 I expand the focus to study a national survey on opinion toward immigration. Since Proposition 187 was able to stir up a wave of reform on immigration law, nativism sentiment was certainly present throughout the country. Based upon the findings in the previous chapters, I analyze how traditional beliefs influence the contemporary views of the "American Dream."

Chapter 6 zooms back to Los Angeles, California, to study urbanites opin-

ion. Since most of the immigrants are urban-bound and that urban population has a high degree of racial diversity, I study whether urban opinion has any special characteristics.

In conclusion I develop a theoretical framework on public opinion formation. I argue that even if it is about one issue, such as immigration, public opinion is often formed with different concerns. The assumption that either the theory of realistic conflict or the theory of prejudice has omnipotent explanatory power need not be true. Different consequences and different social context can bring different logic of reasoning. In addition, the two theories can actually compliment each other to contribute to the understanding of opinon formation.

1.3 Implications of Research

Overall, this dissertation intends to make contributions in three areas. First, it is an attempt to synthesize the theories behind interest politics and symbolic politics. By investigating the empirical evidence that individuals may make decisions based upon different principal factors, I find that opinion formation should be differentiated by context and consequences. Motives behind opinions about attitudes need not be the same as the motives behind opinion for policy recommendations, even on the same general issue. By synthesizing the

two theories, however, we can start to understand why the two theories are compliments, not rivals, of each other.

Second, it makes an addition to the substantive literature on nativism and California politics. It demonstrates a dilemma that most Americans face on immigration issues, namely, the opposite influences of racial prejudice and egalitarianism. The balance between the two can be easily swayed by political campaigns.

And last, this research utilizes survey data at the individual level and voting records aggregated at the precinct level to cross-validate the findings. Voting records provide valuable information on sensitive issues, where survey returns could be influenced by the sense of political correctness. With the latest breakthrough in methodology, I use aggregate data to show the contextual effects by regional characteristics, which are especially important in cases involving group proximity.

Chapter 2

Interest Conflict and Symbolic Prejudice

Since inquiry as to the nature of political man started, people have noted the remarkable explanatory power of self-interest. As we know, modern democratic society is founded on the assumption that people primarily pursue their personal material interest. Hobbes, for example, assumed that men are by nature competitive egoists and argued that in a world of scarce resources, civil peace and political freedom are incompatible (Citrin and Green 1990). Hume put it more straightforwardly: "Avarice, or the desire for gain, is a universal passion which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons" (Hirschman 1977, 54). Acknowledging self-interest as a source of motivation, many scholars have explained inter-group relations as a result of groups' interest maximization.

Others have proposed a theory that attributes inter-group attitudes to an

emotional "like" or "dislike" of each other. Such emotional prejudice against a group is a totally subjective predisposition, which is not derived from material benefit or cost between the groups. This school of thought is best known for its role in explaining racial conflict in the United States. Sears and Kinder (1971) first named it the theory of "symbolic racism," and others have also called it "modern racism" (McConahay et al. 1981). This theory posits that much of the racial hostility is due to personal prejudice, independent of interest calculation.

Both schools of thought have generated large amounts of work, especially on contemporary race relations. In the following sections, I present both theories in detail and summarize the critiques they have leveled against each other.

2.1 Realistic Group Conflict

Economic competition between groups was often found to be highly correlated with negative attitudes between members of different groups. A study by Noel and Pinkly (1964) demonstrated that for both whites and blacks, "the greater the probability of outgroup economic competition, the greater the probability of outgroup prejudice" (p. 621). Their data indicated that lower-class whites were more prone to anti-black prejudice than upper-class whites. Among blacks, the most anti-white prejudices were found in the low

and the upper income levels, while the least prejudice among the middle class.

Allport gave a typical case of economic competition correlating with ethnic conflict in New English mill towns. When mills needed cheap labor, they sent their agents to Southern Europe to arrange for large-scale immigration to supply their needs. "When the Italians and Greeks arrived they were not made welcome by the established Yankees in the region, for they did, in fact, temporarily debase the labor market, reduce income, and increase unemployment among former workers. Especially in slack seasons or in times of economic depression, the sense of competition was keen" (1954, 229).

Such cases relating self-interest to inter-group relations are many. Compbell and LeVine (1965) generalized from the results of their studies and called their approach *realistic group conflict* theory. Realistic group conflict theory assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources. This theory has since been widely used to explain conflicts between groups. For example, almost all studies on racial conflict in the U.S. have tested the hypothesis that racial conflict originated in a clash of group interest. Case studies on the racially divisive opinions on busing, affirmative action, and electoral candidates have often concluded that the competitive aspects of group relations were the cause of conflict (Bobo 1983; Caditz 1976; Cummings 1980; Giles and Evans 1984; Smith 1981; Wellman 1977). As Allport put it, "Realistic conflict

is like a note on an organ. It sets all prejudices that are attuned to it into simultaneous vibration" (1954, 233).

Realistic conflicts derive from incompatible – though not necessarily irreconcilable – group interests. Fireman and Gamson (1979) defined group interest as "an objective interest in a collective good to the extent that the good promotes the long-run wealth and power of the group and the viability of its design for living" (p. 24). Two aspects are made clear in this definition. First, group interest is an objective collective good, which may not coincide with private goods. Second, "wealth and power" of the group can measure the advancement of group interest.

Self-interest vs. Group Interest

Conventional forms of group interest theory are quite similar to self-interest theories, in that group interest can be simply the aggregation of self-interest of all group members. Here self-interest is narrowly defined as "tangible losses or gains to an individual or his or her immediate family" (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). In the case of ethnic tensions in New England mill towns mentioned above, we see a good example of how similar personal interest within each ethnic group converged to a group interest and shaped ethnic relations. Other research has produced similar findings. For example, scholars have found consistent though moderate negative correlation between income level and sup-

port for welfare spending (Gilliam and Whitby 1989; Shapiro and Young 1988). Obviously, similar personal financial conditions result in a common interest in paying less taxes.

However, self-interest sometimes may not be the group interest. Sometimes we are able to observe that a group-level common objective is sought after even though it may not be beneficial to some of its members. Unlike the type of group interest that coincides with each group member's personal interest, this kind of group interest would not have existed if individuals had no sense of shared fate with others. For example, it is a well-known fact that blacks are consistently more supportive of race-targeted policies and welfare policies than are whites of comparable socioeconomic status (Bobo 1991; Gilliam and Whitby 1989; Klugel and Smith 1983). Presumably, the fact that blacks are more likely to support the policies arises from their belief that these policies would promote the welfare of other members of the black community. And they take personal satisfaction in seeing such group-level improvements.

Embedded in the phenomenon of thinking in terms of group-level interest is the concept of group consciousness. Identification with a group and a sense of shared fate lead to group-based assessments of self-interest. In other words, when a person identifies with a group, she "internalizes" the welfare of other group members as her own. So a strong sense of group identity should lead to a higher level of internalizing group members' interests as self-interest. Some

scholars have further explored the correlation between the sense of group identification and the person's socioeconomic characteristics (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Jackman and Jackman 1983). Factors such as income, education and occupation greatly influence the perception of group interest.

The "group interest" used in this thesis considers group interest of both kinds discussed above. The first is the simple aggregation of individual group members' self-interests. This group of interest comes to being when a significant number of the group members share the same kind of self-interest. The second kind of group interest means a consensus interest that needs not to be most of its members' self-interest. It could be of direct beneficial to only certain types of the group's members, but most of other members internalize it and render it a group's interest.

Realistic Conflict vs. Nonrealistic Conflict

Realistic group conflict is distinguished from "nonrealistic" conflict in that it focuses on how groups seek to achieve concrete outcomes (Coser 1956). It is goal-oriented, whereas nonrealistic conflict involves a nonspecific release of hostility or aggressive psychological impulses. Where dispute is focused on a delimited issue or issues concerned with the distribution of power, wealth, or status between groups, and involves clearly defined groups with differing objectives, there is realistic conflict. Disputes lacking these features, especially

those lacking a concern with the rival objectives of the conflicting groups, are "nonrealistic. Although cognitive processes and inter-group affective orientations enter into both types of conflict, nonrealistic conflict is largely reducible to non-rational psychological impulses (Bobo 1988, 91-92).

Of course, "realistic" is what one perceives as realistic. In what Giles and Evans called "power theory," which they argue to explain racial relations in the U.S., the origin of anti-black attitudes was attributed to the perceived threat to whites' social status. Power theory conceptualizes racial conflict "not as vestiges of pre-modern society but rather as vehicles for the pursuit of interest in modern pluralist societies." (Giles and Evans 1986). In essence, power theory is a version of realistic group conflict theory that considers the gain of social status and political influences as group interest. It points out whites' profound interest in maintaining themselves as a politically powerful and economically advanced group. Assuming a "zero-sum" condition in social mobility, they want to prevent blacks from being empowered politically and economically, which they believe would only result in the demotion of whites' status.

Although such perceived conflict in interests may not be "real" in the sense that blacks' increasing social status does not necessarily result in whites' falling behind, it is considered "realistic" conflict. It involves clearly defined groups, white and blacks, in competition, and the goal is to secure the dominant

position in the society in terms of political power, economic wealth, and social status. Though we cannot rule out a psychological basis for feelings of threat, the extent to which such conflicts are "realistic" is often studied empirically.

A handful of empirical studies have sought to explain the "realistic" aspect of perceived threat. Drawing on in-depth interviews with several prototypical respondents from a survey of San Francisco Bay area residents, Wellman (1977) found that whites frequently objected to large-scale change in racial composition in the population. These objections, he concluded, were not grounded in a form of prejudice but appeared to serve as a defense of group privilege. Smith's analysis (1981) of national survey data for the period of 1954-1978 showed that whites' willingness to send their children to integrated schools varied substantially with the number of blacks involved. He found that "whites of all regional, cohort, and educational attainment groups share a common self-interest in their unwillingness to accept minority dominance" (1977, 569). Bobo (1983) found that whites' opposition to busing was determined by their attitudes toward the black political movement. Such an effect was interpreted as evidence of group conflict because attitudes toward black activists involved a sense of political threat. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that blacks and Jews tended to feel threatened by right-wing extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi organizations. Shamir and Sullivan (1983) provided cross-national data for the U.S. and Israel that also indicates that

expressions of perceived threat are based more in real-world politics than in psychological insecurity or projection.

So far I have discussed the two major characteristics of realistic group conflict theory: group interest and realistic conflict. The application of this theory is widely found in the literature on contemporary racial attitudes as I will discuss in a number of cases later. Overall, realistic group conflict theory explains group conflict by first hypothesizing group interests, relative group standing, and perceived threats or challenges to group interests. These hypotheses are then tested with empirical evidence. In most of the research, realistic group conflict is considered as one of the hypotheses. It was often rejected, however, when researchers were trying to explain the "new" racial attitudes in the United States since the 1960's. Among the alternative explanations, the theory of symbolic prejudice has risen as a major rival to realistic group conflict theory.

2.2 The Theory of Symbolic Prejudice

With the landmark 1960's civil rights laws, the principle of racial equality has been enshrined as the law of the land in the United States (McAdam 1982; Stitkoff 1981). Yet, ever since the late 1960's, the civil rights movement

has struggled with various procedural means designed to realize the principle of racial equality. The implementation of civil rights laws, such as busing, affirmative action, minority set-aside programs, and open-housing laws, have generated racially divisive reactions. National polls have shown overwhelming rejections of all the procedural policies, despite strong support for the principle of racial equality (Carmines and Champagne Jr. 1990). Such changes of content in race relations signaled a need to modify traditional studies that were relatively inefficient in explaining the new phenomenon. Symbolic racism has since emerged as an innovative approach to explain the gap between principle and implementation.

First used to explain white opposition to a black liberal challenger, Tom Bradley, in the 1969 Los Angeles mayoralty election by Sears and Kinder (1971), the symbolic racism approach tries to account for white resistance to black empowerment with a form of new racial prejudice which consists of:

> a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American values embodied in the Protestant Ethic. Symbolic racism represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416).

In other words, as an attitudinal construct, symbolic racism can be better understood as having two aspects. First, in terms of theoretical development, symbolic racism has its roots in traditional theory of prejudice. It reflects as an emotional hostility, as opposed to calculated rejection. Second, in terms of measurement, symbolic racism is a "joint function of two separate factors: antiblack affect and traditional values" (Sears 1988, 56). In other words, symbolic racism comes to being when "negative feelings toward blacks merges with other basic values to form psychological resistance to contemporary proposals beneficial to blacks as a group" (Bobo 1988, 103).

Theoretical Issues of Symbolic Racism

Symbolic racism is a theory of prejudice. Earlier studies on prejudice have often focused on factors that vary by each individual, such as personalities, childhood experiences, and so on. Gradually, prejudice has been used to explain inter-group relations, though with various definitions. It has been "thought of as irrationally based, negative attitudes against certain ethnic groups and their members" (Pettigrew 1982, 28), or as "an emotional, rigid attitude ... toward a group of people" (Simpson and Yinger 1972, 24). In general, prejudice can be understood as an emotional antipathy based on an inaccurate and rigidly held stereotype (Allport 1954). The antiblack affect in symbolic racism relates closely to prejudice and stereotype. Kinder and Sears

(1981, 416) explicitly argued that symbolic prejudice is a variant of prejudice. McConahay *et al.* (1981, 577) contended that their "modern" or symbolic racism scale definitely measured an aspect of prejudice.

It is worth noting that the notion of symbolic racism was originally generated inductively from survey responses. In 1971, Pettigrew designed and conducted a survey to study white electoral responses to black mayoral candidates (Pettigrew 1971). Based on this survey and a couple of follow-ups, Kinder and Sears induced the concept of symbolic racism with responses "that had been developed by other researchers for other purposes" (Sears 1988, 56). In later studies, additional variables were generated to measure the symbolic racism concept more precisely. Over time, most proponents of symbolic racism have utilized variables in two categories. The first is "antagonism toward blacks' 'pushing too hard' and 'moving too fast'" (Sears 1988, 56). And the second is "resentment toward special favors for blacks, such as in 'reverse discrimination,' racial quotas in jobs or education, excessive access to welfare, special treatment by government, or unfair and excessive economic gain by blacks" (Sears 1988, 56).

Symbolic racism has been a powerful explanation of contemporary race relations. It is found in white resistance to busing, affirmative action programs, and black candidates for political offices. It is exhibited in white opposition to virtually all procedural race issues, even in instances when whites are not

affected directly by procedural civil rights policies. For example, whites oppose busing even when their children are not threatened directly by busing orders. It is thus suggested that white resistance to racial change arises out of what these policies evoke symbolically and emotionally for whites.

Furthermore, symbolic racism has manifested itself on issues not directly related to race, such as tax reduction, as proposed in the famous Proposition 13 in California in 1978. Sears and Citrin (1982) showed that symbolic racism was the most important factor in white support for Proposition 13, even more than party identification and political ideology. Even when the preferences on government size, attitudes on government spending and government waste were controlled for, symbolic racism still had the largest impact of all variables. Thus, the authors concluded that symbolic racism should be an important dimension in public opinion.

Yet symbolic racism is not without critics, both on conceptualization and measurement. Bobo (1988) pointed out that white racial attitudes have long involved negative affect toward blacks and a belief that blacks lack certain positively valued traits to be found in whites, such as most of the qualities associated with the Protestant ethic. Though symbolic racism claims to be different from the old racism in that it replaces the open bigotry with value-based resentment, the latter is not a new component of racial attitudes. Beliefs and values were long associated with the justification of slavery and old racism.

Tataki provided a vivid example of how Thomas Jefferson used "republican values" to justify white privilege. Jefferson argued that the United States should be a fundamentally new nation based on republican values, which included virtues like self-reliance, industriousness, and moral restraint. These qualities were viewed as more associated with whites than with blacks (Takaki 1979, 64). Thus, despite his moral discomfort with slavery, Jefferson defended the institution of slavery which in his view was most conducive to the maintenance of virtue. Like many other southern whites, according to Shalhope, "Jefferson clung to an ideology–to a way of life with identity and meaning in a changing world–which rested on slavery. The exploitation of the black was legitimized in terms of preserving higher value – a republican society" (1976, 556).

Many researchers have also pointed to whites' sense of themselves as a group endowed with valued traits that were absent in other racial groups. As Takaki (1979) argued, since the establishment of America as a nation, whites have differentiated themselves from other race or ethnic groups with the values and beliefs they hold. These values have become a kind of ideology for the dominant group in the society, and have accompanied the pursuit of various group interest ends, such as the taking of the Native American's lands, the enslavement of blacks, discrimination against Asian laborers, and so on. In short, critics of symbolic racism remind us that traditional values have always

been associated with whites' sense of superiority. To say that they are the sources of a modern form of racism implicitly denies their historical presence.

In short, the theoretical aspect of symbolic racism attracts lots of debate on whether it is different from old racism at all. Proponents of the theory argue that it is, because whites at least use values or virtues to justify the social gap between whites and blacks. The old racism needed no justification at all, deeming whites as superior to all other races. Opponents of the theory argue that the justification was done in the past as well, at least by the elite.

The real-world politics seems to suggest that racism after 1960s has taken a different form than racism before. First, from the reality of the society, we know that the principle of racial equality is well accepted by most Americans. Second, even if the elite had sought to justify racism in the past, it is different when the general public thinks that racism can be justified by virtues or defects. For the purpose of this study, I am more concerned with the measurement problems of symbolic racism.

Measurement Issues of Symbolic Racism

The theory of symbolic racism leaves much to desire in its empirical analysis. Though its measurement is seen to be a joint function of antiblack affect and traditional values, it has not done a good job of measuring either. First,

let us take a look at the typical survey questions measuring symbolic racism in the literature as summarized by Sear (1988).

- Antagonism toward blacks' demands

    1. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. (Agree)
    2. Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. (Agree)
    3. Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. (Trying to push too fast)
    4. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America. (Disagree)

- Resentment about special favors for blacks

    1. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to blacks then they deserve. (Agree)
    2. Over the past few years, blacks have got more economically than they deserve. (Agree)
    3. The government should not make any special effort to help blacks and other racial minorities because they should help themselves.(Agree)

4. Do you think blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without if they tried, or do they really need the help? (Could get along)

5. Do you think Los Angeles city officials pay more, less, or the same attention to a request or complaint from a black person as from a white person? (More)

- Denial of continuing discrimination

1. How many black people in Louisville and Jefferson County do you think miss out on jobs or promotions because of racial discrimination? (None)

2. Blacks have it better than they ever had it before. (Agree)

(Sears 1988, 57)

Obviously, these survey questions capture people's opposition to procedural civil rights legislation. But have these responses revealed anything that is irrational, or any reasoning related to deeming blacks lacking American traditional values? Not quite. Most of these survey questions concern contemporary racial problems, such as the influence of black political activism and the civil rights movement. As Bobo (1983) pointed out, these questions seem not to measure emotional or stereotyped orientation toward blacks, but rather are relevant to real-world politics. When questions explicitly invoke concern about

real-world political actors and events, and tap a dominant group's sense of political threat from a contentious subordinate group, they may be measuring a sense of group competition as well as a kind of affect.

The fact that symbolic racism studies have been able to show the close correlation between whites' resentment toward blacks' "pushiness" leads to another kind of interpretation. From the same kind of data analysis, some researchers have argued that what whites perceived as "pushiness" indicates black activists' struggle over redistributing social resources and political power (Bobo 1988). Compared with before, the civil rights movement has brought more than ever a sense of group interest into current race relations. To many whites, what is at stake is no longer just sharing bus seats or drinking fountains with blacks, but more substantial resources such as higher education, employment opportunities, political offices, and so on. Thus, unlike old racism, the current racial resentment seems to involve more group interest than prejudice.

In other words, the survey questions that most symbolic racism studies have used only tap the surface. Since they often use the answers to these questions to explain public opinion on certain candidates or policies, they go no deeper into the questions which they believe to be exogenous variables in their case studies. As Sniderman and Tetlock asked, "the symbolic racism approach begs the question — how, after all, is one to tell whether opposition to affirmative action is racist or not" (1986, 146). Put differently, Sniderman and Tetlock

question the causal relationship between symbolic racism and public opinion on policies.

This study will go to each component of symbolic racism to expose its explanatory power. Both racial stereotype and traditional values will be built in the model as the theory originally proposed – an additive function of both. In addition, this dissertation only uses the logic of the theory of symbolic prejudice, not its content. What I am interested in finding out is simply the relevance of racial stereotypes and traditional values in explaining nativism.

Theories of Contemporary Race Relations in the U.S.

The literature on inter-group politics is replete with works claiming to prove or to disprove either the theory of realistic group conflict or the theory of symbolic prejudice. Almost every study provides assessments from empirical data analysis, on topics ranging from race/ethnicity relations, gender gaps, conflict between new immigrants and older residents, different linguistic groups, and so on. Since it is not possible to review all of them, let me present some major works on several issues.

I. Busing

As one of the procedural civil rights policies, several judges implemented "forced busing" in the 1960's. Busing was designed to send children to schools

other than their neighborhood schools so that black children living in black neighborhoods could have the opportunity of attending schools in white neighborhoods. This is simply a way to help black children to get a better education. This attempt of racial integration at school was fiercely opposed by whites. From Boston to Los Angeles, white suburbanites fought the policy in court and formed organizations to protest.

Dozens of studies on the public opinion of busing have revealed compelling evidence that symbolic racism was the major cause of the opposition (Kinder and Sears 1981; McClendon 1985; McClendon and Pestello 1983; McConahay 1982; Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980). The irrelevance of personal interest was the first thing demonstrated by these researches. Having school age children, residing in a district threatened by a busing plan, or actually having one's child forcibly bused made no difference on an individual's attitude toward the policy. There was a uniform hostility toward forced busing.

Meanwhile, measures of anti-black affect effectively predicted the attitude on busing. A typical example is Sears et al. (1979), where symbolic racism was an additive scale composed of answers to eight questions: support for segregation, fair housing, blacks' intelligence, fair employment opportunity, access to hotels and restaurants, if civil rights movement have pushed too fast, if civil rights movement have helped or hurt blacks' cause, and if civil rights

movement has been violent or peaceful. Sears et al. found that, together with self-identification of being liberal or conservative, symbolic racism accounted well for opposition to busing. They concluded that "[i]t is apparently the *symbolism* evoked by the prospect of *any* white children's forced intimate contact with blacks, rather than the *reality* of one's own children's contact, that triggers opposition to busing" (1979, 382).

Bobo (1983) challenges this interpretation. He argues that when concerns are extrapolated from *one's own* to *any* white child's welfare, it is not symbolism that is involved, but group consciousness. In addition, though immediate threat was found to have no effect on differentiating the opinion, there could be a sense of long-term perceived threat. At least, symbolic racism is not the only factor causing white opposition to busing. Demands and protests by blacks on behalf of their own group's interest could have triggered a realistic sense of threat among whites regarding their own group's interests and privileges. And this sense of threat was reflected in whites' group-wide uniform resistance to the change of racial status quo.

In rebuttal, Sears and Kinder (1985) pointed out that there was no direct evidence showing that whites perceived busing as a realistic threat. Neither did they view themselves as sharing a common destiny. In any case self-interest was a component of the majority group interest and was direct and tangible. Yet, there was remarkably little evidence of it. Further, they argued that group

consciousness was cognitive and could be understood as an affect toward the group.

This debate between Sears and his co-authors and Bobo attracted many researchers to the topic of whites' opinion on busing. Generally, the effect of symbolic racism was found to have gone beyond and could predict well the electoral outcome of pro-busing school board members, minority candidates, and even ballot measures.

II. Affirmative Action

The research findings in this domain parallel those reported above for the busing issue. Compared with blacks, whites have consistently opposed the implementation of affirmative action programs in hiring and admission. Among whites, indicators of self-interest have at best weak correlation with their attitudes (Jacobson 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1986). Kinder and Sanders (1987) developed measures of both personal interest and group interest in affirmative action by asking respondents whether they themselves would be affected by such programs and also how they felt whites as a group would be affected. Their results indicated that the most powerful predictor of white opposition to Affirmative Action was a measure of anti-black affect.

Kluegel and Smith employed demographic variables as proxies for self- in-

terest and also found that the "objective or direct threat posed to an individual's position of relative privilege" had a minimal impact on attitudes toward affirmative action programs (1983, 211). The authors argue that whites frequently resisted demands for racial change because these were viewed as a threat to the existing stratification system which is regarded as beneficial for themselves and American society as a whole.

So, similar to white opinion on the issue of busing, empirical studies seem to have found both evidence of affect-related resentment and sense of group interest in the opinion formation of whites on affirmative action programs.

III. Inner City Racial/Ethnic Conflict

Racial/ethnic minorities in the U.S. often reside in major metropolitan cities. Consequentially, racial/ethnic conflict has been one of the political features of inner-city politics. New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the three largest cities in the United States, have all experienced racial/ethnic conflicts as severe as riots. Most of the time, researchers have been able to identify the realistic interest that triggered the confrontation.

For example, Rudwick (1964) found the fact that blacks coming into the big cities caused job replacement for unskilled whites could account for the Chicago riot of 1919, the Detroit riot of 1943, and the East St. Louis riot of

1917. In their study on ethnic groups in New York City, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) found that much of the conflict between blacks, Puerto Ricans, Jews, and other ethnic groups could best be understood not as racism but as a competition for scarce resources in the economic and social system.

However, in electoral politics, symbolic racism overwhelms interest conflict. In their ground-breaking study on the 1969 mayoral election in Los Angeles where a black Democrat (Tom Bradley) challenged a white conservative incumbent (Sam Yorty), Sears and Kinder (1970, 1971) discovered that anti-black affect and resentment toward procedural civil rights policies best accounted for whites' opposition to Bradley. Their survey results showed that no sense of realistic or "tangible" interest conflict was associated with whites' vote choice.

Other researchers have also reported incidents of racial/ethnic voting. Namely, support for racially/ethnically minority candidates has been coming mostly from minority voters (Nelson 1979; Pomper 1966). Gordon (1967) argued that ethnic voting is expected if the dominant group in the society is resistant to the minority group's values and culture. This theory is found to be useful in explaining the racial tension in the 1990's Los Angeles. Studying blacks' attitude toward Asians and Hispanics following the 1992 riot, Cummings and Lambert (1997) found that much of the tension was caused by cultural and psychological factors instead of job competition or economic deprivation.

So the debate on the origin of group conflict between realistic group conflict and the theory of symbolic prejudice continues. In view of it, some work has addressed the inadequacies of single-factor theories (Blalock 1967; Castles and Kosack 1985; Wilson 1973), by taking a compromise position to say that both schools of thought are equally persuasive. But overall, the literature is filled with case studies content with showing that one of the two theories is effective in explaining some single case of inter-group politics.

2.3 A Synthesized Approach

A central assumption in this debate is that an individual follows one way of thinking or another. That is, a person always makes her decisions upon careful calculation of self-interest, or alternatively by following her ideological sentiment and predisposition. But this need not be the case. Different issue context or different consequences can trigger different reasoning by different types of individuals. In this dissertation, I use empirical analysis to show that we can differentiate the applicability of each theory by the content and consequences of the issue. There is no reason to expect that one of the theory should be more powerful to explain every issue. Further, the two theories can complement each other to better describe the dynamics of information processing in opinion formation.

In his classical study on the stability of public opinion, Converse (1964) found that belief systems are the source of stable opinions over time. He further predicted that "policy items that do bear more rather than less explicitly upon their fortunes should show less stability than affect towards the group qua group but more than those items for which contextual information is required (p. 240). If we consider what Converse calls "the belief system overlaps with what Sears calls "predisposition, then the above quote offers us a conjecture that the theory of prejudice be better at explaining opinions on issues that do not involve explicit redistribution of resources.

Since most of the opinion studies employ survey analysis, the phrasing of questionnaires is central to the findings. If the survey solicits general attitude between racial groups, then the outcome might be better explained by the theory of prejudice. If the survey solicits opinions on an explicit outcome, then we should expect to see less influence from prejudice, if not more from realistic interest calculation. So in the following chapters of case analysis, although I deal with public opinion on one issue, nativism, I differentiate the opinions into three types: general attitude, policy preferences stated in surveys, and policy preferences expressed by vote in elections. Depending on the content and consequences, I expect the theories of interest conflict and prejudice to show different ability in explaining the opinions.

Further, I claim that the two theories can work together to produce a

better picture of the opinion formation process. It is in the nature of inter-group relations that there be a gap between groups, or there would not even be an issue of inter-group relations. The gap indicates distance. Because of the distance, can one identify a realistic threat from the other side?

It is at this point that the theory of realistic group conflict and the theory of symbolic prejudice talk past each other. The latter has established itself by showing the inadequate explanatory power of interest conflict, but the former keeps coming back to claim other more subtle sources of self-interest unrecognized by the former. Take the case of opposition to busing. Kinder and Sears (1981) identified three references[1] as to whether the survey respondents had interest conflict with busing policy, and found none of them to have a significant effect in explaining the opinion on busing. But Bobo (1983) disputed their results, asserting that the interests they studied were only personal interest, not group interest. So the critical point becomes how the perception of group interest is formed.

It is at this point that I claim the two theories should complement each other. Personal affect toward the other group should have much to do with the perception of realistic interest. For example, given that two people have the same information on a racially sensitive issue, but one has a more negative affect toward the other group, she is probably more likely to see her group's

[1]See p. 29.

interest at stake. In other words, prejudice can make unrealistic interest realistic.

In the following chapters, I use data analysis on nativism in the 1990s to test the applicability of each theory and conclude with a synthetic approach. I will first show that the recurrence of nativism in the 1990's is not a racially neutral issue. Then I measure the correlation between opinion types and the relative explanatory power of both theories. Finally I conclude how racial prejudice and traditional beliefs shape opinion on immigrants, and realistic interest calculation influences the preferences on immigration policies.

Chapter 3

Nativism in the 1990s: Economic Competition or Ethnic Prejudice

As a nation established by immigrants, the United States has traditionally been a generous host of immigrants from all over the world. From time to time, however, immigrants have faced fear and hostility – from both ordinary citizens and government – especially during times of economic hardship, political turmoil, or war. Such cycles of nativism are well documented by anti-immigrant legislation and civic disorder. As early as in 1798, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, giving the President arbitrary powers to deport immigrants, particularly editors and pamphleteers, who criticized the U.S. government. During the depression of the 1840s, the so-called "Protestant Crusade" movement popularized and led Protestant workingmen to burn an Irish convent in Boston and riot in several cities. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the first immigration laws, to keep out all people of Chinese origin. In 1911, the "Americanization Campaign" started,

aiming to change the Eastern and Southern European immigrants' cultural traits, civic values, and especially their language. Following the reason that such Americanization was ineffective to the "lower races," in 1921, Congress created national-original quota system for admitting immigrants. An end to national quotas in the 1965 Immigration Reform Act opened the United States to Third World peoples and brought an explosion of cultural diversity. American citizens who felt unsettled by such multiculturalism launched an English only movement in 1980s, seeking to terminate government services in other languages. Since early 1990's, with increasing complaints about the costs of today's diversity, another period of anti-immigrant activism has started. A popular initiative called Proposition 187 in the 1994 California election symbolized this wave of new nativism. Congress followed by enacting sweeping legislation, toughening immigration enforcement laws and cutting government benefits to non-citizens.

In this chapter, I start to explore why Proposition 187 passed with strong support in California in 1994. I first study how the opinion on this legislation was divided. Using the exit poll conducted by *Los Angeles Times*, I test whether support for this initiative could be predicted by ethnic identity or economic satisfaction.

3.1 Proposition 187 and Nativism in California

Anti-immigrant hostility has been a recurrent theme in California history since the days of the Gold Rush. Since the 1850's, California has had a greater diversity of humanity than anywhere else on the continent. As historians record, there were Chinese and "Maylays," Abyssinians, New Zealanders, "Feejee" sailors, Japanese, Russians, "Turks," Chileans, Peruvians, Mexicans, Germans, Italians, French, English, and Americans from every state in the union. Yet, such vitality was often interrupted by sudden eruptions of anti-immigrant violent episodes. As early as 1849, a quasi-military American force in San Francisco, called the Hounds, went after Chilean immigrants, rampaging through their tents and shanties one night, beating anyone who spoke Spanish. When the Chilean "threat" had been reduced, public hostility in San Francisco turned on Australians (Quinn 1997). California was also fertile ground for the Know-Nothing crusade of the mid-1850s, an anti-Catholic movement aimed at Irish and German immigrants.

Though such anti-immigrant hostility has occurred in other ports of entry such as New York, the way it has been expressed in California is different. Californians tend to use "civil authorities" to deal with newcomers. In last century, when civil society was new and weak, public fear turned into mob

rule and the citizen organizations. The infamous Committee of Vigilance, composed of businessmen, patrolled the coast and turned back undesirable immigrants. In this century, California citizens have used propositions and initiatives[1] to vender their desire of restricting the rights of the newcomers. In 1984, Californians passed the famous English as Official Language Proposition to eliminate bilingual ballots, which then became a stalking horse for official-language measures in 21 other states.

In the 1994 California general election, California again pioneered by proposing and passing an immigration reform law – Proposition 187. It is a legislation designed to exclude illegal immigrants from accessing public social services, such as public health care and public education. This proposition was so pivotal in the election that it restored a weak incumbent governor after he took a strong pro- Proposition 187 stance. The proposition passed by 59% of votes.

What Proposition 187 proposed can be summarized as follows.[2]

[1] *Initiative*, *referendum*, and *recall* are the three forms of direct democracy. Citing Corning (1984), the initiative allows voters to propose a legislative measure or a constitutional amendment by filing a petition bearing a required number of valid citizen signatures. The referendum refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their approval or rejection. Both the state legislatures and citizens can refer such a measure to the voters; and for latter a number of signatures is required. The recall allows voters to remove or discharge a public official from office by filing a petition bearing a specified number of valid signatures demanding a vote on the officials continued tenure in office. Proposition 187 was an initiative.

[2] Proposition contains ten sections: (1) Findings and Declaration; (2) Manufacture, Distribution, or Sale of False Citizenship or Resident Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment (3) Use of False Citizenship or Resident Documents: Crime and Punishment; (4) Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS; (5) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services; (6) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care; (7) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Elementary and Secondary Schools; (8) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from

- It makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services, public health care services (unless emergency under federal law), and public school education at elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels.

- It requires various state and local agencies to report persons who are suspected illegal aliens to the California Attorney General and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mandates California Attorney General to transmit reports to Immigration and Naturalization Service and maintain records of such reports.

- It makes it a felony to manufacture, distribute, sell or use false citizenship or residence documents. (1994 California Voter Information Guide)

Reactions to this proposition were very strong and divisive. Those in favor of it called it the "SOS Proposition," abbreviation of "Save Our State." They argued that California had been burdened with some 1.6 million of illegal immigrants, many of whom received welfare benefits and crowded public health care service and public schools. Since the number of illegal immigrants were increasing rapidly, the citizens of California had to "stop the incredible flow of illegal aliens" before the state fell into "an economic and social bankruptcy" (1994 California Voter Information Guide). On the other hand, those who opposed Proposition 187 pointed out that it had no effect on deterring fu-

Postsecondary Educational Institutions; (9) Attorney General Cooperation with the INS; (10) Amendment and Severability.

ture illegal immigration because of its unfeasibility. Instead of strengthening the U.S. Border Patrol, it required medical workers and educators to enforce stricter measures of identification. Its loose statement of "suspected illegal alien" would only cause more trouble when such suspicion was based on the accent, the last names, or the shade of skin. In fact both presidents of California Teachers Association and California Medical Association were among those opposing it.

But as its supporters predicted, Proposition 187 did go beyond California, arousing strong emotion and intense concern over immigration policies nationwide. Voters in several states with high concentrations of immigrants have tried to put similar propositions on their ballots. It was also heard on Capitol Hill, where the United States Congress drafted an immigration reform bill H.R. 2202. Passed as the "Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996," the bill strengthened border patrol regulation and increased penalties for alien smuggling and fraud.[3] The U.S. Congress later enacted the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" and "Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996," which made substantial changes to further restrict legal immigrants from accessing benefits in the United States. Following H.R. 2202, the Senate introduced bill

[3]H.R. 2202 includes measures on increasing border patrol and investigative personnel, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures, improving the verification system for eligibility for employment,etc.

S. 103 as "United States Worker Protection and Illegal Immigrant Deterrence Act of 1997" to provide additional measures to prevent employers from hiring illegal immigrants.

However, Proposition 187 also faces strong challenges. Hispanic groups and civil rights organizations have vigorously contested its legality. As a result, the U.S. District Judge Pfaelzer ruled in November 1995 that it was unconstitutional to deny children of undocumented immigrants a free, public education, and that federally funded benefits should not be denied to immigrants regardless of their status. In November 1997, Judge Pfaelzer further ruled that welfare legislation passed in 1996 by Congress precludes California from establishing separate laws regarding immigration policy. So what Proposition 187 has achieved, in fact, is the 1996 immigration reform bills passed by Congress. They established what Proposition 187 attempted to do – tougher laws against illegal immigration and more restricted rights for legal immigrants.

3.2 Public Opinion on Proposition 187

The background of this new nativism of the 90's were historically familiar: economic stagnation, rising racial tensions, the dissolution of community ties, and widespread cynicism about the social and political institutions. Yet, the opinion for or against Proposition 187 did not share any common argument.

Those who were in favor of it emphasized its economic motivation, while those who objected it almost equated it with racism.

The economic argument was in tune with the historic pattern. Nativism was known to be associated with economic difficulties, especially high employment rates (Cornelious 1983). For example, after World War II, when homecoming soldiers found their jobs gone to Mexican laborers, Federal government enforced laws to sweep away Mexicans from California. By 1994, when Proposition 187 was proposed and passed, the economy in California was at the bottom of a five-year recession. The high unemployment rate and state budget deficit led many to believe that Proposition 187 was put on the ballot out of economic self-interest by the native residents of California.

Among the politicians who supported the Proposition was incumbent governor Pete Wilson. He entered the race for reelection with a bad state economy and trailed in polls at the initial stages. Soon he endorsed Proposition 187 and started to blame illegal immigrants for state budget deficit and causing unemployment. The polls responded accordingly, with his popularity rising and finally surpassing his opponent. This shift of support for the gubernatorial candidates indicates that Wilson had successfully attracted those in favor of Proposition 187 to vote for him. In other words, many voters bought Wilson's argument that it was not his incompetence, but illegal aliens, who should be responsible for the deteriorating state economy. Given that Wilson promised

to solve the problem of illegal immigrants, they should vote for him if the economy was what concerned them most.

The Democrat side of the campaign tried to show that the Proposition was not about economics. They insisted that Wilson, not illegal immigrants, was the obstacle to economic recovery. The Democratic Party revealed that Wilson and his wife hired illegal immigrants as their nanny[4] some years back, and so did Republican Senator candidate Michael Huffington who also took a strong pro-Proposition 187 stand. Their argument was clearly not well received as Brown lost to Wilson eventually. The Democrat's camp has either failed to convey the idea well that Californians have benefited from illegal immigrants as cheap labor, or has encountered a voting public whose majority would want to reduce the number of illegal immigrants for other reasons.

History also shows that nativism has always been accompanied by discriminatory treatment toward ethnic minorities. In the early part of this century, Asian laborers were excluded from jobs other than railway building. In the 1950's, Asian American scholars with international reputation were not allowed to buy houses in California. In the so-called "Operation Wetback" in 1954, when the economy soured after the Korean War, Mexican Americans were deported by police and INS agents militaristically together with illegal Mexican immigrants. Similar treatment toward Anglo immigrants can not be found

[4]Washington Post, May 5, 1995, page 3.

even though they have been a steady source of immigrants into California.

So an alternative explanation for the passage of Proposition 187 was that it was a racial issue. To say the least, its proposed measures were misleading and could cause discrimination against Hispanic Americans. Since most of the illegal immigrants in California are from Mexico, with similar accent and skin color, many Hispanic Americans could encounter unpleasant treatment as suspected illegal immigrants. In the October 1994 Field Poll, over 45% of Hispanic respondents said the passage of Proposition 187 would encourage discrimination against minorities.[5] To say the worst, it was an effort to stereotype economically disadvantaged minorities and thus to restrict the increase of the non-white population in California. White supremacist organizations like the Pioneer Fund were found bank-rolling the signature drive that put the proposition on the ballot. And civil rights organizations like American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have been among the most visible opponents of the proposition. The Proposition has been an anti-discrimination civil rights issue for its opponents.

With the supporting side emphasizing the economic motivation of the Proposition and the opposing side insisting on the racial bigotry behind it, the opinion on the immigration issue falls right into the theoretical debate

[5]In the same survey, the percentages of white, black, and Asian voters who believed passing Proposition 187 would incur discrimination against minority were 27.1%, 32.5%, and 36.7% respectively.

between realistic group conflict theory and the theory of symbolic prejudice. Based on previous literature and the political context, let us first look at the possibly dividing lines of the opinion.

3.2.1 Economic Voting

A popular account of the passage of Proposition 187 is that voters as native residents vented their economic distress on the newcomers. In other words, it is a case where people's votes reflected their "pocket book," as often being shown in candidate elections (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 1984; Tufte 1978). The electoral significance of economic performance in referenda voting was first studied by Bowler and Donovan (1994), who extended the retrospective voting model to the setting of referenda voting. Their analysis of voting behavior on a series of California initiatives found that when the economic conditions worsen, voters tend to vote in favor of the initiatives, i.e., changes of status quo. While if things are going well, voters tend to be risk averse and are more likely to say "no" on initiatives. In other words, incumbency-oriented voting behavior has a status quo-oriented projection in referenda voting.

The evidence to support retrospective voting on Proposition 187 is ample. Since the end of the Cold War, California started to experience economic dif-

ficulties due to aerospace and defense layoffs. Consequently, the early 1990s saw a rising unemployment rate, a shrinking economy, and a growing state budget deficit in California. As resources become scarce, illegal immigrants were perceived as thieves, stealing employment opportunities from legal residents and welfare benefits from a system to which they have not contributed anything. For example, in a Field Poll conducted in October 1994,[6] 68.9% of those who favored Proposition 187 believed that its passage meant more jobs for legal residents. Wilson also appealed to voters by emphasizing the fiscal impact of illegal immigrants on the state budget, namely the unfair burden on Californians of providing illegal aliens with health and education benefits.

Yet retrospective voting theory is encountering an interesting case here. Following the argument by Bowler and Donovan, Proposition 187 should be passed due to the economic frustration of the native residents. However, according to the retrospective voting model explaining candidate elections, incumbent Pete Wilson should not have been re-elected. In reality, voters re-elected Wilson and passed Proposition 187. This phenomenon suggests that many voters may have bought Wilson's campaign and blamed the bad economy on illegal immigrants. If that is true, then voters did associate the economic performance with their vote choices. So given the data, I will first test if voters' opinions on economic performance are in any way associated with their

[6]The election was held in November 1994.

vote choice on the Proposition.

3.2.2 Ethnic Prejudice

The awareness of illegal immigrants' racial/ethnic identity was apparently involved in voters' preference on the Proposition. For example, journalists have recorded that California farm owners supported Proposition 187, despite the fact that they depend almost exclusively upon immigrant laborers from Mexico.[7] Despite a close working relationship, many farm owners would not consider the Mexican farm workers "the same" people as they are. They disliked the fact that these Mexicans cling to their own language and culture, and feel comfortable supporting Proposition 187 to deprive the benefits of a group of alien people. These observations imply that an anti-Mexican sentiment unrelated to economic interest could be behind the passage of the Proposition.

Scholars have found that racial/ethnic identities could serve as the decision rule in elections. Pomper (1966) studied such a case and concluded that race and ethnicity were considered political information about candidates, in a context where there was a lack of cues from parties. Other studies have also found high correlation between ethnic identity and voting behavior including both participation and perferences (Nelson 1979). According to Gordon (1967),

[7]See, for example, *ABC Nightly News with Peter Jennings*, May 16, 1996.

ethnic voting is also expected if the dominant group in the society is resistant to the minority group's values and culture. In the case of illegal immigrants in California, most native residents were definitely not fond of hearing the newcomers speaking their mother tongues. They passed a proposition to establish English as the only official language as early as 1984. A sense of ethnic identity should have played a role in their preference on Proposition 187.

If indeed the supporters of Proposition 187 were compelled by a sentiment against a group of foreigners who neither speak English nor observe American traditions, then we should see correlation between one's vote choice and how akin he feels to these Spanish speaking illegal or new immigrants. For simplicity, since more of the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, I would expect that voters of Hispanic ethnicity would be more likely to identify with the newcomers, and thus be less likely to vote based on ethnic prejudice. So if ethnic prejudice were the major drive of the support for the Proposition, the vote outcome would be divisive among Hispanics and non-Hispanics.

In addition, ethnic prejudice may have a confounding effect with interest motivations. Many legal Hispanic residents live in the same neighborhood as illegal immigrants, where they experience heightened job competition, less access to government services and a lower quality of life. Stories about conflicts between Mexican Americans and new (illegal) immigrants in some communities have often appeared in the local newspapers, with some typical titles as

"Natives, Newcomers at Odds in East L.A.".[8]

The alienating effect of economic status within minority groups was first studied by Dahl (1961). He proposed a model portraying the minority group as highly heterogeneous socioeconomic group. Those group members with high income have gain influences outside their ethnic group, and tend to vote the same way as the majority group, while those who are low in status, income, and social influence tend to form a more cohesive voting bloc that may have different choices on some issues than the majority group do.

Thus, in the analysis below I will measure the concentration of ethnic voting on Proposition 187 between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. In addition, I hypothesize that the better-established Hispanic voters are more likely to support Proposition 187 than other Hispanic voters. I use income levels as an indicator of how well established a voter is.

3.2.3 Ideology and Party Identification

Many theoretical discussions of the value of direct democracy have argued that ideology and party identification should not be salient factors in referenda voting (Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984). Especially during the first two decades of this century when the populist movement pushed the adoption of ballot

[8]By Sonia Nazario, *Los Angeles Times*, March 4, 1996.

voting in several states, scholars viewed direct democracy as an alternative to party politics. Key and Crouch (1939) did a thorough study on California referenda and proposition voting procedures, where they pointed out that the group of voters who initiate a direct legislative measure must be distant from political parties. The logic they offered was that if it was a group closely affiliated with either party who want to see a legislative measure established, the group can push the affiliated party to have the measure passed in the legislative houses which are controlled by the parties. In other words, direct democracy is motivated by some group(s) seeking their interest, not by party organizations.

Magleby, who carried out the first systematic study on referenda voting, also argued that parties have no incentive to take stands on ballot measures, because "a proposition rarely means any payoff to the electoral fortunes of the party candidates in the election." (Magleby 1984, 174) In his study on a series of propositions, however, he unexpectedly found that ideology and party identification played important roles in shaping votes on ballot propositions consistently across issue areas and over time. For example, he found that since 1972 the California electorate has apparently relied on ideological predisposition to help determine their vote. However, because the predictability of ideology and party identification was higher in partisan elections than in direct democracy, Magleby did not discuss further why ideology and party

identification were significant factors in referenda voting.

Theoretically, scholars believe parties have no incentive to take sides on ballot measures, because any party stand on a proposition may alienate some voters. However, both parties have been actively involved in referenda voting, especially since Proposition 13 in 1978.[9] Cronin (1989) has noted that governors and legislative leaders in several states, mostly Republicans, led the efforts to get the direct democracy enacted in their jurisdictions. In California, both parties get involved in referenda voting when the issue raised is salient. For example, famous politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Lyndon Johnson and Pat Brown initiated or backed certain propositions (Magleby 1984). The case of Proposition 187 appears to have followed this trend. The California Republican Party mailed 200,000 petitions to voters to help get enough signatures to put this initiative on the ballot. Both Pete Wilson and Michael Huffington took clear standing on the issue. So one way to look at the effect of partisanship is that it is a systematic effect on voting behavior. It is necessary to take control of it in this study of vote choice.

Another behavioral assumption involves the effect of ideology. Referenda voting is by nature single-issue politics, so placing the issue along the ideology spectrum is a way for the voters to simplify their decision-making process.

[9]Proposition 13 in June 1978 was adopted by Californians to cut their property taxes by at least half.

Scholars have noted that voters are usually uninformed on proposition issues (Magleby 1884; Cronin 1989). If one could interpret a ballot measure into liberal or conservative terms, one can vote according to his preferred ideological stance. The well-established literature on the spatial model of voting has shown that it is an effective way to describe the voters' decision making process (Downs 1956; Enelow and Hinich 1984). Given that Proposition 187 concerns a single issue, I assume that ideological standing had its share of effect in shaping the preferences. So like partisanship, ideology is an important dimension to control for as in any voting behavior analysis.

To summarize, I have three hypothesized dividing lines of opinion to test. First, I expect to see economic satisfaction differentiate vote choice, with positive evaluation of the economy correlating negatively with the probability of supporting the Proposition. The second possible division is between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. Hispanics would be more likely to vote against the Proposition compared with non-Hispanic voters of similar socioeconomic background. But Hispanic voters with higher incomes would vote more similarly as non-Hispanic voters did. Last, I expect to see opinions being influenced by ideology and partisanship. Republicans and conservatives should be more likely to support the Proposition than Democrats and liberal.

3.3 A First Look: An Exit Poll Analysis

In this section I use a set of survey data to do a preliminary examination of the validity of the above hypotheses. The survey is an exit poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times, called LAT Poll in the following context. The LAT Poll asked the respondents how they voted in the election, their opinions on some political and social issues, and their personal socioeconomic conditions. It consisted of 9481 respondents in California. It contains interesting information of how people voted on Proposition 187 corresponding to their socioeconomic status. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the vote on Proposition 187 broken down by relevant factors: ideology and party identification, income and education levels, race and ethnicity, and gender and age groups. The number of respondents who answered all the relevant questions is 5286.

A brief examination of the data in Table 3.1 shows that the relationship between respondents' economic evaluations and their vote-choice is rather loose. First, we see the invariance of vote differentiated by changes on personal finances. Compare those who said they were worse off financially with those better off, and we see only 3% more of former voted for the Proposition. Even more striking is that the evaluation of the California economy had an effect opposite to that predicted: 53.7% of the voters who thought the economy in California was worse off supported the Proposition, while 59.4% of those who

Table 3.1: Support for Proposition 187 by Demographic

	For		Against		No Vote	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Personal finance						
Better	54.7	651	44.5	530	0.8	10
Same	53.7	994	45.3	839	1.0	19
Worse	57.6	985	41.8	714	0.6	10
California economy						
Right track	59.4	990	39.9	664	0.7	12
Wrong track	53.7	1509	45.5	1278	0.9	24
Ethnicity						
White	59.7	2242	39.7	1489	0.6	23
Hispanics	23.6	98	75.0	312	1.4	6
Black	43.8	113	53.9	139	2.3	6
Asian	47.1	82	51.7	90	1.1	2
Other	60.8	104	38.0	65	1.2	2
Ideology						
Liberal	24.2	223	75.2	692	0.5	5
Middle-of-the-road	52.7	1135	46.5	1001	0.9	19
Conservative	76.5	1261	22.7	374	0.8	13
Party Identification						
Democrat	32.5	628	66.3	1281	1.1	22
Independent	57.8	413	41.7	298	0.6	4
Republican	78.0	1524	21.6	423	0.4	7
Other or no party	41.9	54	56.6	73	1.6	2
Education						
Less than high school	60.1	98	39.3	64	0.6	1
High/vocational school	62.9	421	35.6	238	1.5	10
Less than Bachelor	59.9	823	39.4	541	0.7	9
Less than Master	54.6	743	44.9	611	0.5	7
Master and above	48.5	181	50.7	189	0.8	3
Religion						
Protestant	67.0	941	32.4	455	0.6	8
Other Christian	67.0	511	32.1	245	0.9	11
Roman Catholic	47.9	562	51.2	600	0.9	7
Other religion	42.1	293	57.0	236	0.9	6
No religion	45.3	325	53.9	387	0.8	6
Income						
Under $20,000	49.6	245	48.4	239	2.0	10
$20,000-$39,000	53.7	550	45.3	464	1.0	10
$40,000-$59,000	55.9	638	43.6	497	0.5	6
$60,000-$74,000	55.9	365	43.9	289	0.6	4
Above $75,000	57.4	734	41.9	536	0.6	8
Entire Sample	55.1	2932	43.10	2295	1.11	59

thought things were going well supported it. Such a relationship implies that opinion on the Proposition might have not been correlated with retrospective assessments of economic performance in the expected way. So in the following analysis I will check if this is indeed the case after controlling for other variables.

Not surprisingly, race and ethnicity seem to have mattered. Of Hispanic voters 75% opposed Proposition 187, higher than any other group of Non-Hispanic voters. Whites favored the Proposition in general, with 59.7% supporting it and 39.7% rejecting it. African-American and Asian-American voters split on it, with slight more favoring the Proposition.

But voting on Proposition 187 seems best predicted by ideology and partisanship. As many as 75.2% of those who considered themselves liberal voted against the Proposition, while 76.5% of conservatives supported it. Those who were ideologically moderate were more likely to favor the Proposition than to oppose it (52.7% vote "yes" and 46.5% "no"). Such a distribution suggests that many voters interpreted Proposition 187 along ideological lines. Compared with ideology, party identification appears to be an even better indicator for Republicans: a 78.0% and 21.6% division of votes in favor of the Proposition. There was a weaker relationship for Democrats, with 66.3% voted "yes" on the Proposition. This indicates that Wilson's campaign might have led Republican voters to support this Proposition.

Next, the effects of education levels and religious beliefs also appear to be strong. As a voter's education level goes up, her support of the Proposition goes down steadily. Comparing the two extremes, i.e., from a high school dropout to a master (or doctoral) degree holder, we see a 15.4% decrease in the percentage of "yes" voters on this Proposition. An even more interesting phenomenon is that Christian voters supported the Proposition much more than secular voters and voters with other religious beliefs. Protestant and other Christian voters indicated a more than 2/3 chance in favor of passing Proposition 187, while more than half of the other voters opposed the Proposition. There is no direct evidence that Catholics were more likely to oppose the Proposition, though the Catholic church has been accused of supporting illegal immigration.[10] In fact, Catholics closely followed other Christians in supporting the Proposition.

Last, breaking voters by income levels reveals that the sample includes disproportionally more middle- and upper-class voters, since nearly 30% of those who revealed their income levels report annual household income higher than $75,000, 43.4% higher than $60,000. The breakdowns show that support for Proposition 187 increased with household income level, though the variation was rather small across groups. At each income level more than half of the voters supported the Proposition.

[10]See, for example, Stephen Mumford, "Illegal immigration, National Security, and the church," *The Humanist,* 41:6, 1981, pp. 24-30.

Given this preliminary examination, we start to have a feeling for who might be more likely to support a Proposition to exclude illegal immigrants. First, ideologically conservative voters and Republican voters supported the Proposition overwhelmingly. Second, Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters really split on the issue, with Hispanic voters much less likely to support the Proposition. This discrepancy was similar among Democrats and Republicans, with more Republicans voting for the Proposition. And third, it seems that retrospective evaluations of the state economy or personal finances were not effective in differentiating voters' choices. In addition, education levels were negatively correlated with support for the Proposition, and income levels were positively correlated with the probability to support the Proposition. Yet, all of these are only bivariate correlations between vote choice and one of the explanatory factors. Without multivariate analysis, we can not come to any meaningful conclusions. Especially in this case where income, religion, and other factors may have confound effect with race/ethnicity. So in the following section, I present a multivariate regression model that will jointly test all the hypotheses.

3.4 Who Voted for Proposition 187?

Given the data set shown in Table 3.1 where voters' choices are discrete, I fit a probit model[11] to predict the probability that voters will support Proposition 187.[12] To test the retrospective voting theory, I use the respondents' assessments of the change in their personal finances over the past year, and the respondents' opinion if the economy in California was doing well. For both variables pessimistic responses were coded lower.

To measure the extent of racial voting, I use a variable, H, that is coded "1" if the respondent is Hispanic and "0" if otherwise. Further, H is multiplied with other relevant variables to capture the different effects of that variable across Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. H is combined with both variables indicating the assessment of changes in personal finance and the state of California economy, and education and income levels. Education is measured by respondents' years of schooling and income level is measured by the respondent's annual household income. Larger numbers indicate higher levels.

I include ideology and party identification in the model, and test for parametric differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. In both cases, I define dummy variables to denote liberals or conservatives, and Democrats

[11] I use probit instead of logit model here because the normal distribution assumption is used in the method applied to the aggregate data analysis later.

[12] To make the model straightforward, I only consider the choices of either voting "yes" or voting "no," excluding the choice of abstaining.

or Republicans as compared to the ideologically middle-of-the-road voters and Independent voters respectively.

In addition, I expect religious beliefs to influence the vote-choice. Since few Hispanic voters are Protestant or Christian, I only differentiate the Catholic voters by ethnicity. Though in Table 3.1 Catholic voters appear more supportive of the Proposition than other non-Protestants, I expect Hispanic Catholics to be much less likely to support the Proposition than non-Hispanic Catholic voters. To control for other socioeconomic factors, I also control for age and gender differences. Age might be correlated with the assimilation and naturalization process. The opinion of more senior voters may tell how more established residents felt about new comers. Female voters might have been more sympathetic toward the children of illegal immigrants, thus less motivated to support a legislation to put these children out of school.

With the above specification, my model is summarized as follows:

$$Prob(voting\text{“}yes\text{”}) = \alpha + X\beta + L(\alpha' + X\beta) + \epsilon \tag{3.1}$$

where the X contains variables pertaining to different hypotheses, and β is a vector of coefficients. The dummy variable H stands for Hispanic ethnicity. To examine the effect of retrospective voting, I look to the coefficients of the

economic assessment variables. For the ethnic voting account, the coefficients of the dummy variables are of primary interest. And finally, to inspect the effect of partisan voting in this non-partisan election, the coefficients on ideology and party identification are examined.

The estimates of the probit models are reported in Table 3.2. In the left column I list all the independent variables and the right columns present coefficients of the regressions, which can be translated into probability terms. In the sample used to generate these estimates, 43.78% of the respondents voted against the Proposition and 56.22% for it. The model correctly predicts 73.0% of all individual vote choices.

To make the estimated coefficients more meaningful, I transformed them into probability terms in Table 3.3. To illustrate this, let us assume a typical voter from the sampled respondents, who has the most represented characteristics in each category. That is, she thinks the economy in California was not doing well; her personal financial situation remained the same over the past year; and she is middle-of-the-road in terms of ideology, with no party affiliation; she has an annual household income above $70,000 and some college education. In Table 3.3, I show that when holding other variables constant at the typical voter's level, changing one particular variable would result in the probability of one casting a supporting vote for Proposition 187.

Table 3.2: Probit Regression Estimates of Vote Choice on Proposition 187

	Coefficients for			
Independent Variables	Model I		Model II	
Constant	-0.18	(0.15)	-0.30	(0.15*)
H (Hispanics)	-1.17	(0.52**)	-1.07	(0.51*)
Personal finance	-0.04	(0.03)		—
Personal finance with H	0.01	(0.12)		—
California economy	0.03	(0.025)		—
California economy with H	-0.01	(0.09)		—
California and personal			-0.05	(0.04)
California and personal with H			0.08	(0.13)
Ideology	0.37	(0.04**)	0.39	(0.04**)
Ideology with H	-0.05	(0.12)	-0.05	(0.12)
Democrat	-0.50	(0.06**)	0.44	(0.06**)
Democrat with H	0.06	(0.23)	0.01	(0.22)
Republican	0.34	(0.07**)	0.40	(0.06**)
Republican with H	-0.21	(0.26)	-0.30	(0.25)
Income level	0.05	(0.03)	0.04	(0.03)
Income with H	-0.01	(0.12)	0.01	(0.12)
Education level	-0.17	(0.02**)	-0.167	(0.02**)
Education level with H	0.13	(0.07)	0.16	(0.07)
Protestant	0.27	(0.06**)	0.27	(0.06**)
Catholic	0.06	(0.06)	-0.08	(0.06)
Catholic with H	-0.26	(0.18)	-0.29	(0.17)
Other Christian	0.27	(0.07**)	0.28	(0.07**)
Gender (female)	-0.04	(0.05)	-0.04	(0.04)
Gender with H	-0.06	(0.17)	-0.06	(0.16)
Age	0.04	(0.015*)	0.04	(0.01**)
Age with H	0.10	(0.05)	0.08	(0.05)
Number of observations	4102		4393	
Percent correctly predicted	73.01		72.81	

Note: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates an estimate significant at the $p = .05$ level.
** indicates an estimate significant at the $p = .10$ level.

Table 3.3: Effects of Economy, Ethnicity, Ideology, and Partisanship on Supporting Rate for Proposition 187

	Probability of Voting for Proposition 187 By	
	Non-Hispanic Voters	Hispanic Voters
On Average	0.68(±0.01)	0.36(±0.02)
Personal Finances		
Better	.66(±.01)	.37(±.05)
Same	.68	.36
Worse	.69	.33
California Economy		
Better	.69(±.01)	.36(±.04)
Worse	.68	.35
Ideology		
Liberal	.53(±.02)	.24(±.05)
Middle-of-the-road	.68	.36
Conservative	.80	.48
Party Identification		
Democrat	.48(±.02)	.21(±.07)
Independent	.68	.36
Republican	.79	.40
Income		
Under $39,000	.52(±.02)	.20(±.06)
$40,000-$74,000	.68	.36
Above $75,000	.79	.46
Education		
Less than high school	.78(±0.01)	.38(±.03)
High/vocational school	.73	.37
Less than Bachelor	.68	.36
Less than Master	.61	.34
Master and above	.54	.33

Note: Table entries are the predicted probabilities of a hypothetical individual voting for Proposition 187 based upon the row-variables. The number in the parentheses is the variation within one standard deviation. The profile for this hypothetical voter is discussed in the text.

The economy. Contrary to my first hypothesis, I find that neither voters' assessment of their personal financial conditions nor their assessments of the California economy have statistically significant influences on their decision to vote yes on Proposition 187. More surprisingly, it appears that voters' evaluation of the California economy is positively correlated with their support of Proposition 187. To further display the relationship between voters' retrospective thinking and their vote-choice, I developed another variable which indicates if the voter thinks both his personal and the statewide economic conditions grew worse or got better. I rerun the probit model with this variable replacing the two previous economic variables, and report it as Model II in Table 3.1. This variable does not show any significant effects, either. Thus this finding rejects the hypothesis of retrospective voting.

Ideology and Partisanship. As expected, ideological standing and party identification are statistically significant in the model. Ideologically conservative voters and Republican voters tend to vote for the proposition, while liberal and Democrats tend to vote against it, compared with the ideologically moderate and Independent voters. When the effect of Hispanic ethnicity is combined with these two factors, the sign of the coefficient for ideology is reversed, though it is not statistically different from the patterns of non-Hispanic voters. Similarly, when compared with non-Hispanic voters, Hispanic voters tend to be less influenced by party identification, though not significantly ei-

ther. Table 3.3 shows that, given the same ideology stands and partisanship, Hispanic voters have much lower probability of voting yes on Proposition 187, though with greater variation.

Ethnic voting. The coefficient for H in Table 3.2 shows that the threshold for Hispanic voters to support the Proposition is significantly higher than for the non-Hispanic voters. In Table 3.3, I calculate that the average probability of a Hispanic voter to support the Proposition is 36%, compared with a 68% by the non-Hispanics. In other words, given that all other personal characteristics are the same, Hispanic ethnicity accounts for a 32% difference in vote-choice. Another clear pattern is that the coefficients for the terms with dummy variables tend to be of opposite signs of those without dummy variables (except for gender and age). In other words, Hispanic voters were less influenced by those factors and tended to support Proposition 187 at a lower rate. However, the results also indicate that none of the coefficients for the dummy variables are significantly different from those without the dummy variables at the 5% level. Thus the effect of these independent variables on voters' decision are roughly the same across Hispanic voters and non-Hispanic voters. Table 3.3 helps illustrate that the shift in probabilities along scales is similar for most variables across non-Hispanic and Hispanic voters. For example, there is a 27% increase in the probability of supporting the Proposition if one changes from a liberal to conservative for non-Hispanic voters, while there

is a 24% increase for Hispanic voters. Thus the hypothesis of ethnic voting is revealed by the 32% differences between the average supporting rates across non-Hispanic voters and Hispanic voters. We see some two-thirds of the Hispanic voters opposed the Proposition, making clear a gap between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters.

It is important to look into how this 32% difference varies according to different socioeconomic conditions. The model shows that income levels are not statistically significant in determining vote-choice, which implies that voters of all income levels had a similar probability of supporting the Proposition. It is conceivable that lower income voters would have concerns over job replacement, while higher income voters support the Proposition to save tax dollars. Overall, higher income voters were more likely to support the Proposition more, though not significantly.

By comparison, a voter's education level is able to differentiate vote-choice: the better educated opposed the Proposition more than the less educated, and more so for non-Hispanic voters. In fact, for high school dropouts, a non-Hispanic voter has a 40% higher chance than a Hispanic voter to support the Proposition, but the difference decreases to 21% for master or higher degree holders. Two reasons may account for this difference. First, better-educated voters worry less about job displacement since most illegal immigrants engage in low skill work. Secondly, scholars have long associated a voter's education

level with one's ability to be politically informed (Popkin 1991). This argument maintains that better-educated voters perceived illegal immigrants with less antagonism. Further, this suggests education bridged the differences between voters of different ethnic backgrounds. Table 3.3 shows that the 21% difference for master or higher degree holders is the smallest of all differences.

The effects from income and education levels to some extent confirm Dahl's theory of assimilation, which predicts that the political behavior of minorities with higher social class is more similar to the majority group in the society than those with lower social status. In this case, if income indicates social class, then higher class Hispanic voters supported the Proposition more than the lower class voters, though with quite some variation. On the other hand, if we consider education levels as the symbol of social status, Hispanic "elites" agreed with non-Hispanics "elites" much more. So I conclude there is differentiation in the voting behavior of minority group, which can be traced by socioeconomic conditions. The higher income and better-educated voters are more likely to hold the same political views as the majority.

In sum, the probit analysis questions the retrospective voting hypothesis, but confirms the hypothesis of ethnic voting and the effect by ideology and partisanship. It is rather unexpected that economic concerns could not differentiate people's preference on the Proposition. The data bears strong evidence that voters used ideological standing and partisanship to help deciding

on their vote choice. This finding agrees with the literature that direct democracy in California has become more entangled with party politics. In other words, ideology and partisanship are becoming systematic factors in referenda voting.

3.5 Further Discussion

I set out to test the presence of interest conflict and ethnic prejudice in Proposition 187 voting. Three main findings come out from the data analysis. First, Proposition 187 was definitely not a racially neutral issue. Second, there was relatively weak evidence supporting realistic conflict theory. Last, the strong effects by partisanship and ideology suggests that voters were heavily influenced by the campaigns during the election.

The weak show of retrospective voting does not mean the absence of concerns for interest conflict. Retrospective thinking is not the only source of voters' perceptions of economic threat by illegal immigrants. For example, an alternative view could be prospective thinking. Notice that voters who thought the economy in California was going well actually were more likely to vote for the Proposition, though not significantly. If the logic were that a better economy would lure more illegal immigrants to come, then Proposition 187 seemed particularly relevant in regulating the increasing population. But with

the LAT poll, we simply do not have the data on how voters thought about the economy prospectively. In any case, rejecting retrospective voting is not equivalent to rejecting interest conflict as a motivation for the anti-immigration legislation.

It is easy to add a test of prospective voting on the issue. The data set in Chapter 5 will allow an examination on the correlation between voters' views on the prospect of national economy and their opinion on immigration policy. But it is more complicated to capture the indirect influences on the perception of interest conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, realistic interest conflict is only what is perceived as realistic. In this case, I consider the influences from three aspects.

First, a collective interest at the local level is relevant to the perception. It is possible that one perceived the threat of unemployment or welfare spending by illegal immigrants as independent of personal well being or the performance of state economy. Through Wilson's campaign, voters might have developed impressions that illegal immigrants were draining the state budget no matter whether the economy was good or bad. Or maybe because the media had been informing them that the unemployment rate was rising to a new high, they wanted to restrict the inflow of cheap labor to lower the unemployment rate, even if they had been doing well personally. In other words, voters may be thinking about the economy in their city, county, or even the whole country

which just happen to be neither at the personal nor the state level as the survey captured. To explore these possibilities, I will analyze the effect by social contexts in the following chapter.

Specifically; in Chapter 4, I will examine whether vote choice was likely to be the result of the economic and social characteristics of the county the vote resided in. I explore the "Bay Area Phenomenon" and discuss if economic concerns were in effect at certain collective level. The result will show how the county level economic characteristics influence voters' preferences on the Proposition.

Second, I compare people's opinions by how close they live to minorities. With the data analysis in Chapter 4, I can find out whether county level racial composition had any effect on the vote outcome. The logic is that those who lived more distant to minorities had less information or experience to help form their perception. With less information, how they projected the threat became a more interesting question. Chapter 5 also continues the exploring with a survey sample that was conducted nationwide. Comparing it with the California case, we can generalize if the anti-immigration sentiment had the same motives everywhere in the country. Chapter 6 brings the focus back to Los Angeles to study the urban perspective on immigrants. In particular, I analyze how inner city minorities, who lived close to new immigrants, perceived the impact by new immigrants.

The last aspect is information in campaigns. A rather unexpected finding from this data analysis is how strongly ideological positions and partisanship influenced Proposition 187 voting. It seems that voters were quite receptive to party's or candidates' reasoning on the issue. Such strong influence suggests two possibilities. One is that voters depended on party politics to get information on the issue. This case certainly reduces the chance that voters were seriously informed on the issue of illegal immigration, and implies uncertainty in opinion formation when in absence of political campaigns. The other possibility is that the issue just happened to be divisive along ideological standings. To test for both possibilities, in Chapter 6, I model uncertainty in opinion with a survey data that was not taken in the context of any political event.

All of these further analyses are designed to differentiate both voters and issues into different types, so that we can distinguish the effect of economic concerns and racial prejudice more rigorously. These studies should help to clarify the motivation problem on the anti-immigration legislation surge in the recent years. More importantly, it can tell more about the logic of opinion formation on policies and issues.

Another important reason for further analysis is that the findings in this chapter are solely based on survey data. Many scholars have questioned the validity of survey returns. Converse (1986) showed that survey responses sub-

ject to the style of the questionnaires and the interviewers. Zaller and Feldman (1992) pointed out even if survey interviewees "answer questions," they may not be "revealing preferences." Survey responses are often tempered by framing of the issue or peoples desire to appear politically correct on sensitive issues in front of the interviewer. Consequentially survey answers are expected to have large variance. In the LAT poll, we see that support rate for Proposition 187 is about 55%, about 4% lower than the real vote outcome. It is possible that the racial overtone of the issue prevented people from reporting truthfully.

An alternative way is to use actural vote outcomes. Due to the secret ballot, all vote records are available at some aggregate level. In the past, scholars have often shunned from analyzing aggregate data because of the methodological difficulties involved. Facilitated with a new breakthrough in methodology, I will analyze the vote record on Proposition 187 in Chapter 4 with a method called "generalized method of bounds. The findings there can cross-validate the findings in this chapter.

Chapter 4

Regional Effects and Perceived Threat

Many factors could contribute to the perceptions of American citizens towards newcomers. Although in the LAT survey, retrospective economic evaluation and personal well being could not predict people's preferences on Proposition 187, we can not conclude yet that support for Proposition 187 was not nativism driven by interest conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, the theory of realistic conflict is closely linked to one's definition of group interest. If an individual's sense of shared fate with her group members is strong enough, she may act for the benefits of her group members instead of her own. In the case of Proposition 187, some voters many have supported for it because they saw their neighbors losing jobs or read about the rising unemployment statistics, despite that they were doing fine themselves.

In this chapter, I study the regional effects in Proposition 187 voting. Re-

gional characteristics are types of social contexts. Social contexts have long been regarded as important determinants of voting behavior in addition to individual characteristics of each voter (Alexander et al. 1987; Blalock 1984; Huber 1991; Kelley and McAllister 1985; McAllister 1987). Despite the increasing amount of research based upon the assumption that voters are rational individuals who vote to maximize their individual utilities, there is plenty of evidence showing that social contexts should not be neglected as they add externalities to voter's utilities. For example, urban neighborhood and county are known to have contextual influences on voters (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; MacKuen and Brown 1987).

In fact, regional variation is probably the most common contextual effect. Theoretically, regional differences can be the results from either the composition of the population of the region, or the influences of regional characteristics over its residents. Charnock (1996) called them compositional effects and contextual effects. Obviously, to distinguish contextual effects from compositional effects, we need information of interest on all the individuals in the region. For example, if we see county one passed and county two failed Proposition 187, and we know the two counties are vastly different in terms of ethnic composition or average income level, we can not tell whether it was these county level characteristics that caused the different vote outcome. If we know (say, from surveys) that Democrats tended to oppose the Proposition and Republicans

support it, then the first thing to check would be whether county one has more Republican and county two has more Democrats. Without controlling for the effect of partisanship, we can do any meaningful comparison of the effects by county level characteristics.

A recent example is the work by Tolbert and Hero (1996) on Proposition 187 in California. Regressing vote outcome on county level minority populations, they found that in counties with large Hispanic population and small population of other minorities ("bifurcated counties"), the support rate for Proposition 187 was higher. But their model is fundamentally flawed by confusing the compositional effects with contextual effects. Suppose what they found was true. One can not possibly tell whether the extra support in these "bifurcated counties" came from voters in all or some special group. If it came from voters in all groups, then the variation across counties might be contextual. Otherwise it could be compositional, as these counties might have more Republican voters who were believed to favor the Proposition. Without knowing the answer, there can not be a meaningful discussion of how bifurcated ethnic composition has shaped vote outcomes as a contextual factor.

However, empirically, data on individual characteristics such as partisanship, education levels, ethnic backgrounds, and so on, are rarely available for all the individuals in each region. More often, surveys obtain individual level data but of only a small portion of all residents in certain region; government

records may report region-wide statistics but aggregately. Methodologically, inferring individual level information from aggregate data has been a difficult problem that is traditionally known as the fallacy of "ecological inference." Without an actual record of each individual's votes and socioeconomic background, demonstrating the existence or non-existence of contextual effects across regions is extremely difficult.

Correctly dealing with ecological inference is an inevitable route to disentangling the contextual effects from compositional effects. The literature on solving the "ecological inference" problem is remarkably rich yet controversial. Ever since the so-called "Goodman's regression" (Goodman 1953), dozens of models have appeared in the literature (Achen and Shively 1995; Ansolabehere and Rivers 1995; Grofman et al. 1985; King 1997; Kousser 1973; Palmquist 1994; Prais and Achison 1954). Despite the potential contribution of each methodological breakthrough, not many scholars other than the authors of the models have ever utilized these ecological inference models to explore possible contextual effects. In this chapter, I will apply King's generalized method of bounds (King 1997) to approximate how votes were divided along individual characteristic, such as ethnic background, or party identification, in every county. Afterwards, I used the reconstructed individual behavior to test the effects of county level characteristics on the support for Proposition 187.

4.1 Generalized Method of Bounds

The data used in this analysis is the vote record aggregated at the precinct level, compiled by the Institute of Government Studies in Berkeley from the California *Statement of Vote* and *Statement of Registration*[1] (IGS data). The *City and County Data Book, 1994* provides census data on the economic statistics and racial/ethnic composition of each county.

In essence, what this generalized method of bounds does is to estimate the joint probabilities from marginal probabilities in a two by two contingency table. For example, if one margin gives percentage of votes divided between yes and no, the other tells percentage of voters of Hispanic and of non-Hispanic ethnicity, then the method can approximate the percentage of Hispanic voters who vote "yes." Specifically, in this study, we can summarize the IGS data as the table on the next page.

Empirically, the quantities denoted by the English letters in the table are what is known, while those denoted by the Greek letters are what we want to find out. The number of total voters was recorded in the *Statement of Registration*, and the turnout rate was recorded in the *Statement of Vote.* The percentage of Hispanic voters was approximated from the 1990 census, as IGS

[1]Published by California's Secretary of State Office. The data set compiled by the IGS is missing three counties: El Dorado, Lassen, and Tehama.

Race of Voting-Age Person	Voting Decision				
	Democrat	Republican	Subtotal Turnout	Not Turnout	
black	λ_i^b	$1-\lambda_i^b$	β_i^b	$1-\beta_i^b$	X_i
white	λ_i^w	$1-\lambda_i^w$	β_i^w	$1-\beta_i^w$	$1-X_i$
	D_i		T_i	$1-T_i$	n_i

Notice:
1. X_i, T_i each indicates a proportion out of n_i.
2. β is a proportion out of X_i. β_i^w is the proportion of whites who vote in the i^{th} precinct; β_i^b is the proportion of blacks who vote in the i^{th} precinct.
3. The superscripts indicate the race of voting-age person.[2]
4. λ is the proportion of voters who turn out and vote for a Democrat.

data merged census tracks with precincts.[3]

Let's look at the right half of the table and solve β with T and X first. An "accounting identity" summarizes the relationship between the knowns and the unknowns:

$$T_i = \beta_i^b X_i + \beta_i^w (1 - X_i)$$

The question now is that for every observation i, we have two parameters to estimate: β_i^b and β_i^w.

To solve this problem, traditionally scholars have tried to reduce the number of parameters in certain ways. For example, one way to estimate the

[3]See Appendix A for details of how the merge is done.

accounting identity is to assume that all β_i's are the same. This is substantively equivalent to assuming that the proportion of whites voting is constant across precincts, and that the proportion of blacks voting is constant across precincts. Then we have two parameters (β^w and β^b), and as many observations as the number of precincts. Such an estimation method was proposed by Leo Goodman in 1953 (Goodman 1953), and still shows up in journal papers nowadays from time to time. The Tolbert and Hero paper mentioned in the last section is one example.

Besides the problem that β_1 may not be the same as β_{101}, a practical constraint also prevents Goodman's regression from giving reliable answers. That is, sometimes the estimated β is out of the range of $[0, 1]$. And it is rather hard to face a turnout rate of negative amount or over 100%. More precisely, we can narrow down the range of β_i's as follows:

$$max\left(0, \frac{T_i - (1 - X_i)}{X_i}\right) \leq \beta_i^b \leq min\left(\frac{T_i}{X_i}, 1\right)$$

$$max\left(0, \frac{T_i - X_i}{1 - X_i}\right) \leq \beta_i^w \leq min\left(\frac{T_i}{1 - X_i}, 1\right).$$

In fact, the problem here is not that different from classic regression analysis. For simplicity, suppose we observe a bunch of data points in a two-dimensional space. Assuming the Gauss-Markov conditions, we fit a regres-

sion line to extract information from the data by minimizing the discrepancies between the line and the data. In other words, we obtain $\hat{\beta}$ and its distribution to summarize the information the data carry. Now the case goes up one dimension. A slight rearrangement of the accounting identity shows that instead of data points, now we observe data lines, all of which have negative slopes and are in a unit square:

$$\beta_i^w = \left(\frac{T_i}{1 - X_i}\right) - \left(\frac{X_i}{1 - X_i}\right) \beta_i^b. \tag{4.1}$$

So instead of fitting a line in two dimensions, we can fit a two dimension contour to encircle the intersections of the many observed lines. Figure 4.1 provides a visual feeling of what it can look like. Notice that every line in the graph is determined by equation (1), and that they all show negative slopes.

Like the regression lines that are the projection of a three-dimensional distribution onto a two-dimensional surface, the contour lines in the figure are also the projection of a bivariate distribution, with the parameters of the distribution printed at the top of the figure. Figure 4.2 helps to illustrate Figure 4.1 from a different dimension.

To put this in words, what this approach does is to assume that the parameters we want to estimate, each β_i^b and β_i^w, are drawn from some distribution.

Figure 4.1: Two-Dimensional Contour of Data Lines Obtained from Equation 4.1



Notice:

This is the same as Figure 6.3 from *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem.*;

Every line in the graph is determined by equation (1). So they all have negative slopes.

Figure 4.2: Another View of Figure 4.1



Notice:
This is the same as Figure 6.4 from *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*

The distribution will have a set of parameters that we can estimate. With the estimated distribution, we can then obtain a univariate distribution as each negative-sloped lines in Figure 3.1 slices the three-dimensional distribution in Figure 6.4. The two-dimensional cross section will then be the posterior distribution of each β_i conditional on all the information borrowed from all other precincts.

Three assumptions are required by the model:

Assumption 1. β_i^b, β_i^w are generated by a truncated bivariate normal distribution conditional on X_i, i.e.,

$$P(\beta_i^b, \beta_i^w) = TN(\beta_i^b, \beta_i^w \mid \mathcal{B}, \Sigma)$$

where

$$\mathcal{B} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathcal{B}^b \\ \mathcal{B}^w \end{pmatrix} = E \begin{pmatrix} \beta_i^b \\ \beta_i^w \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_b^2 & \sigma_{bw} \\ \sigma_{bw} & \sigma_w^2 \end{pmatrix} = Var \begin{pmatrix} \beta_i^b \\ \beta_i^w \end{pmatrix}$$

Assumption 2. β_i^b, β_i^w are mean independent of X_i, i.e., completely unrelated.

Assumption 3. Value of T_i in different precincts are independent after

conditioning on X_i.

It might be helpful to reiterate these three assumptions with a concrete example. Say that we are interested in knowing the Hispanic turnout rate in each precinct in California. In order to apply generalized method of bounds, we would want three things. First, we assume that the Hispanic turnout rate in each precinct is generated by one distribution: a normal distribution truncated between 0 and 1. Second, the Hispanic turnout rate in each precinct is independent of the percentage of Hispanic population in the precinct. In other words, there is no correlation between the number of Hispanic voters in a precinct and the percentage of them who will turnout to vote. And third, the total turnout rate in each precinct is independent of the racial composition in the precinct.

It is also worth pointing out that the three assumptions are reasonable and not stringent. Though some author has questioned the validity of this model when the assumed distribution in assumption one is changed to be bi-modal, people have yet to find any incidences where turnout rates or any joint probabilities are bi-modal (Tam 1997). Instead, normality is assumed in most of the voting models. In addition, assumption 2 and 3 can be relaxed without affecting the efficiency of the method.[4]

[4]For details, please see King 1997.

For the simplicity of notations, let's call the vector of parameters of the truncated bivariate normal distribution in Assumption 1 Ψ, and the untruncated version of it $\breve{\Psi}$. They each have 5 elements in the vector: 2 mean parameters, 2 variance parameters, and a covariance parameter. Obviously they are what we want in order to derive the point estimation of all $\beta's$. For the convenience of estimation, $\breve{\Psi}$ is transformed to ϕ with Fisher's "Z transformation" (1915). It is important to keep in mind that Ψ, $\breve{\Psi}$, and ϕ can be derived from each other easily, and we first approach ϕ which is easier to estimate.

Bayesian updating yields a way to derive ϕ from the known data of $T_i's$. Specifically, $P(\phi \mid T) = P(\phi)P(T \mid \phi)$, where $P(\phi)$ is the a prior, and $P(T \mid \phi)$ is the likelihood function. For the a prior, the mean parameters as elements in the vector ϕ are assumed to be flat, the variance parameters are log half-normal with variance of 0.5, and the covariance parameter is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. The likelihood function is multiplication of normal distributions of T_i conditional on $\breve{\Psi}$. Given both, we can figure out the posterior distribution $P(\phi \mid T)$.

Having a posterior distribution of ϕ brings us one step closer to obtaining $\breve{\Phi}$, which will determine the distribution of $\beta's$. The above three assumptions generate the conditional distribution of β_i^b on T and $\breve{\Psi}$, as shown below:

$$P(\beta_i^b \mid T_i, \breve{\Phi}) = N\left(\beta_i^b \mid \mathcal{B}^b + \frac{\omega_i}{\sigma_i^2}\varepsilon_i, \sigma_b^2 - \frac{\omega_i^2}{\sigma_i^2}\right) \frac{\mathbf{1}(\beta_i^b)}{\underline{\mathrm{f}}S(\mathcal{B}, \Sigma)} \tag{4.2}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega_i &= \sigma_b^2 X_i + \sigma_{bw}(1 - X_i), \\
\varepsilon_i &= T_i - \mathcal{B}^b X_i - \mathcal{B}^w(1 - X_i), \\
\mathbf{S}(\mathcal{B}, \mathbf{\Sigma}) &= \int_{max\left(0, \frac{T_i - (1 - X_i)}{X_i}\right)}^{min\left(1, \frac{T_i}{X_i}\right)} N\left(\beta_i^b \mid \mathcal{B}^b + \frac{\omega_i}{\sigma_i^2}\varepsilon_i, \sigma_b^2 - \frac{\omega_i^2}{\sigma_i^2}\right) d\beta^b, \\
\beta_i^b &\in \left[max\left(0, \frac{T_i - (1 - X_i)}{X_i}\right), min\left(1, \frac{T_i}{X_i}\right)\right].
\end{aligned}$$

But what we ultimately need is the unconditional posterior distribution of β_i^b. There are a couple of ways to get there. First, we can try to integrate it up from ϕ. Namely, we solve for

$$P(\beta_i^b \mid T) \propto \int P(\beta_i^b, \phi \mid T) d\phi$$

which proves to be too much to handle. Alternatively, we go back to $\breve{\Psi}$ to deal with

$$P(\beta_i^b \mid T) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} P(\phi \mid T) P(\beta_i^b \mid T, \breve{\Psi}) d\breve{\Psi}$$

with all the help we can get from the computer. Instead of carrying out the integration, we can use the Monte Carlo method to simulate the posterior distribution. The logic is that with enough sample points of $\breve{\Psi}$, $P(\beta_i^b \mid T, \breve{\Psi})$ will be equivalent to $P(\beta_i^b \mid T_i)$. In other words, the computer simulates the integration process by filling the area to integrate with all possible values, thus gives us a kernal density of the unconditional distribution.

The exact steps to accomplish this are not difficult. Remember that I already got the distribution of ϕ. Now, draw a ϕ value from $P(\phi \mid T)$, and convert it back to $\breve{\Psi}$. Then, insert this $\breve{\Psi}$ value to equation (2), and draw a value of β_i^b randomly from it. Repeat this procedure and plot all the values of the β_i^b in a histogram. Given enough repetitions, the histogram will become smooth and resemble a kernal density. This kernal density is the approximation of the distribution of β_i^b. Take the mean of this distribution and it should be the point estimate of the turnout rate by Hispanics in that precinct!

After obtaining point estimates of parameters for each β, I go back to the table at the beginning of this section and get the λ's with the same method. From these precinct-level estimated parameters of interest, it is straightforward to calculate the parameters of interests for more aggregated level areas, such counties.[5] The fundamental reasoning behind this generalized method of

[5]The method also applies to estimation of joint probabilities in larger than 2 by 2 contingency tables. King (1997) also provides discussions on how the model works with slight adjustment when some of the assumptions are not met.

bounds is that we can borrow strength from the many precincts which may share a similar turnout or voting pattern. The estimation procedure is based on a Bayesian framework and utilizes maximum likelihood estimation extensively.

4.2 The Bay Area Phenomenon

In Chapter 3, I studied a survey data set where individual respondents revealed how they voted on Proposition 187, their opinions on the economy, and other demographic features. A natural response to the findings there is whether individual level variables are enough to explain the voting behavior. Especially in this case, regional variation was clear and present — Proposition 187 failed in eight out of 58 counties in California. Moreover, as Figure 4.3 shows, all eight counties happen to be located in the San Francisco Bay Area! The 8 counties are: Alameda, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Sonoma, and Yolo. Except for Yolo, all the other 7 counties share borders with each other. This "Bay Area phenomenon" suggests that there might be certain regional characteristics in effect. Compared with the rest of California, did these 8 counties have better or worse economies at the time? Did they have higher or lower Hispanic population percentages? Or was the vote outcome simply the result of the liberal tradition of the Bay

Area? Understanding the reason Proposition 187 did not do well in these 8 counties can shed some light on whether Californians perceived the issue of illegal immigrants economically or racially.

4.2.1 Compositional Effects: Ethnicity and Partisanship

Chapter 3 has provided almost all the possible sources of compositional effects. Through the individual data analysis there, we see that a few factors stand out as the dividing lines of preferences. Hispanic identity, ideology, partisanship, education level, and religious beliefs are all significant in predicting voters' support for Proposition 187. Naturally, I would like to control for the effects of all of these factors. However, the IGS data does not contain information about ideology, education level, or religious beliefs. So I only estimate the compositional effect of Hispanic ethnicity and partisanship, which in fact are the most important dividing lines in Proposition 187 voting.

Figure 4.3: The Bay Area Phenomenon on Proposition 187 Voting

4.2.2 Contextual Effects: Regional Economy and Ethnic Diversification

The county economy. The issue of illegal immigration has often been framed as one with economic overtones such as job competitions or welfare magnets. For example, in the October 1994 Field Poll, 68.9% of those who favored Proposition 187 believed that its passage meant more jobs for legal residents. As discussed in Chapter 2, like every time nativism surged in California, Proposition 187 was proposed and passed during a time of economic distress. Yet, different personal financial conditions resulted in the same probability of voting for the Proposition. So here I would like to test if voters formed their perception of economic threat upon what they observed in their residing region instead of what happened to themselves.

The data analysis in last chapter has shown that voters did not form different opinion on Proposition 187 based upon different evaluations of the state's economy either. So I would like to look at some level that is between state and personal conditions. City, County, Assembly District, or groups of counties are all possibilities. In light of the Bay Area phenomenon, it seems that county is the appropriate level. I hypothesize that the county economy is accountable for the different supporting rate on Proposition 187 across the counties. The model will test if lower income, higher unemployment rate stimulated more

support for this Proposition.

In addition, I try to capture the effects of real concerns over job replacement. Since most illegal immigrants are believed to take low skill, low wage jobs, those who they are able to replace should be mainly the less educated workers. I use the percentage of each county's population who hold bachelor's degree or higher as an indicator for the intensity of job replacement threat in a county. Moreover, because of the special relationship between illegal immigrants and guest laborers Californian farms depend upon, the model will take control of counties that are agriculturally concentrated. In comparison, I also distinguish the counties by the size of their manufacturing industry which reflects the concentration of blue collar workers.

Ethnic composition. Studies on California politics often find that ethnic composition mattered in vote outcomes (Cain 1992; Citrin, Reingold, and Walters 1990). Cain (1992) first mentioned the phenomenon of "new populism" in California. That is, as the minority population grows, more popular initiatives appear on the ballot to take advantage of direct democracy. "New populism" reflects the threat whites feel from the increasing political participation by minority groups, especially in the state legislature. In the case of Proposition 187, Tolbert and Hero (1996) found that in bifurcated counties, where whites might have felt stronger threat from the Hispanics, the chances were better that Proposition 187, as a policy targeting minorities, passed. As-

suming Hispanic voters everywhere voted for the proposition at the same rate, they concluded that the presence of large Hispanic populations in bifurcated counties must have caused more white voters to vote for the Proposition.

However, it is rather restrictive to assume that Hispanic population's opinion was homogeneous on Proposition 187 across counties. According to Dahl (1961), any minority group is highly socioeconomically heterogeneous, thus its members were assimulated differently by the majority group. Since we have reasons to believe that the voting behavior of Hispanic voters reflects their socioeconomic status and degree of assimilation, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the Hispanic support for the Proposition was actually heterogeneous across counties. Thus, I will re-test the hypothesis of new populism.

Instead of using population percentage of each minority group, I measure the racial/ethnic diversification of a county with a combined index. The index of relative dominance of whites (RDW) is constructed in a way that accounts for both size and dispersion of ethnic groups. Following Londregan, *et al.* (1995), this index is defined as follows:

$$RDW = \frac{W^2}{\sqrt{W^2 + H^2 + A^2 + B^2 + O^2}}$$

where W stands for the population share of white, H for Hispanic, A for Asian,

B for blacks, and O for other groups. For each county, RDW sensitively reflects the relative size of white population and diffusion of ethnic groups. Specifically, RDW varies between 0 and 1, with larger values reflecting stronger dominance of the whites. Notice that it gives disproportionately more weight to the ethnicity of white, emphasizing its current dominant social status. For example, if the white populations in two counties are both 70%, but one with 30% Hispanic and the other with 20% Hispanic and 10% Asians, then the RDW score for the first county is 0.64 and the second is 0.67. In other words, whites are less dominant in bifurcated counties than in heterogeneous counties. And if a third county is 85% white and 15% Hispanic, then its RDW score is 0.84. So this index is a consistent quantification of previous literature on that whites feel least threatened in homogeneous counties, and that they feel more threatened in bifurcated counties than heterogeneous counties.

In summary, the following analysis will examine the contextual effects after taking control of the compositional effects. Compositional effects are what we found in the last chapter. That is, Hispanic voters and Democrat voters are expected to be less supportive than non-Hispanic and Republican voters respectively. Though ideology is also an important compositional effect, the data used in the following study does not contain information on people's ideological positions. So it is not considered here. In the following section, I will explain how the first step of analysis will produce the estimated percentages of

Hispanic voters, registered Democrat voters, and registered Republican voters who voted for the Proposition. In the second step, I use these estimates to explore the effects of contextual effects. I will first examine if Hispanic support and partisan line were heterogeneous across counties. If so, how racial/ethnic diversification and county economy explains such variations.

4.3 A Two-Step Analysis

Equipped with the IGS data and the generalized method of bounds, I proceed to do the first step estimation. As discussed earlier, the first step estimation is designed to isolate the effects of individual ethnic identity and partisanship from contextual effects that were external to the voters. Assessing how Hispanic identity influenced opinions on the Proposition is accomplished by estimating the percentage of Hispanic voters who voted "yes" on Proposition 187 in each county. To obtain such an estimate, I employ the generalized method of bounds to generate point estimates of the percentage of Hispanics who voted for the Proposition in all precincts in each county and aggregate them to obtain the estimates for the county.

Table 4.1 reports the estimated outcome. For comparison, Table 4.1 also lists the estimates generated by another method, Goodman's regression. It has estimated probabilities that fall beyond the boundaries of 0 and 1, making

the generalized method of bounds obviously a superior method.

Table 4.1: Estimated Percent of Hispanics Voted "Yes" on Proposition 187 at County Level

		ESTIMATES GENERATED BY	
	COUNTY	EI	Goodman's Regression
1.	Alameda	40.48	82.42
2.	Alpine	28.84	30.33
3.	Amador	70.41	183.69
4.	Butte	12.36	-96.89
5.	Calaveras	79.31	102.99
6.	Colusa	26.57	25.44
7.	Contra Costa	47.16	52.36
8.	Del Norte	18.23	5.17
9.	El Dorado	—	—
10.	Fresno	18.02	20.24
11.	Glenn	23.84	9.42
12.	Humboldt	14.09	-151.3
13.	Imperial	21.34	22.71
14.	Inyo	95.52	163.07
15.	Kern	34.55	25.13
16.	Kings	21.34	14.70
17.	Lake	43.52	187.21
18.	Lassen	—	—
19.	Los Angeles	10.68	28.80
20.	Madera	34.22	34.34
21.	Marin	81.45	148.94
22.	Mariposa	40.03	97.79
23.	Mendocino	92.48	204.98
24.	Merced	13.99	2.99
25.	Modoc	61.66	99.61
26.	Mono	81.92	242.32
27.	Monterey	40.53	36.71
28.	Napa	12.67	12.76
29.	Nevada	57.72	86.10
30.	Orange	18.88	29.34
31.	Placer	58.98	46.23
32.	Plumes	24.79	25.70
33.	Riverside	28.18	11.58
34.	Sacramento	10.90	-41.19
35.	San Bonito	17.09	17.58
36.	San Bernardino	30.05	18.47
37.	San Diego	9.78	28.04
38.	San Francisco	21.69	22.83

continued on next page

continued from previous page

	COUNTY	ESTIMATES GENERATED BY EI	Goodman's Regression
39.	San Joaquin	11.23	-11.12
40.	San Lius Obispo	50.54	38.67
41.	San Mateo	16.91	20.06
42.	Santa Barbara	43.94	43.78
43.	Santa Clara	27.84	19.39
44.	Santa Cruz	68.96	57.25
45.	Shasta	89.13	136.77
46.	Sierra	22.40	-23.31
47.	Siskiyou	5.41	-157.51
48.	Solano	4.72	-33.01
49.	Sonoma	46.97	13.00
50.	Stanislaus	17.97	9.55
51.	Sutter	60.91	51.33
52.	Tehama	—	—
53.	Trinity	63.60	246.57
54.	Tulare	27.30	24.84
55.	Tuolumne	9.33	-87.54
56.	Ventura	37.31	35.12
57.	Yolo	62.06	48.66
58.	Yuba	13.65	53.00

Note:
— indicates that the data on that county is not available. See footnote 1.

The number of Democrats and Republicans that are estimated to vote for the Proposition respectively are reported in Table 4.2. Note that the percentages estimated are the fraction of those who voted "yes" on Proposition 187 among all of those who voted on this Proposition.

After obtaining these results, I summarize what they tell in Figures 4.4 through 4.6. First, compared with LAT poll, the aggregate data analysis generates similar results. The survey reported that 23.6% Hispanics voted for the Proposition. In Figure 4.4, most of the counties are centered around 20%. It is similar in the cases for Democrats and Republicans. The LAT poll has a 32%

Table 4.2: Estimated Percent of Republicans and Democrats Voted "Yes" on Proposition 187 at County Level

		PERCENT OF YES VOTE BY	
	COUNTY	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS
1.	Alameda	15.85	90.55
2.	Alpine	30.50	93.26
3.	Amador	36.43	92.89
4.	Butte	24.23	93.01
5.	Calaveras	35.08	93.05
6.	Colusa	47.42	92.76
7.	Contra Costa	14.67	72.01
8.	Del Norte	23.31	85.44
9.	El Dorado	—	—
10.	Fresno	21.62	87.66
11.	Glenn	41.60	92.15
12.	Humboldt	14.36	95.68
13.	Imperial	24.24	96.17
14.	Inyo	33.36	88.71
15.	Kern	19.89	70.70
16.	Kings	22.52	90.45
17.	Lake	35.02	88.01
18.	Lassen	—	—
19.	Los Angeles	14.67	88.89
20.	Madera	34.15	90.45
21.	Marin	11.13	93.22
22.	Mariposa	35.05	98.65
23.	Mendocino	18.97	93.10
24.	Merced	25.33	96.67
25.	Modoc	32.11	92.79
26.	Mono	57.32	88.90
27.	Monterey	21.93	83.03
28.	Napa	17.52	91.12
29.	Nevada	23.37	99.77
30.	Orange	27.53	89.85
31.	Placer	24.51	89.66
32.	Plumas	40.72	92.18
33.	Riverside	15.94	76.60
34.	Sacramento	21.37	79.98
35.	San Benito	25.53	87.45
36.	San Bernardino	24.51	70.49
37.	San Diego	38.72	97.38
38.	San Francisco	13.94	73.08

continued on the next page

continued from previous page

	COUNTY	PERCENTAGE OF YES VOTES BY DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS
39.	San Joaquin	16.18	92.33
40.	San Lius Obispo	20.90	89.81
41.	San Mateo	8.90	63.37
42.	Santa Barbara	15.82	85.71
43.	Santa Clara	11.17	62.40
44.	Santa Cruz	15.75	66.60
45.	Shasta	27.68	83.40
46.	Sierra	33.58	86.09
47.	Siskiyou	42.74	88.01
48.	Solano	12.26	75.95
49.	Sonoma	15.44	70.66
50.	Stanislaus	26.94	83.87
51.	Sutter	24.29	78.11
52.	Tehama	—	—
53.	Trinity	29.13	90.5
54.	Tulare	24.98	93.75
55.	Tuolumne	28.51	88.98
56.	Ventura	56.87	70.65
57.	Yolo	13.25	74.14
58.	Yuba	24.66	91.51
	Statewide	20.8	82.7

Note:
— indicates that the data on that county is not available. See footnote 1.

support rate for Democrats, and Figure 4.5 shows that in most counties, 10% to 40% Democrats supported the Proposition. The corresponding numbers for Republicans are 78% in LAT poll and a range of 70% to 90% in Figure 4.6. Such similarity offers a cross-validation to the returns in the LAT poll.

Secondly, there are obviously a few counties that have extremely homogeneous support along ethnicity or partisanship. A further review of these outliers shows that these counties are the ones with homogeneous population composition. This suggests that the generalized method of bounds may not be at its best when dealing with extremely skewed data. Future work is called for to either improve the method of generalized bounds, or develop new method to analyze homogeneous precincts.

Granted that the method is not extremely erroneous, we see that Hispanic support rate is more heterogeneous than support rate along partisan lines. I then analyze whether the heterogeneity in choices by Hispanic voters and partisan voters can be explained by the regional economic and ethnic characteristics. Since this is a county level analysis comparable to Tolbert and Hero (1996), I first replicate their results to show that I have roughly the same data set as theirs. The first column of numbers in Table 4.3 is the reprint of their major results, and my replication is in the second column. Notice that they are very close, showing the same degrees of statistical significance.

Figure 4.4: County-Level Support for Proposition 187 by Hispanics



Figure 4.5: County-Level Support for Proposition 187 by Democrats



Figure 4.6: County-Level Support for Proposition 187 by Republicans



Table 4.3: County-Level Race/ethnicity Diversity and the Vote for Proposition 187 (Replication of the Analysis by Tolbert and Hero)

	Percent of yes on 187		
	Model 5 in their Table 3	Replication	With Education
Percent Hispanic	-.15***	-.15***	-.07
	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Percent black	.54**	.62***	.14
	(.17)	(.17)	(.15)
Percent Asian	-.42***	-.49***	-.18
	(.12)	(.12)	(.10)
Unemployment rate	1.26***	1.20***	.02
(percent)	(.19)	(.15)	(.02)
Republican party	1.16***	1.05***	.87***
(percent registered)	(.08)	(.08)	(.06)
Education level (percent with bachelor's degree or higher)	–	–	*-.63*** (.09)*
Constant	9.93**	14.21***	41.67***
	(3.93)	(3.70)	(4.85)
Adjusted R^2	.89	.89	.94
Number of Observations	58	58	58

Note:
Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$ (two tailed).

Such an exercise can also demonstrate that their models are not robust. When I include education levels as an additional independent variable, the coefficients reported in the third column are vastly different. It seems the minority population can no longer explain the county level variation, thus their story is seriously questioned.

I model the county level vote outcome as follows:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta * X_1 + \gamma * X_2$$

where Y is supported by Hispanic voters, by Democrats, and by Republicans respectively. X_1 is the index of relative dominance of whites. X_2 is a vector of variables about the economic characteristics in the county, including the percentage of total employed that are employed by the agriculture sector, the percentage of employed by the manufacturing sector, the unemployment rate, the logarithm of each county's per capita income level, and the percentage of the population with bachelor's degree or higher.

Table 4.4 provides the result of the OLS regressions. The first column of numbers shows how contextual effects account for variation of Hispanic support across counties. Interesting enough, the measure of relative dominance of whites has a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that in counties with

stronger white dominance, Hispanic voters there were more likely to support the Proposition.

Table 4.4: Regression Estimates on Aggregate Support by Hispanics and Partisan Voters

	Percent of Yes Vote By		
Independent Variables	Hispanics	Democrats	Republicans
Constant	-3.85	3.55**	2.53*
	(3.12)	(1.26)	(1.17)
Relative Dominance of	0.73***	0.27***	0.17*
Whites Index	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Agriculture Employment	-0.19	0.56	0.27
	(0.72)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Manufacture Employment	-1.32*	-0.15	-1.15***
	(0.64)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Unemployment Rate	2.70	0.61	0.08
	(1.54)	(0.62)	(0.57)
Log (Per capita income)	36.35	39.11**	-19.62
	(33.77)	(13.65)	(12.64)
Education Level (Percent with	0.70	-1.21**	0.32
bachelor's degree or higher)	(0.96)	(0.39)	(0.36)
Number of Observations	55	55	55
R-squared	0.34	0.49	0.26

Note:
Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.
* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$ (two tailed).

Also, for Hispanic support, the sizes of both the agriculture and manufacturing sectors in each county have negative coefficients, meaning the less people employed by the agriculture or manufacturing sectors, the more Hispanics voted for the Proposition. Especially for manufacturing sectors, the effect is statistically significant. The unemployment rate, per capita income,

and education level all have positive but not significant coefficients. It seems that for Hispanic voters, the type of the county economy mattered more than the performance of the county economy. Hispanics in highly agricultural concentrated and manufacturing concentration counties were more likely to vote against the Proposition.

The second and third column shows how Democrats and Republicans were influenced by county characteristics. In both cases, the measurement of relative dominance of whites has a positive and significant effect. That is, in counties where whites were more dominant, both Democrats and Republicans tended to support the Proposition more than elsewhere.

The effect of agricultural concentration is marginally significant for Democrats and not significant for Republicans. But they are both of positive signs, suggesting ample support for the Proposition from agricultural counties. Notice that this is the opposite to the effect found for Hispanics. It leads one to believe that non-Hispanic voters in agricultural counties might have voted very differently from Hispanic voters. It is also interesting to see that manufacturing sector has negative effect on both Democrats and Republicans, and significantly for Republicans.

The performance of county economy has stronger effect on Democrats than on Republicans. The unemployment rate has positive coefficients in both cases,

though not significantly, meaning that higher unemployment generated more support for the Proposition. For Democrats, higher per capita income is correlated with more support, and more better educated neighbors is correlated with less support for the Proposition. The signs are the opposite for Republicans, but not significant.

The overall pattern seems to contradict the hypothesis of "new populism." Controlling other effects, we see counties which score higher on the index of relative dominance of whites have stronger support for the Proposition. In other words, in places where whites actually dominate the total population, they are more likely to back up a policy that restricts the inflow of illegal immigrants. Such finding is completely opposite to that of Tolbert and Hero's (1996). Comparing what correlates with the variation in choices by Democrats and Republicans, the results show two different pictures. For Democrats, county's economy can explain as much variation as county's racial/ethnic composition. Specifically, when a county has more richer people but fewer better-educated people, more Democrats tend to vote for the Proposition. While for Republicans, racial/ethnic composition overwhelms the economic condition.

4.4 Ethnic Distance, Party, and Economy in Proposition 187 Voting

Combining the findings in Chapter 3 and 4, I reconstruct Proposition 187 voting in the following way. First, it was an issue involving racial/ethnic sentiment and ideological standing when put on the ballot. Second, the parties heavily politicized it during the election. And last, economic concerns outweighed ideological standings for many Democrats, who defected to vote for the Proposition.

4.4.1 Direct Democracy and Party Influence

The significance of partisanship demonstrated in the study implies that Proposition 187 was an issue heavily politicized by the parties. Previous research (Magleby 1985) suggested that parties stayed rather detached from ballot issues for fear of alienating voters. What we have seen here, however, shows that parties do not necessarily avoid taking stands on certain ballot issues and may even want to transform some salient ones into their campaign issues. This certainly conforms to the trend in California referenda voting in the recent history. From the "tax revolt," "English Only," to the "Abolition of Affirmative Action," each party and all party candidates – gubernatorial, congressional,

and presidential – took clear standings on whether they support or oppose the propositions.

On the voters' side, the parties' heavy involvement may have introduced to them an information short cut. Propositions are often difficult to comprehend. A proposition is about one single issue, which may be of remote interest or relevance to a voter. If a party or its candidate whom the voters likes talks about the proposition and suggests which way she should vote on the Proposition, it is certainly useful information to her. Given that ordinary citizens do not and probably can not afford to listen and weigh each side of the argument as thoroughly as professional legislators do, they would probably overweigh the side of argument from their favored parties and politicians.

In a way, proposition voting in California has become a unique combination of civil movements and party politics. On one hand, California has a rich history of employing civil authority to impose the will of majority groups. With the tradition of the west, government was newer and weaker here compared to eastern states. Historically, people came to California to make a quick fortune, and for that it is most efficient to mend laws as needed. Direct democracy is widely used in California, especially on issues that appear to strengthen the benefits of the majority. Consequentially, political opportunism has found its way to rise in California politics. Pete Wilson's using of Proposition 187 was a vivid example.

On the other hand, political opportunism has facilitated participation in referenda voting. Proposing and publicizing ballot initiatives are costly, and can use some help from organized political activists and channels like parties. In the case of Proposition 187, the California Republican Party helped mail out 200,000 petition letters to solicit enough signatures to put the Proposition on the ballot. Moreover, having party candidates or prominent politicians endorsing ballot initiatives sends clear information to voters as which party is taking a more pro stand. After all, party affiliation is a key factor in most elections. Support or objection by a party on initiatives provides a reference point to most voters.

This combination of party politics and direct democracy has certainly diluted the issue in question with a systematic and ideological influence. In this study, this systematic influence is effectively captured in the LAT survey analysis and is controlled for in the aggregate data analysis. After separating this systematic effect, I was able to show whether pocket book politics was in effect in Proposition 187 voting. County income and education level had much to do with the Proposition's appeal to Democrat voters. This suggests that interest conflict resulted in different degrees of concern to different types of voters. Partisanship, as well as other factors depending on the issue, can determine whether the dimension of economic competition becomes involved in the decision making process.

Although Proposition 187 serves as a perfect case study on the inter-group relations between native residents and new (illegal) immigrants, the opinion seems to have been heavily influence by campaign effects due to its involvement in the gubernatorial election. It would be more interesting to see how native residents perceived the issue of immigration and immigrants in absence of politicization.

The data analysis in the following chapters will provide a good chance to look at public opinion in absence of political events. In comparison, I would expect people to consider the issue more on the issue itself, revealing their concerns on economic competition and/or traces of racial prejudice. It is also natural to expect people to have somewhat less information on the issue, so as to show uncertainty in their opinion. With heteroskedastic discrete choice models, I will examine the dispersion, in addition to the position, of opinion.

4.4.2 A Note on Methodology

The aggregate data analysis in this chapter shows the benefits and problems of generalized method of bounds. Overall, generalized method of bounds produced results consistent with survey returns, cross-validating the findings and inferences. We see that it produced much better results than traditional methods such as Goodman's regression. It is safe to say that it provides better

estimation than any alternative method.

However, it is also important to note its inability in dealing with skewed distributions. In counties when the numbers of Hispanics are really small, the method tends to overestimate the joint probability of being Hispanic and voting for Proposition 187. It seems that the method works best with data from bifurcated populations. In other words, its performance is dependent upon the range of bounds. When with small number of Hispanics, the possible support rate could be ranging from 0% to 100%. While if Hispanics and non-Hispanics split the population, with the exception of having an exact 50% total support rate, the bounds for either group can be narrowed down.

Since the generalized method of bounds builds its foundation on the "bounds," its limitation is inevitable when the bounds are not informative. Besides calling for improvement upon the method, I would like to point out another alternative. Stepping back a little, we can see the need for methods that can estimate jointly probabilities was driven by the lack of homogeneous regions. Now that we have developed methods to do so, we find that a very good one of them cannot handle homogeneous regions well. Then it is perhaps time to look at the old way of doing research again. If a region contains a really small number of minorities, we have the following options. First is to consider whether it is the majority or the minority in the region that we are more interested in studying. If we are more interested in the majority since they shape the regional politics,

then we can assume that the minority is missing in the total outcome. After all, rational choice theory predicts that the minority will not bear the cost of participation if they know their small number cannot make a difference in the outcome. Alternatively, we can go out and do an old-fashioned field work. That is, we can try to sample the minorities and obtain their preferences.

Due to the scope of this study, I will not try these alternatives. Instead, I present the performance of generalized method of bounds, providing a benchmark for further application of the method.

4.4.3 Distances and Perceptions

The most salient characteristics of the voting on Proposition 187 was the gap between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. The LAT survey revealed it first and was further exposed in the context of county wide racial/ethnic composition. In counties where whites are the dominant majority of the population, both Democrats and Republicans were more likely to support the Proposition. This implies that people who were physically more distant from ethnic minorities perceived the threat of illegal immigrants as more serious. If we assume that their perception is less fact-based than the perceptions of those who lived more closely to Hispanics, then what this reflects is that physical distance correlates with projected fear or resentment.

This helps to explain the Bay Area Phenomenon. The 8 counties who failed Proposition 187 all had high concentration of ethnic minority residents. Meanwhile, one could feel less surprised by the fact that the author of H.R. 2202, Senator Alan Simpson, was from Wyoming. Wyoming has been the state with fewest legal immigrants settled in decades, and where the percentage of white population is as high as 94% according to the 1990 census.

It is important to understand the correlation between physical distance and psychological distance as the two reinforce each other. Physical distance would probably cause less information exchange between different racial groups, giving the elites' stories, such as an "invasion" by immigrants, better receptions. Meanwhile, psychological distance may be the motivation for people to be physically distant. As numerous studies on racial attitude have shown, an important element that prevents complete racial aggregation is whites' belief that they have certain beliefs and values that blacks do not possess.

So in the following chapters, I start to explore the effects of racial distance, both physical and psychological. In Chapter 5, I use a national opinion poll on immigration reform to let the sample go beyond California. Immigration issue is understandably a big topic in California, as it attracts about one fourth of total immigrants annually in the 1990's. But for the vast central and midwest states, immigrants are people they hear rather than they see. So for people in places like Wyoming, what would be the factors that determine

their perception on immigrants and preferences on immigration policies? I hypothesize that the traditional beliefs may help. As a country established by immigrants, individualism and egalitarianism are deep-rooted beliefs that give meaning to the phrase "American Dream."

In Chapter 6, I complete my inquiry on the topic with an analysis on African American's view on immigration issues. In many ways, African Americans are at the intersection of native residents and new immigrants. They have been the political allies of Hispanic and Asian Americans, and also are positioned in the direct impact zone in terms of job, housing, and schooling competition. They behaved differently than whites on Proposition 187, with 57%[6] of them rejecting it. With an opinion poll conducted in the city of Los Angeles, I study how African-Americans perceived the impact of the increasing Hispanic population. Compared with whites' view on Hispanics, their attitude should reflect some "realistic" expectations, which may not be the precise impressions, from the close contact.

[6]See Table 3.1.

Chapter 5

Traditions and Newcomers

As America changes its immigration policy, immigrants are perceived as a group of people with distinct characteristics. For example, they do not speak English well, they are poorer, and they have different views on life and values. Yet, these perceived group characteristics are not necessarily objective or agreed upon universally. According to anti-immigration activists, immigrants are job thieves. According to immigration advocators, immigrants are vital to keep the economy going. Even among economists, proponents of each side disagree on almost every statistic. It is quite obvious that the perception of the effect of immigrants varies drastically, which leads to possibly very contrasting views on the whole issue of immigration policy.

The previous chapter probed the question of perceptions about immigration. Popular opinion was found to be influenced by elite and political campaigns, especially during elections. In addition, predominantly white regions had less favorable views on immigration issues. Partisanship and type of econ-

omy in a region could also jointly affect preferences on immigration policy. In general, while racial distance has a clear dividing effect, all the evidence suggests that political predisposition is closely related to the perception of immigrants as an "alien" group.

In this chapter, I focus on explaining Americans' perceptions of immigrants and the immigration issue with the key characteristics that are supposed to distinguish these opinion holders from the newcomers — the traditional American values. I use a nationwide survey and explore the relative explanatory power of personal beliefs and economic evaluations on people's opinion on immigration issues. I find that personal beliefs like egalitarianism and individualism were highly effective in shaping one's view on the economic impact that immigrants caused. Much of the sentiment for more strict immigration policies also could be explained by one's core beliefs. Economic concerns exert different patterns of effects, showing their influence primarily through policy preferences instead of on immigrants.

5.1 Information and Uncertainty

Compared with previous chapters, the analysis in this chapter seeks a more general result by using an opinion survey that was not influenced by issue campaigns. The data used in this study is from the *American National Elec-*

tion Study, 1992: Pre- and Post-Election Survey. The total sample size is 2485. This survey was conducted at a time when the issue of immigration just started to rise to prominence on the political agenda in the United States. States with high concentrations of immigrants, such as California, New York, and Florida, were voicing their concern on state expenditures on immigrants. Individuals were concerned about the cost and benefits of "multiculturalism." This 1992 survey reflects this political environment by asking questions pertaining to opinions on multiculturalism and immigration. Since we know that the opinion on Proposition 187 was strongly affected by party politics and election campaigns, it is interesting to compare the opinion on the immigration issue in the absence of strong information from campaigns. Specifically, I test if people show any uncertainty in their views of immigrants and immigration policies.

Uncertainty is often caused by lack of information. Though immigration issues have gained national media attention, they still are not a top priority in most states. New immigrants tend to settle in metropolitan areas and the vast central and Midwest states have not experienced much of an inflow of immigrants. For example, according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), from 1992 to 1994 about 80% of new immigrant every year settled in 10 states,[1] which means the other 40 states received on average

[1]These top 10 states are: California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Massachusetts, Washington, Pennsylvania, Maryland.

some 0.5% of new immigrants.[2] Further, this pattern of settlement is very stable over time — those who have had more immigrants continue to attract more new immigrants, and those who had fewer, get fewer. So I suspect that most people in most of the states have no experience of being suddenly flooded by foreign immigrants, and thus have less first-hand information on the reasons and directions of immigration reform.

Further, even in those states traditionally receiving large numbers of immigrants, political campaigns make big differences. Assuming that it is costly to obtain information, organized political activities reduce that cost. Imagine sitting in one's own living room and watching Wilson's TV campaign advertisement showing road sign near the border of San Diego and Mexico — a picture warning motorists that there might be people and children coming out of nowhere and running across the highway suddenly. One would probably feel "informed" that the problem of illegal immigrants was getting out of control. As many scholars have found, campaigns through modern media can significantly increase the awareness of certain issues.

In the following analysis, I will use a measurement of how informed one is to control for systematic variation in people's opinion. To measure how well one is informed, I use an individual's answers to six questions on political facts to

[2]In fact, according to the INS, the bottom 30 states received on average about 0.25% of total immigrants every year from 1992 to 1994.

construct a variable called "knowledge" (see Table 5.1). Four of the questions ask the respondents to name what offices Quayle, Rehnquist, Yeltsin, and Foley held respectively. The other two questions ask the respondents to name "who decides consitutionality of a law" and "who nominates the Supreme Court judge" respectively. The level of difficulty of these questions was negatively correlated with the number of people who answered them correctly. I use a factor analysis to derive the commonality weight assigned to each answer. For each individual, the value of "knowledge" is the sum of the commonality values of the questions that he answers correctly.

5.2 Prejudice and Preferences

Immigration issues can certainly bring up a sense of economic competition between natives and immigrants. As Hoskin (1991) argues, immigration is an economic phenomenon. Immigrants are often motivated to come to the host country by personal economic fortune, as in the case of Turkish laborers in Germany and Mexicans crossing the Rio Grande. However, whenever the economy slows in the host country, which is often accompanied by rising unemployment, immigrants often become the scapegoats.

Being a scapegoat is different from being at fault. At least, none of the economists who have been presidents of the American Economic Association or

members of the President's Council of Economic Advisors gave a negative evaluation to the effect of immigration on the nation's economy in the twentieth century (Simon 1989). Political scientists, on the other hand, have often found the cause of anti-immigrant sentiment to be something other than economic difficulty. For example, Legge (1996) showed that German's anti-foreign sentiment was better measured by their sense of German identity rather than by their satisfaction with personal economic conditions. Hood and Morris (1997) found that white Americans' opinion on immigration in 1990's had prominent racial and ethnic components. As I found in Chapter 4, they find that whites living in close proximity to minorities are more likely to favor increased immigration. In almost every study of public opinion on immigration, the opinion gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is clear and present (Alvarez and Butterfield 1997; Binder et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997).

This is reminiscent of the research findings on many racial issues, such as busing or welfare policies. Naturally, it looks like that prejudice may be the motivation of the anti-immigration sentiment. To test whether personal prejudice has shaped one's view on immigration issues, I use the very definition of symbolic racism to measure the presence its effects. Specifically, I use an independent variable that represents people's anti-minority affect and a set of independent variables that measure the degree of beliefs in American core values of individualism and egalitarianism.

As seen in Table 5.1, the measurement of anti-minority affect is based on one's view of minorities' traits. The answers are of the form "Where would you rate people of X race on this 7-point scale?" For example, 1 stands for hard-working and 7 for lazy. Other traits include unintelligent to intelligent, and violent to peaceful. The three types of questions are asked of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians respectively. My coding makes higher values indicate more negative stereotypes. Again, I conduct a factor analysis to obtain the appropriate weight for each answer. For each individual, multiplying the commonality value with its corresponding answer and then summing the nine products generates the scale for anti-minority affect.

Notice that these questions are not the typical ones used by symbolic racism theorists listed in Chapter 2. However, I believe that they can effectively measure one's affect toward minorities and have fewer problems of endogeneity. The standard questions of one's feelings toward black's "pushiness" or government's special favors to minorities only capture the results, not the sources. One of Sniderman and Tetlock's main objections to the symbolic racism concept was that proponents of symbolic racism often use policy preferences as independent variables in models that purport to explain policy choices as dependent variables (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986).

Incidentally, both individualism and egalitarianism have much to do with the history of immigrants coming to this continent and building up this coun-

try. Both concepts were put forward by European philosophers during the Enlightenment but were repressed by European monarchies at the time. The early immigrants to America included a large number of people who were heavily influenced by the new thinking in the Enlightenment and were fleeing their repressive government in Europe to pursue freedom. Reflected in the writings of the founding fathers, and reinforced in the extraordinary endeavors of building a new homeland, individualism and egalitarianism have been the core values of American identity. In many ways, the so-called "American Dream" is a vivid summary of the values. Americans have admired those who came to the country with nothing and then built personal successes with their bare hands, and have believed that everyone has an equal chance to fulfill his ambition in this country.

Yet every time when nativism surges, it seems the perception of the newcomers is that "[t]he immigrants who came in the past were good folks, but the people who are coming now are scum" (R. Simon 1985, 66). Opinion polls show that many older residents worry that illegal immigrants are taking more from the system than they contribute. For example, a 1986 poll showed that 47% of respondents felt that "*most* of the immigrants wind up on welfare" (New York Times, July 14, 1986). So if individualism as a traditional value helps Anglos rationalize prejudice against blacks, it is certainly useful in helping individuals justify their "dislike" of new, predominantly Hispanic,

immigrants.

Accordingly, egalitarianism should work against anti-immigration policy preferences. As many works have pointed out, egalitarianism is a core value of American society that generates sympathetic views towards those who have been deprived of equal rights or opportunities. For example, egalitarianism has a positive effect on welfare policies, as found by Gilens (1995). From the perspective of egalitarianism, newcomers deserve an equal opportunity in this land of dreams.[3]

However, egalitarianism is a concept that include many "equalities." Rae et al. (1981) differentiated egalitarianism to three "subtypes" — equality of condition, equality of means, and equality of outcomes (p. 144). Their work pointed out that different subtypes may have different effects on issues, though with overlaps. Due to lack of a priori, I do not exclude any subtype as the source of explanation for liberal immigration policies.

The scales for individualism and egalitarianism are constructed as follows. I identified two questions that asked the respondent to pick which one out of two qualities is more important to teach their children. One is to choose between independence and respect for elders, and the other is between obedience and

[3]Before 1996, the United States used a system called "amnesty" to grant illegal immigrants legal status. As long as an illegal immigrant can show that he has good morality (i.e., has not been convicted of any crime) and physical presence since certain years back, they can obtain legal status. So there has been a tradition of establishment first and legal status second.

self-reliance. The higher the value, the more individualistic one is. The factor analysis generates the commonality values which are used to weigh the answers. The scale is obtained from the sum of products.

The scale for Egalitarianism is based on six questions. All of the answers to the questions are of the form "How much you agree or disagree with X?" They are coded from 1 to 5 as from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly." The questions are mainly about the equality problem in society as listed in Table 5.1. The higher the value, the more egalitarian the respondent is. Similarly to the way the individualism scale is constructed, I also obtain a scale that measures egalitarianism.[4]

5.3 Beliefs and Ambivalence

A more interesting phenomenon arises when both individualism and egalitarianism are included in the model — ambivalence. Ambivalence is caused by conflicting values or beliefs. If people are rational, then everyone needs some "axioms" to operate. For example, a study by Alvarez and Brehm (1995) presented a good example of ambivalence in opinion — abortion. Many people

[4]Notice that in Table 5.1, the first and fourth question on egalitarianism mentioned either "opportunity" or "chance" and have similar commonality scores. This suggests that these two questions probably referred to "equality in means" while all of the other questions are all quite general. But since the commonality scores across all six questions do not differ very much, I use them all to index the concept of egalitarianism.

Table 5.1: Commonality from Factor Analysis

Variable	Commonality
Anti-Minority Affect	
Work ethics of Blacks	.739
Work ethics of Asians	.766
Wrok ethics of Hispanics	.718
Intelligence of Blacks	.762
Intelligence of Asians	.793
Intelligence of Hispanics	.735
Violence tendency by Blacks	.743
Violence tendency by Asians	.782
Violence tendency by Hispanics	.734
Individualism	
Children's quality - Independence	.700
Children's quality - Self-reliance	.700
Egalitarianism	
Society should see that everyone has equal opportunity to success	.412
Society has gone too far in pushing for equal rights	.660
We should worry less about equality	.728
It is not a problem someone have more of a chance in life	.567
There will be fewer problems if people are more equal	.706
Inequality is a big problem in society	.681
Knowledge	
Quayle's office	.321
Rehnquist's office	.264
Yeltsin's office	.481
Foley's office	.472
Who decides constitutionality of a law	.458
Who nominates supreme court judge	.508

believe as a primary principle that we should not kill innocent lives, including unborn lives. But many of these people also believe in women's right to choose. So for these people, their internal beliefs were pulling in opposite directions.

Scholars have found individualism and egalitarianism to generate conflicting views on welfare and racial policies (Alvarez and Brehm 1997). As mentioned earlier, immigration is closely linked to welfare and racial issues. So here I would consider the possible ambivalence caused by individualism and egalitarianism on the policy preferences. Specifically, if one ties immigrants to welfare recipients, then individualism may work against the preference for increased immigration. On the other hand, egalitarianism would probably urge one to consider giving newcomers help getting started.

I use the differences between one's degree of belief in individualism and egalitarianism as the measure of ambivalence. Ambivalence represents systematic dispersion around the expected opinion, similar to the effect of uncertainty. Compared with the random dispersion assumed in standard discrete choice models, this systematic dispersion calls for a heteroskedastic model to correct it, which I will discuss later.

5.4 Modeling Choices and Variations

I use the answers to six questions as the dependent variables. The first two questions are about policy preferences and the other four are about perceptions on the impact of new immigrants. The first question asks if the respondent thinks the number of immigrants permitted in to the United States in the future should "decrease a lot," "decrease a little," "increase a little," or "increase a lot." The second asks if new immigrants should have access to welfare immediately upon arrival or have to wait for a year or longer. On both questions, the higher the values, the more restrictive policies the individual prefers.

The other four questions ask how likely it is that Hispanic and Asian immigrants have increased job competition respectively, and how likely it is that they have caused higher taxes respectively. The respondents answered "not at all likely," "somewhat likely," "very likely," or "extremely likely," indicated by 1 to 4. On all four questions, higher values indicate more negative impact caused by immigrants.

Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of the six dependent variables. Obviously, the opinion is skewed toward decreased immigration. To moderate the effect, I combined the answers of "increase a lot" and "increase a little" to one category. Opinions on the impact caused by immigrants are distributed more evenly across categories.



Figure 5.1: The Distribution of Dependent Variables

Having two types of questions as dependent variables can help detect any variation in opinion formation. Policy preference is highly subjective, with much leeway for personal idiosyncrasies. Perception on an economic phenomenon, however, could be more objective. Individuals could form such perceptions based upon media reports or personal experience, which we assume to be more concrete. However, personal prejudice can be involved in interpreting the observed events, and may result in perceptions that are quite distorted from reality.

Besides the three independent variables measuring symbolic prejudice, another independent variable I use is ideology, which is shown in the case of Proposition 187 to be a significant factor in opinion formation. The spatial model also attributes the preferences on political issues mainly to ideological standings, arguing that it serves as a simple but consistent decision rule for most people when obtaining detailed information on every issue is infeasible. Thus I include it in my model as a control variable.

The degree of economic satisfaction is measured by the answers to three questions asking the respondents to evaluate changes in the national economy, personal financial condition in the past year, and expected change in the future year. All of the answers are 5 point scales representing "much better off," "somewhat better off," "the same" to "somewhat worse off" and "much worse off." They are coded such that a higher score indicates being better off.

For better comparison and interpretation, all independent variables are rescaled to between 0 and 1.

With these variables defined and constructed, I proceed to analyze the individuals' opinions on six different aspects of immigration. Since I have multiple dependent variables to study, I have to be careful to model them correctly. Notice that there is only one dichotomous choice — whether immigrants should have welfare access immediately upon arrival or wait for a while. For this choice, I use a heteroskedastic logit model to study this choice. For the other choices, heteroskedastic ordered logit is used since these are ordered responses.

The difference between heteroskedastic logit and the standard logit is in the modeling of the variance. The standard logit assumes that the variance of the choice function is constant, and can be standardized to 1. Heteroskedastic logit allows the choice to be heterogeneous and parameterizes the variance, $var(\varepsilon_i)$, for an individual's choice as a function of an additional set of explanatory variables, Z:

$$var(\varepsilon_i) = exp(Z_i\gamma)^2,$$

such that

$$Y = \frac{X\beta}{exp(Z_i\gamma)} + \varepsilon,$$

where $\varepsilon \sim \Lambda$.

This leads to a variation on the usual logit log-likelihood:

$$\log L = \sum_i \left(y_i \log \Lambda \left(\frac{X_i\beta}{exp(Z_i\gamma)} \right) + (1 - y_i) \log \left[1 - \Lambda \left(\frac{X_i\beta}{exp(Z_i\gamma)} \right) \right] \right),$$

where $\Lambda(.)$ indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function.

Here the Z vector includes two variables: "knowledge" and the absolute differences between egalitarianism and individualism scores.[5]

The heteroskedastic logit models test the following hypotheses. First, anti-minority affect and individualism are expected to have positive effects on supporting more restrictive immigration policies and having more negative views on immigrants. Egalitarianism is expected to have the opposite effect. Second, economic dissatisfaction is expected to be associated with support on more restrictive immigration policies and more negative views on immigrants. And last, individual choices vary systematically with uncertainty and ambivalence which can be captured by political knowledge and the conflicting values of individualism and egalitarianism.

[5]Theoretically, Z and X should be independent. The model specification here points out the possibility that the absolute differences between egalitarianism and individualism scores in Z may be correlated with the two variables in the X. However, the collinearity is not very strong, and the X and Z matrixes remained full rank to generate estimates. As I will discuss later, the Z is dropped due to the absence of heteroskedasticity. So the estimation reported in later chapters is obtained with the standard logit model, and is free of any possible bias that may be caused by the correlation mentioned here.

5.5 Estimation Results

Table 5.2 lists the results of the logit and ordered logit analyses on the two policy questions. It gives estimates of model coefficients, t-statistics, and χ^2 values for the general goodness of fit. Though the χ^2 values show that the models all fit well, both heteroskedasticity tests failed to be statistically significant. So I ran the Model II's for each dependent variable to correct for any bias or inefficiency the mis-specified variances could have caused. The following discussions are based on the coefficients obtained in the Model II's where variances are assumed to be constant.

To account for the probability one prefers fewer immigrants in the future, anti-minority affect, egalitarianism, and retrospective and prospective personal financial situations all have significant effects. The positive effect is from anti-minority affect, and the negative effect is from egalitarianism, as hypothesized. Surprisingly, a more individualistic person does not mind more immigrants than a less individualistic person does. As for the economic evaluations, we see that a person who was worse off in the past year supports having fewer immigrants, and so does someone who expects to be better off in the future.[6] A positive assessment on the national economy also indicates preferences for fewer immigrants.

[6]Past personal finance condition and future personal finance condition are not highly correlated. Their correlation is 0.133 and covariance 0.008.

Table 5.2: Heteroskedastic Logit and Logit Estimates
On two policy preference questions, 1992 NES Survey

	Amount (decrease)		Welfare Access (delayed)	
Variables	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II
Choice				
Constant	5.72*	5.74*	4.09*	4.10*
	(9.84)	(14.79)	(2.32)	(7.98)
Anti-Minority Affect	2.50*	2.50*	1.60*	1.60*
	(5.28)	(5.62)	(2.06)	(2.79)
Individualism	-0.25	-0.25	-0.37	-0.35
	(-1.69)	(-1.72)	(-1.45)	(-1.84)
Egalitarianism	-1.17*	-1.17*	-1.49	- 1.73*
	(-4.01)	(-4.20)	(-1.08)	(-4.55)
Ideology	0.38	0.34	-0.27	-0.22
	(1.38)	(1.38)	(-0.76)	(-0.67)
Past personal finance	-0.24	-0.24	0.46	0.44
	(-1.16)	(-1.17)	(1.36)	(1.51)
Future personal finance	0.74*	0.74*	-1.03*	-0.95*
	(2.73)	(2.87)	(-2.41)	(-2.78)
National economy	-0.80*	-0.80*	-0.90	-0.80
	(-2.51)	(-2.57)	(-1.55)	(-1.76)
Variance				
Knowledge	-0.01	—	0.33	—
	(0.06)		(1.54)	
| In. - Eg. |	0.00	—	-0.37	—
	(0.00)		(-0.43)	
Number of observations	1233	1233	1211	1211
χ^2	92.84*	94.08*	62.61*	60.29*
Het. test	0.01	—	2.32	—

* : $p < .05$
It is ordered logit applied to dependent variable "amount."

For the policy preference on delaying welfare access for immigrants, we see that anti-minority affect significantly increases the chances one supports delayed welfare access, while egalitarianism has the opposite effect. Again, individualism has the same sign as egalitarianism, indicating objection to delayed welfare access. This is accompanied by a change of sign for the effect of ideology. It seems liberals tend to slightly favor delayed welfare access, in contrast to their support for more immigration.

Among the economic factors, only the prospective personal financial condition has a significant effect, showing that a person who expects to be better off in the future opposes delayed welfare access for immigrants. Notice this is completely opposite of the effect of this variable on the first policy preference. Interestingly enough, the retrospective personal financial condition also reversed its effect too, though not significantly, suggesting that someone who has been worse off does *not* support denying immediate welfare access.

The effect of the evaluation of the national economy is no longer significant on this issue, but has the same sign as in the first policy choice. Evidence from both choices show that anti-minority affect is highly relevant to people's opinion on immigration policies. A racist attitude results in an anti-immigrant attitude in general. Egalitarianism generates the opposite effect, leading to less anti-immigrant choices.

Table 5.3: Ordered Logit Estimates On the Impact by Specific Immigrant Groups

1992 NES Survey

	Job Replacement by		Higher Tax for	
Variables	Hispanics	Asian	Hispanics	Asian
Choice				
Constant	0.95*	-0.07	0.52	-0.37
	(2.86)	(-0.21)	(1.48)	(-1.04)
Anti-Minority affect	2.73*	2.06*	2.80*	2.64*
	(6.45)	(4.99)	(6.41)	(6.04)
Individualism	-0.95*	-0.61*	-0.56*	- 0.71*
	(-6.50)	(-4.26)	(-3.82)	(-4.85)
Egalitarianism	-1.11*	-0.54*	-0.99*	- 0.73*
	(-4.26)	(-2.11)	(-3.66)	(-2.69)
Ideology	-0.47	-0.15	0.77*	-0.17
	(-1.93)	(-0.62)	(3.10)	(-0.69)
Past personal finance	-0.28	-0.31	-0.18	-0.43*
	(-1.38)	(-1.53)	(-0.87)	(1.99)
Future personal finance	0.42	0.47	0.18	0.39
	(-1.67)	(1.91)	(0.72)	(1.54)
National economy	-0.23	0.08	-0.51	0.41
	(0.74)	(0.27)	(-1.61)	(1.31)
Number of observations	1253	1253	1251	1251
χ^2	123.87*	59.59*	123.20*	93.12*

* : $p < .05$

I applied the same model to the other four dependent variables and found no heteroskedasticity as well. So Table 5.3 shows the results of standard ordered logit models. The table entries are estimated coefficients, with t-statistics in parenthesis, and χ^2 values for the goodness of fit. Across questions, anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism are the only variables that have consistent and significant effects. The following discussion further examines each question.

On job replacement. The experience of economic satisfaction does not seem to be highly associated with people's opinion on how likely immigrants will take employment opportunities from natives. The only influential factors seem to be anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism. It is rather interesting to see that those holding more individualistic attitudes usually blame immigrants less for job replacement, as does a more conservative person. The latter finding to a degree contradicts party stands on the immigration issue. The Republican Party is the one which promotes anti-immigration legislation, but it is also the party which consists of more conservative people. This may suggest that the Republican Party's anti-immigration platform could have attracted traditionally non-Republican votes.

On raising taxes. The responses on this question differs considerably depending on whether it focuses on Hispanic or Asian immigrants. As before, anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism all have significant ef-

fect upon both racial groups. The difference lies in the role of ideology and past personal financial condition. Being ideologically conservative significantly raises the probability that one thinks that Hispanic immigrants have caused higher taxes. However, when considering Asian immigrants, the effect of ideology is the same as in the last model. That is, a more conservative person tends to disagree that Asian immigrants have caused higher taxes. In comparison, the opinion that Asian immigrants have increased taxes is strongly motivated by misfortune in one's personal financial condition.

The results of the logit and ordered logit models allow only for rough comparison of the effect of personal beliefs and personal economic satisfaction. In the following section I compute the magnitude of the estimated effect and present them in Tables 5.4.

To compute the magnitude of estimated effect, I first set all the independent variables to the sample mean value. With these values and the estimated coefficients, I can determine the probability that a hypothetical respondent would give a particular answer to a survey question. Then for each variable, I hold the values of all other independent variables constant, and calculate the probability of the choice function when this variable is 0 and when it is 1. The difference between the two probabilities is the maximum effect of the variable on each choice, which I use here.

Table 5.4: The Significant Independent Variables and Their Maximum Effect on Each of the Six Dependent Variables

Independent Variable	Amount	Welfare	Job Replacement by Hispanics	Job Replacement by Asians	Raising Taxes for Hispanics	Raising Taxes for Asians
Anti-Minority Affect	.526	.541	.369	.297	.424	.253
Egalitarianism	-.272	-.181	-.155	-.079	-.157	-.066
Individualism			-.112	-.082	-.079	-.056
Ideology					.111	
Retrospective						-.055
Prospective	.187	-.109				
National Econ.	.066					

In Table 5.4, I list the prejudice variables on the top part and economic satisfaction on the bottom part, with the magnitude of their effect on the choices that are anti-immigration. First of all, there is strong evidence that anti-minority affect is the predominant determinant of public opinion on immigration policy. Next to it is the effect of egalitarianism. Overall, the magnitude of effect of economic variables is much smaller than that of the belief variables.

5.5.1 Immigrants and Immigration

The stories in the first two columns and the next four columns in Table 5.4 contrast each other. The first two columns link economic concerns with opin-

ions on immigration policies, while the next four columns suggest that values and prejudice were shaping people's perceptions on immigrants.

Let us look at the impact of immigrants on the economy first. There is limited effect of economic (dis)satisfaction. The only clear evidence that people's opinions are distinguishable by their past personal fortune is on the question of whether Asian immigrants have caused higher taxes. Those who have been worse off in the past believe that Asian immigrants have caused the taxes to rise. It is not clear to me why this is the case, but notice that the magnitude is quite small.

In comparison, the issue of immigrants driving up taxes is more contextual than the issue of job replacement. It appears that people have more fixed ideas on the latter, and that economic satisfaction is not quite relevant. It is an opinion that invokes only the prejudice and belief variables. If we assume these prejudice and beliefs are formed in the early process of socialization, then opinions on job replacement are pretty much settled. Those who are more racist are more likely to think of Hispanic and Asian immigrants as the cause of unemployment among older residents. Those who are more individualistic tend to think that there are reasons other than immigrants that caused older residents to lose jobs. A more egalitarian person also believes in less likelihood of job replacement caused by immigrants. In other words, a person who is more individualistic or egalitarian basically believes that new immigrants do

not cause rising unemployment among older residents, and this opinion does not vary with the ups and downs of the economy or their personal well being. If most Americans are individualistic and egalitarian, then the job replacement issue seems to be very much fueled by racial prejudice.

The opinion of immigrants causing higher taxes shares the same pattern of correlation with individualism, egalitarianism and racism, but with additional influences from ideology and personal economic well being. Liberals object to the idea that Hispanic immigrants are tax burdens or welfare burdens. In addition, those who had worse personal financial situations tend to believe Asian immigrants caused higher taxes. So we see a difference of opinion on the issue of raising, depending on which immigrant group is in question. Hispanic immigrants seem to invoke a liberal-conservative feud on taxation for the poor, while Asian immigrants seem to remind people of economic competition.

However, when asked for policy preference on decreased immigration, people give interesting responses based on their evaluation of the economy. Those who think the national economy is going well are more likely to prefer decreased immigration. So are those who expect a better personal financial condition in the future. This suggests that many people think that a better economy in the future will probably attract more immigrants and thus stricter regulation is needed. It is also possible that these people thought the economy at the time was the worst and anything in the future would be better. They could have

preferred decreased immigration since they attributed part of the economic recession to the current immigration policy.

The sense of interest conflict is also apparent on the opinion of welfare reform for immigrants. Those who expect to have worse personal financial conditions in the future tend to prefer delayed welfare access for immigrants. So the opinion of this group of people is rather interesting — if I expect to do worse in the near future, I do not mind having more immigrants in this country but they had better not live on welfare. This attitude somewhat suggests that they want to use immigrants to boost the economy.

On both policy preferences, belief variables have slightly different effects compared with those on the opinion of economic impact. Anti-minority affect jumps to a new high in predicting the preference for decreased immigration and delayed welfare policies. Individualism no longer has a significant effect on these opinions. Egalitarianism continues to show strong effects on opposing decreased immigration and delayed welfare policies. It seems opinion on immigration reform can be very much determined by the relative strength of one's racial bigotry and belief in egalitarianism.

To summarize, the findings in this chapter generalize the results in the previous chapters. First, it establishes that what motivated the Californians to start the immigration reform in the 1990's is shared by most Americans

nationwide. Second, American identity does not result in anti-immigration sentiment, racism does. And third, interest calculation is more involved in policy suggestions that have direct economic consequences.

In addition, the findings show that there was no uncertainty due to information shortage. Most of the survey respondents had well-formed views on immigrants and immigration policies. This suggests that the immigration problem is not a new issue at all. The steady inflows of immigrants into this country have lasted for over a century now. Being the descendents of early generations of immigrations, most of the native residents are rather familiar with the consequences of immigration. Political campaigns may further polarize the opinion on certain policies instead of educating individuals about the immigration issue in general.

The absence of ambivalence also suggests that the effect of individualism on the issue of immigration is completely different from its effect on welfare policies. In other words, most of the native residents do not think of new immigrants as welfare recipients. Rather, a more individualistic person might feel closer to the spirit of new immigrants and would like to have more liberal immigration policies. So most native residents in fact acknowledge the individualistic efforts by new immigrants.

5.6 The American Dilemma

It seems that the traditional values passed down from early generations of immigrants are still shaping people's views on immigration issues nowadays. Both individualism and egalitarianism help Americans to justify the impact of immigrants. Egalitarianism in particular encourages more liberal immigration policies. That probably explains why a good portion of the time in history, the U.S. has acted with generosity to immigrants beyond what it conceived to be in its national self-interest, though many argue that its self-interest was thereby better served.

Unfortunately, racial prejudice is almost inseparable from the evolution of the American belief system as well. What we see in this chapter is very intriguing — racial prejudice has direct influence on how native residents judge the economic impact of immigrants. In fact, the more negative stereotypes on minorities one has, the more likely one tends to see job replacement and higher taxes caused by immigrants. Though it seems logical to link "laziness" with higher taxes, presumably for welfare spending, it is really hard to explain how "laziness" or "unintelligence" could cause job replacement.

It seems that once the disliking affect is developed, the impression is easily influenced. Driven by racial prejudice, one does not hesitate to give bad reviews of immigrants, despite apparent inconsistency. This case shows how

easily opinion on racially sensitive questions can be subject to racial prejudice. Notice that economic performance was almost completely disregarded in the forming of the judgment.

The tradition of individualism and egalitarianism has conflicted with racial prejudice to give America a dilemma on immigration issues. On one hand, they believe in individualism and egalitarianism, the values that made this country one of the greatest in modern civilization. They believe in American Dreams, admiring those who came empty-handed and succeeded with individual effort. They believe that everyone should have equal opportunity to fulfill personal ambition on this land. Consequentially, they do not blame new immigrants for job replacement, and they have much faith that new immigrants are hard workers instead of tax burdens.

On the other hand, racial bias is causing much resentment toward new immigrants. Either way new immigrants perform, racist lenses distort their achievement. If they do well, then they become job thieves. If they stay behind, they become tax burdens. So no matter what new immigrants do, they become a disturbance to native residents and are not welcome. Racism has offset much of the liberalism in immigration attitude that American identity has generated.

Compared with symbolic racism, the way symbolic prejudice has operated

on nativism sentiment is quite different. Here the traditional values can not justify the "dislike" of new immigrants. Rather, traditional values work against racial prejudice to generate more positive views on immigrants and more support on liberal immigration policies. So the symbolic prejudice against new immigrants is of a simpler form than symbolic racism. It only contains anti-minority affect.

5.7 The Rational Public

An important discovery of the analysis in this chapter is that people reveal different ways of opinion formation on different types of questions. When asked about their impression on immigrants, the answers heavily rely upon subjective beliefs. While on questions regarding policy preference, rational calculations of economic performance come to share the reasoning.

It seems important to distinguish the types of public opinion under study. If the opinion solicited is about the impressions or judgment of other people, it could show dominant influences from subjective idiosyncrasies such as values, beliefs, or prejudice. This suggests that inter-group perceptions are formed at a rather early stages of socialization and stay relatively unchanged, as the values and beliefs are. Positive or negative, these perceptions will be reflected accordingly on various issues, as in this case of immigrants' impact.

Yet, opinions on policy suggestions appear to have drawn more dimensions of consideration. Besides personal principles, the effects of such policies are not neglected. As discussed earlier, people either wanted to change the current immigration policy because they had suffered economic distress, or wanted to regulate potentially large inflow of immigrants brought by the expected booming of the economy in the near future. Thus, most of the public did engage in rational calculation of interests when presented with questions about potential actions.

This calls for caution in public opinion study. While we have found economic concerns to be of negligible influence on people's perception of the impact of immigrants, we can not conclude that interest conflict does not drive people's desire to change public policy. Public policy represents concrete changes of benefits and costs. Interesting enough, people are willing to think realistically and rationally when suggesting changes of public policy.

Chapter 6

The Urban Perspective

Not to be neglected is the special case of urbanites. Most of the new immigrants have been urban-bound, making the country's top three cities — New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago — the homes of over one third of the new immigrants. Compared with other native residents, urbanites are at the direct impact zone of new immigrants. They become neighbors, coworkers, fellow PTA members, or even political rivals of the new immigrants. Given their close interactions with new immigrants, they deserve a special place in this study. This chapter focuses on Los Angelenos' opinion on immigration issues.

Los Angeles experienced a wave of new immigrants before the recurrence of nativism in the 1990s. It is also known for its diverse ethnicity. The rapid increase in non-Anglo immigrants in Los Angeles has created a new dynamic between different ethnic groups. Besides the traditional black-white conflict, the tensions between blacks and new immigrant groups have been mounting.

For example, in the 1992 Rodney King beating case, blacks could not tolerate the verdict by a white jury, but in the riot in protest of it, the looters and the looted were mainly blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the inner city. Most of the Hispanics and Asians involved were new immigrants. So the case of Los Angeles provides a window to the complex relations between new immigrants and different groups of native residents.

6.1 The Immigrant Magnet

According to 1990 census, in the city of Los Angeles, over 27% are foreign born; in the greater Los Angeles area, over 32% are foreign born. This is the highest rate among all major cities, except for Miami, which has a much smaller total population and where 34% are foreign born. Needless to say, a good portion of Angelenos are immigrants. Furthermore, most of these immigrants came in the recent decades.

In "Los Angeles and Its Immigrants," Roger Waldinger (1996) detailed L.A.'s history of being an immigrant magnet in recent decades. Though Los Angeles had been home to a substantial foreign-born population at the earlier part of the century, a steady inflow of domestic immigrants from the Midwest had kept the region's foreign-born population below 8% by 1960. Since late 1960's, the foreign-born population in L.A. has increased rapidly. During

the 70's and 80's, Los Angeles was the nation's most intensive immigration focal point. Very large immigrant inflows, combined with net domestic out-migration during the 1970s, and reduced domestic in-migration during the 1980s, sharply boosted immigrant population shares: by 1990, immigrants comprised 27% of the region's population and 33 percent of those living in Los Angeles county.

What distinguishes Los Angeles from New York, the other important stage station for immigrants, is the sudden increase in the number of immigrants in recent decades. New York has retained a very substantial foreign-born population throughout the twentieth century; consequently, the very large immigrant inflows registered since the mid-1960's have had a more modest effect on the foreign-born share of the city's population. But L.A. really exceeded the others as a magnet for the very recently arrived: the immigrant wave of the 1980's made up 13% of the region's population, as opposed to 4% for the U.S. as a whole. In 1996, L.A. was again the top metropolitan residence for immigrants, recording over 159,000 immigrants settling in the region.

According to many scholars, new immigrants have brought L.A. cheap laborers who are indispensable to the region. For example, Simon (1989) showed that Mexican Americans arriving since the 1970's filled in the low-skilled, low-paid jobs in Los Angeles. In comparison, employment of blacks in Los Angeles increased by 107,000 in the 70's, with 98,000 of these in white-collar occupa-

tions. By contrast, Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles held 210,000 jobs in 1980, but fewer than 25,000 of these were in white-collar employment. Even though the total number of jobs in the low-skilled occupational categories declined at the time, the number of Mexican immigrants holding jobs in these occupations soared by 108,000. In addition, the rising job status of black women was especially noteworthy. In 1980, 7 out of 10 black women working in Los Angeles held white-collar jobs, the highest ratio in the nation. By contrast, only one out of every ten Mexican women immigrants was employed in a white-collar occupation. It is fair to say that the input of Mexican Americans as well as other new immigrants supplied the L.A. economy with much needed labor and helped it to boom for two decades. Meanwhile, new immigrants enjoyed a boost in their own living standards. Among Mexican Americans in L.A., the proportion with professional and managerial jobs almost doubled between 1970 and 1990 (Waldinger 1996).

The success that some of the earlier immigrants achieved encouraged more immigrants to come to "gold paved" California, with or without the permission of the INS. The recession in early 1990's definitely decreased demand for migrant laborers. Thus, many of the newcomers entered the U.S. through the backdoor, and L.A.'s proximity to the border meant that it attracted far more than its share of unauthorized immigrants.

Many native residents started to feel under siege by Spanish-speaking illegal

immigrants. The foundation of such perception was that L.A. did have an extraordinarily high volume of immigration from Mexico and Central America. Asians have moved to Los Angeles in substantial numbers, but their numbers remain dwarfed by the Mexican and Central American presence. Overall, ten countries, Mexico and nine other Central America Countries,[1] accounted for 70 percent of all of the region's foreign-born residents, an unusual pattern, since elsewhere, immigrant origins are far more scrambled (Waldinger 1996). The ten countries that dominate the flow to LA account for only 40 percent of the immigrants living outside Los Angeles. Even an immigrant dense region like New York is far more in line with the overall national pattern than is Los Angeles.

6.2 Next-Door Neighbors

Besides the characteristics of attracting high volumes of Hispanic immigrants, another feature deserves special emphasis – Los Angeles' "majority minorities," who live in close proximity with new immigrants in the inner city, and who might have had unique opinions on the issue of immigration.

Previous studies have provided mixed views on the effects of close proximity

[1]The other nine countries are: El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bahamas, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic.

between different groups. Some studies suggest that an increase in inter-group contact tends to reduce inter-group conflict (Amir 1969, 1976; Hood and Morris 1997; Jackman and Crane 1986; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Rothbart and John 1993; Stephan 1985). These works assume that inter-group antagonism stems from "unrealistic negative expectations of one another" (Rothbart and John 1993, 43). By increasing contact with other groups, experience replaces expectations and the perceptions of the other group are modified based on favorable attitudes toward individual group members. In other words, if inter-group conflict is caused by prejudice, then close proximity could bridge the gap between groups.

Other studies have come to opposite conclusions. For example, V. O. Key (1949) found that southern whites who lived in areas with high concentrations of blacks happened to show the most racially conservative attitudes. Many other studies concur that inter-group contact intensifies conflict (Giles 1977; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). The rationale behind this argument is that proximity results in more competition, which then breeds conflict. Not surprisingly, this resonates with the theory of realistic group conflict.

My findings in previous chapters also reflect on the complexity of this problem. On one hand, I find close contact with minorities could reduce the support for Proposition 187, as happened in the Bay Area cities. On the other

hand, Los Angelenos did pass Proposition 187 and Los Angeles also has a high degree of multiculturalism. So what distinguished L.A.? As discussed above, one reason might be its sudden increase in Hispanic immigrants in the recent decades, a pattern unique among major American cities. The other reason might be its size. Los Angeles spreads out over 4000 square miles and the real mixture between new immigrants and native residents might have happened in limited neighborhoods whose residents did not represent the overall racial composition of the greater L.A. area. In other words, racial minorities live close to new immigrants in L.A. while white natives do not necessarily live closer to new immigrants in L.A. than in other cities.

So I would like to test how different ethnic groups in L.A. perceived the impact of the increasing Hispanic population. While the theories are pointing toward different possibilities, the evidence from the city politics at the time does not have consistent suggestions either. On one hand, there was indisputable evidence that native African Americans did not like new immigrants, symbolized by the 1992 Riot. On the other hand, minority native residents had more sympathetic views on illegal immigrants, as they objected to Proposition 187 at a higher rate than whites a year later. So I do not have a hypothesis that predicts whether minorities would have more positive or negative views on the impact of new immigrants.

The hypotheses I have are based upon the general patterns of opinion found

in previous chapters. I expect to see the presence of the dilemma caused by racial prejudice and American values.

6.3 Data and Analysis

Showing whether L.A.'s minority groups have different views on immigration issues is a difficult task due to the lack of data. First, in almost all surveys, minority sample sizes tend to be too small to bear a separate analysis. Second, surveys at the local level are often about single issues, and rarely provide information on questions other than those the survey designers wanted to investigate. Fortunately this author discovered a survey conducted by colleagues at University of California, Los Angeles, who were interested in similar questions. Courtesy of the Institute of Social Science Research at UCLA, I obtained this *Los Angeles County Social Survey* (LACSS data) conducted in 1993. 1993 is an important year for Los Angelenos. It was one year after the 1992 Riot and one year before Proposition 187 appeared on the center stage of race relations. This data set may well reflect the uprising concerns about issues of immigration at the time. I conducted the following analysis with Michael Alvarez.

The survey randomly selected 986 residents in Los Angeles county to interview over the phone, out of which 359 were black, 168 were Hispanic, and 42

were Asian. Blacks were deliberately over-sampled. The dependent variables are a series of questions about the impact caused by Hispanics. Specifically, the first question asked whether "more good jobs for Hispanics means fewer good jobs for members of other groups" (Job Crowding). The second asked whether "the more influence Hispanics have in local politics, the less influence members of other groups will have in local politics" (Political Crowding). The third asked if "as more good housing and neighborhoods go to Hispanics, the fewer good houses and neighborhoods there will be for members of other groups" (Housing Crowding), and the fourth asked whether "many Hispanics have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of members of other groups" (Economic Crowding). The fifth question is more about the opinion on Affirmative Action, which said "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Hispanic should do the same without any special favors." Respondents answered each question with "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," or "strongly disagree," indicated by integers 1 through 5.

We used the answers to these questions to measure the opinion on the increasing Hispanic population at the time. The survey was conducted one year before Proposition 187 came out, so we have a perfect chance to see what the public opinion was like before the issue of illegal immigrants became heavily politicized. Similar to the dependent variables in the previous chapter, the

responses here solicited public opinion on the impact of a group of newcomers. Prompted by the findings in the previous chapter, we use racial prejudice and American values to predict people's perception.

The measurement of racial prejudice is constructed from the answers to several relevant questions. Similar to the procedure described in the last chapter, we identified three questions tapping into racial stereotyping, then conducted a factor analysis, and then used the commonality score to build an index for racism. The three questions asked the respondent whether they agreed on the reasons provided to explain why Hispanics were relatively worse off economically. The reasons were "less inborn ability to learn," "lack motivation," and "not speaking standard English." For the purpose of presentation later, we recode the variable so that higher values indicate stronger racial prejudice.

Due to data availability, the measurement of beliefs is only on egalitarianism. Three questions were relevant to this index, including a feeling about "social equality between groups," and whether "more equality brings fewer problems," and how much one should "strive for social equality." A factor analysis was conducted to measure respondents' belief in egalitarianism. Higher values stand for stronger belief. As before, both scores on racism and egalitarianism were re-scaled to be between 0 and 1.

To capture the hypothesized unique opinion by minorities, we use dummy

variables to indicate the respondent's ethnic identity. Namely, black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents could have different reactions to the dependent variables. As mentioned earlier, this data set provides a reasonably large of minority sample. The survey over-sampled blacks and has a total of 57% minorities, of which 36% are blacks, 17% of Hispanics and 4% Asians.

Also included as an explanatory variable is the respondent's answer on whether his or her neighborhood had experienced an increase in Hispanic residents. If so, a dummy variable is set to indicate such change.

To control for other effects, we also included people's ideological standings. Dummy variables are used to indicate being liberal or conservative, with the baseline as ideologically moderate. Female respondents are also given a dummy variable, for possible gender gap in the opinion.

What calls for more discussion is how we handled the missing data in this analysis. Due to the survey methodology, almost all questions about opinions were asked to only two-thirds of the whole sample, so we had a large number of missing data for racial stereotype and each of the dependent variables.[2] We felt that the sample size would be too small to draw any inference if the missing data points were simply left out. So we used imputation to fill in the

[2]For other independent variables, there are no systematic missing data. Questions regarding egalitarianism were asked to the whole sample. So were the other demographic variables.

missing data points for the variables of interest.[3] The criteria were mainly demographic information, including education level, gender, age, ethnicity, ideology, and partisanship. In addition, we also used the respondent's feelings toward Hispanics and Hispanic civil rights organizations to impute racial stereotype and the dependent variables. For each dependent variable, we used the other dependent variables to help impute it as well.

Of course, we tested whether the imputation would generate vastly different results compared with the original but smaller data set. We replicated the analysis without the imputed data. The results turned out to be essentially identical. Using the imputed data, the efficiency of the estimates improved, as expected with a larger data set.

Figure 6.1 shows the distributions of the dependent variables. On the first 4 questions, there were many fewer respondents who answered "disagree" or "strongly disagree." To avoid skewed tails, we combined the answers of "disagree" and "strongly disagree" as one choice. So each dependent variable has 4 ordered choices, from "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," to "disagree," indicated with 1 to 4. On the question of special favors, we retained the 5 ordered responses.

The histograms show that the opinion was definitely not positive on the

[3]The imputation we used is filling in least squares estimates for missing data. Please see Chapter 2 of Little and Rubin (1987) for details.



Figure 6.1: Distribution of the Dependent Variable on Hispanics' Impact

impact of Hispanics. For comparison, we also graphed the same responses on the impact of blacks. If the two groups draw drastically different responses, then the opinion on Hispanics must have been influenced by something unique to Hispanics, possibly their close link to new immigrants. If they are roughly the same, then it suggests that such opinion were based on something common to both ethnic groups. As Figure 6.2 shows, the latter seems to be the case. The distribution of the opinion on blacks' impact looks very similar to that on Hispanics' impact.

This finding suggests that a comparison across racial groups may reveal more on the motives. So we constructed the same kind of independent variables to explain the opinion on blacks' impact. Most of the independent variables are the same, except for the measurement of anti-Hispanic prejudice and the dummy variable indicating more Hispanics have moved to the respondent's neighborhood. Since the survey also asked corresponding questions about blacks, these two variables are constructed accordingly with the same kind of questions on blacks.

Figure 6.3 summarizes the correlation between anti-Hispanic prejudice, anti- black prejudice, and egalitarianism. The 3 diagonal cells tell each cell's dimensions. For example, the middle cell of the first column graphs the observations of anti-Hispanic prejudice on the horizontal axis and anti-black prejudice on the vertical axis. So the lower left-side three cells and the upper



Figure 6.2: Distribution of the Dependent Variable on Blacks' Impact



Figure 6.3: Correlation Between Variables

right-side three cells are the symmetric images of each other by the diagonal cells.

It appears that anti-Hispanic prejudice and anti-black prejudice are not well correlated, meaning that people could have very different views on different minority groups. The correlation between racial prejudice and egalitarianism were rather loose too. This suggests that many Hispanics and blacks were probably having more negative reviews on each other, assuming that they had better reviews of their own groups.

We employed ordered probit to study the different opinions, since the answers were ordered choices. Four probit regressions are used to predict each of the five dependent variables for each ethnic group. The regressions estimate the thresholds between each ordered choices with all the independent variables discussed above. I expect racial prejudice and egalitarianism to have opposite effects on the perception, with racial prejudice encouraging more negative views on each group. I have no a priori view on how minority opinions differ from Anglo opinions.

6.4 Mutual Feelings

Table 6.1 provides the estimated coefficients and their standard errors for each independent variable. The estimated thresholds are indicated by μ_1 to μ_4 under the coefficients. Table 6.2 shows the corresponding findings of the same model applied to blacks.

Let us look at the opinion on Hispanics first. Higher values of the dependent variables indicate more positive views, such as, less likely to cause crowding in various aspects. Anti-Hispanic prejudice has negative signs across all questions, meaning that a more racist person is less likely to give positive views on the impact of Hispanics. Egalitarianism has positive effects on views, meaning that higher degrees of belief in egalitarianism tend to give more positive views on the impact of Hispanics. And just like the findings in the last chapter, both racial prejudice and egalitarianism are statistically significant and have opposite effects on the opinion.

On the four questions about Hispanics' effects on crowding the political and economic system, compared with white respondents, Hispanic respondents could not disagree more. Their answers have significantly higher probabilities of falling into the categories of giving positive views on the impact. Though this is not surprising, the answers given by blacks and Asians were very interesting. Compared with whites, blacks were much more likely to think that

Table 6.1: Perceptions on Hispanic's Socioeconomic Impact

Independent Variables	No special favors	Unlikely Chances of Hispanics Causing Job crowding	Political crowding	Housing crowding	Economic crowding
Anti–Hispanic	-.47*	-1.1**	-1.4**	-1.3**	-1.9**
	.30	.30	.30	.33	.31
Egalitarianism	.48**	.58**	.24**	.67**	.62**
	.21	.21	.21	.23	.21
Females	-.05	-.01	.01	-.01	-.11*
	.08	.08	.08	.09	.08
Hispanics	.12	.34**	.51**	.26**	.21**
	.11	.11	.11	.12	.11
Blacks	.21**	.04	.10	-.18**	-.19**
	.08	.08	.09	.09	.09
Asians	.26*	-.16	-.05	.37**	-.06
	.18	.18	.18	.21	.18
Liberals	.20**	.13*	.08	.16*	-.01
	.09	.09	.09	.10	.09
Conservatives	-.04	-.04	-.17*	.09	-.03
	.10	.10	.10	.11	.10
More Hispanics	-.09	-.17**	-.19**	.02	-.05
	.08	.08	.08	.09	.08
μ_1	-2.1	-1.9	-2.0	-2.1	-2.4
μ_2	-.55	-.24	-.53	-1.4	-.90
μ_3	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.3	.95
μ_4	1.8				
Sample n	940	940	940	940	940
χ^2	27.0**	48.0**	58.4**	46.2**	65.8**

Note: *: $p < .10$, **:$p < .05$.

Hispanics caused crowded housing and achieved economic progress at the expense of others. They were slightly more likely to think that Hispanics did not cause job crowding and political crowding. Asians strongly disagreed with almost everyone that they believed Hispanics did not cause housing crowding at all. But they were slightly more likely to think that Hispanics caused job replacement, political and economic crowding.

On the support for no special favors, most of the Hispanic respondents did not differ significantly with the white respondents, though Hispanics leaned towards allowing some special favors. But blacks and Asians definitely showed their strong support in keeping affirmative action. They both have significantly higher probability of disagreeing with no special favor for Hispanics.

Female respondents have roughly the same opinion as males on all issues except one. They were more likely to think that Hispanics succeeded economically at the expense of other groups.

Liberals in general gave more favorable answers. They also heavily favored allowing special favor for Hispanics. On the job crowding and housing crowding issues, they differed significantly with ideologically moderate respondents. Conservatives did the opposite. They particularly thought that Hispanics over-influenced local politics.

Whether more Hispanics had recently moved into the respondent's neigh-

borhood had significant influence on his opinion on job replacement and local politics issues. Interesting enough, it does not make the opinion on housing crowding any more negative.

Looking at each issue, it seems that besides the consistent influence from racial prejudice and egalitarianism, some other factors may be particularly relevant. On job replacement issue, having more Hispanics moving into the respondent's neighborhood definitely made her more likely to worry about good jobs going to Hispanics. More Hispanics in the neighborhood had a similar effect on the political crowding problem. But conservatives definitely worried more about Hispanic power in politics. Housing seems to only concern blacks, though highly. Blacks were also the only group that complained of Hispanics stepping on other groups to achieve economic progress.

Now turn to Table 6.2. The first difference comes from the opinion on no special favors for blacks. Compared with Table 6.1, a conspicuous change is that the other minorities did not side with the group in question. Compared with whites, both Hispanics and Asians were even more likely to agree that no special favor should be given to blacks. Also, the gap between liberals and conservatives on the issue was more polarized than on the Hispanic case.

Anti-Black prejudice and egalitarianism have similar effects on opinions as in the case of Hispanics. The major difference is the effect of having more

Table 6.2: Perceptions on Black's Socioeconomic Impact

		Unlikely Chances of Blacks Causing			
Independent Variables	No special favors	Job crowding	Political crowding	Housing crowding	Economic crowding
Anti–Black	-1.6**	-2.0**	-1.6**	-2.1**	-2.1**
	.29	.31	.31	.32	.29
Egalitarianism	.34**	.69**	.72**	.79**	.49**
	.20	.22	.22	.23	.21
Females	.15**	.03	-.01	-.02	.06
	.08	.09	.09	.09	.08
Hispanics	-.10	-.05	-.12	-.18*	-.15*
	.10	.11	.11	.11	.11
Blacks	.37**	.30**	.50**	.34**	.52**
	.08	.09	.09	.10	.09
Asians	-.25*	-.12	-.01	-.04	-.21
	.18	.19	.20	.20	.18
Liberals	.24**	.05	.17**	.08	.14*
	.09	.09	.09	.10	.09
Conservatives	-.21**	.10	-.08	-.05	.10
	.10	.11	.11	.11	.10
More Blacks	-.01	.07	-.18	.10	.05
	.15	.17	.16	.17	.15
μ_1	-2.2	-2.3	-2.1	-2.5	-2.1
μ_2	-.96	-1.5	-1.2	-1.6	-.76
μ_3	.84	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.3
μ_4	1.5				
Sample n	940	940	940	940	940
χ^2	116.1**	84.7**	109.2**	105.6**	142.4**

Note: * : $p < .10$, $p < .05$.

blacks moving into the neighborhood. Unlike the case of Hispanics moving in, blacks did not cause their new neighbors to think that blacks would cause more job replacement and influence local politics. This may have reflected relatively slow social mobility of blacks.

Hispanics' opinions on housing and economic crowding by blacks complement the findings in Table 6.1. Compared with other groups, Hispanics were the only ones to give significantly more negative views on these issues. This confirms that housing competition is mainly between Hispanics and blacks who must have been more likely to live in the same communities. And such close proximity has also made them each think that the other was stepping on them to move up.

However, the overwhelming effects were still from racism and egalitarianism, since the two variables have much larger effects. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 depict the change of probabilities by each variable on each group.

The vertical axis in each graph stands for the probability of the dependent variable. The horizontal axis shows the value of an independent variable. By holding all the other independent variables at the mean value, we let the independent variable indicated by the horizontal axis vary from 0 to 1. In



Figure 6.4: Effects by Racism

the upper graph of Figure 6.4, we can compare the relative attitude across different questions on Hispanics' impact. The question of job replacement by Hispanics consistently attracted more negative answers than other questions. Housing crowding was the least negative. Political crowding and economic crowding were in between, but were more sensitive to the change in anti-Hispanic prejudice.

The lower graph plots the same kind of change in answers by an independent variable, the anti-black prejudice. Apparently more people believed that blacks advanced economically at the expense of other groups. All of the other questions had similar distributions of answers.

Figure 6.5 shows the estimated influence of egalitarianism. The upper graph is the impact of egalitarianism on attitudes about Hispanics and the lower is on attitudes about blacks. Apparently egalitarianism had opposite effects compared with racial prejudice since now the changes of probabilities are going upwards. But the relatively flat lines indicate that the influence of egalitarianism was not as strong as racial prejudice. Furthermore, each question had roughly the same degree of sensitivity toward the change in egalitarian belief.



Figure 6.5: Effects by Egalitarianism

To summarize, the opinions studied here were subject to strong influence from racial prejudice and egalitarianism. The two factors had opposite influence and racial prejudice had larger magnitude of effects. Each ethnic group gave themselves a more positive view on the impact generated by its socioeconomic progress. Hispanics and blacks were in competition for good housing, and blamed each other for progressing at the expense of the others. The increases in Hispanic neighbors resulted in more negative opinion on job competition and influence in local politics by Hispanics.

6.5 Personal Competition, Group Alliances

The conflicting influence of racism and egalitarianism confirms the dilemma found in Chapter 5. It tells us how much one relies upon her sense of like or dislike and the sense of right or wrong to form opinions. But people are also responsive toward change in the environment. If one sees more Hispanics moving in to become neighbors, she tends to believe that Hispanics cause job competition and sway the local politics.

But who are the people that are more likely to become neighbors with Hispanics? Most likely blacks. They complain that the housing supply is cut short by Hispanics, and believe Hispanics are stepping on others to move up economically. But compared with other groups, the majority of the blacks

actually sided with Hispanics on supporting more liberal immigration policies. Both the NAACP and the ACLU advocated the rejection of Proposition 187.

This seems to be another case where political attitudes and policy preferences deviate from each other. Apparently blacks' attitudes toward Hispanics were quite negative, blaming them for unfair competition in social upward mobility. But their policy preference went the other way. They supported the policy of aiding Hispanics with special favors. They did not support Proposition 187, a law designed to contain the growing power of Hispanics. One probable answer is that blacks had a strategic interest in keeping the alliance with Hispanics to fight with white racists. Political commentators offer supporting views on this argument. Edward Litwak pointed out in 1992 that "[f]rom Jesse Jackson on down, wider political ambitions induce black leaders to betray the uppermost interests of their poorest followers in order to coalesce with Hispanic groups that oppose all serious efforts to contain immigration."[4]

Such "betrayal" did not happen without objection. As the exit poll in Chapter 3 showed, almost 44% of black voters in California supported Proposition 187. The concern over direct economic competition is only growing, as we see more black leaders coming out to argue against the strategic alliance with Hispanics. In a 1997 rally, Jesse Peterson of Brotherhood Organization of

[4]From "The Riots: Underclass vs. Immigrants," by Edward Litwak, *New York Times*, May 15, 1992.

a New Destiny reminded that "[i]mmigration, both legal and illegal, is having a major impact on the Black community. They are very unhappy about it. ... Jesse Jackson, Maxine Waters, Louis Farrakhan, and others, have told the Black community this is a racial issue and it's not. It's an American issue."[5]

The phrase "an American issue" is changing the whole dividing line. It tends to replace the racial overtones of the immigration issue with the sense of American citizenship. Yet this will not happen, as long as the gap between whites and blacks is still wide enough to keep America divided.

[5]From "The Next Big Divide?" by Romesh Ratnesar, *Time Magazine*, December 1, 1997.

Chapter 7

Personal Prejudice and Interest Calculation in Opinion formation

As a nation of immigrants, the United States has welcomed immigrants in periods of expansion and optimism, and reviled them in periods of stagnation and cynicism — a cycle of nativism that has not stopped. A thorough examination of public opinion on immigrants and immigration policies in the 1990's reveals that ethnic prejudice has produced much of the fear and loathing of foreigners. The yearning for social homogeneity finds an internal enemy to sustain itself: the "alien." Nativism has reflected one of America's basic divisions: race.

Yet the United States is also the land of the the "American Dream." It is against the traditional American values to deprive newcomers equal opportunities to succeed with an honest effort. In fact, the traditional values were largely the legacy of immigrants' endeavors generations ago — individualistic

effort and equal opportunities. As long as new immigrants are following the footsteps of the old generations of immigrants, Americans can hardly deny their input to this country. Egalitarian and individualistic beliefs uphold the nation's faith in immigrants and immigration.

The opposite effects of racial prejudice and traditional values accompany the swing in public opinion on immigrants and immigration policies. With the increase of non-Anglo population in the country, racial prejudice inevitably widens the gap between native residents and new immigrations with negative stereotypes and expectations. But as most of the new immigrants successfully establish themselves, the traditional American values prevent native residents from being blind on the newcomers' effort and contributions. As long as both racial prejudice and American core values exist, Americans face a dilemma on immigration policy. Recognizing the internal conflict, one author puts it this way: "American nativism has had less to do with 'them' than us."[1]

In the middle of the conflicting values and prejudice, people are also highly rational when it comes to making public policies that will have concrete influence on their economic well being. Though preferences on immigration policies reflect individual's attitude toward immigrants, the two are not equivalent. Policy preferences invoke interest calculations in addition to the emotion of

[1]By "immigration Facts" James Crawford, delivered at the National Immigration Forum, 1997.

whether one likes those foreign-looking new immigrants. The performance of the national economy and personal pocketbook become an important dimension in making the choices.

In addition to such concrete interest, the choices made by most African-Americans on immigration policies reflect a calculated interest that is long-term and for the whole racial group. As the socioeconomic lower class, blacks are in direct competition with new immigrants for jobs, housing, education, and local political power. Compared with whites, they have more negative attitudes toward Hispanics. Yet they are more sympathetic to Hispanics' fight for more liberal immigration policies. In fact, they are in alliance with Hispanics on the immigration issue in order to have Hispanics as their partners on other racial issues. Their top interest of fighting against white racism has motivated them to take such a stand on immigration policies.

More important, when people are weighing their interest to form their policy preferences, various factors are involved in the process of assessing the realistic interest. Proximity is an important one. Lack of contact makes the decision making process rely more on subjective expectations instead of updated experience. In this case, personal prejudice could disproportionately influence the decision making process by filtering in the information that is consistent with the prejudice. As perceived threat becomes "realistic" threat, the interest motivation bears a deep mark of personal idiosyncrasies.

This picture of opinion formation synthesizes the theories of interest politics and symbolic politics. It first points out that different types of questions invoke different aspects of concern. In addition, it explains how hard it is to disentangle the effects of prejudice from the measurement of realistic interest. Furthermore, it calls for analysis that treats interest politics and symbolic politics as complements, rather than rivals, of each other. With the improvement in the field of methodology, more sophisticated models may be able to reveal the process of prejudice and interest conflict interacting with each other to form perceptions.

This thesis intends to contribute to improving inter-group relations. My findings suggest that ethnic aggregation and economic equalization are the key factors in bridging the various groups. In a sense, both prejudice and interest conflict are inevitable in human society. However, aggregation can increase information exchange between groups and reduce the influence of outdated stereotypes. The vote outcome on Proposition 187 in the San Francisco Bay Area is a good example of how close contact reduced ethnic gap. Of course, close proximity alone can not accomplish anything. Without leveling the economic progress between groups, interest calculation can always be the cause of division, as truthfully projected in the black-white paradigm in the United States.

The President's call for a dialogue between racial groups in this country

is certainly a constructive measure toward eliminating prejudice. Let people get to know the majority members of other groups, and not settle for partial images. But equally important is to advance the economic status of minority groups. With or without the Affirmative Action programs, any policy that encourages the underprivileged groups to get ahead is a valuable contribution to better race relations.

Appendix A Merger of Precincts to Census Geography

The Institution of Government Studies provides the following documentation on the procedure of merging precincts to census geography.

1. Geocoding of Registered Voter files.

All registered voter files are geocoded against the TIGER files. As geocoding puts the census geography on an individual address and this address also has a registration precinct on it, this allows the creation of a registration precinct to census geography equivalency file. If every address on the registered voter file could be placed in census geography, then a complete equivalency table could be built up. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Thus, two further steps are necessary.

2. Geographical Representations of Registration Precincts.

The other method of obtaining precinct to census equivalencies is through mapping the registration precincts onto the census geography directly. One can

always (assuming one has the precinct maps) create an equivalency this way. For the 1992 General elections, the geographical mapping program utilized required the use of whole blocks in making assignments to the precincts.

3. Assignment of blocks to Registration Precincts.

This allows the assigning of blocks to precincts independent of TIGER or geographical representation, and is useful primarily when the geographical representation (which was required to follow block boundaries) is not an accurate representation of the actual boundaries. This split is then handled by a statistical assignment procedure (see below).

4. Balancing (assignment of split census blocks).

The primary difficulty is when a precinct splits a census block into two or more sections, as it is then indeterminate how many registered voters live in each section. This can be handled either by geographical estimation or statistical estimation (statistical is used in this process). The statistical procedure is designed to allocate registered voters which have been left unassigned to census geography by geo-coding the blocks in such a manner as to equate expected registration with actual registration (the expected registration is also an estimate). This problem is formulated as a linear programming problem and is run through multiple iterations to achieve the final result.

5. Merger of Registration data to Census Geography.

The <tt>RB##AD%%.TYR</tt> file is a precinct to block conversion file constructed by the methods described in 1, 2, 3 and 4. The precincts here are RR type precincts. For registered voters assigned to a particular block through geocoding, the derived registration data is assigned directly to that block.

For registered voters assigned through the balancing procedure, a straight breakdown of the derived registration data proportional to the number of registered voters assigned through the balancing procedure is made. This algorithm could be improved upon by conditioning on the characteristics of the individuals in that block.

6. Merger of Statement of Vote Data to Census Geography.

The RB##AD%%.TYR files are merged to the level of the final consolidation precincts using the SR##AD%%.TYR file. SOV data is then merged to block using this merged file. A straight proportional merge is made using as a breakdown the proportion of voters assigned to each block. Note that a more accurate methodology would be to calculate the estimated proportion of each type of voter in each block voting for a particular race and adjusting by this percent.

The calculation of these proportions is a difficult theoretical problem which we believe we have solved, but this solution, if indeed it is a solution, has not been tested at the level necessary to implement it.

Absentee precincts are not in general merged to the block level unless the absentee precinct results are reported at the level of the registration precinct (counties such as San Francisco and Monterey are reported that way, for example). Thus, areas (primarily in rural, sparsely populated areas) where the election results are collapsed into a larger absentee precinct (usually at the level of the ballot group) will not have any election results reported for them. The number of these areas is relatively small.

The above documentation can be found at `http://www.igs-ucb.caltech.edu/igs/documentation/merge/sscmrg.html`.

Bibliography

[1] Achen, Christopher H. and W. Phillips Shively. 1995. *Cross-Level Inference.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[2] Adorno, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[3] Alexander, J., Giesen, B. Giesen, R. Munch, and N. Smelser, (eds). 1987. *The Micro-Macro Link.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[4] Alford, John R. and Jerome S. Legge Jr. 1984. "Economic Conditions and Individual Vote in the Federal Republic of Germany." *Journal of Politics* 46:1168-81.

[5] Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.

[6] Alvarez, R. Michael and Tara Butterfield. 1997. "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration." Manuscript, Caltech.

[7] Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 1997. "Are American Ambivalence Toward Racial Policies?" *American Journal of Political Science.* 41:345-374.

[8] Ansolabehere, Stephen and Douglas Rivers. 1994. "Bias in Ecological Regression Estimates." unpublished paper, MIT.

[9] Apter, David E., ed. 1964. *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: The Free Press.

[10] Binder, Norman E., J. L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. 1997. "Mexican American and Anglo Attitudes toward Immigration Reform: A View from the Border." *Social Science Quarterly.* 78:325-337.

[11] Black, Earl and Merle Black. 1987. *Politics and Society in the South.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

[12] Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[13] Blalock, Hubert M. 1984. "Contextual-effects Models: Theoretical and Methodological Issues." in *Annual Review of Sociology* 32:127-36.

[14] Bobo, Lawrence. 1983. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46: 1196-1210.

[15] Bobo, Lawrence. 1988. "Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes." In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy,* ed. Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor. New York: Plenum Press.

[16] Bobo, Lawrence. 1991. "Social Responsibility, Individualism, and Redistributive Policies." *Sociological Forum* 6:71-92.

[17] Bobo, Lawrence and James R. Kluegel. 1993. "Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitude." *American Sociological Review* 58:443-464.

[18] Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan. 1994. "Economic Conditions and Voting on Ballot Propositions." *American Politics Quarterly* 22: 27-40.

[19] Brace, Paul. 1991 "The Changing Contest of State Political Economy." *Journal of Politics* 53: 297-317.

[20] Brewer, Marilynn B. and Roderick M. Kramer. 1985. "The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior." *Annual Reviews and Psychology* 36:219-243.

[21] Brodsky, David M. and Edward Thompson III. 1993. "Ethos, Public Choice, and Referendum Voting." *Social Science Quarterly* 74: 286-299.

[22] Browning, Rufus, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb. 1984. *Protest is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Latinos.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[23] Caditz, Judith. 1976. *White Liberals in Transition: Current Dilemmas of Ethnic Integration.* New York: Spectrum Books.

[24] Cain, Bruce. 1992. "Voting Rights and Democracy Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society?" In *Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective,* ed. Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

[25] Cain, Bruce and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1985. "Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional district." *Social Science Quarterly* 65:315-27.

[26] Cain, Bruce and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1986. "California's Coming Minority Majority." *Public Opinion* 48:50-52.

[27] Cain, Bruce, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner. 1991. "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Journal of Political Science* 35:390-422.

[28] Cain, Bruce and Ken McCue. 1985. "The Efficacy of Registration Drives." *The Journal of Politics* 47:1221-1230.

[29] Campbell, Donald T. and Robert A. LeVine. 1965. "Propositions about Ethnocentrism from Social Science Theories." Mimeographed.

[30] Campbell, Donald T. and Robert A. LeVine. 1968. "Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Relations." In *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source Book,* ed. R. P. Abelson et al. Chicago: Rand McNally.

[31] Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[32] Carmines, Edward G. and Richard A. Champagne, Jr. 1990. "The Changing Content of American Racial Attitudes: A Fifty Year Portrait." in *Research in Micropolitics,* ed. Samuel Long. Greenwich: JAI Press.

[33] Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power.* New York: Random House.

[34] Castles, Stephen and Godula Kosack. 1985. *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

[35] Charnock, David. 1996. "National Uniformity, and State and Local Effects on Australian Voting: A Multilevel Approach." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 31:51-65.

[36] Citrin, Jack and Donald Philip Green. 1990. "The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion." In *Research in Micropolitics,* ed. Samuel Long. Greenwich: JAI Press.

[37] Converse, Jean M. and Stanley Presser. 1986. *Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized Questionnaire.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

[38] Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press.

[39] Coser, Lewis. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict.* New York: Free Press.

[40] Cronin, Thomas E. 1989.*Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[41] Cross, Harry E. and James A. Sandos. 1981. *Across the Border: Rural Development in Mexico and Recent Migration to the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[42] Cummings, Scott. 1980. "White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice, and Labor Market Segmentation." *American Journal of Sociology* 85:938-958.

[43] Cummings, Scott and Thomas Lambert. 1997. "Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments among African Americans." *Social Science Quarterly* 78:339-353.

[44] Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

[45] Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

[46] Fireman B. and W. A. Gamson. 1979. "Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective." In *The Dynamics of Social Movements,* ed. M.N. Zald and J. D. Mc Carthey. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.

[47] Frendreis, John, and Raymond Tatalovich. 1997. "Who Supports English-Only Language Laws? Evidence from the 1992 national Election Study." *Social Science Quarterly* 78:355-368.

[48] Gabriel, Richard. 1972. "A New Theory of Ethnic Voting." *Polity* 4: 405-28.

[49] Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1994. "A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans," *American Journal of Political Science,* 38: 514-554.

[50] Giles, Michael W. 1977. "Percent Black and Racial Hostility: An Old Assumption Revisited." *Social Science Quarterly* 58:412-417.

[51] Giles, Michael W. and Arther Evans. 1984. "External Threat, Perceived Threat, and Group Identity." *Social Science Quarterly* 65:50-66.

[52] Giles, Micheal W. and Arthur Evans. 1986. "The Power Approach to Intergroup Hostility." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30:469-486.

[53] Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Arthur Lupia. 1995. "Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections," *Political Behavior* 17: 287-306.

[54] Giles, Micheal W. and Melanie A. Buckner. 1993. "David Duke and the Black Threat." *Journal of Politics* 55:702-13.

[55] Giles, Micheal W. and Kaenan Hertz. 1994. "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification." *American Political Science Review* 88:317-26.

[56] Gilliam, Frank. 1987. "Race, Class, and Mass Attitudes: An Ethclass Interpretation." Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association.

[57] Glasser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *Journal of Politics* 56:21-41.

[58] Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1970. *Beyond the Melting Pot.* 2d ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.

[59] Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[60] Goodman, Leo. 1953. "Ecological Regressions and the Behavior of Individuals." *American Sociological Review* 18: 663-666.

[61] Gordon, Milton. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life.* New York: Oxford University Press.

[62] Greeley, Andrew M. 1971. *Why Can't They Be Like Us?* New York: E. P. Dutton.

[63] Green, Donald P. and Jonathan A. Cowden. 1992. "Who Protests: Self-Interest and White Opposition to Busing." *The Journal of Politics* 54: 471-496.

[64] Greene, William H. 1993. *Econometric Analysis*, 2d Edition. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company.

[65] Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. 1985. "The 'Totality of Circumstances' Test in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective." *Low and Policy* 7: 209-223.

[66] Guerin-Gonzales, Camille. 1994. *Mexican Workers and American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and California Farm Labor, 1900-1939.* Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, New Jersey.

[67] Guimond, Serge and Lise Dube-Simard. 1983. "Relative Deprivation Theory and the Quebec Nationalist Movement: The cognition-Emotion Distinction and the Personal-Group Deprivation issue." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44:526-535.

[68] Hahn, Harlan, ed.. 1972. *People and Politics in Urban Society.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.

[69] Harris, Joseph P. 1955. *California Politics.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[70] Hirschman, Albert. 1977. *The Passions and the Interests.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[71] Hood, M. V. III, and Irwin L. Morris. 1997. "Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration." *Socail Science Quarterly* 78:309-323.

[72] Hoskin, Marilyn. 1991. *New Immigrants and Democratic Society.* New York: Praeger.

[73] Howell, Susan E. and James M. Vanderleeuw. 1990 "Economic effects on state governors," *American Politics Quarterly* 18:158-68.

[74] Huber, Joan. ed. 1991. *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology.* Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

[75] Huber, Joan and William H. Form. 1973. *Income and Ideology: An Analysis of the American Political Formula.* New York: The Free Press.

[76] Jackman, Mary and M. Crane. 1986. "Some of My Best Friends Are Black ...: Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50:459-486.

[77] Jackman, Mary R. and Robert W. Jackman. 1983. *Class Awareness in the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[78] Jackson, Byran O. and Michael B. Preston, ed. 1991 *Racial and Ethnic Politics in California.* Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies.

[79] Jackson, Byran O., Elisabeth R. Gerber, and Bruce E. Cain. 1994. "Coalitional Prospects in a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes Toward Other Minority Groups." *Political Research Quarterly* 1994:277-295.

[80] Jacobson, C. K. 1985. "Resistance to Affirmative Action: Self-interest or Racism?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29:306-329.

[81] Kelley, J. and McAllister, I. 1985. "Social Context and Electoral Behavior in Britain." *American Journal of Political Science* 29:564-86.

[82] Key, V. O. and Winston W. Crouch. 1939 *The Initiative and the Referendum in California.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[83] Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[84] Kinder, Donald R. and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40: 414-431

[85] Kinder, Donald R. and L. Sanders. 1986. "Survey Questions and Political Sulture." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

[86] Kinder, Donald R. and Tali Mendelberg. 1995. "Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites." *Journal of Politics* 57:402-424.

[87] King, Gary. 1997. *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[88] Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith. 1983. "Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views." *Social Forces* 61:7978-824.

[89] Knight, Kathleen. 1990. "Ideology and Public Opinion." in *Research in Micropolitics,* ed. Samuel Long. Greenwich: JAI Press.

[90] Kousser, J. Morgan. 1973. "Ecological Regression and Analysis of Past Politics," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* IV(2): 237-262.

[91] Kousser, J. Morgan. 1993. "A Generation of Ecological Regression: A Survey and Synthesis," unpublished paper, California Institute of Technology.

[92] Kuklinski, James H., Paul M. Sniderman, Kathleen Knight, Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tetlock, Gordon R. Lawrence, and Barbara Mellers. 1997. "Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:402-419.

[93] Lee, Eugene C. 1960 *The Politics of Nonpartisanship.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

[94] Legge, Jerome S. Jr. 1996. "Antiforeign Sentiment in Germany: Power Theory versus Symbolic Explanations of Prejudice." *The Jounal of Politics* 58:516-527.

[95] Little, Roderick J. A. and Donald B. Rubin. 1987. *Statistical Analysis with Missing Data.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[96] MacKuan, M. and Brown, C. 1987. "Political Context and Attitude Change." *American Political Science Review* 81:471-90.

[97] Magleby, David B. 1984. *Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[98] Mansbridge, Jane J. 1990. "The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life." In *Beyond Self-Interest,* ed. Jane J. Mansbridge. Chicago: The University of Chicago press.

[99] Markus, G. E. 1979. "The Political Environment and the Dynamics of Public Attitudes: A Panel Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 23:338-359.

[100] McAllister, I. 1987. "Social Context, Turnout and the Vote: Australian and British Comparisons." *Political Geography Quarterly* 6: 17-30.

[101] McClendon, McKee J. 1985. "Racism, Rational Choice, and White Opposition to Racial Change: A Case Study of Busing." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49:214-233.

[102] McClendon, McKee J. and Fred P. Pestello. 1983. "Self-interest and Public Policy Attitude Formation: Busing for School Desegregation." *Sociological Focus* 16:1-12.

[103] McConahay, John B. 1982. "Self-Interest versus Racial Attitudes as Correlates of Anti-Busing Attitudes in Louisville: Is It Buses or the Blacks?" *Journal of Politics* 44:692-720.

[104] McConahay, John B. 1986. "Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale." In *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism,* ed. John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner. San Diego: Academic Press.

[105] McCohahay, John B., B. Hardee, and V. Batts. 1981. "Has Racism Declined in America? It Depends Upon Who's Asking and What is Asked." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25:563-579.

[106] Nazario, Sonia, "Natives, Newcomers at Odds in East L.A." *Los Angeles Times,* 4 March 1996, sec. M.

[107] Nelson, Dale C. 1979. "Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* 73: 1024-38.

[108] Noel, D. and A. Pinkney. 1964. "Correlates of Prejudice: Social Desirability and Self-report." *Psychological Bulletin* 67:273-293.

[109] Palmquist, Bradley L. 1994. "Respecification Approaches to Ecological Inference: A Comparison of Control Variables and the Quadratic Model." Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York.

[110] Prais, S. J. and J. Aitchison. 1954. "The Grouping of Observations in Regression Analysis." *Review of the International Institute of Statistics* 22: 1-22.

[111] Pettigrew, T. F. 1982. "Prejudice." In *Dimensions of Ethnicity: Prejudice,* ed. S. Thernstrom, A. Orlov, and O. Handlin.

[112] Pomper, Gerald M. 1966 "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30: 79-97.

[113] Quinn, Arthur. 1997. *The Rivals: William Gwin, David Broderick, and the Birth of California.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

[114] Rae, Douglas, Doug Yates, Jennifer Hochschild, Joseph Morome, and Carol Fessler. 1981. *Equalities.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[115] Ratnesar, Romesh. 1997. "The Next Big Divide?" *Times Magazine,* 1 December, 1997.

[116] Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 74:432-446.

[117] Rudwick, Elliot. 1964. *Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917.* New York: Pergamon Press.

[118] Robinson, William S. 1950. "Ecological Correlation and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review* 15:351-57.

[119] Schuman, Howard and Stanley Presser. 1981. *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys.* Orlando: Academic Press.

[120] Sears, David O. and Donald R. Kinder. 1971. "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles." In *Los Angeles: Viability andProspects for Metropolitan Leadership,* ed. Werner Z. Hirsch. New York: Praeger.

[121] Sears, David O., Carl P. Hensier, and Leslie K. Speer. 1979. "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?" *American Political Science Review* 73:369-84.

[122] Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Aleen, Jr. 1980. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 74: 670-684.

[123] Sears, David O. and Jack Citrin. 1982. *Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[124] Sears, David O. and Donald R. Kinder. 1985. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: On Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Group Conflict," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48:1141-1147.

[125] Sears, David O. 1988. "Symbolic Racism." In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy,* ed. Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor. New York: Plenum Press.

[126] Senator: The Electoral Consequences of Federalism," *Journal of Politics* 52: 29-53.

[127] Shamir, M. and J. L. Sullivan. 1983. "The Political Content of Tolerance: The United States and Isreal." *American Political Science Review* 77:911-928.

[128] Shipiro, Robert Y. and John T. Young. 1990. "Public Opinion Toward Social Welfare Policies: The United States in Comparative Perspective." in *Research in Micropolitics,* ed. Samuel Long. Greenwich: JAI Press.

[129] Simon, Rita J. 1985. *Public Opinion and the Immigrant.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

[130] Simon, Julian L. 1989 *The Economic Consequences of Immigration.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.

[131] Simon, Dennis M., Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. and Robin F. Marra. 1991. "The President. Referendum Voting, and Subnational Elections in the United States," *American Political Science Review* 85:1177-92.

[132] Simpson, George E. and J. M. Yinger. 1972. *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination.* New York: Harper and Row.

[133] Sitkoff, Harvard. 1981. *The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1980.* New York: Hill and Wang.

[134] Smith, A. W. 1981. "Racial Tolerance as a Function of Group Position." *American Sociological Review* 46:558-573.

[135] Sniderman, Paul M. and Philip E. Tetlock. 1986. "Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis." *Journal of Social Issues* 42:129-150.

[136] Sniderman, Paul M. and Philip E. Tetlock. 1986. "Reflections on American Racism." *Journal of Social Issues* 42:173-187.

[137] Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[138] Takaki, Ronald. 1979. *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th Century America.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.

[139] Tam, Wendy. 1997. Iff the Assumptions Fit.... Manuscript: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

[140] Tolbert, Caroline J. and Rodney E. Hero. 1996. "Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California's Illegal Immigration Initiative." *The Journal of Politics* 58:806-818.

[141] Triandis, Harry C. 1971. *Attitude and Attitude Change.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[142] Uhlaner, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s." *Political Behavior* 11:195-231.

[143] Waldinger, Roger. 1996. "Los Angeles and Its Immigrants." Manuscript.

[144] Wellman, David T. 1977. *Portraits of White Racism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

[145] Wilson, William J. 1973. *Power, Racism, and Privilege: Race Relations in Theoretical and Sociohistorical Perspectives.* New York: MacMillan.

[146] Wilson, William J. 1978. *The Declining Significance of Race.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

[147] Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1965 "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting." *American Political Science Review* 59: 896-908.

[148] Wood, Jeremy. 1994. "Is 'Symbolic Racism' Racism?: A Review informed by Intergroup Behavior." *Political Psychology* 15: 673-86.

[149] Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[150] Zaller, John R. and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 579-616.